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ABSTRACT 
The present study 1s a modest attempt to analyse 
industrial location in Sudan, and to explain existing location 
patterns and industrial localization. Future industrial 
location trends are examined in the light of past and present 
development. 
The commitment to non-industrialisation in Sudan during 
i 
the colonial regime has had a pronounced impact on the post-
independence spatial distribution of industry. Thus investment 
policies and development in the pre-independence period are 
investigated. with reference to the set objectives and prevailing 
opportunities in Chapter Two. Private capital investment was 
insignificant compared with the public sector which was under-
taking 'commercial plantation' and infrastru.ctural capital outlay. 
However, business and trade was the domain ·of private entrepren-
eurship. Public and private sectors were nonetheless co~lementary 
to each other and their activities were co~ordinated in what is 
termed the 'charter government system'. StYQctural transformation 
~nd economic growth· (Chapter Three) is seen as a manifestation 
of this co-ordination and partnership. Planned non-industrialisa-
tion, 'growth thro~gh trade', and primary export base are all 
attributed to the development endeavour of this period. An 
industri:~l location theory specific to developing countries is 
. . 
expounded in the Prime Base theory (Chapter Four). Localization 
of industry according to this theory seems inevitable in many 
other prime bases of developing countries. 
In the second part, Sudan's industrial activity is i·nvesti-
gated within the context of contemporary urban and regional develop-
ment. In Chapter Five the spatial organisation of the 
industrial activity in the Prime Base is analysed in so.:ne 
detail, and the regional distribution and pattern of industry 
in Sudan is examined in Chapter Six. The emergence of 
secondary bases is seen as part of the economic process, and 
co:1ld be developed to realise industrial region ali sation. 
Chapter Seven is a case study of cotton-seed oil to test 
existing localization as against the 'theoretical optim~m' 
according to classical location theory. Chapter Eight analyses 
human and natural resources in relation to regional development 
and future prospects for industrial location •. So.:ne suggestions 
are offered, and policy issues are raised in the concluding 
remarks. 
ii 
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1. Bahri. 
GLOSSARY 
Although the English translation of the official 
name is Khartoum ~orth, the local name of Khartoum 
Bahri is preferred in this study. Consequently, 
the widely used shorthand of Bahri is adopted. 
2. Basic and non-basic industries. Basic industry refers to 
those industries that serve nationwide and overseas 
.• markets, while non-basic industries are confined 
to local markets. (p.201) 
3. Charter Government. The term refers to the assimilation 
of the functions of the charter government system 
where by a functional di vision and syndication is 
made between public and private sectors during 
colonial regimes. (p. 39) 
4. Industry. Refers to power driven, mechanical operations 
for the manufacture of consumer and capital goods 
as distinct from cottage industry. In this research 
consideration is confined to establishments of 30 
or more workers. (p.7) 
5· Prime Base. The centre of gravity of industrial and 
commercial life as expressed in the diversity and 
disproportionately large number of factories, 
workers, capital outlay and value added. In the case 
of Sudan it refers to the tripartite capital of 
Khartoum, Omdurman and Bahri. (p.101) 
xvi 
6. Profit on cost to Store. Denotes the practice of 
calculating profit on basic cost plus an extra 
profit on costs of transportation, insurance 
and excise duties to the main depots at the 
Prime Base. (p.120) 
7. One-factory industry. Industries that are established 
in isolation from other industrial activities. 
These are generally regional public enterprises 
that process local raw material. (p.203) 
8. Mercedes map. A cartographic device that makes it 
possible to represent simultaneously data on 
a percentage scale for three variables in such 
a way that each variable is observed individually 
and in relation to the other two variables. (p.207) 
9. Shadow-entrepreneurs. A concep~ coined to describe business-
men and traders who were in command of the distri-
bution channels and foreign trade before the 
advent of industry. Later~ when industry was 
developed, this credit-worthy group was in a 
better position to invest in industry. (p.131) 
10. Thumb-forefinger growth zone._ An area defined by the two 
tips of Khartoum and Port Sudan, and the broad 
base of Ko sti-Sennar, with 'joints' such as Medani, 
Hassaheisa, Gedarif and Kassala. This area 
possesses the essentials of economic growth and 
xvii 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Theme and Approach 
This thesis deals with a specific problem of industrial 
develovment: industrial location. Probing the extensive literature 
on development inevitably disappoints the student of industrial 
geography, particul~rly the striking paucity of published 
material on industrial location in Sudan. Even the limited acad.emic 
c.ontributions available are often presented from the perspective 
of economists with an innate bias against spatial dimensions, and 
preconceived ideas often blurred by the wholesaie adoption of 
existing industrial location models. The task of planners in 
'developing' countries is thus hampered by insufficient knowledge. 
Their wbrk in facing the challenges of rapid econo:Jlic change, the 
problem of·urban growth, and widening regional disparities is also 
impeded by having to cope with everyday details at the local level. 
Nor are there adequate planning strategies available at national 
level on which industrial location planning can be·based. It is 
hoped that the present study will fill some of the gaps in know-
ledge and provide a fresh basis for rational planning strategies 
by offering a new explanation for the process of polarisation, . 
. ·especially industry, and propounding a conceptual and methodological 
framework against which relevant Sudanese projects may be tested. 
The endeavour is by no means easy,. and arguably there istoo little 
industry and insufficient industrial diversity in Sudan to warrant 
a specialised study with such ambitious goals. Indeed industry in 
mo.st 'developing' countries is of recent origin, and contributes 
I· 
marginally to the ,gross domestic product (GDP).* However, 
industry is neither negative in its spatial impact, nor laggard 
in growth rate relative to other sectors of the economy, and it 
presents considerable scope for future development. 
The most obvious characteristic of industrial development 
in many . 'developing' co"'..lntries is the sheer spatial concentration 
of 'basip' private industry serving the market at the national 
scale.· This fact has often been observed, yet unsatisfactory 
explanations are frequently preferred in terms of an 'undifferen-
( 12 
tiated list of "fa:vourable location factors"', Ci.e. markets, 
capital, labour, t'ran-sportation and land.). The immediate ques-
tions to be asked will be related to the mechanisms that under-
pinned the colonial system rtJi th its centralised 'charter govern-
ment' , export-import ·trade, a centralised servi·c·e sector, and 
comrnodi ty flow system. In turn, these a;e related to, and deter-
rrri.nants o.{ socio-economic structures, sectoral growth and the 
.. 
who1e process of change • Thus the purpose of the first part of 
. ·. 
2 
this thesis :l.s to cou.ch in. essentiall~ spatial terms the aggregate 
economic process insofar as it shapes the industrial location milieu. 
The,.se processes as interpreted by an essentially historic approac.:h 
in Chapters Two and Three, may be questioned by those who pre.fer · 
strictly econo:;nic. interpretations. 
Historic. events are relevant in a variety of ways. For 
instance, the concomitant growth of industry and urbanisation in 
Western Europe arid North America is an historical development not 
experienced in 'deve,loping' countries. Instead, urban gro·...rth and 
sectoral development both proceeded in complete isolation from 
*Abou.t 10-12 per cent in the case of Sudan(1979). 
industrialisation. Thus the identification of this disparity 
and the processes associated with it, is an integral part of 
the inquiry into industrial location. In fact, our starting 
point is that industry in the case of Sudan was retarded by 
the development policies adopted, and the economic system 
fostered during the first half of this century. Capital invest-
ment looms large in this respect, since a distinct linkage between 
availability of capital, sectoral priorities, and decision-making 
invariably contributes to the creation of the economic system 
and induces specific structural changes. Within this qystem an 
exPosition of the economic processes and their collective inter-
actions is fundamental, as they all intertwine with the capacity 
of the production system, and marginal surplus thereof created. 
Throughout these formative developments, industry was either 
suppressed, discouraged or appeared less remunerative. The seeds 
of industrial localization are sown in this disparity, a· situation 
unique to territories we call 'developing' countries, and renders 
irrelevant classical general location theory. Equally important 
areas to inyestigate in our bid to explain industrial localization 
are the laws that nurse the economic systems and sub-systems. 
Rejecting the prescribed location factors immediately calls for 
a new alternative; the Prime Base theory,* to piece together 
specific economic interactions, socio-economic change, and the 
accompanying structural and organisational change. 
The approach is primarily inter-disciplinary, combining the 
spatial preoccupation of geographers, the abstraction of economic 
theory, the insights of economic history and the empiricism of 
* This theory attempts to explain the high degree of industrial 
localization in the heart land of many 'developing' countries, 
in the case. of Sudan the tripartite capital of Khartoum, Bahri 
and Omdurman. See Chapter li'our for fuller definition. 
3 
' \ 
social-anthropology. Regional planning, development theory 
and urbanisation are also freely transgressed, though with a 
keen awareness of the pitfalls of being master of none. Concepts 
such.as 'shadow entrepreneurs', 'new wants'; and 'thumb-forefinger 
growth zones' are introduced to describe socio-economic relations, 
and gauge. their spatial influences. At the same time coefficients 
depicting tP,e geographical association and location quotients are 
deployed to aid the industrial location analysis of structures, 
patterns and distribution. It is hoped that these techniques, in 
combination with correlation analysis and the historic realities 
of the whole economic system will go beyond the conventional geo-
graphic-concern of depicting Man's imprint on the earth's surface 
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to concern with deci.sions that create distributional mosaics and 
·rem6uld activity patterns. Although unusual in industrial geography, 
it proved possible to use three variables; empl·oyment, paid-up 
capita~ and gross value added at the urban and regional levels 
in this study. However, this only applies to industries employing 
30 or more workers. Naturally, industrial structures are more 
developed in the Prime Base than anywhere else, where there is 
' ' ' ' ' . 
diversity of sub~groups and, indeed, the highest degree of indus-· 
trial concentration. On some of the above variables the Prime Base 
·share may often amount to two-thirds of the country's industry. In 
terms. of profitability margins and transfer cost, the localisation 
of 'basic I private ~ndustry in Sudan is almost inevitable under 
present conditions and the grip of the past development _rhythm. 
Further, 'it could deductively be construed that the economic system 
and structure has a spatial impact on regional inequality and 
ultimately the concentration of industry in the Prime Base. In 
the few cases where an industry does not comply with thispattern, 
a complementary least-cost model is engaged :to measure against 
. \ 
locational optimality. The procedure is successfully applied 
to the cotton-seed industry (Chapter Seven) to portray the hiatus 
between actual localisation and optimum least-transfer-cost loca-
. . 
t:lon. 
Altho-q.gh it is absurd to speak about the locational dynamics 
of industry at the present stage of development in developing 
cou,.ntries, there are bound to be some modifications to the spatial 
milieu of the. indu~trial activity in the not too distant future. 
~· 
_The multi-million poundt investment programme adopted by the 
Sudanese government in 1976 to promote the public industrial enter-
prise, Joresh.adows rapid changes which will inevitably affect 
present industrial localisation. It is anticipated that a 'thumb-
forefinger' growth zone will develop to include the Prime Base, 
. . . 
the G~'zira, ·and the fertile· eastern portion of the country to a 
point defined by Port Sudan. In this growth zone, industrial inter-
linkages and integrated proce.sses will take place. However, this 
will in·. ~ore than one way consolidate the pre-eminence and struc-
tural. diversity of the Prime Base through inter-linkages and 
scale economies, especially of agglomeration. 
1.2 Data Sources 
Much of the data used in this study is. obtained from official 
unpublished documents, historical documents, research publications 
(incl'lldin·g U.N. publications), and personal experience in the 
Ministry of Industry, Sudan. · 
1.2.1.1 Official Unpublished Documents 
(i) The Industrial Survey, Sudan, 1970( 2) 
The first comprehensive industrial survey conducted in Sudan 
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was executed by the Industrial Development Centre for Arab 
States (IDCAS), sponsored and supervised by t~e Sudan Government 
in 1969/70. · Three volumes resulted from this intensive survey. 
Volume Two is of ~ecial interest to this study. It gives 
.detailed data on classified industries, on variables including 
the location of industry, numbers of workers, paid-up capital, 
gross vahie~a.dded, production cost and wages and salaries. The 
. . 
classification of industries is broadly based on the International 
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC ). In this thesis slight 
modifications are introduced, and referred to in the text with 
the abbreviation (SIC m) to suit the industrial structure.of a 
'developing' country. ·For example, Footwear and Leather - includ-
ing plastic footwear - (Group III) is classified as a separate 
major group from Standard Textile Industri~s used in ISIC. To 
this lat:te:r·group ginning is added. Some sub-groups are also re-
arranged· such as metal furniture which .is annexed to Metals and 
Electrical Industries (SIC m Group VI). 
As expected; the Industrial Survey does not escape obvious 
shortcomings as it contains some impressions and displays· some 
oversights; these are detailed at appropriate points in the thesis. 
However, the basic problem related to this study is the neglect 
of some industries such as cotton ginning and other regional 
industries. Furthermore·, the criterion of. '30 and above' workers 
. is only adopted for industries in the Khartoum conurbation. The 
cut-off limit for regional industries is (100 and over' workers.) 
This obvious inconsistency is mitigated by including data for 
regional industries collected by tm Statistics Department, 1970, 
and processed and tabulated by the Min:hstry of Industry in liaison 
with IDCAS~ Consequently, it is possible. to reproduce a uniform 
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set of data for the whole co~ntry's industry. Appropriately, 
industry in this study refers to power driven, mechanical 
operations for the manufacture of consumer and capital goods, 
as distinct from cottage industries.* 
(ii) Report on Productivity, Managerial and Technical . 
Development of Vegetable Qll Industries in Sudan, 
1970. ( 3) 
This survey was also conducted by IDCAS on behalf of the 
Sudan government in1970, and forms the basic source for the case 
study (Chapter Seven). 
(iii) The Second Population Census (Preliminary Results) 
Sudan, 1973. (4) 
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For the first time it is possible to conduct an inter-censal 
comparison, especially on urban growth. However, the figures 
obtained are mere tabulations as issued by the Statistics Department. 
As a supplement, The Reconstruction of Provincial Bo:.mdaries Project, 
Local Government, Khartoum, 1974,(5) garners a.wealth of statistical 
information on population and regional resources, based on the 
Secopd Population Census. 
1. 2.1 .2 Government Documents 
C~rent and recent government documents are varied and pro-
lific. They include ministerial publications such as annual reports, 
periodicals and bulletins. 1!npublished data collected in the 
l"'ini.stry of Industry include internal memoranda, files and expert 
reports. ·Also reports by the Comm.i ssion for the Evaluation of the 
Public Industrial Enterprise, 1969,( 6 ) and files on individual 
* Saw milling ip excluded because of lack of consistent and 
reliable data. 
public enterprise industries prepared by the Industrial Develop-
ment Corporation (IDC), form a general background for the analysis 
of this sector. These are also supplemented by speciali$ed studies 
prepared .by the Com.mttee for the Evaluation of the prospects of 
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(7) 
Nationalised and Confiscated Enterprises, Sudan, 192.Q (Two volumes). 
The Household Sample Survey, 1967/68, published by the Statistics 
Department.i·s a basic source, still to be updated.C 8 ) The Annual 
Reports issued by the Ministry of Planning and Bank of Sudan are 
established informative sources recurrently referred to. Lastly, 
various conference papers are consul ted especially tP,ose related 
to industrial and economic development. The School of Extra-Mural 
Studies, University of Khartoum, ranks high in this respect. (9) 
1. 2. 2 Historical Documents 
(i) .. Personal correspondence 
The archives of the Durham School of Oriental Studies are 
sto eked ·with in valuable manuscripts and documents on Sudan, e spec-
ially the.critical period of colonial rule (1898-1955). Private 
correspondence of the personnel of the Sudan Political Service, 
particularly 'Wingate's papers' make up indispensable evidence of 
how the economy of Sudan was planned and managed. This is also 
Public 
supplemented by documents in the/Record Office, London, and un-
published theses and typescripts. 
(ii) . Reports, Memoranda and Policy Papers 
In.~ddition, there is available a large. collection of official 
reports, memoranda and policy papers. Of specific interest are 
those. relat.ed to the Gezira Scheme, internal migration, reports on 
the economy .by the Intelligence Branch, ('10) the Sudan Gazette('1'1) 
and Foreign Trade Statistics. ('1 2 ) 
1.2;3. Research Studies 
Location theory is a field of great challenge and unflagging 
interest. As with all social sciences, the problem of continuous 
' ' 
change in socio-economic conditions poses serious limitations and 
invariably renders workable models difficult to come by. However, 
a handful of general location theories both in economics and geo-
graphy are e~lored to evaluate the progressive development of 
locational thought since the seminal work of Alfred Weber, ( '13). and 
the expositions of 1'1. Greenhut, ( 14 ) E. Ho·6ver, ( '15) A. LB sch, ( 16) 
W. Izard, ( 1 7) and the recent works of P. Hagg~tt, (18 ) D. Smith('19) 
and L .. Collins. ( 20 ) 1'19-,jor texts will be critically reviewed at 
appropriate places in this study. Studies in related disciplines 
are extensively consulted. In regional sciences and urban studies 
J. Friedmann,C 21 ) w. Alonso,C 22 ) A. Pred,C 23) and B. Berry( 24 ) are 
among the most pr.or!linent. The Latin America School was closely 
considered, especially C. Furtado( 25) and A. Frank, ( 26 ) while 
. . . . . 
A. Lewis,·( 27) G. l"'yrdal, ( 28 ) J. Galbraith( 29) 'and H. Brookfield(30) 
·. ,. ,_ . ' . . 
served as a general background to development theory. On inter-
national trade Bo Sadersten(3'1) and G. Haberler(32 ) and critically 
examined. A. Beshai ( 33) ·covers broad ground on Sudan's foreign 
trade; and. is. considered an important reference. 
1.2.4 Publications of U.N. Agencies 
Regional, inter-regional and intra-regional studies prepared 
b.Y specialised U.N. agencies are progressively'becoming a virtually 
in.e~austible source of specialised information. An example specific 
to Sudan is the I.L.O's study: Growth, Employment and Equity: a 
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comprehensive strategy for the Sudan, 1976. (34) Sinp.larly, the 
I.B.R.D. report on The Economic Development and Pro\gpects of the 
Sudan (Four volumes), 1972.(35) Also the voluminous study of the 
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD); A Basic 
Programme for the Development of Agricultural Sector of the Demo-
. g_raphic Republic of the Sudan, 1976-·1985 (Five volumes). (36 ) Other 
publicat:Lons by United Nations Industrial Development Organisation 
(UNIDO), and United Nations .Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 
include seminars, sympo·sia and workshops on industrial location 
and industr:l.al development in 'developing' countries. Of particular 
relevance is the U.N. Manual on Economic Development Projects, 
1928,(37). used as a reference for the socio-economic evaluations 
of productiVity of single variables and productivity coefficients. 
1. 2. 5 . Persona~ E?g?eri ence 
As an industrial inspector in the Ministry of Industry, Sudan, 
the authqr had the opportunity of encounterin.g many of the teething 
problems .of a nascent private industry, and participated in the 
onus Enxpe~visionar] task. This provided a working knowledge of 
. . . 
the industrial organisation in Sudan, an insight into many facets 
of industry in a 'developing' co~ntry, and a window on African 
and Middle Eastern industries through regional and international 
conferences. and seminars. Yet more, this post acted as a lever 
that facilitated access to invaluable confidential materials. An 
. . . 
interesting example is the decoding list of the names of the 
industries in the Industrial Survey. However, for ethical reasons· 
the name$ were left undeciphered although inner-perception was 
gained from.this knowledge. 
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1. 3 Statistical Techniques 
Statistical techniques are used sparingly. This is possibly 
·a reaction to the feverish adoption of stati f.tic s in the geography 
of the 1970's. The author is a self-confessed· sub-optimal practi-
tioner ready to use such techniques where necessqry, but always 
questioning the logic behind their adoption.· The. development in 
Chapter Five of 'base-lines' and the ·concurrent graphic representa-
tion of location quotients (L.Q.) and the coefficient of localisa-
tions (Q~L~) is a case in poin.t. Similarly, the coefficient of 
specialisation ( C s) whi.ch is in much use in industrial location 
analysis is discarded as inappropriate to develol?ing countries, · 
· since one isolated regional· industry wo'J.ld give a·· false impression 
of. speciali'satio.n. Coefficients o'btained for production factors . 
·such as production-capital ratio and employment :coefficient are 
. subjected to the product 'moment correlation. co~fficient. (r) for 
. varicn.ls :i)ldustrial groups . both at the urban and;: regional levels 
. . 
. . . 
(Chapters Five and Six). 
1.4 Outline of the Stud~ 
This study CO'J .. ld conveniently be divided into two closely 
related parts. The first part is a di scussicn of the com.:ni tment 
' . . ' 
·to pan-industrialisation in Sudan during the colonial regime (1898-. 
1955), · an·d its post-independence· impact on the s-patial distribution 
of industry. Investment policies and development ·(Chapter Two), 
.· . . . 
are investigated in the light of opportunities and objectives, and· 
. . 
the· subOrdinate role ascribed to private capital· investment. While 
. ·. . . . . . 
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. the public sector .was confined in the main tc.· inves~ment ·in 'commer- · 
cial plantations' in the Gezira, business arid trade was left .to· _the 
private.initiative. From their complementarity 8.nd interaction the 
'charter·government' model is developed to verify the relation-
ship as reflected in the specialisation inherent in the 'syndica-
tion' system. Structural transformation and economic growth 
(Chapter Three) is a manifestation of this system. Here an out-
line -of the progressive role of the primary export base is con-
sl.dered in detail. Chapter Three also exposes the weaknesses of 
'growth :through trade'. Planned non-industrialisation is a 
feature of the colonial economy, and display'ed rather strongly 
in the absence of modern industry from the scene of development 
thro·u.gh much of half a century. An industrial location theory 
specific to_developing countries is expounded in the Prill1e Base 
Theory (Chapter Four). Weaknesses of classical and contemporary 
industrial location theories are critically reviewed. The hi stor-
ical relevance of specif:l.c experiences of ·ex-colonies is exposed, 
first in rE?lation to import firms and later incorporated in the 
Prime Base Theory. Localisation of industry in specific places 
in Africa, and many developing co;mtri e s is a reflection of a pro-
longed process involving the various econo~c sectors, the economic 
: . . ·. . . 
system, abd the spatial arrangement of all this as interpreted by 
the Prime·Base Theory. 
Industrial location analysis in the second part is concerned 
with the urban and regional context of the industrial activity. 
Some empirical testing and evidence of industrial localisation .is 
. provided. · ln Chapter Five the spatial organisation of t.he indus-
trial activity in the Prime.Base is looked at in some detail • 
. ·.,. 
Structural analysis is conducted on 'sectoral stYQcture', 'size 
structure'-, and structure .. of 'input/production'. Industrial con-
centrati.on within the Prime Base is also considered with special 
interest in areal variations ·and specialisation in the tri-pa'~ite 
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Prime Base of Khartoum, Bahri and OmdurmR.n. Industrial location 
patterns and distribution throughout .Sudan are analysed in Chapter 
Six again within the bounds of regional character and stru.ctural 
configuration of the industry. The existence of secondary bases 
is an integral part of the economic process and possibly a pre-
•, . . 
requisite for further industrial development as shown by the study 
of selected industrial groups. 
The industrial location analysis is carried a step further 
in Chapter Seven, the case study on cotton-seed oil. This was 
undertaken as a means of testing existlng localization as against 
the theoretical opti'mum according to least-transfer-cost. Trends 
of future industrial location are by necessity geared to resources 
and the dynamic mobilisation of them. Ultimately this means the 
stage of industrial dynami siil in proximity to population change, 
mineral and agricultural resources, and regional development plans. 
Chapter Eight discusses these possibilities, and it is hoped.that 
this will enable a certain degree of projection at least for th·e 
near future~ In a short conclusion (Chapter Nine), the mR.in find-
ings are gathered with some emphasis on the Prime Base Theory and 
fut:ure regional planning. 
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CHAPTER TwO 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT POLICIES AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN SUDAN ( "18 99 - "1 9 55) • 
2. "1 Introduction 
In ~etermining what is to be developed in a dependent 
.economy, capita.l investment is probably the most critical issue 
to face a colonial regime •. To complicate· things, capital invest-
ment is neither abstract nor static. Decisions on investment 
are reiated. to the government's perception, development philo sop by, 
prevailii1g socio-economic do6trines, and zeal •. These may be 
spatially' re.flected in provisions of plantations, railways, urban 
centresand_administrative. headquarters. On the other hand, the 
cci:paci ty oT the. colonial ad mini strati on, its political status, 
... 
and human' and natural resources are all fundamental factors 
p~nctuating .the economic space. Thus the economic policies as 
·determined by the· availability Or Un(:l.Va{lability Of investrJent 
funds, and the mode, form, and field of investr.'1ent (private or 
public, concentrated or diSpersed,· agricultural or industrial), 
inevitably contribute to the spatial patterns of structural change 
and ·,modernity' in the dependent terri tory. 
With respect to different econonic sectors and priorities, 
there is a .natural tendency for sectoral interaction and inducive 
me.chanisms. The identification of these factors is much needed 
in location. studies, especially in 'developing countries'. How-
ever, the generative mechanism is left for the next chapter. 
Here we arebroadly· dealing with the· initiation of the system in 
Sudan during the pre-independence period (1899 - 1955). The 
linkage between investment priorities, decision-making and avail-
ability of capital is often neglected in industrial location 
17. 
studies as the realities of these linkages are either out of 
reach, deep in historic archives, misinterpreted or simply un-
fashionable. In this chapter so::ne effort is made to piece 
together evidence about the period of the dependent economy of 
Sudan. The whole machinery that bonds together '"'i th various 
forms of investment and develop::nent in the diverse fields, is 
built.into the concept·of the "ch3.rter government model". This 
refers to the syndication system ~hereby a functional div~sion 
is made .between.p"!lblic and private sectors when in partnership 
. . ... 
to facilitate efficient exploitation and harmony. Pro'!.).3.bly the 
inexistence of an industrial sector in Sudan during the first half 
of this century is a manifestation of the very peculiarity of the 
system, and significantly, of grave consequences for future 
industrial location.· 
Furthermore, the major components of this paradigm were laid 
down so~etime during the form3.tive years that ended in the mid-
1920's when the Gezira .schem.e and· the last railway extension vrere 
completed. From tb,en on development policy.became a matter of 
horizontal expansion_and maintenance. Indeed, the varying _.magni-
tudes of investment and rate of economic expansion h3.ve a distinct 
spatial pattern as expressed· in the spatial frameworks of a dual 
economy, urban centres and asterisk or fan-shaped railway systems. 
However, these latter features will only be to:.1ehed upon at the 
· end·of. thi::? discussion - further elaboration is reserved for 
separ~te treatment. 
2.2 Investment_Q££ortunities~nd Objectives during Co-partner Rul~ 
The Sudan today is considered to be a:rilong the twenty five 
poorest countries in the world measured by per ca,pita inco::ne,C 1 ) 
yet the poverty seems disj)roportionate to the. hugeness of the 
'18 
country and the diversity of its known resources. In this 
' . 
sense Sudan is sometimes rated differently among these twenty 
five bottom-of-the-list co·J.ntries. "Tho;igh underdeveloped,~ 
reported the.Economic Commission for Africa, •the Sudan exhibits 
di.fferent features in some respects, fro::.n several similarly 
p·laced nations. n ( 2 ). This view conceals two critical elements: 
f:lrst, the ~nacceptabill.ty of per capita inco.me as a measure of 
economic.well-being; second, the disparity between available 
res~urce·~ and the slackn~'ss of their mobilisation. It is this 
last poi'nt which is of special interest to this study. 
For an appreciable period in modern times (1899 - 1955), 
. . . . 
the economic policies of Sudan, like many other African countries, 
were executed and fostered by colonial administration. Tne 
·synonymity of underdevelopment and. colonialism has often been 
pointed out in development studies.C3) However, the case of 
. . 
Suda~ 1s s~::newhat complex. Observers of d:j_fferent nationalities, 
including some Sudanese, have p·raised the lines along which the 
. ' . ' . 
sociaiand economic~ development of Sudan were pursued. The 
·Gezira. scheme st~nds as a testimony to the :endeavour of colonial 
enterprise. 
The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1899 made it possible for 
.Britain· to retain.the upper hand in Sudanese affairs, thoagh the 
same agreement r.ecogni sed Egypt as an equal partner. It does not 
•, ' . . . ·. 
nee<i too.much imagination to portray a fair picture of the Sudan's 
economic situation before the Omdurrnan defeat ( 1898). I sola ted 
from theoutsl.de world and engaged in a holy war, Sudan remained 
a country with an agrarian·subsistence economy. Conditions were, 
. . . ·'· ' :. 
. . 
more oriess, c<;:>mparable to most newly conquered African terri-
. . : 
tories. The· ess€mtial features thus pr~valent were the under-
utilization of human and natural resources in the materialistic 
modern sense. 
The British cm1ld barely appreciate the economic values 
attached to the native system, and a \vell-form·,liated. stratagem 
hadto "be implemented immediately. The end. product of the 
strategy was presupposed- modernisation and develo;>:nent, and 
the input was also asswned ~investment and 'technology' •. Thus 
the most urgent needs were categorical: 
-~~'more population, more irrigation, more 
Bri ti.sh officials ••• more schoQl.masters and 
more public b:.1ildings .•• (4) 
To. be precise, the strategy could be SlLllmed up in the words 
'capital' and 'technical staff' .. The cri.lX of the matter was, hO'tJ-
ever, to·what.extent capital and technical· staff would be forth-
co_ming? The question is more complicated than wo·J.ld at first 
appear. ·To "begin with, the chances of a European influx was ex-
. eluded, as was point~d out by Rudolf 81<?-tin. in 1899: 
The Sudan Nill not I suppose present a 
favourable field for European colonisation. 
·The climate excludes great European 
·colonies.. Much of it is tropical. (5) 
As a matter of fact, all of it is tropical.· This exclu::led too, 
a 'settler economy' ·with its ultimate political pressures behinrl 
settlers' claims on financial support and trade concessions back 
home •. · Development of private plantations and primary processing 
indu$try ir1 Kenya,· for example·, was in soi:ne cases a direct result 
of the lobbying power of people like· Lord Delamere and Lord Francis 
S~ott.(6) .However, ·~O't+ntries do change during colonial rule, even 
wi t:t1o·:.1t substantial influx of Eu.ropean immigrants. Capital trans-
ference in the hands of private entrepreneurs or in tl).e form of 
·grant-in-aid;· .loans and grants, could part~cipate in rectifying 
. ' ' 
the·cJ:lronic needs for capital investment in such areas. 
·Evidently, there was a strong attraction to public and 
20 . 
.2'1 
private enterprise in the Sudan after the conquest of '1898. 
The potential for 'economic development' was enormous, as was 
anticipated by many international agencies, including British 
ones. (7) In the second half of the nineteenth century, travel-
lers and explorers had featured Sudan as one of the ·richest 
countries in the world. Gold and other minerals were said to 
be in abundanceand thirty million acres were estimated to be 
r~C3_dy 'for cotton gro·Ning. ( 8 ) Nonetheless, any financial advances 
from Britain 'to the Sudan. were o"!:>vlously out of the question and 
were 'certain to meet with absolute .·refusal i. (9) l"'any reasons 
'' 
could be cited.for this abstention.- Firstly, the Sudan did not 
fall directly within the absolute domain of Britain and the partner-
ship agreement .made the . future of the country rather dubio·~s. The 
Sudan couid not· be treated as a full British dependency with all 
. . 
due obligations. Tnis was repeatedly sho·NTI when Sudan was excluded 
from preferential tariffs granted to British colonies during 
econqmic d:Lffic~lties. Seoondly, the economic policies of Britain 
· by the ninet~enth century wer~ heading towards lower overseas 
investment. ·Whatever capital was forthcoming, ho·.Never, was 
chann~lled on a very selective basis. Thlrdly, if Sudan was con-
quered for the benefit of Egypt as was sometimes alleged, then 
Egypt should naturally be made responsible for the essential 
capita~ requirements in Sudan. ·Against this presuinption, a 
financial ··settlement was immediately reached after the formulation 
of the .1899 Ang;Lq~Egyptian Agreement. Egypt herself· was a 
Bri.tish protectorate and could do nothing· but co:mpiy. Thus, 
. . 
Egypt was fina~cing developmental schemes in Sudan until 1912. 
i\fl.t~r tlri.r; t'latc :i.t was believed that the Sudan had reached 
:l J>OLnt ~vlwre [1hc c:o:1ld support her financial needs fro::n her o·:m 
· reven.1es. Thereafter the country was nm on a policy of financial 
.. '.: . 
'$elf-reliance' throughout the colonial period with only slight 
changes th~t were dictated by needs arising in Britain. 
Ref,erence ~as made above to the British crovernment Is point 
I • • 
of view on issues related to public capital investment in Sudan. 
Such financial issues were guided by the principle of 'hands off 
policy'. But had there ever been an agreeable climate for 
private investme-nt in Sudan? Observations of colonial policies 
towards privat'e investment shovv an apparent lack of consistency 
. . :. . 
th!x)ugp_ the: whole colonial period.. The . suggestio:J. ::nade by J. 
Stone for example :ls that Lord Cromer was not keen on p.rivate 
enterprise.C10) The opposite opinion expressed by F. Percy in 
.. 
1921 ~ refl.ects the willingness of the Sudan Adm:Lni stration to 
. inv:l te ·a_~a_ enc~u.rage private foreign capital, n ••• the crovernment 
was fa:r;> from being niggardly in its dealings wi tP. the private 
enterprise .• ;,(11 ·) Tho·:.1gh both opinions were formulated on the 
early experience of the administration, it is gu:ite possible to 
identify ·the same two.opposing arguments revived in -writings 
a'bout subseirh~nt ye13.rs o;f the· colonial period • 
. According to L.A. Fabunmi, investment by the· B:ri tish and 
. . . . . 
other Eru0p~ans was one of.the objectives for the British control 
. . . .· (12) 
of.: Sudan.. ~ .. · ·Another rec~nt proponent of the 'anti--capitalists 
de.;elo~:D.ent argl.l.ment' is A. Abd-al-Raheem. (1 3) He was able to 
extend. the .original views advocated by Ston~ to cover the whole 
colonial period, tho:1gh his inter-pretation of the forces behind 
. such polici~s ~as di:f.'ferent from those of Stone. Likewise, A. 
Gai tskell, ·whose .views are mainly drawn froai the Gezira experience, 
sp.ares a_similar op:lnion based on yet anoth~r case.C14) 
. The main. d-iscrepancy with any of the conclusions considered 
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is the i·ncapaci ty to draw·. a clear-cut boundary betv.reen the 
dtfferent issues .involved in the complex 'C'elationship between 
government and the private sectoro Such a relationship is 
affected: 'by the size and magnitude of the private capital' the 
field in which it is to be invested and the timing of its advent 
in relation to internal and extern9.l p~litical and economic 
circumstances. The.decision process in most economic matters 
had in il,any instances been· initiated in Khartotim, appraised in 
Cairo, ·a~d decided upon in London. Ho-vvever, the inconsistency 
of decisions co~cerning :pr:lvate capi'tal will be' discussed later. 
Clearly, there was no preconceived policy to adhere to in 
dealings wi.th the private investors in the first few years of 
the ne~ rule. Hence painfully slovv deliberation was preferred 
to ·hasty. action, "we must not go too fast," oom.:nented R. Slatin, 
1902, in· reply to a suggestion raised in a press interview in 
Britain. that the British public sho:J.ld be made acquainted with 
the :Possibilities of the Sud~n, "We do .. not ·want to h.g,ve a boom 
in Sudan· shares on'' the ~m.arket follovved by a .drop ••• rrC 1 5) The 
same idea of slow develo:p-:nent was consistently repe9.ted by Lord 
' : · .
. . ' 
Cromer, who. strongly believed in its practicability. Indiscrimin-
ately, a line of successors .maintained the same conviction. 
Oby~~::ru..sly, the politics of a condominiu:n are bo:J.nd to be neh:llou.s 
· and a keen balance has to be stri.lck if the hybrid is to be 
·successful.. .It follows that decisio:.ls h9.d to be weighed care-
fully. and sluggishly; However, this co·:1ld sometimes be very 
~rritating to private entrepreneurs. Such delays were condemned 
.bY ·the.;Briti$h Cott.On Growing Asso~iation in 1912: 
.• ~:. th~re is great delay in arriving at 
decisions on commercial matters, and the 
government apparently do not recognise 
that comtnercial men cannot wait indef-
initely for decisions 0:.1 proposals they 
may have put forward;. •• (16) . 
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This slow-do·m policy proved to ~ave an adverse effect on the 
mo~ility and attraction of private entrepreneurs. 
2.4 Investment Chances and .Policies: Comme:r0ial Plantation 
The circunstances that animated the whole investment policy 
towards Sudan and.culminated in establishing a general policy 
towards private enterprise has largely revolved aro:.md cotton-
gro·Ning ,and land develop:nent. For pressing economic reasons 
Britain's ambitions were aro:.lSed by the possibilities of cotton-
growing in Sudan. 
Britain's most prominent industry, the textile industry, was 
increasingly becoiiJ.ing vulnerable to the precario·~s international 
cotton trade and.-prod11ctlo.n: 
.The whole·nation, [reported the Morning Post 
in 1904], h3.s become alive to the fact that · 
·one of. our greatest stable ind-:1s~ries is 
. serioasly menaced by its dependence on foreign 
so:u.rces, of supply for. its raw material. (17) 
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The United States of Ariie;ica was virtually monopolising production; 
in 1904 she. produced 80. .per cent of total wo:r;-ld consumption. (1S) 
The imnense feeling of insecurity entertained by Manchester Chambers 
and the public at large, was expressed in a passionate speech by 
King Edward VII in 1904: 
.. The insufficiency of the supply of raw material 
upon which the great cotton industry of this 
country_ depends, has inspired me -with deep con-
cern ••.•• I trust the efforts which are being 
·made in· various parts of my Empire to increase 
.the area under cultivation may be attended 
with a large measure of success. (19) .. 
Nonetheless~ there is ample evidence to suggest that attempts in 
the direction of cqtton production were turned down before 1910. 
· .. The British Cotton Growing Association was rebaffed when it 
·approached Lord Cromer on the question of growing cotton in the 
Sudan; its representatives were bluntly told there was "nothing 
they pould usefully do" and that "their services were not 
. . . (20) required~ 11 .. ··. At the same. time the only option· given to 
interes~ed land companies was :merely land reclamation rather 
than cu1 ti va-tion. ( 21 ). Even this sor~it of development was only 
vnder corisideration in 1908: 
The .advisability of invi t:img private 
enterprise to assist in the last mentioned 
direction-land reclamatio~, [co~ented the 
Land director] is now und~r consideration. (22) 
There were, of·coarse, practical qu~stions to be solved first. 
TransPortil.tioxi and c~~munication, +arseness of po:;nlation and 
iand own:er:ship were. all important fiactors and involve directly or 
1ndirectly.the.sertsitive question Jf Egypt's ·st~ke. 
. Equaliy important however, wa,k the incapacity of the officials 
. in Kha~toum and Cai'o to reach agr/eemen.t oii the issue of private 
capital. :This was clearly sho·tm 1:ly the lack of coordination and 
the diff~rent attitudes ·of KhartoJm.and Cairo. While Wingate 
sho·weda great interest in privatk investment in 1909 his superior, 
Sir E. 'Gorst, head of the .British/ residencY in 8airo, was clearly 
against t,he.·· B.C.~.G. ~A's.re:presentatl/l···ve, as is.evident from a private 
letter to .Wingate: 
~· .... , .... ·For tl).e present. Lavot, [the head of the. 
B.C.G~A's delegation],/ should be choked off, · 
and .. told that his proposal [the Gezira Scheme] 
. . is premature •••• (23) I . 
. Yet' only t·wo ·.months later' Wingate Is orders to. his subordinates 
.. . . . . I . 
in connection .with the B.C.G.A 1 s representatives were opposing 
Cairo i ~ instructions. Hence La~ot and his colleagues, 
. .. . I . . . . 
. • • • sho·:.1ld rece1 ve th
1
e most sympat~et~c treat-
ment ·from the Sudan Gbl vernment as 1 t 1 s clear 
to me that they a.re actuated not merely by 
. J'inanc:i..al considerat~on hat by thoroughly. 
···p·atriotic sentimentsJ (24) · · 
Ap::parently.the distinction emphasised here between entrepreneurs 
' . . 
hunting fortunes and responsible patriotic investors reveals the 
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fears entertained by. m:3;ny .that private investment co'.lld upset 
a delicate situatiorr in Sudan, and interfere with the calculated 
steps to maintain a free hand for Britain. In a private letter 
to G.F. ·clayton in 1910, Wingate was able to suni up his griev-
ances about investment policies that hampered the. advent of 
capital in the hands.of private British Capitalists: 
My general feeling is that we have. nothing 
whatever to conceal in our Sudan arrangements 
and if O"i.U' agricultural. and. other developments 
:Q_:!3.ve not proceeded at a ver:J great pace, it is 
f.or the very.good reason that we nave been 
stinted in funds, and as we are endeavouring to 
ipterest sound. British capital to invest in 
· Sudan, I think· the argwnent that we have not 
yet bee~_E_i ve~ fair _£..'2:,~£.~, * is -oneo'f-f:he 
most use.f~l ones~ .. ~e emploJed when giving 
· eff.ect to. our en~eavour. ·(25) . · 
·, . 
Clearly, then, .the Sudan adm.ini strati on was denied the chance of 
proceeding with its plans to invite British capital to invest in 
commercial plantation. 
By the end of ·1910 the argument of the B.C .• G.A. was strongly 
put again .to the British Government: 
. . . . 
It cannot be too strongly emphasised that 
unless something is done in the immediate 
.future, there is the ·greatest danger of 
.· serio·u.s and irreparable injury being .. in-
flicted on the cotton trade of Lancashire. 
It is for these reasons that the council 
of· the British Cotton Growing Association 
ha.ve again turned their attention to the 
possibilities of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 
which country, tho·:1gh not entirely British, 
does fall within the terms of their charter. (26) 
. . 
Under such pressures the British Government eventually relented.· 
. . . . . . . 
However, Cl. formtila had to be worked out whereby the previo·:1s · 
reservations about prl vate capital were put into consideration • 
. . ' . ' . 
The c6:nprdmi. se reached was to select so·:1nd, thoro"J.ghly patriotic, 
p.t··ivatl~ ihvestoi'L' 1.vho could 1.\'ork under an .unorthodox admi.nistra-
.. (; 'i. v.,' . ~:;~r.::;t:~..:~lll . uf :..~t~~~te. control of economic enterprise. 
*Emphasi~of author 
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1_·. 
Drawing from this very experience, A. Gaitskell suggests 
that the Sudan Government rejected foreign capitalists where 
terms were not fair to native tenants an:l in effect rebuffed 
much of the .expected private capital because o.f the buffer 
created by th~ direct control of means of economic enterprise. 
He added: 
. by choosing these objectives [participation 
.' of. peasants] they immediately affected· their 
. ·relationship to capital investment. They re-
jected the conception of foreign capitalists 
developing-the country purely for private 
· profit because.they had certain political 
·and·social aims mixed with their economic ones 
and were not prepared .to h_ave them subordinated 
or ignored~ (27) . 
In some respects the new economic departure was apparently an 
.adaptation ofa'socialist experiment on social and economic re-
forms under'taken by Denmark before 1919. Land holdings in the 
· Ge.zira were consolidated, rented on nominal ann~al fees (five 
piasters ·per Feddan or th~ equivalent of five new pence per acre 
per annum),. ·and redistributed to tenants. An extra ingredient 
that makes.thewhoi~ scheme differ fro:::n the Dan·ish model, was the 
invitation of· a foreign capitalist third party to m.9.nage the. 
scheme in a tripartite partnership. As we wi~l see later this 
·f'or:m of liason was ·in essence a new form of government that draws 
from the chgrter_government·mo:lel and leans on certain aspects of 
. . 
the sociali~t-_develop.ni.ent model. The ultimate. goal was efficient 
e·xplo;i. ta tio~ ~-.··· · 
. . . 
Thus,' the narro·iv specialisation (on cotton production) was 
necessitated,.· not by economic chance, as was the case in. Denmark, 
. . 
but by considerations r~l-ated to the British textile industry. 
Whilst the Danish ma::f:kets were expanding, tp.e cotton trade in. Sudan 
• .. · 
was gauged· by fluctuating prices and a traditional market. Hence 
the Gezira schei!le was an end in.itself to surmount the grave 
27 
danger encroachin·g upon the most vi tal industry in Britain 
and clearly lacks the touch that ought to generate the desirable 
·U1> 
agro-industrial linkages or create a rich peasantry~able of 
high consumption OT reinvestment. Secondly, the Gezira scheme 
~ 
did not come~to being as a component of an integral socio-economic 
policy, from_ the.point of view of Sudan, nor did :lt conform with 
.a.n over;:111· plan ·designed to enco:1rage private investment in that 
cou.ptry. 
Only in this· context 1s it possible to :mderstand the reluc-
tance of Wingate in 192-:1 to identify himself after retirement with 
-
a rubbe.r industry. firm. His fears which contradicted his earlier 
positive,!3,ttitude towards private capital were that such private 
investment.was bound to harm the British existence in Sudan: 
It is certain that any weakening.of the 
British control in the Sudan would seriously 
·.jeopardise the success of the British ·enter-
. prise.· (28) 
. . 
A new. dimension was added to the cotton-growing theme when 
lo~al private capitai was persuaded, after the 1930's depression, 
to ~evelop riverain pump schemes. The financing was largely 
thro·:J.gh foreign commercial banks in Sudan. Eventually, the 
whole. eoono:m.i..c policy to Sudan culminated in the conversion of 
the cou.ntry_:l.nto a grand cotton farm of world magnitude in long 
staple cotton trade. The mushrooming growth of the private 
invol vem~mt in agricultural developJlent in Sudan could only be 
seen as an integral part of a well-defined· policy towards economic 
develop~ent~. Naturally the capital expected to come into Sudan 
follo·Ning .the const.:MlCtion of the grand project had largely 
remained an act of hope and only signifies the. isolation and in-
.adequ'icy of the new econom.i..c approach. 
28 
2.5 Investment Chances and Policies: Infrast~ucture 
BesidE?s cotton;· there were other fundamental opportunities 
appealing to private enterprise. Transportation fa.cili ties 1vere 
most needed as a precondition for political c6ntrol and economic 
develop'!Ilent. Nonetheless, it could be said that there was no 
d.efini te polic·y for the development of communication before 1905. 
In fact thei'e was a strong tendency to encourage private ent~r-
prise to. interest itself in railway building •. The fqllo·wing 
extract from a. letter from Wingate to Lord Crom~r in 1901 is a 
cl,e13,r .testimony: 
..•••. I am sure that any encouragement you can 
give to private enterprise to construct a 
.railway from Duem to El Obeid will be a 9tep 
in the· right direction ••. · I hope to ·see 
.Rogers before I.leave and will do all I can 
to enco~rage private enterprise. (29) 
Obviously the direction of railway development was well discussed 
and agreed ~pan before this letter was written. In line with this 
~ttitude. wa~ the co~cession released to a steamer service company 
during thi'E? ~arly. period. EventuallY. the steamer concession was 
. ·., 
ter:illin·ated after the construction of the western railway Line in 
19·12. ( 30) . 
The.reversal of.the railway p:>licy outlined above· was quite 
abrupt· and drastic.· The Sudan Government should be the main 
·. investor and· beneficiary. The starting date of this change of 
.mind was 1905 •.. The only evidence available was the fact that 
the government declined many offers from would-be British, 
Egyptia,n, as. well as Sudanese private investors. who were tempted 
b; previb~~· ~nco'J.ragement.C31 ) By 1908 ·the railway policy was 
completely formulated as seen from correspondence of this period. 
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The. nE;)W 'rail way policy was guided by two inter-related con-
siderations';· military and. strategic, and economic. 
T·wo elements of· paramount importance from: the viewpoint of 
the mili.ta:r;-y .si:tua·tiqn were the extensive area. of the country 
and the real threat of the local resentment of foreign rule.C32) 
In an alariil.ing letter by Wingate in 1908 the security situation 
and th'e urge-qcy for improved comn;mication was. raised: 
A glance at the huge extent of the Soudan, as 
co:mpa:r;ed with the' slender military force avail-
able for its protection, will show the· insecure 
.basis on which our hold over this country rests ••• 
. To remedy, therefore, the present condition of 
insecurity, llnd. minimise the risks which are 
being run, it is evidence that the internal 
.. · commu.nications sho~.lld be immediately improved 
in order'to bring the outlying provlnces into 
~loser connection with headquarters~ To carry 
o'.lt this, considerable expenditure will be 
.. n~cess.9.ry in railway.extension to the south, 
east and west •.••• (33) 
In the. same letter it was·suggested that the British Government 
• '. l 
sho·~Id. raise the necessary funds for carrying out rail way ext en-
.. sions. 
·From the Tmper:i,.C?-1 strategy stand-point three considerations 
were vit~l to the constrllction of rai].ways. Firstly, to :meet 
prE)ssures exerted by the French on the western.frontier. This 
need was frankly spelled out by Lord.Kitchener in 1911: 
The. Soudan Government are ·constructing a 
·railway to El Obied to ~eet pressure brought 
.on theiT. frontier province of Darfur by recent 
Fr·ench action i.n T.Jadai. ( 34) · 
Secondly; theinterest in the eastern frontier created by the. 
. " 
· Itali~ns. c:md. the security of the .Blue Nile waters necessitated 
imme.diate action. These fears were again disclosed by Lord 
.Ki tchener' in th~ above-quoted letter: 
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.f 
Additional expen:li ture will shortly ··be 
required in other districts, in Eastern 
So·~dan in particular, where the unsettled 
state of the Abyssinian boundary makes 
the extension of railways a matter of 
strategic importance. (35) · · 
' Thirdly, a rather ambitious idea on the subject of Imperial 
defence ,-and strateg;y was in Wingate's mind. His thesis w3.s that 
in the event of a blockade of the Suez Canal rm.1te (a possibility 
. . . ' 
that could.not be overruled given the political unrest in Abyss-
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inia) an overland co.nmnnication wm.1ld mitigate the serio·:.ls implica-
tions to Imperial Far Eastern trade.C36 ) 
2. 5.1. 2 The .Econo:n.i..c Factor 
It is over simplification to isolate one factor from others 
in a mJ.lti'!""purpose project such as a railway construction under-
tak:lng~ . Beside the strategic and military purposes,· ·other incen-
tive~ we~~ .rilea~ly seen. · 
Firstly, the develop:nent of natural resoui:'ces was equally as 
. . . 
important as these strategic factors. Thus railway construction 
was essential too for bringing :into reach the produce of the west 
and the fertiie east. Over and above that was the indispens-
ability of transport facilities for the co:nmercial production of 
cotton in the,Gezira.C37) The existence of themtlitary railway 
. . . . 
(Halfa - Halfaya, 1898 - 1899) proved valuable, experience to the 
gQvernmerit in i.ts dealings· with the Zeidab private cotton scheme 
· (1.904) and: othe·r' cotta~ e'states. 
. Se~rndly, the ~ailway development was anticipated to vitalise 
trade and .·expand. revenue: 
.• · •• no very great expansion of revenue 
can ~enceforth be expected witho~t 
·preliminary development of the railway 
system. ( 38) 
\. 
! . 
On yet another level, it was hoped that the Sudan's transport 
facilities w9'uld diffuse B:ri tish trade and coJJ.merce in many 
directfori s in. the heart of Africa. ( 39) The rem1merati ve nature 
of the railway, accru.ting from freight rates and fares, was 
also crucial and proved to· be of considerable significance to 
the ever-perturbing revenue. pro"!Jlem. 
The immense delicacy of the situation so far disclosed, 
.... . ' 
which underlined railway extensio::t in Sudan, makes it fairly 
obvious that the involvement of private enterprises in railway 
development wasconsidered inexpedient. Thus it is naive to 
assume ·that this policy of rejection "was simply part of a 
general· attitude of suspicion with which the Sudan Goverrunent 
II ( 40) 
viewed private enterprise... The railway policy involved 
. ,•' 
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the very. e:X::i stence. of Britain in Sudan, the strategy of the 
Empire's. traQ.e and eqrnmerce in new markets, and incoJJ.e from transfer 
charges that.would partiaily help discharge.any liabilities on the 
part of thE? colonial co-partners. The sticky political circum-
stances ·that ti~d together Britain and Turkey in Egypt and Brita~n 
and Egypt in·Sudan.necessitated· utmost sagacity and expedient 
lobby to exclu(l~. Turkey Is inter'feren.ce and deny Egypt Is stake in 
the Sudan. However, the openness of the argument presented by 
Lord·Kitchener to the British Government in 1911 is unparalleled 
. in i;;he .politics of the co-partnership in its Q.ealings with Sudan: 
. .· . ~ ·. . 
••• the·present circumstances and the political 
status of the Soudan preclude the possibility 
·of borrowing money on the credit of that Govern~ 
ment alone. There are strong obj·ections to the 
guarantee of a loan by the Egyptian Governinent, 
which would need the sanction of the Porte. In 
the present circumstances of the Islaiii1cworld, 
it would not .be expedient to give Turkey any 
pretext·for interference in the Soudan. Further, 
an Egyptian guarantee would not.only increase 
'Egypt's stake in the Sm1dan, but afford ground 
for what I believe to be the onlyvalid criticism 
qf·the Nationalistparty against British 
administration, namely, that the revenues 
of· Egypt are employed to :levelop a co:.mtry 
where the British flag flies. (4"1) 
Under these pressu-res the British Government sanctioned guaranteed 
loans for·the.financing of the Gezira on the conditions described 
above. Simiiarly' loans were provided by the British Treasury 
for rai1wa~ extension to the west in 1912 after.the first phase 
was co:npleted prior to 1907 ·with the financial aid of Egypt. The 
final railway ventures in the 1920's were, h~wever, dealt with in 
a mannerco:mplytng·with the 'syndication plani applied with 
'suocess' ~o the cotton industry. In fact t1le eastern line was 
initiated by .botb,economic and strategic consideration •. From a 
stra~egic. point of view it was first .. ··t]Jought to be pru<;lent to 
encourage private enterprise to :~ndertake the eastern railway 
. . ·. ' " . . . . . 
project 8:~: .. a disguise for the real objectives _suggested by Wingate 
in 1911: 
Of. one thing I am quite sure [commented 
Wingate], and that is that it wo·:1ld be 
folly to take the Newco:nbe project (Sudan-
Abyssinia Railway) at the present stage -
the. only way would be to. get private · 
enterprise interested in it and with 
·Abyssinia in its present stage, the less 
we' say about railway projects the better. (42) 
Rene~· .the. co::npromise reached later by the formulation and financing 
of tn.e Kassala Railway Co. by a guaranteed loan from the British 
Treasury could only be seen as part of the new fonrnla reached 
for· the :dev:etopment of the Gezira scheme. The main feature of 
the concerted public-p~ivate effort and involvement, one may add, 
,. 
was a discretion designed to facilitate gaining a larger stake in 
Sudan and calculated to covertly achieve some political targets. 
Yet the same incentives acted adversely against railway extension 
. in ce:cta~n,_directions where ·political interaction was undesirable. 
For example~ private investor's had approached the Foreign Office 
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for concessions in 1920 for railway lines over southern Sudan 
but they we·re deferred even though the private entrepreneurs 
suggested a join·t venture in line. with the prevailing public-
pr_i vate synq.ication and co8peration·. (.4 3) In fact, when the 
railw$.y l:lrie h!ld to be extended southwards to .Jebalein (abo·J.t 
455 Km south Kharto·w:n) for military purposes in 1942, the govern-
ment wm1ld.not accept the idea and hurriedly dismantled the line 
ln-.1944:~.( 44 ) On the other hand major roads were constructed to 
~- . . 
link the southern region with Uganda and British East Africa. 
The 'possibility of linking up the Sudan with Ugand.a, B.E.A. 
(British East Africa), Somaliland ••• and m.'3.king it one big Governor-
Generalship g_U:ite distinct from Egypt' (4 5) was well th::)'J.ght of. 
One of the ·i.ronies of railway building in Sudan was that .no attempt 
was ever-made to connect Egypt and the Sudan although Egypt was 
. . . . 
responsl.bie for the iargershare of railway building finance in 
Sudan·. The railway network seems to have .granted the optimum 
.requir.em~rit s for th~ Brl tl sh Government in 1923. The country as 
a colony had witnessed no· further extensions after that date. ( 46 ) 
2. 5. 2., Road Tran~or"tg_tion 
Road build:lng was conside~ed by i:;he Sudan Government as only 
supplemepta_ry to railways._ The gneral o'J.tline was to develop 
feeder lines in areas not served by railway. This ·wo·;J.ld guarantee 
two tb,ings: firstly, it wo'J.ld reach distant districts for tapping . 
thei:r reso'J.rces and channel distributive trade. (47) Secondly, it 
WO'J.ld avoid .the com:p'eti ti~n of motor vehicles with railways. A 
compro:m:lse_had to. be .made to bring these two goals together. 
The govern3nent realised that motor transport by its very 
nature lies within the domain of private business. Hence private 
enterprise enteri:ng this field had to be contained within some 
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bounds so ?-S. not .to jeopardise the British enterprise or weaken 
the British .. control. Nothing CO':.lld be more serious to the slow 
progress policy than diffusion of ideas and fast mobility, and 
nothing ·could·be more conducive to potential unrest than all-
weather roads.· . Consequently, all offers by private capital to 
build metallic road~ were declined. ( 48 ) The official justification 
in 1929 for this rejection apparently looks sound. The argument 
rests mainly on the cost apd uncompetitiveness of roads compared. 
,l .• ·
with.railways at that time. 
The list of Sudan products contains ·very few 
that could stand the cost of mechanical trans-
pprt, and until it can be shoNTI that it pays 
better to make roads than railways, or until 
haulage costs are cut down by one means or 
another, no great increase in the carriage 
~f goods ~y motor vehicles can ~~ looked for. (49) 
. ·' . 
Evidently, :~.he. go~e:rnment was desperately co_ve_r.ing. the real 
intentions behind this argument. As a matter of fact it was the 
. . . . . ~ ' . . . 
competitiveness of road transport rather than the suggested in-
ability to stand costs which mOtivated the policy against roads. 
This was emphatically disclosed in the Sudan Government's Railways 
Annual Repo;t of 1931: 
••• the railways will have to face a very serious 
·loss of revenue unless strong action-is taken by 
the .Government to prevent or control motor co:npet-
ition between the points already served by the 
Railways. Motor transport parallel to the railway 
serves no public interest and merely transfers to 
·· .. the pockets of, at present, irregponsible motor 
.drivers· ~nd traders' money which sho·:.1ld go into 
·the revenue of the GovernJJ.ent railway. (50) _ 
Clea.r1y. the dry-'t~eather dirt roads which were developing against 
m.9.riy ·od.ds were in fact creating all sorts· o'f problems ·for the 
p11blic revenue! 
The government was compelled to lower the freight rates on 
the western -li.ne in 1934 to stay in the competition created by 
ro3.d traf.f:i;~.(51 ) Such a move was only feasible because the govern-
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ment could increase royalties on some com.;:no:iities. In the same 
year the ~-overn:nent was compelled to pass a :resolution to pro-
hibit competition with·the railways.C52 ) No batter proof of 
the unfo:mded assuib.ptions already made by the government co~ld 
be attained~ Indeed, no change of policy towards road building 
was ever ~ttempted. The result was that not a single metallic 
ro·ad othef '·tp.an town avenues and streets, was built during the 
pre-indep.endence period. 
2.6 Investm.ent Chances and· Policies: Business -and Trade 
.. 
. Having made th;is analysis of British plantation and tran.sport 
. . 
policy~ one is confronted with Fabunmi's judgement ·which attributes 
great significance to the part played by private capital in Sudan. 
··From. -&h(lt has been ·said, however, Fabun:ni' s argument .is only 
. . ·. 
valid·inso~ar'as trade and commerce is concerned. As a matter of 
fact,there is ample evidence o.f the involvement and coiiDni.tment 
. of British capital in thi.s field during the P·8riod in question • 
.. : ,• 
Trade and commerce were.undo'J.btedly more attractive than other 
. . 
forms :ot' pr:i.vate .epterp:rise for several reasons. Firstly, the 
export..,.~mport firms· normally expande~ their margin of profit if 
services were rdi on a social':"'cost basis ra:ther than on profit 
maximization as ·was the case in Sudan. Secondly, there is no 
problem with capital-raising for private b~siness, and the risk. 
ipv,ol ved in trading companies is m·1ch less than in many other 
·forms of private ente:rprise. The short gestation period and the 
. ' . 
luc:fative.quick tlirnover, coupled with an oligopoly status, would 
marginalise the risk eiement. At the same time, the banking 
. . ' . . 
·short-loan system was tailored to such undertakir:gs. Thirdly, 
bec.ause ·:of. 'the diversity and complexity of import-export ~rade, 
(whoiesale 'ani retail) and the numerous agencies involved, direct 
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goverD.::nent management costs wo'..lld be exceedingly high if not 
totally impractical. After all, any such step .wo·:.1ld co:n;>letely 
. . 
wreck whatever was left of the laissez-faire doctrine and 
bluntly shade the whole colonialism argu:nent with suspicion and 
do·J.bt. No wonder, then, that trade and coillffier~e was left to 
private. entei:pri se. 
Whatever the intentions were, 'free trade' would ob-liously 
je~pardise British interests even more when ~ third party, i.e. 
Egypt,~ _h9.d as m·1ch .ambition in this direction and theoretically 
. .. 
as much .. ~ight. Withstanding this right and aware of the free trade 
obl{gatio.ns defined by a series of international trade agreements 
and the Anglo-French convention of 1898, the.British· had.to work 
mit a neat sol-lition to attain the upper hand in the commodity flow 
.. . . . . 
system' :ind .rri::mey transactions. This was vi taL to Eri tain in· both 
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directions of export and import and was beco:ning_ increasingly so 
after:W6rld War I, the 1921/22 ~e~ession and the 1930's depression. 
Britain was becoming more dependent on the ra-w· materials and to a 
le.sser degree ot.: the markets of the dependencies •. At the same time, 
:B~ita~n>was e:viden.tly oecomt.ng :m:)re vulnerable ··t;o. internatiomil 
trade eo:mpet~ tion •.. This was reflected in the high une::nploJmeri:t 
that reached 2. 2 million in 1927, (53) and evinced by the verj 
many drastic measures taken which·culminated in the passing of 
many laws such as the Trade Facilities Act, 1921·,_ EJ.nd the ·1929 
·Act, and the· set tin_g u.p on the Colonial Aid Programne, the 
·.·Imperial Pre~erence and Empire Marketing Board., and Colonial 
Development. Advisory Committee 1929, etc. The imposition of .a::u 
th~se-~~asures meant better organisation and rebrientation of thi 
col.on:Lal machinery~ 
. A 'grave need for closed· trading which wo:.::.ld l:j.:rik Sudan ·with· 
· Britain and the Empire was only natura;L •. The formula was not 
I . 
.· _,: 
._··,. 
difficult to rea~h, and would not be too far from the. 
experience already gained by the syndication system alr~ady 
in practice. The function of the co::nmercial bodies WOiJ.ld then 
be to co~ordinate the market needs of Sudan w.i.th Britain's 
industrial ones and ultimately secure as many orders as possible 
in the hands of British industrialists. To complement that 
.would obviously be to :lirect Sudan's produce to the mother 
country. What was.then .needed was a selected number of powerful 
British firms that co·:.1ld be described as patriotic and so:J.nd 
. ~ . . 
British capitalists. The dominant role in .Sudan trade was given 
. to .. Sudan _Mercantile Ltd., Gellatly Hankey & Coo Ltd., Bauxhaul, 
and :Mitqhell Cotts., all of which were British companies . 
. , - . ·. . . 
Stressin'g the role of these as well as Egyptian firms, the 
Fin.9:nce Dep:3.rtment reported in 1953 that: 
Private capital here [in Sudan] favours 
-trading activities in the main~ There are 
a small .n·;llllber of powerful British and 
·Egyptian firms at the head of this group ••.• (54) 
It should be emphasised that there were only two Egyptian trading 
. ; ·~ 
38 
agencies coping with the main trading interests which were predom-
iria.ntly .agricultural and anim<'ll export and cheap consumer goods 
imports·. Both s:pheres of trade were of little practical inter·est 
to Britain. At the same time Britain could use these concessions 
as an extra bargaining card as she did in the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian 
Trade Agre~ment~ Egypt was theoretically given an equal trading 
chance in. Sudan, but obvim1sly the fields of trading activities 
. I 
were implicitly limited •. 
. •.Under·the same 'label'- patriotic, sound British capitalists-
and. i-q · confo~mi ty with. the general policy, there evolved other 
und.erta.kings such as the· Sudan :Light and Pow~r Co. Ltd., Wad11ed-
ani Light and Power Co. Ltd., and the printing and p'.lblishi.ng 
ag~ncy., l"'acCo~quodale and Co. (Sudan). In all.these companies 
the. goirernmi:mt was a sha;reholder and the main financier. The 
companies were operating op behalf of .the government; on a 
similar basis~ though on ·~ smaller ·scale, as the other commercial 
undertakings in Sudan. 
2.7. The. ·Charter. Government Model 
--
The administrative control of the government over econom~c 
ente~:rise, especially cotton:· plantation and transportation, has· 
temp~ed s.ome writ~rs to think that economic develop:!Ilent ·of Sudan 
durin'g, the colonial. period was de·signed to ameliorate the economic 
problem~ through. a. rtationalisa.tion. policy of one form· or ··arlOther. 
A.Ccording to Abd.-al-Raheem: · 
. . 
••• a policy of nationalisation was ·adopted 
··throughout without even the merits or dis-·· 
advantages .of nationali.sation being dis-
cussed. '(55) 
Enough ha/s been said to show the magnitude of ·the administrative 
c.ontrol and administrative all:lance with selected private c~pital. 
. . . ' . . . 
.. · 
But does this control amount to a fully-fledge.d nat:j.onalisation 
. . .. 
policy?. Whatever· the stand is, the many contradiction's that 
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·. cololired .the sistem would not lenq. themselves to a simple conclu.sion. 
:-::. 
The !lypothesi.s which is needed here must first of all resolve 
the inh~rent heterogeneity of aspirations and interests of the co-
- .. ,. ,-,, 
·partners~. This confl:l.'ct ought to regenerate· its own chain reaction. 
The SuQ.an's sit,uapion was by no means the ideal for the. British 
··.·expansion .and ~nte~rise, and the fact tb.at the Bti. tish were not 
. having a • ,f·ree hand in their dealings in Sudan meant that th,e 
·.· .. ·economic Jine ·adopted universally in forma],: dependencies could not 
·. succ.essfully be transplanted. 
The· British enterprise in .Sudan had to· resort to practices 
of informal· trade domination as she did throu.gh charter companies 
in India·, Canada and Latin America. This time, however, the key 
to the British enterprise system had at its convenience the 
experl.ence of modern charter government which was legalised by 
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·changes in International Law in the mid-1880's. The essence of 
this form of govermnent was the right granted to ~harter companies 
to tra.de, ad.mini'ster and finance a terri tory under Imperial lic-
enoe.C56) The immediate. function was to back commercial expansion 
and later fa.cili tate proper annexation. (57) Any attempt to evalu-
ate ·cha.r~er government is· obvio:.1sly beyond the scope of this study. 
Nonetheless, the-significant similarity between this form of govern-
'. 
ment and the British Adrnini strati on in Sudan is worth depicting·. 
Firstly; e3,n important function of the charter government was to 
"form a buffer between the Imperial Gove;r-nment and Foreign States 
which reduce the risks of international friction and war. "(58 ) 
The Sudan Government with. its inherent_ 'chartered government' 
elements·.· co:ild obviate the . Anglo-French· Friction in Fashoda in 
1899. · More significant was the pe:J:'manent need for such a buffer 
. 
between the co-existing British·and Egyptian interests. Secondly, 
the S~d~n Governm-ent; as we have seen earlier, had to depend on 
its own resources for financing economic schemes and administration. 
It .ls easy to see the resemblance in this respect with the modern 
charter~ It was :n,oticed by Lord Lugard in 1921 that modern 
charter; 
' ' 
~ •• · ste3,rted as an administration, the expenses 
of which were to be met from commercial profits -
in theory to be exercised without monopoly. (59) 
As .far as monopolies were concerned, the Brit~sh Administration in 
Sudan hadapparently rejected the idea by refusing to grant con-
·cessions: fo+· some interested private investors on long-ter.m lease 
basis. · But that was only one form of monopoly. Oligopoly was 
at leastthe common practice by the various syndicates. The 
Sudan·mai'kets and produce were virtually a monopoly to Britain,-
th.e Em.plre. ·and Egypt. Thirdly, in the charter govern11ent there 
is a ·clear distinction between the administrative and commercial 
bodies. The best economic results wo:1ld be attained by an 
independent specialised business. ma.nagement while the prestige of 
the administration could be maintained. The British Administration 
in Sudan, more thah any other government, had to .maintain a 
balance betwe€m thel?e two o~jecti ves. 
. . 
Tli'e administration was expected to m.g,intain a workable 
relati~.nshi:p bet~een the different parties while, at· the same time, 
it was also· excessively committed to British enterprise. On this 
consideration·. the charter government model· was progressively 
implemented especially after.1906. By that time the rush for 
mineral exploration-created by ·London mining syndicates under the 
. . . . . . (60)* 
auspices 9f the ·Foreign Office, was attended with little success. 
Once this bypo.thesis is verif:Led,- one car~ understand the 
natural development of the private-public relationship. The 
. mod.el. was successful in creating a system that harnessed differ-
ences between :public and private investment and· drew both in one 
· and t:he 'same .direction •. 
Bufa~:extrel!le.and striking illustration of the failure of 
this form of government is provided. by: 
·· (a) its incapacity to regenerate the economic 
structure. This came about as a result of 
neutralising the positive effect of investment. 
(b) the rigid institution that created an adverse 
climate for the natural process of development, 
as it largely shut•off the flow of capital and 
consigned whatever was available to very narrow 
---------·~---·----
*·.A cri ttcal view is given in 8"hapter 8. 
fieldsof investment. All this was.under strict 
guidance to comply with the very objective of. the 
economic model. · 
Und~riining the pros and cons of the charter govern~ent model 
)' 
is the fabric of spatial organisation. It is not the shape of the· 
railway or the .degree of connectivity that matters as m•1ch as 
freightage charge policies and cost differentials between export 
co~nodities and imported goods. The charter government had a 
definite role,of.pro:noting export-import trade, yet had the 
obligatiqn .of raising cap:L tal whether jointly with government, or 
privately •. ~-By creat:Lng a modern sector and drawing the traditional 
sector into. intern9.tional trade, a dual economy was fostered. The 
reso·:.rrces of one were the seeds of existence for the other. In-
. ' . . 
equity -'of in'corries a:hd standards further projected the mal-distribu-
tion o':r:· utili.zation- 'bf resources, thus paving the road for in-
migration. Furthermore, the. centrality inherent in the a·dmini stra-
ti ve .side of .the charter government was reinforced by co::runercial 
headquarte::r:-s. Likewise, the ad:inini strati ve urban hierarchy was 
supported by the commercial collection and distribution channels 
'· 
of exp.or.t-import trade. Since the rewards for the selected firms 
of the· ¢harter government w'ere in the form of high profit m;'3.rgins, 
a·~d since ~eal th iS security for raising mo're capital, the CUJn\lla-
ti ve eff~.ct i.s .paramount. In turn, taxes, transfer and surcharges 
from these. s~lected firms, . was a substantial proportion of the 
government revenue. .Within the spatial context, these transactions 
were performed at the most convenient point for government and 
commerce -in the eapital city, or Prime Base. 
In conclusiori, th~ need for understanding the distinctive 
impact ()f eaP,i tal investment policies in this framework is of con-
,I" 
sidera'ble importance. Firstly, because industry was direct~y 
.. \ 
affected.ori·the decision-makLng level, secondly, the performance 
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of commercial plantation, infrastY~cture and business and trade 
was cons~derably influenced by .the new paradigm. The fact remains 
. that, ··under the circu.nstances ~ the running of these .sectors 
necessitated their own rules and created their own in.sti tutions 
which shm1ld be the. starting point of industrial location analysis 
in. 'developing' countries. How m:1ch influence these institutions 
have had on economic development and industrial location is the 
theme of the subsequent two chapters • 
... ·. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH BEFORE 1956 
3.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter has suggested from the charter govern-
ment model. that capital investment was restricted in character and 
magnitude between 1899 and 1955. Despite that, a profound struct-
ural transformation of the Sudanese economy took place during the 
colonial rule this cent~, especially in the direction of .'system-
atic' agriculture, public utili ties and social services. However, 
the same charter government contained the very elements that 
arrested the pace of economic growth and perpetuated a state of 
economic impoverishment. This chapter seeks to explain the anomalies 
of the model through an exposition of the economic processes and 
interactions. 
At the heart of this process was the promotion of the export-
import trade through an initial, though restricted, capital outlay 
and a strict management by the colonial administration of.the money 
supply and expenditure. In the absence of the application of tech-
nology to the productive factors, two hypotheses are in order: 
Firstly, the productive system would only create a marginal surplus, 
concentrated in the hands of a dominant group or groups, at a 
prominent location, i.e. the tripartite capital of Khartoum, Omdurman 
and Khartoum Bahri- the Prime Base.* Secondly, industrial ventures 
were either suppressed, discouraged, or appeared less remunerative 
through the biases of the economic system. 
3.2 The Formation of a Primary Export Base: Phase I 
The first economic steps taken by the new colonial government 
* In this chapter a broad identification of the processes that led 
to polarisation is considered. However, a full discussion of the 
term Prime Base and the forces behind it is given in Chapter 4. 
49 
in Sudan in 1898 were to engender a reversal of policy by S\vi tchi.ng 
from the closed subsistence economy .managed by the National govern-
ment (1882-1898) to an open export economy. The objectives \·Jere 
simple: ·to re..;.instate the country as a producer.of primary .materials 
' .. ' . . . 
in order ·.to. !neet management and public spending costs, while, at the 
same timer, providing cheap raw materials and soft :markets for the 
colonial co-partners within the framework of the Smithi.an model of 
. . . . . 
free trade, and the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage. 
Th~ lack of trans:p:Jrt and harbo·u.r facilities were the main 
practical o')J9tacles to an immediate 'grafting' of the Sudan's 
economy 'to·international trade. Egypt was obliged to finance such 
schemes on. the premise th:ft an undeveloped Sudan. woul~ only be a 
worthless posseE;sion ~ a continuo·~s burden on 'b.er finances, and a 
threat to. her .security and water supply. (1 ) The Egyptian advances 
were forthco:ming in the form of annual contributions to balance an 
estimated deficit in Sudan's budget, a.redeemable government credit, 
and an over-draft ~th.the National Bank of Eg;ypt (a total of 
£E9.02 mfllion).C 2) Of all capital advances 85.1 per cent were 
. . 
allocated to.transportation and communication and harbour facilities. 
Meariwhiie, Eg.ypt was increa.singly becoming the master of the 
export~impo~t trade of Sudan', and in g()od years prior to 1925 she 
was handling,. on average, more than 65 per cent of B:udan' s trade. (3) 
. Egypt's task was to revitalise trade through channels only too well 
known to he:r from previous Turko-Egyptian experience in Sudan (1820-
1882), 13:rid through agents well acquainteQ. with Sudanese produce, 
Sudanese traders and trade centres. The bulk of export trade con-
tinued to be collected natural products :.mainly gum. Arabic, and wild 
game produce such as ostrich feathers and ivory.C4 ) Towards the 
mid~1925's this picture was increasingly changing in favour of 
agricultural' production, the o~tcome of cultivation and animal 
husbandry. The new list of exports included sesame,, dura (sorghum 
vulgare) anim•ils, hides and skins, and cotton.· The production of 
the latter-was promoted along the main Nile by the provision of 
credit facilities fro::n the Sudan Government, (int.erest rate at 7~ 
per cent, ·r~deemable over three years, ( 5) and in. the Gezira as a 
I 
rain crop th.ro·Qgb, finan.ciai · r.ewa~ds. ( 6 ) 
Before the completion of the Red Sea railway line in 1906, 
. . . 
export was· trans-shipped th:i:-ough the Nile Valley - Halfa ro·:1te. 
Clearly, diverting trade to the Red Sea wo:lld challenge Egypt's 
control over Sudc;mese produce and for. that reason .she was adamantly 
critical of the new railway line. But the British-influence in 
Egypt, and the British argument were too strong: it was a quest ion 
of .c.reatin·g"trade that COUld never flO'llriSh without an outlet to 
the Red Seac~nd the world.C7) 
·In ·strict secrecy however, the British were preparing their 
master plan for agricultural development in Sudan - the grand 
cotton proJect - and watched with some unease the unrestricted 
trade links b~tween Egypt and Sudan. (B) In Britain's view Egypt's 
financial involvement in Sudan, though cri tica;L, ·should not exceed 
t_he Jimi t of providing for infrastructual development.. Any contri-. 
bution t·owards other economic sectors would further her claim on 
Sudan as was explicit in the argument of Lord Kitchener quoted 
above, and_in the·manner the National·Bank of Egypt was dealt with. 
On.the one hand, money from this financial institution was most 
welcome fo+ railway building. Writing privately in 1910, Wingate 
. . . . 
expressed)1is eagerness to receive Egyptian money: 
I·-had heard a good. deal before I left Cairo about 
the negotiations for the National .Bank Loan for 
· ·· tl:J.e co::npletion of the railway to El Obeid and 
am very. glad it has been finally arranged •. (9) 
But when loans for the promotion of the projected'. Gezira Scheme were 
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in question, the req1:1est of the National Bank of Egypt to .make 
advances w~s tactfully declined,as was disclosed by Wingate in 
1913: 
Of cou.rse I should like· to see the arrangement 
:. in the hands of the Bank of England, and I think 
Lord Kitchener's plan, of more or less saddling 
the British Governm.en t with the final decision 
and thus relieving us of the onus of r~fusing 
. the National Bank of Egypt's request, is so·illld. ( 10) 
One !IlOnth later everything fell into itS 
was grarit:ed, t.o the National . Bank. ( 11 ) 
right place; nothing 
• .I··. 
·. significantly, all Egyptian advances and subvention were 
. . 
. . . 
stopped when the Gezira loan was authorised by the British Treasury 
in 1913. it was anticipated that Sudan sho:ild pay her own way from 
exportproceeds arid trade. Apparently all the pre-requisites to 
steer ~p,e- export ecopomy along a different co·J.rse were well in 
hand. By·then the Egyptian do:.ninance over Sudanese trade was 
gradually slackening and giving way to direct trading with Britain 
. . . 
and »J.~ope. (12) It. so happened however, that thistrend and the 
scheduled ,'start of. the. cotton scheme were instantly hal ted by· the 
First ·wo:rid· War, and soon the economy relapsed into the previous 
. .. 
pattern. of ·export of. surplus food and raw materials to Egypt. One 
practice that was never to be resorted to again was external or 
d~ficit financing • 
. ?~ 3 · The :Primary' ~x.;Qort Base: Phase II 
The.inauguration of the Gezira Scheme :mid-way thro:1.gh the life 
. sp.:in of the colonial . co-partnership' in 1925, marked the second 
·phase of <leve.lopirig primary exports, and necessitated an· organisa-
tion.al overhaul'. stretching over the political, administrative and 
productive systems. Limi. ting o:n d.{ scussion to the latter, it is 
noticeable that the Gezira Scheme involved capital .and technology 
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on a scale unprecedented in Sudan~ But the extent to ,,rhich that 
capital and· technology was productive of growth and structural 
. . . . . ' . 
. , . : . 
change wa·s probably disproportionately insignificant. T:he machinery 
imported to produce cement, build the niasoriry walls of Sennar Dam 
and cut deep into the Gezir.a clays was briefly commissioned and 
ended with the completion of the scheme. What emerged in contrast 
to t"):le first phase was a more.secure system for primary production-
capable o:n.iy ~l.horizontal expansion- and a free hand to the 
British, ·enabling them to sell and buy cotton thro·J.gh the British 
' ~ .. 
Cotton Growi·ng Association. The British share of Sudan's export 
trade rose .from ·42.3 per cent in 1920 to 66.7 per cent in 1925, to 
. 77.1 ;per -¢~_nt·£n 1929• Conversely, export to Egypt was progressively 
d{mini~hing·f:rom 45·.s·per cent to 13.7 per cent and 9.6 per cent 
for corresponding ;years. C 1 3) 
Altho\lgh the Gezira Scheme was designed.with expansion in mind 
in order to minimise future overhead costs, the area under cultivation 
' . . . . . 
w~s :on;I.y slwg.i-shly. expandi:n.g after the peak of 1930/31. ( 14 ) Neither 
the rneag:r·~ c~pital resou..rces, nor the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement 
,· .· ·... . . . 
would al:J.ow any spectacular develop:n.ent. Until such time ·as these 
cbn$t;rairits "\N .. ere all~viated, there could not be n11~ch hope for· 
cotton expapsion. ·However, Egypt's plans to build a dam on the 
White Nile wer~ seen in Sudan. in 1914 as a new.so'.lrce of money · 
supply: 
••• the construction of the dam [Jebel Auliya] 
will mean a claim on the part of the Sudan 
Government for a very considerable sum for 
compensation to the inhabitants •. (15) 
Eq_uCJ.lly'. i:rqportant ·was ·the new storage capacity of about three milli-
ard, cubic· ri1etres of 'untimely' water which wo~d raise water to 
• 
levels that wm.lld per.mi t lift irrigation on. the White Nile.. A new 
sou·rce of fin;ancing and a new technology - ·water pwnps - were 
.~ . 
. •, ... 
. ~ ~ ~ . "' .. 
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simultaneously injected into the ecopomy in 1936. The o:1.tco.me 
was the White Nile Livelihood. Schemes, for cotton prod.uction. 
These were run by a government board on a similar tenancy system 
as that of·the Gezira. On the White Nile banks too, private pump 
schemes for cotton were developed with a high growth rate after . 
the Second World War. 
As for--the informal sector, the counterpart of · 1 systematic 1 
agriculture,_ 'the process of development was less. homogeneous and 
entailed ~no new technology nor. capital influx, though in it self 
it was adequately conunerciaii sed, especially the production of gu.n 
Arabic, sesame, sorghwn (sorghum vulgare) and groundnuts. Labour, 
land, and water were the major factors of production. As population 
was ·contim.lt:sly increasing, and land was_ abundant, variability and 
ttmi.ng of_rain was the most crucial constraint ·o~ exp9.nsion. Other 
factc)rs we;e pri:ces, proximity of cultivated land to transport fac-
il~ties,,-_t~xes·cind royalties, elasticity of .demand; the degree of 
absorptio~ into <the c·ash ~cono.my, and availability of cred.i t facil-
.. ~· : ' 
itie·~~-, 
· Two 'di st1nguishi.ng elements appear to underly the vario':.ls 
systems· of production so far descri be·d. In theory, one would expect 
in~e:r~regional income differentials proportionate to capital inves-
ted, techno}:ogy applied, type and volu:ne of produce, means of 
w~tering,. EtP.d productivity i.n general. Al tho:1gh no serious attempt 
was 'made .to _weigh these variations, they were probably rather .mini-
_ mal. P:pqfitability of the whole productive-system relied heavily 
on :tJ:le ;low price.d .labo:.Ir factor rather than technological change 
and raising of productivity. This led. to the marginalisation of 
re:turns accr!ling 1;o the .labouring comnuni ty. 
. . . . . ' . 
The Gezira tenants; allegedly the highest paid 'peasants in 
.' 
. . . ' 
the country, were.liv:Lng on an ann-:.1al cash income averaging 
LS ··17 per ten~nt for· the years 1955/65, (16) in addition to a 
subsistence crop grown in rotation with cotton. One cause for 
this low :·ine:o:me is pro"Sably the unjust sharing of the production 
~ost·b~twe.en the tripartite~ p9.rtners i.e. the Sudan Plantation 
Syndicate, the. tenants,· and the Govern::nent. Tenants were held 
67 per cent of the total 
. . . 
opera tlon: costs, including so :me 40 per cent of a joint account -
marketing' .tr~~spo~t' ginning' insurance etc.' and the whole of 
. . .. 
the actual i.n.:..the-f:leld production costs such as sowing, ploughing, 
ciea'Q.ing; .. s:Praying, fertilisation, pulling cotton stalks. 
' . . ·. . (·, . 
Probably more detrimental to income .differentials was the 
~ . ' ' I •' ' 
parcelling out of: income .between the various production factors, 
i ~·e~ ···lab;·u.r·;, land and capftal. The bulk of income from. the Gezira 
was pa~tly.' :t;epatriated as dividend$ to. sh:;reholders ip Britain and 
partly transferred to the central treasury at Kh?-rtou.m as an 
· ... '; 
ihdispens.able part of the publ i.e reven·J.e. The financing of the 
White N'iie. p'tmlp schemes .was altogether different. This was 
achi.eved.through the commercial banks, whose income was expanding 
· .steaQ.il!:~fte; the.depression of the 1930's and the boom years 
shortly .a,ft~·r the Second World _War.· F9r these commercial insti tu-
ti'ons, bbrrowi~g froil'the Bank of Egypt and head.offices in 
Eur'ap~ ·at·. an interest· rate of three per cent was also becoming 
. . . . 
. . 
readily ayailable.. The banks wo"..lld normally make short term credit 
and co'llect their money after crop sales at ·an interest rate of up 
to seven per cent.C17) The other beneficiary to whom advances 
were made··, ·was· a. small group of 'Notables' spearheaded by the two 
~ . . . . 
r.eligious l·~aders of. the Ansar and Khatmiyya. sects, in addition to 
.•' \. 
or 'iri coordinatio'n with land owners, tribal leaders, and .commercial 
entrepr€meurs •. ·· Tl;le sharing of the proceeds was similar to that of 
· ... 
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'· 
.the Gezira whereby the tenant gets a percentage for his labo~IT 
from net.profit thro'..lgh shouldering a larger proportion of cost 
including· ._50 per cent of the joint account and all 'in-the-
field lab.'::rU.r I • Unlike the Ge zira' the owner' whether alone or 
in partnership gets tll.e other half of net proceeds. By virtue 
' . 
of its location at Khartoinr or affiliation to the Kharto:.un 
institl..ltions, this group immediately transferred.money to the 
. :. . . : 
Prime Bas~. in the form of interest repayments, commercial under-
tak~ngs, :consumer goqds and in real estate and savings.· A. sub-
. ~ . ' . . ' . 
stEmtial part. of the proceeds WO'..lld also 'be repatriated outside 
the .co·(lntry thro:1gh conunercial banks as profits and b:::>rrowing 
repay.ment;s> . 
. .. ·· 
· . The· next main subsystem involved a systematic transferrance 
of money from the. rain . .:.fed 'agricultural' regions and grazing land 
to the Prime Base thro~gh a. chain of hierarchies cen.tralised at 
. . . 
Khartmxm in the hands of the exp:::>rt-import companies and commercial 
. entrepre.neur_s·~. ·.The commercialisation of the rural segment of the 
community. irrvol ved . the pro vision of goods in credit to provincial 
. ' . . - ' . . 
trad~;i:{who: irf 't~r~ supplied corisu;ner goods to village shop keepers. 
·: , 
. The mB+giD.s ofprofit tend. to increase towards the Prime Base. The 
:;.-
'~ . ··.. .. lo~e'st: link in th],s chain assumed the. pmction of cred.i tors to 
a,gr],.cuitu:r.ali sts at a· high margin of ppofi t. When the produce 
. ·'· ·. . . '.• 
b.a~·been h~?-·rve·ste¢! it would. be appropriated by this tiny gro:xp 
and .. transferred to .catchment areas~ :Whether the produce wa:s sold 
by auction or otherwise, middlemen, provincial traders and company 
a~ents WO:.lld buy t~ secure the vast margin between local prices 
and, Khart6·cun or overseas prices •. Co.mmercial·banks were also 
~· .. 
involved as ·.the whole. trade had a short 'gestation period and a 
:h.~gh margin ·of profit. Again, those who were categorised by the 
ba'nks' as. creciit-worthy wo·u.ld be able to purchase 1arge .volumes of 
. . . 
the· produce and reap vast profits, and consequently money 1vould · 
move along a simil~r channel as described for consumer goods. 
. . 
Th~s perpetu.a,lly reinforces the prominence of Khartoum as the 
centre Qf. financial . transaction and commercial activities. 
From this general survey it is evident that an unrestricted 
process of polarisation. was taking place with the. ultimate outcome 
' . . -· 
. . . 
of enriching the Prime Base to the detriment of all ·other regions. 
However, the ·s·ame process was by no :means isolated from the 
management of" public finance and by-laws, the overall size of 
I • . ' 
:: J 
export~i:rnport·trade and income from trade, and the policies that 
confined.developinent to agriculture and· trade •. This is the theme 
'• . ,. 
ot'':the next sub-sections~ 
. ',•. 
3 .• 4;. The -Fiscal. System. and Monetary Base 
- . 
"! -~ •.' ~ • .•• 
The financial limitations and dearth of capital in Sudan 
loomed .large.in the di scus$ion on investment, and indeed have had 
.. 
an ever-lasting influence over the monetary base and fiscal policy, 
. especiai l;Y' -~ft~r the co.::n:mi tment to financial self ... reliance in 4 94 3o 
With respect_ to this o'bligation, the governmen~ followed a consis-
.tent: ecdrtomic llnE/wb.'ereby it 'became dir.ectly ±irvolved in ·the 
· prbductiv·~ sector, monitoring foreign tra<I.e ·and shaping demand 
t:q.rough _.P~bl{c finance, taxes, and price stabili~ation programmes. 
Tt .is o·U.r .task· .in this sub-sec.tion to unravel tt.e spatial connota-
tiot1s that. ~uch policies wo·:.Ild create. 
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rt· was anticipated by the administration that that mo'bilisation 
of domes_tic :r:esources within the charter government model would 
increase the national income and permit the growth of public revenue. 
But i.nc:r:ease and g:powth in this form of economy were both dependent 
va~iaoi.es· mtich affected bY the underlying :Lnvestment stringencies 
· aria· uncertaiirty_ of. production and prices. In a~tempting t.o minimise 
. ·.' '•, . . 
... 
~ ' . ' 
• ! .• 
• • ~·>.I •:, 
·.•, .:. ' ... 
. . • ':. • .... ·.~.~ l . 
the negative ·effect of these forces a restrictive fiscal p~licy· 
was· introd'll.ced to equ.i.librate the erratic changes of pric·es .and 
production; in a bid to m~e go~:i the deficits of bad years. It 
follows that public ~X:pendit~re and private investment were both 
co.ntinmUiy .belhg. restrained. Public revenue was consequently 
maintained at a level that. would frequently perili.i t accUmulation 
.of mo:mey to pe. passed to the various statutory reserve funds, and 
private investm.ent' .·vias confined, in the main, to agriculture and 
for~ign trade •.. Profits were either·repatriateq., rec;ycled.in the 
same e'conbJ.1lJc .fields or invested in unproductive transactions such 
as r~al est~te, lending,· ·hoardings, or otherwi.se dtrectly consu.:ned. 
;: Mo.st :.9f the ~ttributes · char.acterising these .e?ono.m.i.c processes 
.... 
. 
di-rectl~ .emanate from the concepts of a balanced budget, reserve 
:.funq.,E?, apd .se~·f-:-sufficiency, and ~ere widely accepted. fiscal dogma 
. . 
throughoutBritish Tropical AfricB;· The guidelines were aptly 
desc:ribed by E.A_. Brett in '1973: 
. Britain '.s central concern in this area [fiscal 
.. · .. :;:PoLLey] was to ensure. colonial self-sufficiency 
and balanced budgets. The first objective of 
:·ahy administration was to pay for all its 
. :: ... .-.. ser:yices· qu.t of recurrent revenue; having 
. onc·e 'achieved this, to ensure that it main-
'.·· .. tainE:)d suf~icient .reserves to meet con.tingenci.es 
··arising o.·~t ·of economic failures qf any sort. (18) 
Th,~ theoret'ical base of such fiscal polic:i,.es was-.probably the relic 
.. 
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of. mercarrtilism. Thi.s was a doctrine with a prime concern to· procure 
··. 
·a favourable· bai.ance ·of trade thro·J.gh Etxpansion .. of exports and 
·· p:r:otecticmism, and .to pile up as m·.1ch preciou.s bullion as possible 
to fin::tnce -~he esser1tials (the army and later, in neomercantilism, 
. the pro:iuctive -sect'or), and save the balance. as a war-chest.C19). 
~he_ strict observance of these monetary 'rituals' by Sudan 
I adtninistrat:Lnn was well docurnen:ted in the va~:j.ou.s issues of official 
.·reports and p:Iblications.. The adoption· of a fi seal system which 
· ... ·, . 
.. 
.·· ., .. 
does not err·on the side of severity and control·over state 
e:Xpend;i.ture was adopted by the Sudan administration in 1902 as 
. t" 1 . 1" ( 20) d . f t h h d b t l"ttl . ~·prac Lca,~po 1cy, an 1n ac .as c ange u ·1 e. s1nce 
' . . . 
then. Th~ s;3.me me.asures designed to reduce public expenditure 
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and close'tli~·account. without deficit were successfully imple-
mented dur~Il.g the. First World War. In subsequent cycles ·Of goo:i 
pro·O-uction 8;ndjo·r prices, the drive was for improving the .popition . 
.. 
of r~ ~erve- funds: .. : 
. Revenue remained buoyant and provided budget 
·surpluses which enabled the policy of strength-
e!}ing the underlying reserve position to "!:>e 
·.continued. (21) . · . 
It ·app~a;s·- that the maxim of. sound finance, arid. the success. of 
th~ tib.ole ~~p,~r~tion was attained when Sir John Maffey' s term. of 
tenure ended as Governor-General in '1932: 
· [He]· ha~' t:he satisfaction· of knowing that he 
has left behind him a peaceful cou.nt:r,:'y ~nd a. 
balanced budget. (22) - · ·. · 
.· Inde~d ·-the nE?ed to dip· into· reserves had occasionally recurred and 
. . . . 
was .acknowledged a·s. being contrary to sound finance'· but. it should 
be emphasised that such course of action was an integral part of 
the whole·J?rocess, and to suggest that that was a deviation fro.m 
the orth~dox· 'b.al~:n~ed budge.t.', ·as A.A. Beshai did, is plainly a 
misapprehension of.the main theme. ( 23). 
Iri view of the import~nce o:f reserve funds as an equilibrating 
:factor' \.a thin. the· f:i_sca;L. system, it is necessary to sketc}l other 
·functions that relate to the two· bro.9.d types of reserve funds. 
::. 
Government reserve fund 
:.:-:-~.~ 
·~: '' . , .' 
In the handsof the central treasury, reserve funds, consti-
t~teO, q_n~ffect, excess money over recurrent expenditure collected 
through taxes (direct and indirect), in addition to returns on 
' . . . 
government's share in agricultural schemes •. rn.one respect, 
reserve funds· could thus be operated as a dai:nper on the internal 
price structure whenever an inflationary gap appears on the 
horizon as a result of good yields and/or good· prices. Tax 
· increases oi more than 100 per cent were quite co.m..mon 
during such times, (the First world War, after the 1921 recession, 
. after the 1930's depression, ·during the Second World War and 
lastly, duri.~g the 'Korean boom' (1951)). ( 24 ) Incomes were con-
tinally·. beirig 'checked' by syphoning newly won money thro~gh various 
'monetary dev:Lces'int~ reserye·f~nds. 
1?rob.9.bly the most conspicuo·us of all re·serve funding was the 
Price· Stabilisation Scheme conducted as a co;1nter inflationary 
measure during the Second World War. An official agency, the 
United Kir:~gdom · :Joinrriercial Agency, was made responsible for conduct-
ing' Sudan.·' ·s ·.export· trade; buying internally at low prices and 
' selling', in. theory' at the '·ruling inflationary price overseas~ 
The difference· wo:1ld be passed to a price stabilisation account 
with tP.e. {q:.q~tfon of iU.l?sidj..sing the price of po~e imports. But 
the scheme did not function in this way. Firstly, it sho:1ld be 
\.. l ··": :.· :i··, ·'' 
' ... 
stressed that when' sanctio~ing this scheme the govern:nent was only 
referring to a small fraction of Sudan 1 s produce (about one tenth 
. of: export by value) that wo·:1ld freely be sold at the ruling prices • 
. ' ' 
.Thus cotton,· cotton-.seed, livestock, a:pd hides and skins that con-
. . . . . . ' . ' . 
·., stitllteQ. ~ilp: to 
,. ·. ,)', .. 
90 per cent of export's by value at the ttme, 
·.were<:sold; ·on behalf of Sudan, by the aforesaid agency to Britain 
and ,~gypt' SJ,t artificially lo·tJ" prices: 
· .. <It· was 9-ecided to let the purchaser h~ve the 
· ·· benefit of· the Sudan 1 s low-priced economy as 
·• :iri the case of sales of cotton to the United 
· .K:i,ngdom .and of animals to the Middle East 
· ' · · Foree s. ( 2 5) 
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As lor1g as_the gains to the producer and trader were fixed, the 
margin of 'profit fro:::n export . trade vmuld h::tve in no way impaired 
the anti-inflation~ry measures adopted. Any extra money vmuld 
. . . . 
. have b~eii simiiarly passed to reserv~ fund~ •. ·· But the foreign 
admini~t:ration opted to sacrifice Sudan Is leg;i..timate right in 
': .. 
the·.in~.e;r::~sts of the co~p::trtners, and literally robbed the country 
of millions. of. poJ_nds in the n::tme of price st::tbilisation. 
' . ~ . 
. . . Another function. of the. reserve funds was. to safeguard 
r'orei gn investment arid en sure pro~pt credit rep::tyment s. In the 
case of·· Sudan thi.s was carried a step further. Reserve funds 
.could. free~y be called upon by the mother cquntry whenever they 
. ' ' 
·exceeded a -·.certain margin~ The begLnning of the Second World War 
witnessed an inexplicable drain of Sudanese .reserve currency. 
More' :tb.a:ii ·£E3~ 3 million were passed to the British· Treasury to 
redeem1.35-yE?ar loan~ whi~h sho·:J.ld have been mature in 1959. And 
... , 
. in 1946 pudan- w::ts made responsible for financing the occupation 
. ' ' 
army! c( sum of ne~~ly £E6 million.(26 ) In 1942 another £E0.44 
millio:n. was .paid prematurely for buildings taken over fro!ll the 
Plantation Syndicates. The companies were to pay an annu::tl rent 
for'th~ same b.uildings. Lastly, a su:n of £EO. 3 million was also 
. . . . . . 
advan¢ed···a:s a ~a;,...time gift to British and Indian ·governm·ents in 
· .. recogni tio~·.of th~ir services in Sudan. ( 27) 
. ,This appalling dissipation of re~erves had .deprived the 
·cd'.intry :sr· ya.lu::tble ·capital and eliminated the .. ~hances of produ,c-
, . . 1. .·· '• . • 
'·' 
'tive re~investmeilt· and economic growth in the period that follo·.ved 
3•4. 2. Prod.ucers' reserve funds 
Prod.ucers' reserve funds were sanctioned in the mid-1930's 
so 
a~ ,equal~saticm devices to cushi()n the effect of seasonal variations 
.. · · ... · . . :. 
o.f.productlon and/or pric~s on real income, and to repay _out-
stand;ing d~bts incurred in the depression years and any such 
debts in :subsequent seasons. Towards the end of foreign rule 
in 1955_, the Gezira Tenants Reserve Fund, the most im:;?~rtant of 
all such· :funds, was kept at the stB.tutory ceil~ng of £E. 3 .:nillion. 
This figure is considered to be very lo;.v in comparison with 
rese.rves•of mar~eting boards in other African cou.ntries.C 28 )· The 
economic value of.the GeziraTenants Reserve Fund was also 
questioned by Beshai .on· the g:::·otin<l that payments were freq1.1ently 
mac:_e when they were _'least needed and co:1.ld only embellish the 
system '::tb,at thrived on. dissipation of occasio"nal trade gains on 
import.edconsumer g~ois.C 29) 
: ' . . . 
As seen.'· thliS far, to. 'implement the principles of mercantilism 
. in a dep:en_dent economy was an easy task. With. a free hand· and a 
~ilenced 6p:pos:ltion., the administration could freely raise taxes, 
. -
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reduc~ expetlditure, give price concessions tothe foreign p:Irchaser, 
manipulate people's demand and keep it in '1.ar.mony with 9. chB.ngeable 
-·income •.. This was :the fiscal stability that p~ecluded inflationary 
13aps and r.e'-:-investment, and muddled the country ·into a spiral of 
-spendin~' on: foreign consUmer goods. As a consolidating factor, 
~he qankLng_system was tightly geared to the ~gyptian system, and 
1·oca1 ·cu:rrency in circ·ulation was readily convertible into foreign. 
. . ' . . 
exch:m.ge' .and credit was conducted with the. seasonal peak coinciding 
'· . . ' . 
witn_ the:.gro·Ning season. Deficit fin9.n·cing was 9.Voided at -all cost • 
. ,, ,· 
However, the price to be paid was the confinement of the whole 
eco:norny·in _a position of no real progress. The outcome of similar 
enco,unte_rs in Latin America was pin-pointed by C. Furtado ( 1964): 
..... 
. . . . ' 
· ·~.. the cost of. avoiding inflation and externa:j_ 
·. ·: Cliscquili bri urri is high: stagnation, or at least.,-
-.a .restricted· rate of growth. (30) 
' .. ' 
It i$ logical to expect that restricted public expen1iture 
and g~owt:h·:would have serious consequences on a variety of 
. devel"o:p::nental aspects. Foremost was the curbing of spen1ing on. 
adm:Lni~tration, p:1blic utili ties and social overhead costs . 
.. ·, .· 
Centralisatio~ of·govern:nent, adopted without exception in African 
: . : ~ . . . . . 
dependencies, wa·s a direct outcome. :[n soJle parts, including 
.... 
Sudan~. p9l:lticai 'devolution' in varying degrees was granted 
whereby native'rule was incorporated into the colonial administra-
tive machinery p.:irticipating. 'in judicial matters, maintenance of 
I• 
law and ord,e:r, and in tax collection etc~ Tribal heads and 
surrogates. tins enjoyed both social distinction and materialistic 
rewards· in· the sense that the wealth of this gro·:1p was m·,lltiplying 
arid it~> chances of betterment were furthered through the biases of 
the ··educational and: admin:istrati ve systems that favoured .its heirs. 
• .. '·· 
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W:lth the expansion of exports, .impo::-ts, population and education, 
' . . 
the c~ntral .. go~ernment expanded in shee:r n·.lln~er of personnel and 
offices thus consolidating the rille of the cent.ral .departments in 
Kharto:im. Furthermore, the bureaucracy had to accommo1ate school 
and. colle~e leavers who '/'Jere progressively .aiul tiplying and swamping 
the: g~ye;n.:nent department~ of the Prime Base.: · 
c)~·: :t:he other hand, the trading co:nm·:1ni ty as described within 
.the context.of the charter governnent mo1el·depicted th~ same 
.. centr~l~tj· concept and formed a powerful ally ~Ari.th the central 
. . . 
· ~·overnwe?t, .and .constituted a solid pressure group by virt'.le of 
{ts'contrlbution to the central treasury. As early as.1.908 a 
. cha:i:nper of commerce was initiated and had 'considerable weight in 
.m.:ltters .of.profi t margins and prices, tax rates, money in circula-. 
( ~. ' 
tion, .. wag;es and salaries and more significantly on the service 
. . ... 
· ·E?e.ctor, .wh{ch was tailored to suit the requirements of its members. 
·~·· 
· .. , .. 
1:. 
The interaction of all 'these groups created the impulse 
that characterised the Prime Base with its for~idable power to 
polarise and perpetuate. Thus the understanding.of the build-up 
to 9. mercantile economy is fundamental to any explanation of 
. . 
· indust:,rial location in Sudan and simila:r;- ·countries. 
3. 5 Gro·wth . Thro ugQ~ade. 
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·.,I . '• 
In "the· preced:i_ng discussion we have examined 'b9.lanced budget'· 
and '.reserve fUDdS I ·as two fiscal deViCeS to ~(tigate Capital 
shortage •. and induce development and structural change. One further 
' . . 
co:a:iponE:mt deemed necessary by the colonial. administration for the 
realisation of these' objectives was self-suffici~ncy within the 
i'rame~ork of the Bri;tish Empire. For Sudan, that meant in practice, 
· the break.:.;aw~y from autarky which. the cmintry. enjoyed· during the 
brief'self~rule (1882-1898). But the call for 'self-sufficiency' 
reduced 'tb.~ country to 9. state of perpetu.al· insufficiency' whereby 
importabJe consumer·goods gradually replaced _ho:rie-made articles, 
c~eated ne.w_ones; an(i activated new desires, tastes and wants. In 
' . 
it 8 'e:btiret.y; this affected spending patterns; earning gro:.vth rate,· 
and th'e capacity to invest and develop. Since expansion of imports 
is indicative of export growth it is often assumed th9.t the quaii ty 
of life is up~graded thro:1gh tr9.de.. In the m•3antime, it suffices 
to mention that the policy gllide-lines were .deeply seated in the 
.concepts:of' c0mparative advantage and_gains ·from specialisation. 
· · . -~~t :us explo.re the argu:nent embodied in the international 
.traQ.~ .thesis. In its simplest model, it could be ascertained that 
·· .anj' two .·trading. partners cb'.lld gain from trade and specialisation. 
'. 
·rrhi$ ·-was ·the· classic f~undation laid by D~ Ricardo and later incor-
;or~ted. in:. t~·e· .exposition of .John Stuart Mill. (31 ) However, the 
eX:p1ici t conclusions on terms of trade and :developrr!E~nt were formal-
ised by R.· Torrens. (32 ) His advocacy v.ras that industrialised 
n·ations would in the long run suffer a deterioration of the terms 
of trade ·(i.e. the ratio of· export and import price indices), 
. . •' 
because of the diminishing ret-urns of agriculture and the decrease 
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·of marginal productivity of the production factors in the primary 
prod.ucirig countries; whereas industrialised co~ntries progressively 
' . . . 
cut back ·on production costs with an increase in margin:::~.l prod.uct-
:Cvity'~ . "These. views were taken :1p by J.I'1. Keynes early .this century 
with some emphasi"s on:the law of di:rn.i.ni.shi:qg returns in primary 
production and pop:1lation gro'/lth in Western ·~.1rope, and the corise-
.· quEmtial ·deterioration of the terms of trade· for the latte;. (33) 
The ·critical assumptl.on here was the decrease.-in returns to scale 
in· .~gricul ture and. consistent returns to ·scale: in industry. Tnere 
w9.'s ~-'cl~ar :riegiect' of key factors such as demand. and technological 
. I . 
progress. Whereas .technical progress in agriculture wm1ld alter 
the si tu'ation, .inelasticity of demand would halt, c·onsisi:;erit returns 
t'6 .·.seal~ i±J. industry·. 
On· the 'other side of the fence a fresh li;ne of inquiry has 
been exemplified in the si~ger-Prebi sch thesis~ (34 )_' The as~ertion 
. i 8 that the terms of trade go against the 1 developing 1 coant.ries 
and :that grO-~Nth t~ough trade could o:ily lead to a_ dead-end. It 
. seems that the British trade figilres ('1870's to '1930's) on which 
tll~ Sfnger-P::t:'ebisch the~is was based were inSl:lfficient evidence. 
Nevert'riE;less, the Singer-Prebisch case sheds some light on the 
. ·negative: ~ffect of trade in 1 developing 1 countries and underlines 
·~. ' 
.:t}le ti.rge'ncy, to 1ndustria1i se. 
. ,. .. '.. . . . . 
, .. •' 
·t~t, ·there· a're those who could see t}1e weaknesses of both 
· · appro:::i.ches· and ho~d, in their own right, a moderate. position. 
G .. Haberler, for instance, sees no point in the suspicio:1s attitude 
. . 
towards trade and is convinced that trade is vi tal. for the develop,... 
.. : . 
ment of · '1 e s s de_;.eloped i countries. ( 35) He maintained th~t only 
broad generE!-lisations could be made withregard to short rlill va.ri-
ability, oth~rwise it is neither possible to prove secular ten:l-
'encies ~-n the terms of trade nor meaningful to extrapolate into 
·the future. 
·' ' 
· ·. By makin-g so:rie qualifications, dropping a few postulates; and 
. . ' ' . . . . 
formulating fresh ones, Bo SBdersten was able t.o build a model 
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that gives much support to the basic argument of Singer":"Prebisch. (36 ) 
He' fir·st. of all vindicated the static nature of .comparative· q,dvant':"" 
age, and to 'reach Singer-Prebi sch' s findings h~ maintained t:P,at 
' . .. 
three con(li.tions. ought to prevail: f:j_rst, grO'rlth should _be confined 
···. 
. . . . . 
to they,xport.sector; second, elasticities of supply and demand 
· sb.o·Qld· .. remain lo/V; third; growth of demand_ sho:rld also ~e lo;..r. 
··'· . : ' 
p~·~~ici'ed· that these· condi ti ODS were met it CO"'J.ld·be ·said with so::ne . 
·,. ', 
·confid~nce.· that terms of trade would sho·w a. general tendency to 
det.eriora te • 
. Turning our attention to .the case of. Sudan·;.· the most· elabQr~te 
eXposition. of eXport performance and terms of tr~de have been 
furnish~~ by Be~hai.C37) He forcibly argued that the Sudan's 
termE) 'of, trade were favoJ.rable and showed no sign o.f secular 
.. 
Cie't~·i-io~ation •. He c-oncluded that in mos-t cases dem~nd for Stidan 
·produce· was ·lnCOJlre.:.elastic. and internf-3-tion~lly, the co·J.ntry was 
. . . . . . 
·st:songiy c ompeti ti ve ~ ·He w~s also conyinc~d that export instability. 
. .b..~a·. created. ·no ·i:ierimis pro"bl_em to the economi~ development of 
. ' . ·.· .· < ( 38 ) ' 
S1,1dan. ··. . Yet he w~snot unaw~re of the failures .of the Sudanese 
. . . . '• 
e·cono)Ily; an· economy who~e gro·.rJth, accordinf'? t·o him, was rat~er 
sl;w~ ·giving the impression that 'the country ~la~ been sl~epy'. (39) 
He attributed this to the inability to realise a more.significant 
. . . . . . 
c9,rry-over from ex:ternal trade to intern9.l.develop:ment because of 
. ,. ' ' 
don1esti'c.al'iy :ba.sed o~stacles. The rural credit system, the sheil, 
,. 
was singled out as the major factor to blame together with the 
government's inability to interfere with the market imperfections. 
The supporting evidence presented by Beshai leans heavily on the 
commodity terms of trade for the period from 1945 through 1968, 
. . ( . . . 
in addition to Nhat he called 'abnormal periods' of war, economic 
recession or boom. 
Many objections could be levied against the findings of , 
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Beshai ori technical as well as factual .grounds. First, the commodity 
terms of trade* as a statistical index is void of any inference to 
gains in real terms to the extent that its improvement does not 
necessarily .make a nation better-off if the contribution of invisible 
trade is negative or when factoral terms of trade** or income terms 
of trade are deteriorating. Cownodity terms of trade also neglect 
the contribution of invisible trade which could be negative. 
Second, the selection of the base year as a yardstick against which. 
gains or losses are measured is by necessity an .arbit.rary one and 
has an unavoidable bearing on results. Third, Beshai·has only con-
sidered overall cotton-piece prices as the import.price index!in 
order to arrive at the terms of trade. :T~e assumption that textile 
prices move in sympathy with other imports is rather unrealistic. 
The bulk of the cotton-piece imports was sup~lied by Egypt, India 
and Japan with a completely different price structure as oppo.sed ·to 
eomparable imports from Britain and West Europe. FUrthermore, as 
textiles were generally cheap grey sheetings their prices would 
only move gently. Any deviation from this gentle movement would 
* The commodity terms of trade measures the export and import 
price indices. 
** The factoral terms of trade relates price of exports and 
imports to domestic cost of exports. 
. . 
lead to a drastic_deterioration of the terms.of· trade as shown 
by .Beshai' ~·'calculations for the years-1919-1921·. (40) In one 
instance Besh~i has ~dermiried all his argument by maintaining 
that the Sudan terms of trade were almost static.C41 ) 
Befo·r~ ;attempting t~ d.evelop the argwnerit. of trade gains 
conside~, first, the conditions With no trade. It was reported 
;,· j ·.·, 
' . 
early this century that Sudan could fully p:r:ovide he~ immediate 
consumer necessities to the limits of satisfaction: 'I do not 
suppose', claimed th.e Governor-General, 'that there is any part in 
. . 
the world ·in which the mass of the population have fe.wer unsatis-
fied want9•·:C 42 ) T'!iat being so was only because of the limited 
needs of.the population, and the self-sufficiency of a closed 
economy thci~ had not yet felt. the effects of international trade, 
and being-: ·q.ntii then 'divorced from the influences of the Empire's 
''· . 
selr'-su£fici~ncy. ·. The. proiucti ve factors were ·mainly engaged in 
subsiste:nce with little to spare for external transactions. In 
. . .. . .. 
. fact, conplliller goo·~s such as textiles, leather -w-ear, honey,. 'beer' 
·etc., were all prod.uced within the village. Relapsing into that 
.· old· .system. of· prod~ction was observed at a later stage of the 
country' 9 .q~ve.iop:lrent · dilring the Second World War when it. was 
. . . ' . ' . ~ . . ' . . 
noticed'tb.at the prod.uceri 
. me.t the. situation by becoming l[ll'gely self-
supporti~g, ~-1!gain' growing "his~ o~. cotton 
.and weav:J,.ng ht-s own clothes,. search1.ng for 
.· ... ··.honey to replace sugar, and reserving more 
• · . · grain for. brewing instead of' turning it into. 
·· .... ·:.·cash which he .coald not spenQ.. (43) . 
, Howev~r, a $tateme:rlt of ·this nature could not possibly reveal 
. . 
whether·. the com.m,mi ty was beco:m:ing any better of:f wi tho·:.lt the 
. . 
a(ivantages ·.of trade. Such an economy, one would assume., could only 
attain aslow rate of economic growth because of the lack of 
regional· specialisation; division of labour, . the inability to save, 
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inv.est or raise productivity. In short, this m.eans ·sacrificing 
·the advantages of .trade. 
• More · s.erious ·perhaps was the immediate action taken at· the· 
. turn of. tp,e .cEmtury to· incorporate the existing traditional· 
· systeJl!, :lhto. int~rnational trade. Firstly, economic regeneration 
.·of Sudan 'during the colonial period. (1898-19~5) heavily relied on 
. ' ... . ;. . . '· . '' 
·the export sector: almost all of her foreign earnings and national 
income emanated 'there. Secondly, Sudan's supply factor was deter-
.· .. mined by. a lovt investment ratio, and also shackled with the chronic 
problem.o:! 'Nile water limitations. It should be remembered that 
. . 
. the propo.sals for the Gezira scheme were briskly· opposed in Egypt 
. . ' . . - ' . . . : 
.:be.cause of the fears that this might impair Egypt's present and 
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. fuhli'e. ·~ight ~nthe Nile. (44 ) · .. Only a fraction of Sudanese irrigable 
·r~k~t.~s ·.utili.sed~· · Besides honouring the cJ_auses of the Nile Waters 
., . 
. I'" 
Agre~ment of 1929,'the British were probably not so keen to step· 
. . .. . . . . . . . . . . 
. up ~otton production beyond their iinmediate requirements and mark~t 
capaqity. ,In one instance when Sudan Is production was in excess .of . 
. . . 
that iimit, ·the BI'itishhad to pass the extra cotto~ to India at 
prices ·well above what they paid for it, and a difference of 
.. :£E~.7 mi~lion was later rebat~d to Sudan.C45) Further,m~reprod~c.:. 
. . . . . 
:tion would inevitably heighten competition in the labo·.:lr ma:&ket 
and increase labour costs, the very production factor that made 
. ' 
the cotton enterprise a profitable British venture • 
. ·.· .. . . . . ' •' 
'.·; : . 
In the traditional sector J..t was quite natural that the supply 
•'. 
of agricultural products ·CO:J.ld not respond to elasticities of 
: : .. ' \ ··' . 
. demand as· expansion was· determined by seasonal distribution and 
·annual .rainfall totals, as well as income elasticities for import-
" ables, pr~ce elasticities of demand, and in the longer term popula-
tiOn.growth rate. In addition a substantial proportion of production 
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was normally consu.ned locally. 
Given the conditions of a fairly low elasticity of supply 
' in the modern and traditional sectors, it fo~lows that the economy 
would be· indifferent to· the growth rate of world demand exc·ept 
within the limits set by the actual two extremes of low and high 
production an<;l productivity • 
.Another ingredient with some bearing on the terms of trade 
was the labour factor. Since entering international :trade, the• 
Sudan administration was faced with the labour·. factor of production. 
But .the labour force was apparently growing fast. This has often 
been note<;l. and was specifically reportE?d in 1921 With .a shocking 
apathy: 
••• the villages are full of children: . the 
. result of quiet government and peace •. · This 
.. ·should in ·time lead to :more cultivation and . 
tax revenue I suppose~ (46) · 
Infant mortality was progressively being curtailed ·and .the 
trend was one of higher population growth rates, In the absence 
of a· diversified economy, labour cost was kept low apd overhead · 
costs in both the traditional and modern sectors largely remaine.d 
marginal to production costs. An adequate sti.pply of cheaper labour 
was also gu.ara:i:tteed th:I:-o·:.1.gh planned schemes to· encourage. West 
African nationals to stay as long as possible in .the production . 
centrep while pl.lgri~s ·were traversing Sudan to :and from 1'1ecc·a.(47) 
As long as. marginal productivity remained stagnant and ·land 
under cultivation was sluggishly expanding, one would expect a 
higher man/land ratio due to natural population growth and immigra-
ticnl, on.· the assUlllption of a relatively low rate of out-migration 
from the rural areas because the economy was not creating alter-. 
native jpbs in other economic activities. Excess supply of labour 
was thus a natu-ral manifestation of the _prod-q.ctive .system, con-
tiriually. erasing any benefit from trade. This culminated in.a 
further deterioration in the country's terms of trade .especially 
when elasticity of demand for imports was increasing in the 
absence .of local industrie:s. 
One more. aspe~·f of equal im.portance to population growth was 
the pattern evolved through the y·ears for markettrig Sudan·' s 
produc~. . The right of pre-emption over the country's produce · 
was ex~~lified i:q, the monopolistic manipulations in Britain and 
. . 
Egypt.· Mention was made above of controlled purchase ·during the 
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Second World War. However, that was in no way an isolated episode. 
In: fact;·. th~ Br:l ti sh Cotton Growing Association, the same ~stabli sh-
ment that promoted cotton production in Sudan and elsewhere in.the 
' . . .· . . 
BritishEIDpire, and the tnain shareholder. in the Gezira Plantation 
Syndicate, was entrusted withcotton marketing since 1925 in what 
was known as the bulk sale system. The· whole of the· Gezira 
produce would normally be consigri~d-to agents in Liverpool who bid 
' . 
Within a ·_monopsonist .price range. Of cm1rse there were occasional 
factors which altered the price structure·in favour of primary 
producers:; · ·the best example being the· feverish stock-piling during 
the early·' day·s of the Korean War in 1950-51. With respect to the 
. . . 
.,_ ( 
initial cotton expansion it m·u.st be added that production was hori-
zohtally:extended re~ardle$s of international prices as evinced· 
in t:he f~llo~irig statement in 1933: 
· ·.Sir John [Maffey J concent.rated the extra mopey 
available .on extending the Gezira Scheme as a 
. measure of insurance against low cotton prices. (48} 
u~der. such circum$tances, the terms of trade would inevitably go 
. against· the producing com.ffiuni ty. 
·. · · The:bulk of the other ·primary ·products such as gum Arabic, 
g;r.oundnuts, cereals and livestock found their way, almost exclus~ 
. . . . 
· i vely., to· Britain, Egypt and India. This· was achieved. through an 
''· 
.. ·· ·. 
.. :.. ~ . . :.f: :· 
-· 
elaborate auction system conducted and supervised by the. 
. . 
colonial adininistration. Only a h:mdful of p':>werful· companies,. 
specialising. in one or two co:mmodi ties were making economic· 
transactio~s in complete isolation from world competition. To 
. comply with the principles of the co-partner agreement f~r ·. 
instance, . Egypt wa.s g:i ven the first call upon Sudan 1 s food produc-
tion and on many occasions export to countries other than Egypt· 
. was proh{bited. (49) Moreover, Egypt, the sol:3 import~r of live.:.. 
stock was in 13. position' to control her animal il11ports·and intervene 
in the price· structure bj' direct governm·ent purchases at fixed 
pric~s •. This poli'cy was immediately enforced when.free competition 
. . 
bet~een Egypt~an traders started to yield high~r.returns to' animal. 
producers.C50) Essentially, the national income and te.rms of trade 
would be ··eXpected to suffer since the country co"Jld neither maxi-
mif1e proceeds from exports nor increase product:. vi ty to maintain 
a low pr~ce struct~re - such as happened in North America and · 
Australia with regards to primary production at the· beginning of· 
,· ;·.·· 
this century .. · 
br:l'e .. further point often neglected is the effect o:f- .the i'nvi s-
i bie 't:tad,~. account whi~h cater$ for. insurance' shipping·, c·ontribu.:.. 
tion$ .towards pensions of. retired· personnel, to·:J.riSm.~ an·d .. inter.:...· 
national. transfer payments to expatriates, and company prof.i ts. 
The deficit on this account amounted to £E2 million in 1947. (51 ) ... 
Ignoring this and a]_l. other factors discussed above, Beshai 1 s con-
·clusion'~ that the Suda:n trade fared well is probably unjustifiable.* 
· It ID .. i.ght well be argued that a secular deterioration ot. terms 
of trade ·was indivisible from the failure to· ·st:rike a fair deal for 
·*It must··be stated however, that there are insuprable problems 
regarding the calculations of a realistic figure.· for the terms of. · 
trade. Basically, data is unavailable fpr var:i..ables such as·free 
market prices·, differential population and productivity· growth~· 
invisible trade, etc. Indeed, some of these variables .. are non-:· 
quantif~abl e. 
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. ·' . 
.. . 
. ~ . 
·. {,•-
,.: . ·,1 
Sudari~se· producers, and the inability to create self-generc:tting 
. . 
· ex:pansfon •. Concurrent w:Lth population growth a:nd stim~Ilat·ed 
de?J.an(i_ -~8r i:rriportables ~1as a built-in process of impoveri"sh11ent 
-inherent in·the ch~rter government model, which was productive 
of social and economic imbalance$ that forcibly .drove rural 
pornilat:ion ·to provincial towns ani indeed to the .Prime B!lse. In 
strlkLng· contrast~ the trading coJllJluni ty centred at the Prime 
. . - .·, 
:Base, was. well prote.cted by autliori sed high profits of more than 
twe·n.ty'p·~t: c$nt, (52 ) .together wlth its abili~y to appropriate the 
: - ; .. 
Sll.rplus, _:and transfer it in differing proportions to the P:dme 
Base:and abroad." 
.(·· 
· .. 
3.;6 · Pl~nned ·Non~industrialisation and its ... :f_~act 
.. . . . . 
· The . economic modei ·expo·;Inded lli. therto'; . showed hcbl the re-
structuri-ng o-f the pro:iucti ve system' its grafting to international 
• • I ' • . \ 
trade and. contain.:nent within various fiscal ·and monetary frames was 
• • •. r • • 
only -ca..Pable o'f restricted development •. 'rhe mere absence of 
industry .Jr6!U the scene of development. ·in Sudan· during the first 
·'·. . 
·,: ... ' 
· l).alf Of. this· century; WO:-J.ld suggest that the e·ffor~S to effect 
I: .. '·· 
economi~ 'development were ·somehow inimical to industrial_growth 
..... , .. · . 
~n·a ·i_n·corripatfble. With its emergence aq a pro:iuct;ive ·sector. 
·. ; .• .. . . 
Similar· evidence of. industrial undevelopmer.t was ·repeated in 
many .'d~veloping•· co·untries with such _regularity as to justify an 
. . . . · .. · . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . ·. ass"limption of a policy of non-industrialisation~ among colonial 
. . . . 
powers •.. It is worthy of -note that while the ·.empirical findings 
· .. 
. . . 
·.cover a host of co;Intries no prognosis was ever made to link such 
no:q~industriali sation ·com:rni tment with industrie.l location and 
i-qdust:rJ.aJ. s:tructure9 when industry was. later p:.:-omoted. A search 
··: .. . -. ' ' 
of the rfterature on Sudan I s development thro:.Igh half a century 
· .. , wo·U.Id, bnly • ;r-eve~i. an appalli!].g lack .of sU,ch:.empir:icism .. and. a 
. . . . ' . 
. .' .. 
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general unawareness of the significance of non-i::ldustrialisation~ 
.. 
In r.etrospect, the impact .of non-industrialisation seems to. extend 
beyon'd:·the 'usual lament of missing a chance to the vi tal areas of 
Natibri~l··Ihc6~e·, · li;ic·bme· distribution, employment, and indust;rial 
locatio::J..'Subsequent pageswill be devoted towards rectifying these 
shortcoJ4:i.rigs. 
~erhaps.the most important asset of the colonial powers before 
t'neir drive 'int~. Africa in the late nin~teenth century was the 
invaluabl~ experience acquired throu~h earlier_formal and. informal 
.. ·, 
I· ~· ' ' • ' ' 
Qolonisatiori e~pecially in Asia and Latin· America. Even if, 'the 
:i:ni]?e,r:'ialists: were merely. scraping the bottom or:the barrel, ,(53) 
in trop{c·al Africa, they were doing so with unslackening interest 
arid the.:utmost .p:r>oficiency. There is available specific. evidence 
' I ' ' • ' 
of how iu<:]:ustry wa·s repudiated,. but one could ·not find. anything as 
·.. ' . . : . . : .' . . 
outitigeous ·as the. acticm of t:h~ Queen o;f Portugal in· 1786 when, by 
a sovereigu decree, she ordered that industry, of all description, 
should be abolished and extinguished in her Brazilian Domaiu~(54 ) 
Though_ f)Ub$equerit .objections to industry took a more slibtle mode, 
Ind11·strial. development had to be 
. . . 
~ti.~:P'#e.s's~d. i~· th~·eolonial dependencies as the economies of these 
courrtri~'s had to complement rather th~n compete With the. industrial 
core. · 
'I 1 ,· '• _/. ' '•,• 
'.··B.J:.itish attempts to Suffocate in~ustry_ in .India are a good 
. example;;.·: B~i tish commerci~l policy th~re, as a.sserted by. the 
Indian Industrial .Commission in'1916-1918, was to confine business 
to. trade arid commerce to the exclusion of manufacturing industry. 
Instead:of mak.i.ng ·India strong .and self-supporting the British 
in .their· ·own interest. as a 
in~ust~i~l _progr~ss 1 • (55)· 
!Ilanufacturing nation· 'retarded her 
. . 
In the opinio:ri :,; of .Lord Lugard the 
whole exercise was.gravely mistaken: 
... 
73 
,,'.: 
1.· .. ·· 
.. · 
.·; 
. The attempt to suppress local industries 
·by excise duties or otherwise is, on the 
. other hand, a short sighted. policy, unjust 
to the people for whose development we have 
assumed responsibility, and one, moreover, 
which fails to achieve its selfish object. (56) 
To.all.intents and pur-poses the economic policies carried. 
out in d~pendent Africa were ·derived from the Indian experience. 
In the N~rth:;- Egypt's textile industry with substantial possibil-
i ti_es·~: was·-~ suppressed for no reason. other than competition with 
L:Sri.cashire·~ · ·In th~: ·.f;i.nal analJ78is, E.R. J.: OWen. was convinced 
.:···,. ,•.:. · .. 
. . . 
~f ;th~ ~e.no]:.mous pre~·sure s ·em the British consUJ. in Egypt, ·' ••• 
Cromer was: anxious, at all costs to avoid protests 'from ·Lancashire 
~il~owners • .; • '(57) ·As. with India· in the 18901 s,' perniciou$ 
excise. duties were imposed on local mills •. 
. . . 
· ~he Nigeri~n hand looms ~ere considered ·by the British admi.n-
. istratol:'s ·~s ineffi'cient parasites consuming valuable cotton that 
sh.q:ul:c:('b.~ '~1lpplied to Lancashir:e. 'The I sensi'ble I action wa$ thus 
. to chai:ln~f·the pi>oduce away' froln lo~al manufacturers' as was 
. . . ·~\ :-·:: . ' ' :. . 
· . ·suggisted by the administration in the 1920's·: 
.. -: :~. < ' . -
·· ·. ·· .. Pa:r;'t of: the p,toblem _was then to direc.t the 
... <·:; .. : .. > :supply. ·of .. cotton from Nigerian hand-looms· .to 
. ·: · ': <the power+looms of Lancashire. (58) · · · · ' · 
. . '· . . ' ··. . 
, . ). . . ' 
In -Frer:ich West Africa. any attempt. to open. C3. factory was met with 
~evere .restrictions· wherever there was a threa~c to similar French 
·' ·. . . . . 
· .. ·industry .as was t:qe case in Senegal in the 1930's. (59) 
:. ~he. pic~ure in East Afric·a .was h~rdly different. Here t.oo, 
. t,he; ·compiementari ty 'concept of. development was well established 
·in: the 19g0':, s. · Ev~n ·a small matches factory or a twine rope 
· _. f~ctory· wo~d. cause·· alarm concerning· publiC. reve~u~ losses through 
..... ,. 
·. Xail,ing<custom duties an.d in the case of·th.~ latter,·losses of 
j~{;·~ ·~ria'.busine~.~--i~::Aqerdeen. ( 66) Excis~ duties.. we_re ·promptly 
imposed qausirig subsequent closure •. Hq·wever, the :white settler's 
economyin Kenya was slightly different as-pressure on theBritish 
•' I 
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Colo,nia:I Office yielded some concessions to establish processing 
· .. ···. 
·, ,· 
.. ; 
It ·seems evident. that the charter government model and 
·sti:'uct'liral change· in Sudan already discussed could not accommodate 
an industrial sector in Sudan. The concept of self-sufficiency . 
. .' 
held.by the administ!!'ation_was an inception of complementarity 
.. ~ . 
. '· ' 
betwe.en ::t~~ee economies at differing stages of 'development: 
.. ·. 
· Bri tB:in; the home ?f the ·Indu-strial Revolution,_ now in full swing; 
·Egypt, an agricultural country,. striving. to e~tablish her own 
'i'Qq:ustry; ··_ ... and Sudan, a wholly agrarian· econom.y· with. a. sp~cific 
. ~ .· '•. ':..''• . 
. role ·~s· .a p~imary produce~ •. These varying· l~vels of development 
. · .. •'• . .. . . ' . . . . . .. . . 
. ·. :: 
arid speciaiisation eris1lred.d~fferent economic spheres of interest 
. ! . 
' . 
for the ·co~partners. ·· 
. ':Engagement in Sudan's mar~et 'and her trade. could conveniently 
be. shared. by the. co-partners if some und~rstanding prevailed. The 
~eby .fac't: that' E~ypt ·and Britain were· at t'wb extreme ends of. tech-
. no~ogical ·~avan~~e_ment. and industrial development. defined their 
dire.ct ~con.omic .intere~ts which were harrqo::1ised by the very nature 
. 9f ·~heir v~ryi'ng r.aw material reqUirements, .and ·salea~le:production~ 
: '9f'. -;i.~~diate_. i~ter~st. to Egypt.· w~s the _.vi tal question of 
:~ec~i~~' · ~urplu9 food $1lpplies from Sudan: for .her fastly growing 
·, 
population._; and· raw .·.materials as well. as n)arkets for a nascent 
. inQ.u~~ry. · The faGt that Egypt wished to safeguard her stake in 
. Sud8.n i ~ depleted .in trade. flgures (see Tabl.e 3.1). In th.e Adly-
.. . 
·. 'cuFSOrt n.~gotiatl()~S- in 1921 it was clearly stated that besides the 
.. · ·._ 
Nil·~ wat:ers· .the Egyptians had :.many other .intere;sts including the 
-.~uppli,~~·or.is~dan .to .. ~gypt. ( 61 ) By 1918 Eg;ypt was importing about 
' '. 7 • ' • 
. · .':~ 079 per ·cent of Su9-an' s produce.C62 ) Equally important 
t6 :Egypt were. th~. soft :m.arket s of Sudan •... On occasions when a 
. . ... ' 
\'. . . 
. . ·' .. . . .. . .", . . ~ . . . 
·. favourable, climate ~a:d preyailed for the .promotion of industry as 
.,·.' >: .', .. 
. .· -·~ .. ... . .• 
...• - . '• ·.·.; : •• •'t' •• ·•· . 
-·. Britain< · : · . · · ' .·. ·~ ·.· Egypt. , . ·:-.: · ~: ~ ·::_:Britain·.:: , · _Egypt . : ··~ .. .. ··: .- '._· . :···. ~. 
· .Iropott s :· E:X:porf13 . Tmp_ort·s . ExpO,rt s ·~· ~· :· _; . . . Im)_)ort s .. ·EXpor.t:E:( . -Tmj;)orts Exports · 
.. . , 
1920 . 21.5 42.3 .. .· 55-2 ' .. 45'.8 1939 27.7 45-.5 28.3. ,- 11.2 
1921 ?7'·3· 
. - .. . 34~8 .. - 39 .• 8 - <A0~3 ·. ··1940 19.3 36.·8·•-· ·_ 35-5' .. 19.1' ,-
1922 .. 24 -~. 3 . . . • -~-~ 9 . 39.0 : ... 33·7 '1941 . 15~ 1 44.4' .: 33-3· 14.0. 
. 1923 32-.8 35.6 32.9 .. :_ 23.4 . · .. 1942 8.0 58.4 .. 37.1 .- . _24.7 
1924_. 30.1 57-3 33-3 16.9 1943 6.7 40.1 . 34.6 .. 23.1' 
1925 32.9 52.7 . 29.7. 23.T: . 1944 7-3 ·· .. 40.2 22 .• 5. 27.6 
1926. 30.9. ·66.7 .. 24.8 .. 13.8 '1945 12.7 40.8 16.9 ·. 24.1 
1927 36-7 72.8 28.2 10.3 1946 23-9. 34.4 18.8 19~2 
1928 34.8 71 .• 0 25.6. 9-9 1947 24.0 . 38.8 21.6 18.3 
1929 31.8 . 77-1 . ·' 23~2 9.6 1948• 30.0 61.4 21.2 . 13.9 
1930 3':1-· 3 63.6 21.6 11.;4 '1949 32.5 61.0 . 16.4 10.5 
.. 
19-~1 31.0 40~8 20. ~ · -· . 21 .A 1'•950 39.7 54~8 9.4 8.1 - . 
. 1932 22.7 65 •. 9 21.·8 . . 9.4 ... 1951 34.8 66~5 9.1 . 6. 3 .• 
1933 . 25.~- 3 56.0 24.3 14.3 .. 1952 . 33.6· .. 55-3 
- . 
7.1 7.0 
1934 24.;7 51.7 22.1 . 21.4 1953 41.5 41.0 8.3 5-5 
1935 31.4 . 44.1 19~4 13.1 1954 '32.4 42.--3- 10.4 8.8 
I 1936 26.5 53-4 20.5 11~3 1955 30 .• 2 28.1 11.3 9-9 I 
9. 5. I 11937 . 23.4 40 •. 9 22.6 . 1956 27.6 33.0 }3.9 ·11.1 
.' 
I . 
26.2 45.1 . 23.0 '14.5 ; 1938 
! 
Source:. Compil~d from ( 1) ·Sudan Government, Fgr)ign Tr~de Report, 1947, D~partment . _of Econo~cs and Trade, Khartoum, 1948.. 2 Republ~c of the Sudan, Annual Foreign 
.·Trade Report, 1956, Ministry of Social Affairs, Department of -Statistics, Khartoum, 1957. 
.··,· 
---..J 
()'\ 
in war time, or ·during a world economic rece.ssion, Sudan 1vould 
\ . . 
•: . ·••· . . · ... !- • . • 
parado~ically be. faced :with an increased volume of Egyptian 
ex_Ports: .TJ:;ms in 1917 Egypt was increasing her export of 
industrial goods to Sudan, e.g., cement 1 textiles, glass, soap, 
(vegetable) oil, and leather.C63) These were precisely the sort 
of artfcles a country like Sudan wo:1ld hope to- manufacture 
1ocaiiy. But the physical p:r;-o.Ximity of Egyptian suppliers, a 
. . . 
co.mrpon .;cU.rrericy a,;nd _customs ·union' all contrived to pulify such 
opportunities •. Indeed, any initiation of such industries in 
Sudan ':wo.uld. not only cO.mpete with Egyptian industry, ·but. ~ould . 
.. 
', :'.· 
d.epr;Lve.:Eg,Y]?t ·of· a cons·iderable volume of raw material· for which 
'she::wa~:paying low pric~.s. 
··The ... second c~ntral econo:qri.c stake in Suda!f ·was that of· the· 
. . 
British. ·However,' the stage was not set f.or an immediate British 
. . ~ 
involvement. Achieving. this goai hinged on a massive build-up 
through two d.eca'des of infrastructural development culminating in 
the launo~:i:ng. of .the Gezira scheme in 1925, and the informal schema 
·,.'' I • 
t~~t ·geared. -th~· .economy of Sudan to the Empire's free trade and 
. . . 
m~rice~ir:{g · syst~~·s·. · Becaus~ of savings on transport cost made 
".: ,, . 
possi bl~ by the new. Red Sea line· and :j?ort .~pudan: and acquaintance 
~i\:h 'i'~e:European- m~:Z:.kets,. and' the establishrner.it of British firms 
... ·:·· .. ·;_.. ~
and age!l:t;s.· in su:q.an, the supremacy over Sudan's industrial crops 
~ . 
1
. · and trade. was gradually gathering momentum and redressing in 
I 
favour of the Briti.sh towards the mid-1920's. 
On ~he imp~rt side it is necessary to distinguish between 
·va.,rioU:s·typesof goods~ . Fi:r:st, capital goods: primarily. asso~ia­
teh.with't~e c;igric"ultural and transport sector~, such as loco.JJ.o-
.:' ·.' · ... · . - . 
. tives~ :r:olt:l~g stO.cks and raiJ.,s, motor vehicles and tyres, pumps, 
. agricul turc'l1-D:J,achinery' power generators; ginne:ries' . flour' mills 
• ·:,,. •• ·:. ••. • .·j • 
etc• ·These ~were invariably supplied by Britain~ In th,e second 
~ ,:, :. '•. ' .... 
,:· ,. 
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group we~e _consumer goqds which could be divided into durables · 
' '. 
·such a~. electrical. appliances, mainly supplied by Britain, .and 
non_;ci~rable$, 'includi~g cotton and wool-piece goods, food .stuffs, 
.... 
bevera;ges, .chemical products, pharmaceuticals., leather articles 
e.tc. _;· Bepa'Use ·of· production and cost. structures: or natural endow-
ment, Egypt and India specialised in providing items such as 
ceine.nt, · s;ugar, tea ~nd also· successfully competed at the cheaper 
·. '. ' . .. . . 
end of· text:lies. and food industries. On the other hand, Brl. tain 
had passed the stage of profitably producing at this end of the 
... 
market because of the ~ising cost of the factors of production • 
. :,_.' 
.-. '· 
Wiii.le trade with Britain, E~pt and India was conducted on 
... 
the. pr:.~m:t se'·: of free' trade' these countries suppiied, at times' 
lnQ~~ than : . ·so' p e.r' ce~t of Sudan Is imports. (6Lt) Of' course' the 
·• · ... 
maXi:m'o!,·' fre.e trade was o'bserved.'whenever grey areas were in 
: .' 
que'stidn arid.·' ~ome concessions were made at times of political 
. tensions.: The'.: clau~es concerning trad·e and commerc·e in the 1936 
Fr~endship Treaty. between Brl. tain ·and Egjpt ·is· a. good ex~mple. ( 65) 
It,.is importan.t ho·wever, to note that in the rare c·ases when 
Britai~ went o.·~t b:f her V!ay to promote a .specific industry, meat 
cannfpg ;for:''irista~c·e, the retaliation of Egypt· was a deterrent. 
·: .. There',.we:re strong factor's in· favqu.·r of a meat processing· 
ip:d\lst:ry in'", Sudan. Prices of Sudanese animals were low and .re-
... .. . ' ·. 
m:3-ined .. st~ble .for B:: long period as a result. of c_irc1ll1lstances 
·· .. 
a~r~~~y··~i'sc:losed~ · SecOndly, offici a~ estimates of the animal 
. w~alth. had always·: maintained' that the off-take potential was high. 
' . ' 
. . 
In .fact,. as· far, baqk as 1904 an expert of the Indian Colonial 
.Servic,e, ,invited by the Sudan Government, ascertained this and 
recoillmende~ a:~annipg industry •. ( 66 ) However, the animal wealth 
_was .unut:i,lise(i becaus.e of limited demand in the traditional market. 
. . •• i- .. •. ' · .. , 
Other p~odu,~t~on factors such as labour and _tr·ansport were favour-
. . . 
: '· ._; .· .. , .. _ 
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able and wou~_d_ enhance the possibilities of prs>fi table 
o:perati9n for new markets." 
. To the dismay of·· the Egyptian Government in 1950 a British 
firm·, Messr·s. Sud~n Meat Products Ltd., a .subsidiary of Liebigs, 
was h~nded the concession for a meat factory at Kosti (375 Km 
south Khartoum). One year later construction started and in 
1.953. production cmnmenced after a delay of one season. It will 
.. 
be recalled that Egypt was the sole importer of livestock with a 
share of up to one hundred per cent, and thatf.o.b. prices were 
persistently -kept at about £E14 per head for the four years that 
·. ; pr~cede<l,~the. sancti.oriing of the factory •. It shoul·d. also be 
rerir?mbereci.tb.at 'the.Egyptian Government was .the direct importer 
79 
and organiser of the trade. thro·:J.gh selected Sudanese cattle 
merchants:·and Egyptian dealers. This 'monopsony' ·was now seriously 
.' ., ' 
.chailenged. ·The newly created demand of a meat processing factocy 
wm.ild ei'ther· be in~t .from existing supplies or an increased animal 
. ' ' ·. . 
'·r • ~ 
off~ take.. ·In either case,. prices wo·:J.ld inevitably go up in the 
~bsenc·e, of. a.'· duopo.ly agreement.· The ·response· of the Egyptian 
' ~.' .. .. ' ·: ·> ·' 
:authoJ:>i ties was pro.mpt, . ferocious and intrig4ng. .They took · 
.... 
. tlie·>ir;titi.ative of start:i!lg a price war •. As will be noticed from 
· , ·o 
'l'able .. 3-·?; pe;r- head· wholesale price. at El Obeid increased in 1951 
. to 38.6 per c€mt over prices of previous years; i.e. nearly 
' ' 
£E2.Q per head. Taking 1950 as a base year, the increase amounted 
. to· s'7.4 p·er ·cent in 1952, the year when produ,otiori was due. These 
'prices' w:ereevidently beyond any profitable ope_ration for the . 
company and probably £E4"!0 pe; head above:initl.al estimates of 
... · ·... . .. . . . . 
·m~terial ~osts.· Th~· factory's structure was consequently shattereQ., 
and .the.· firm .was in perpetual financial difficulty till it petered 
. O.ut in ,1'957 • 
.. 
Table 3.2 
Egypt's relative share of Sudanese live animal 
trade (cattle) and price per head (1944-1956). 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
. 1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
Egypt's share of 
. Sudanese live 
cattle trade 
(per cent) 
99-96 
100.00 
97.68 
100.00 
100.00 
99-90 
96.40 
100.00 
100.00 
98.90 
100.00 
100.00 
98.20 
Price Pe~·.' Head 
(£E) 
8.85 
9-76 
11.49 
14 61 
14."74 
_14.13 
14.67 
17-56 
20.00 
19.87 
18~28 
.16.86 
17.26 
Source: Compiled from data in Table 3-3 
'· 
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· Neverthel-es-s, -the short-lived experience of meat processing 
in .Sudan,. c?ild neither .prove the unfeasi bil i.ty of meat canning 
nor demonstratea positive attitude towards industry when the 
· factory.was approved. It was reckoned by the Sudan administration 
th~-b- th( SudaJ?ese animal reso·J.rce was a time-honcm.red· ·monopoly to 
:Ee;YJ,t ~. and the only.: :feasible way to re-direct a. sizeable portion 
. ·. . . _:' . . 
of this ··:r~so\lrce .to Britain .co:1ld only be effected by making the 
. ' . . . 
produQt' :saleable in that market through canning_. · Iri 1954 ·alone 
·t· .. •'·. . . 
Britain.was for the first time air-lifting 1.35 ~illion Kg of 
canned meat from.K~sti factory, roughly equivalent to 14,000 head. 
' .. An especially relevant proposition was suggested by G. Karrar 
:tn·1966(.67}.t~ the ·effect that :ineat processing in Sudan repre$ented 
·-.··:: 
reso·J.rce utility minimisation. He claim,ed that,· 'On per head 
basis··'export 'On-the-hoof brings greater returns of foreign curr-
e!lcy ... •.C6~) ':FroliJ.·a-·· .. sirilple display of figur~s the disparity was 
'. ·;. 
proj~-~t-ed ·by· Karrar to disfavo:1r meat processing Wi tli ·a tota1 loss 
of·. fo;eign earnings in. the region of more than a. quarter of a 
mi'ilion ·p;·~nd~ in 1956. 69) It should however, be addeci that the 
quoted !lwnber of animals slaughtered in the factory was a mere 
.. 
approXimation .based. on.· factory. production in Kg. Furtherm.ore ~ 
possible· gains {r·om ancillary and al],ied industries and employ-
ment w_e:r;-~ completely ignored. 
Quite .ap·a.ri; fJ:'Oirl' these shortcomings,· there is ·a critical 
~ .· .'• .'' . ' . . . . ' . ' . . 
... · assumption :i'ntririsic in the co.mparison between live animal export· . 
. . • , .~- :. ': :_- •• ··.''·::-•• ': ·• • ·.... .. .• · .- ·.• • . .. J • • • . • • 
a:!l·d ~~at.processi;ng. that ·supply and demand would remain constant. 
:. _·; . . :: 
Once we:· _assume an excess of supply over the limited .. demand of 
. ) . . . . . 
the tracl.itional mp.rket because of differential rates of gro·trth 
·or elasticities, then the attainment of new markets in whatever . 
. ;' . . .. :. . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
form should simply .multiply ·foreign earnings, as resources pre-
yiousJ,.y ·:untouched would now en'ter inte:rnational trade. In fact, 
·. ,;'·. 
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pot~ntial ,$Upply in Sudan was buoyant as confirmed by the off-
. . . . 
take increase stimulated by the factory demand. As in Table 
3~3. sup:l:)lY: s:ho_wed .an Lncrease of 174.8 _per cent in 1954 over the 
average· c,·:r the previous six years, 146.0 :p·er cent in 1955, and 
164.2 per cent .in '1956. Significantly, this .enormous exp9.rision 
of off~t9.ke occurred at a time of a sharp price :rise, reflecting 
the price elasticity of supply which was due to an escalated 
pri~~ war.ratherthan :priceelastici ty as such~ Wh9.tever the· 
case ~ay·: b~ ~- S~dan Is gciins from ani~al trade fared well because 
an ur1pre¢edented off~ta,ke·growth'coincided with a rising trend 
of' pric~s, ~:hd this would not have occurred had it not been for 
.· . 
•", 
the ·Kosti meat factory. 
. . . . . . 
c·on~ideri:ng the' three years. immediat'ely before the factory 
! :_ 
wa~·.: established a~d ·the_ same period afterwards'·. we notice' that 
sales revenue. for the'fi~st period was £E1,265,993,.whereas the 
corre~ponding figure for the. se~ond period was £E3,351,209 with 
·a net ~a:rgin of ID:Ore.than £E2 million pounds.· 
:. ~~ 
· .. Tlie recurrent failure to achieve economic· growth, and the 
,-.: 
anxiety 't:h(3.t surrol.lllded the government circles. especially during 
ep~·hoih;tc.··:d~pressions, increasin.gly emphasised the vulnerability 
. ·' . .. . 
. . . 
of:~mo:r.i6~c111'fu:&e: and underiined the need to eli versify the· economy. 
. . . 
Despite.freqU:ent c.oncern however, industry was never considered 
I··. ~·~· ej.D· obyious altern~tiv,e •. The principle against this line .of 
d.evelo:P.m .. e~t· w~~· p~esented by .R. Davies, on beha1f o'f the Sudan 
."' I ," • ' • • 
Political Service· 'iri 1934; ·possibly in response to applications 
. . . '.. . . 
put forward for flour milling and the manufacture of cigarettes,-
textiiep .and spap. (7~) Basically, it was argu.ed, the government 
·· wo.i.J.ld ri:sk lpsing· .a ·substantial proportion of its reven~1e from 
:import dv.ties· and railway freightage if such undertakings were 
gr<?-nted •. · · .To provide. an .{nsight into the government 1 s · co.ricept ·of 
'·, 
. ' .. , 
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Table 3.3 
. Sudan's .ex,Port· .·of ··~attle, ·.1944-1956 
. . . 
· .. ' 
Export to Total Value of export Total value 
Egypt exp.ort to Egypt (£E) of export (£E) 
1944 34598 
1945 36281 
1946 29579 
1947 1{'9001 
·34611 
36281 
30281 
19001 
1948: 21-~$3. 21583 
·. ~. 
1.949 . 33.30Q 
1950 . 31:300 
19!)1 _· _27980 
1952 25223 
1953 :21520 
1954 .. 45334 
1955 43460. 
19 56 . . 58.415 
32467 
.. 27980 
25223 
21759 
.45356 
43460 
59480 
306157 
354059 
339741 
277538 
318158 
470580 
459301 
491331 
504460 
427538 
828808 
732658 
1008429 
306270 
354095 
352217 
277538 
318158 
LJ-71039 
476796 
491331 
504460 
431297 
829204 
732658 
'1026267 
Sc;>urce:· The Republic of the Sudan, Annual Foreign 
.Tr~de :Report.s, 1950-59, Stati.sti cs Departme~t, 
•• •t• . • 
·Khartoum, 1960. 
I . 
, . 
. ; 
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p:roposed industrial_ projects it is essential .to quote. R. Davies 
-at some l~ngth: _ 
It is clear, however, that, if the four 
industries mentioned were all established 
and were successful to the point of ex-
cluding the whole of the present import 
of the commodities concerned, then in the 
absence· of ~my excise or other new tax; 
the government would lose a very serio·i.ls 
_portion of,its revenue, even making gener-
ous allowance for the extent to which in-
_:.direc.t return from money kept in the . 
country would offset the lost import duty 
·... ' · .a,n·d railway freight. And it. is very · 
· . doubtfu:J,. whether, if additional taxation 
were imposedon a scale to compensate for 
this loss, the local products could coJl-
. ·· · pete with. those at present imported. - It 
therefore seems unlikely that the Sudan 
will change to any considerable extent its 
present .economic role of exporter of raw· 
. . . p_roduce and .import;er of maqufactured-
. _articles. (71) · · · · 
-I,. Thts' fs an· excellent illustration of the revenue argliment 
. ;.:: . 
in it~'very_rig:l.d ·form. Its proponents see income from taxes 
> ... ·._··:. ':. ·.: . :'' '< .'·. . ._ -.. - ' . 
~s· outweighing all ·other benefits, _both material and social. 
·Thus any. p.rbposals .. to p;oriiote local industry woLild be scrutinised 
with 'th.~_ only: objecti v~ of. ascertaining that the industri'es in 
: '.·· 
question would yield an income proportionate to the government's 
;~~~nue from. tr-an--sfer charges and taxes on com.modi ties normally 
;imported-in 'the :a.psence of locali.ndlfstry. 
Und_erstandabiy,- s.uch nascent inqustries would not hope to 
. . 
score ·instant ~lfCCess. This was a~gued in what is. now known as 
the ·inf.ant ·_industry argument first expounded by F. List in the 
~s_4o' s.(72 ): .In ~ssence, List maintained that the infant in~ustry 
. ·, . . _:-. 
wi t;hip, '9- .. iree :market situation would operate belo:J>I the margins of 
, .. 
·internal, ~con-~mies. of. scale· and wo·i.lld subsequently be undercut 
. if unpr'?tected. In-dustrial investment in Sudan· was ultimately 
rejected as the government was· strongly commi. tted to· its anti-
protectionist.~olicies and not prepared to forfeit the slice of 
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income from import dues and surcharges. This action was indeed 
short-sighted as it sacrificed long term benefits for immediate 
. . . ? 
rem-:.m'eration ~ arid in the process' impeded the creation of new 
,, : . 
jobs·an_d newproduction capacity in agriculture and industry, 
and thus pet.rifi.ed investment, re-investment and training. With 
regard to such tendencies, what ha:s to be underlined 'is not so 
. . . . . 
much the undermining of the infant industry argument, unjust as 
it ~ay be,. as the fact that the government would nevertheless 
repress~any.-LnduS.tJ:'Y by imposing excise duties·even if these 
·. indust~i'es were. succe'ssful to .the point of entirely supplanting 
im];>orts~ una'ided· by government intervention Of' protection. It 
is worth noting :~hat th~ taxes in question; when calculated for 
. . . . ' . 
the industries. specified above as a percentage of all tax revenue 
wo1lld :q.ot··exceecr 2.0 and 2.5 per cent in 1928 and 1929 respective-
ly. ( ?~) : 
One~ more, there were numerous examples from Africa of the 
line o,fargwnent 't)?.at advocates non-industrialisation and the 
neeg .to ?a:f'.e·g~ard revenue.. The causal relatipnship was posed by 
the.· Gpve:rnoi:-. of Ugapda i~ 193,?: 
. -:·· . 
' . · .. 
' .. 
. ... ~ .•• if industria;!_ undertakings were· started. 
' in· East A.frica a certain loss of revenue through 
. the falling .off of custom duties ·might accrue 
. . to · ~ga:Q,da. ( ?4) 
However,. it is .:j_mpossible to convey the deterrent effect of 
governrn.ent :policieswhich consistently reminded the entrepreneurs 
of the failures tp.ey would encounter should.they·indulge iri 
industry •. ·.· 
, New cppcepts and dev.elopment ideals seized many colonial . 
dependencie~ and inspired a deep sense of resentment to the 
. . -··· . 
practice:s .o.f·· import:Lng everything from· the mother countries after 
:\, 
' .· .. ··:· 
the. Seconq World War.. This triggered an immense need. for ·colonial 
85 
economic planning. In this spirit, industrial development in 
the FrenchAfrican territor,tes for instance, became a hot issue 
for debate. Policies were presented, for the. first time, with 
a full recogn1. tion of the contribution that inclustriali sation 
c.ould make towards the progress of the community. The new 
.. 
policy of the French in 1944 was that 'the industrialisation of 
. ' . . . 
. coloniai terr{to . .:ties .is. to 'be enco'.l.raged I. (75) Drastic measures 
,· . ~ ·• 
were_accordingly sought to provide protection for local industry 
wheneverneeded, also to conduct research and freely disseminate 
information to the private sector, and more ger..erously, to assume 
the cost of pilot industrial schemes. (76 ) 
Probably the most imrnediat·e result of :j_nternational hostili-
ties-was the sudden collapse of the colonial economic mechanism, 
and the '·disruption. of the centuries old momentUm that adversely 
. . 
·a·ctea· against· lo~ai industry, and created a·vacuum of compelling 
'··'' persua~:i:oi{ t'o·_·new· a_t.ti tudes. After all, the war was fo·:1ght in 
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the name of iiberty ~nd in that context the colonies were aspiring 
for' inqependence as a r~ward· for their war_· effort. · In the second 
place, it would appear that the paralysis that struck occupied 
France:,· and the distress that choked the West. might have been eased 
had· the ··economies ·of the· colonies been strong and sound. The 
economic: state of French Equatorial ~frica, and. for that matter 
of India in the First World War -was deplorable. The most effective 
course of actiori to rectify these economic weakriesse9 was believed, 
~ . .. . 
~t least i-n· tb,eory,_ tp b,e the fostering of econom.lc planning and 
... 
±n mari:y·::'c~ses·th,e ,·givin~ of high priority to industry.; Finally, 
... 
. an~ of direct bearing, the desperate shortage of consumer goods, 
increased propehsi ties to spend, inflationary prices and avail-
. . I 
apili ty of· capital' . both foreign and "lo·~al which was freed after. 
a long bre·ak of investment, '):lad. all prompted the .need for, and 
enhanceQ: the possibilities of industrialisation. 
It was riot surprising that the Sudan government emerged 
in 1946 as a contender in .the field of economic planning through 
the restructuring of public expenditure to finance two Five Year 
·,. 
Development Programmes (1946/1951, ·1951/1956) •. Much of the 
. I 
capital-investment in the first programme was·devoted to the long 
ov.erdue·. renewals of the deteriorating public service. Allocations 
in the second programme wer·e. mainly confined tu education and 
health services,.p'.lblic utilities, agriculture and irrigation • 
. Ba,rb~·U.r, in reviewing these programmes commented: 
••• ·the absence of provisions for manufacturing 
industries is the most serious o.mission·from the 
.list of development projects. (77) 
Bef~re.mour~ing thi.s serious omission, we should analyse the 
principl~~ tha.t guided such a development programme •. Since prior-
··.· 
i ties must 'be established in any plan or programme,. no absolute 
rules could be laid for or against one iine of capital investment 
... 
rather·tl).an. another. Perhaps .the very laws of change that brought 
a.·bo·U.t · econo.m:ic planning had. persuaded the government to seek the 
. . . 
pa~ti~ipation of private capital in industry,· as was the common 
prac~i.ce in. the ·cap{talist economies. Attention should tb,us be 
fbcussed on the govern:.nent' s policy towards ipdu.stry arid private 
. . ' . ' 
cap:ltal~-
. . . . ' 
Fir·st·lE:;t us examine the government's :r:-eaction· to import 
.substitu.tion industries that sprang up during the Second World 
War which were fostered by the protection of a riatural tariff 
. . 
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·barrier. due· to import shortages. Following in the line of tradition 
set ~by t{le· anti-protectionists, the government opted to refrain 
fro:ai int'erfering with the market mechanism when things were nor-
. . ' . . . . . 
malised -afte.r ·the war. · The government had an .obligation towards 
.. •,, . 
. the ·trading·eo111JU'-l.nity and the suppliers a.like, and WOUld. Jeopardise 
.·· ... 
its stand if restrictions were imposed on imports~ \.Jar time 
factories ~ere dying o·J.t for lack of protection and their in-
~bility to co:llpete with imports. To the administration that was 
. . . r 
.a good, omen, and a cause of jubilation. Thus it was a great 
r.elie.f to; the· Governor-General to report in 1945 that: 
There was welcome evidence of. a slackening 
····.:in the .spate of ill-conceived projects 
hitherto fostered by the availability. of 
disused and often derelict machinery .in 
. some pf the neighbouring territories. 
While considering its duty to be the dis-
·. ·:couragement of such ill-fated ventures, the . 
Depart~ent of Economics and Trade has done 
.its.utmost to support and encourage projects 
that were likely to succeed and to bring 
· ·,benefit to the country as a whole and not 
merely to their sponsors. (78) 
·. To. ·put the record straight.· at the risk of repetition, the 
.,iii~fated' projects were fostered, in the first place, by 
. . . .
interrial· f~c'tors ~nd direqtly promoted by the rei""strictions on 
··.· ' ... 
·import~· and the complete rejection of laissez-faire during the 
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war. It is misleading to attribute their promotion to any ex-
ternal impetus such as the availability of the described m.achinery •. 
Having said that, it now becomes obvious that the government was 
. . . 
under no' circlimst~nces ready to digress frolil.its anti-protection-
. -· . ::·. . 
:ist~patharid woulP. logically eschew all industries that would 
' . . 
not sti.rvi ye the flood. of imports. Of spe.cial interest, and 
p6$s.iqly .a:. direct .reflecti.on of the qovernment' s· policy towards 
~~q.U.sJr!' was the ~istin.ction made be~ween 1J.Ddertakings that bene-
fit· th~ ·6o\mtry as a·~hole' and. those' that merely profit their 
. ",' ', . . . . . . 
·. ), 
o·.;mers.· This di.stinction, superficial as it may be, denies the 
importance of private entrepreneurs and their aggregate contribu-
t"ton to the economy. In modern capitalist thought, especially 
tb,at of .J •. Schump.e.ter, it is this talented ~roup, capable of 
iri.novation., investment· and re~investment, that engenders economic 
', ·' 
. . . ' 
change and development through no special effort other than 
seekLng opportunity and concerning itself with immediate 
inte~·ests·. (79) 
. . 
· Th~re' was of co:u.rse, the possibility of direct government 
· p~rticipatlon in industry, or indeed a public/private partnership 
simiiar in outlines to the syndication system of the charter 
government model. Industrial development along any such course 
was openly. rejecp~d in front of the Advisory.Council in 1948: 
,•, •. it :Ls not right for. Government t9 use 
the taXpayers money for speculative under-
takings and risky eXperiments. (80) 
Iri ~as sing it was asserted however, that industry was to be left 
tO'j>ri vate 'ini tiat:lve. But it is illusory to think that such a 
casua:j_ co:mment was meant to be taker! seriously. For one thing, 
the. g~v'ernment s'$em~d. resolved to pursue pa,st policies and was 
. resigned in its effort to ·continue ~the production of primary 
' products as was stated in 1948: 
.••• the economy of the Sudan of the future must 
.bebasE;d, as it has.been in th$ past, on 
·increased eXports of improved qualities of the 
primary products of land and animal husbandry 
·which 9-re the natural endoN.!Ilent of the co·J.ntry. (81) 
It ~h.61J.~d' .. be .emphasised that this pol~cy statement was maintained 
de'spi te the clamant demand for industry reiterated in the local 
press.. Ev~n l.f .we accept this view a$ an implication of the 
·:· 
I · base .s_eqtor·. argpment, the same premise would not altogether ex-
.; 
clud~ oth$r activities such as industry. 
··The consolidation and extension of rion~industrialisation 
p61icie,s vvas chi~fly coined and presented by n.J. Hillard, 
'.' 
director. of the Department of Economic~ and Trade, within the 
· ._bo~y·qf.a policy paper delivered to the Sudan Chamber of Commerce 
in 1948: 
... ~ . ~ . . ' 
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· 'This absence of consumer goods in sufficient 
... variety and supply has led to ill-conceived 
· ·' expressions of ·opinion abo·J.t the. opportunities 
we. have missed of industrialising the Sudan 
and altogether obviating the need for sone · 
. of our present imports. There is a tendency 
to dismiss with an airy sweep of the hand the 
dangers and difficulties which industrialisa-
·. tion may briug in its train· in a country such 
as this.. There are useful lessons to be 
iearned from India's experience. (82) 
In this vein, the trading comrnu.ni ty and wo'.lld-be industrial-
ists,. at their annua;I. gathering, were not· only discouraged by 
meanE;' 'of exaggerating the dange:rs .of industry' but' they were dis-
. . . . 
uaded in the J:p.ost:.fervent tone by condemnation of their critical 
•.· ..... · .• <. 
resentment· of non-industrialisation. In addition we are deliber-
. . ' . . . . . 
ately led to believe that agriculture in Sudan would be abandoned 
ouce industry started. Accordingly, the implications for Sudan 
development .were ·thus: 
•••. to take ~qen away from food.production apd 
to have to import to·feed them when they are 
. only PI'Oducing industrial products for home 
· · consumptiop may be a most unprofitable business. (83) 
Al tho.ugh thi. s conclusion seems, in an abstract sense, coherent and 
.. . . '' , . 
i~deed :Pia:usiple, it would certainly disintegrate if we retracted 
.· . . '· . . . 
· the h;tPothetical .premise .- that all active population would be 
' . '· . . . . . .. 
cocnpletei;Y-'drawri :into a new industrial sector \vhose ultimate tar-
get is confined to the provision of import substitutes. In fact, 
it was none other than Hillard who observed the drift of unde+-
employed labour ~o· the toWns in the r~cent post-war period; ( 84 ) 
and, _.it w'CJ,f? P,e .wh~. 'accounted for the tendencies of disguised un-
employJile.nt. in the countryside. Talking on a similar occasion one 
· • year lp.i;e, he revealed the findings of research conducted by his 
owri .. d:epartm~nt in .the folloWing manner: 
·._. .. :.·~~.·the. figures I have given you suggest that 
· · -in this. pr~dominantly agricultural and pastural 
c·o:Intry. th,ere are too many people doing too 
littlework; even that little being vf unprod-
uctive-nature. (85} · 
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If it we~e only fo.r these reasons, there should h3.ve been a 
sound argu.m.ent for industrial promotion rather· than the opposite. 
In fact," it is now widely accepted, especially after t~e inspired 
studies of w .A. Lewis, that this was the time to invite labou.r-
intensive industries to absorb previo:.1sly unemployed manpower.C 86) 
Nevertheless, Hillard marshalled argu:nents.to assert th3.t industry 
under these,assu1ned conditions would only dissipate the wealth of 
the. country· •.. Tb.us by induction' Sudan WO:lld find itself in that 
same wasteful position·as if his assumptions had co::nmanded the 
~tatus of f~cts: · 
If there is one thing the Sudan cannot afford to 
·do, at this stage of its development it is to 
dissip3.te its wealth. (87) . 
Iri a nutshell, Sudan sho:.Ud avoid industrialisation. 
With these considerations in ::r1ind, and prior to the Second 
World War, it can be appreciated th3.t local mechanical preparation 
of Sudanese·. :produce was ~n ·a few cases unavoidable in the export 
sector, if>~o~ld markets were ever to be profitably reached. 
Cotton, for tnstarice, ·.had to be ginned E!-nd baled because consider-
. able ec'6nomies, amounting to three-quarters of transfer charges, 
were possi?le on.delivery to Liverpool.C 88 )· Likewise, cleaning 
plants' ~fdr. dura(sOrgham ~gar~), gu::n Arabic and sesame were 
er~cted' iri .·the . Gezi ra, Gedarif and Omdurman to meet the minimum 
:Lmpurities requirements of overseas. It wa:s reckoned by the 
Econo::nic· Board of Trade in 1914 that: 
_.It wotild. have been extremely difficult; if not 
. ;impossible to h3.ve hand:-cleaned these large 
.:. quantities of grain. (89) 
For the: samE) reason of freight econo'mies- a small factory was 
i:mil tin ktbara· ·:Ln 1913 to ·produce but ton. blanks which were sliced 
fro::n doni nut~ (hyphaenl? thebaica). On the same scale,. though as 
. . 
- . . . 
an imp'oJ.?t substi t"t+tion, ·a .cheap. quality soap factory was established 
'- ·; ... 
at 1Qlartoum in 1914, and a dyeing factory was also santioned 
at Port Sudan, 1929, to supply 50 per cent of the goods dyed 
in piece for local consumptioni. This operation reduced retail 
pri~~s·:by some 25 per cent.C90) 
A cement factory was also installed at Sem1ar for the co~­
struction. of the. Sennar dam. A meeting held at the Foreign Office 
at London disclosed the aims of this action: 
It was originally intended before the outbreak 
of war (W.W.1), to obtain from England the 
cement necessary for the construction of the 
works [Sennar dam] but in view of the loss of 
tonnage caused by the. war and the increased 
. freights it has no·.N been decided to make 
·. cement in the Sudan. ( 91 ) · 
While the production ·co:mplied with British standards quality 
specifications, the cost was even lower. However, prod.uc:tion was 
. stopped after· the· .. ~ompletion of. the dam by the mid-1920's. Two 
other undertakings signi.fi'cantly different in orientation were 
the date packing at Abu Hamad, and making tins and cases at Port 
Sudan. They both developed a considerable export trade. 
·.A handful of import substitute industries were also initiated, 
during ·t'he. Second. World War and they included vegetable oil mills, 
soap·mamifacturing, perfumes mixing, packing paper, domestic glass-
ware, ~··pilot sugar mill and a match splints factory. A brief 
·addition· to the list of import-savings industries that survived 
the' flood of imports after the war to 1952/53 (self rule) were a 
.·. .· . . 
· ceme!lt .factory; a m.echanical tannery, two canned tomator puree 
. '•. ' . 
factories, a number of soap and oil expression facto:ries, in 
addition to printing, oxygen manufacturing and the spinning and 
· wea,ving rpill of Nzara. Noticeably, while the pre-war industries 
were resource-orientated, the war industries and the ones that 
followed. were predominantly localised in the Prime Base, 
·thus marking • the new trend in location prefe.rence (see Fig. 3.1). It 
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PERIODS 
• 1914-1939 
• 1940-1949 
• I!IS0-19" 
I PORT SUDAN .. 
2 ROWAYA • 
3 DARRA • 
4 SUA KIN 
!I ATBARA • I.A..A. 
6 ABUHAMAD • 7 ZEIDAB 
8 KASSA LA 
9 GEDARIF 
10 S08A 
II KHARTOUM • • T•• 1¥1 I .a. I• I i.a.•J•• 
12 8AHRI l•l•le~ 
13 OMDURMAN 1 l• 
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..... 
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should be stressed however, that the contribution of these 
. • I ' 
industries to G.D.P. was insignificant and probably under one 
per cent. 
It only remains now to relate the disproportionate growth 
ofthe.econo:mic sectors to localization of industry and its 
'', 
strilctv.re •. Despite expansion of agriculture, services: and, 
importables~ the economy remained stationary and' typified by a 
shortage Of productiVe investment as wo·J.ld happen in a mercantile· 
economy ,;and 'predicted by the charter government' mo::lel. Hmv-ever, 
. . .' .· . 
the exclusion of.industry had freed.the export-import sector to 
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deveiop at its own pace a special system of·co:mmodity flows, 
specific channels leading to concentration of wealth and new 'wants' 
diffused through the various agencies of the export-import trade. 
,, 
Th(:j :gen~ral pattern. was: one of central1sed control over capital 
and .the means·of distribution and .diffusion. Associated with this 
patterp too, were.the bureaucratic machinery and commercial banks 
which ,1Ne~e mana·ged to gauge the allo~atioil of . essential services, 
money .. suppiy, ·and internal consumption. The .effect was to a great 
extent'. concentra·tion of public _spending and -more wealth with those 
already in command of internal·supply and clearing houses. To 
. this interest group centrality was both a cause and effect in that 
profit' margins were larger at the Pri~e Base and thus. inequity had 
a spatial connotation of considerable ,·significance to industrial 
location:· At. the same time the same gro"J.p acted as a vehicle to 
more' hori4orital pro(iuction, more consumption of importables and 
ind~edmore concentration of capital asap. integral part of the 
. ' ' . 
process. 
The revitalised desire to industriatise after self-rule was 
a·threat to ce-rtain established import businesses as the new 
· indust'ry WO'-).ld ·produce items previously imported. In many dases 
this meant either surrendering import licences or positively 
participating :in inP.ustry. In fact many sought the latter course. 
The shortest road to achieving this was superimposing industry I 
on the well~defined centralised system to economise on transporf, 
extension services, distribution channels and existing markets. 
Si:q:ci.l~rly, local industry, whi.ch was conducted by businessmen 
and traders was superimposed on a well developed export-import 
system, profit margins, and credit worthiness. In all, it 
·inherited 'localization that characterised the uriindustrialised 
. . . . . 
economy.· 
' .. '· .~ 
,· 
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CHAPrER FOUR 
THE PRI1'1E BASE THEORY 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter lS to seek an explanation of 
the high degree of industrial loealization in the leading urban 
. . . . 
agglo.ineration s of African. and 'developing' countries, especially 
Sudan. ~n analysis o"f the irrelevance of classical, neo-classical 
and much of .contemporary locatiqn theory is probably an· appropriate 
~tart:Lrtg point as these treatises. reflect on experiences confined 
ti:) th~ w~ste~n model of development. Significantly,. the close 
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of the d,ependency state in.Sudan and many ·other ex-colonies prec-
ipitated ·p.rofo·p.nd and rapid economic changes,' especially with respect 
to industrial plirsu.i. ts. Such countries developed· a high degree of 
. ' 
industrial· localization in their Prime Base, that is, their centre 
of· gravity of industrial and commercial life as expressed in the 
d.i ~ersi ty ·and. disproportionately large number of factories, workers, 
capital· outlay,. and value added; Khartoum, Lusaka, Tunis, Lagos, 
NaLro.oi, and Rio de Janeiro,· are well known examples. If mining 
·and aili'eq.· activities' and first stage processin~. are excluded, Prime 
Base l,ndustry.may well exceed two-thirds of all industry. (1) 
. . 
·Although the rising tide of spurning EUrocentric models. has 
. . . 
reached many fields of d.evelo:I;mient, this form of critical awareness 
has been rather slow in the field of industrial location. Probably 
the main reason is· the acceptance of prescribed locational factors 
. . 
as· ·fixed 'determinants of location. The propo _sed theory attempts to 
. ·ruse factor locati'<?n with the historic realities of economic develop-
. . . . . 
. . . . 
ment, ··strticturai .transformation, e_conomic gro·wtll and the underlying 
systems and institutions at both the macro and m.iqro levels of inquiry. 
~ 
I 
I. 
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4. 2 Industrial Location Theory: A cri t:lgue. 
The essence of industrial location theory is the approximation, 
in abstraction, to the complex reality of socio-economic activities 
in the capitalists' market exchange system to :resolve the question· 
of optimum plant locati.on~ Jt seems essential -for location theory, 
whether normative or po si ti ve d_eductioni sm, to assume undifferentiated 
functions and even distributions such as population, behaviour, 
demand and constant transfer cost over distance. Some further 
. specific postulates about production' consumption' cost and objectives 
of decision~makers are also made or indeed assumed away. Thus, if 
we consider location theory as an image of reality or how-reality 
should be, and the constructs of theory as adjusting devices,' i.t ·. 
will become clear that the more close these assumptions are to-w~at 
is depicted or aspired for, at a given time, in. a given economic 
system, tl;le more sll.arp the image will become. Of course, the more 
withdrawn these assumPtions are from reality, the more futile the 
theory· will be. 
Once we accept the concept of dynamism in industrial location, 
we are invited to reassess longstanding dogmas of location theory, · 
and well-established location factors that were probably·more rele~ 
vant at a. specific time and place. One·such comprehensive approach 
. . . 
that sought to resolve the question of optimal location was expounded 
in 1909 by Alfred Weber as the least-cost location theory.C 2) Weber 
depicted simplified economic relations by eliminating the spatial 
variations. of demand and competitive pricing - in other words, demand 
· was assumed to be unlimited, and prices could not be influenced by 
· individual action. Location of the market and materials were given 
and'all purchasers had equal opportunity to buy from punctiform 
consumption· centres. Thus what matters is the variation in trans- · 
port cost of raw material and transformed products, labo"'.ll' costs, 
and the econo~es or di~ecor10mies of agglomeration. (3) Though 
Weber's neglect. of the demand side may be considered the most 
serious o~ersight by contemporary western scholars in the light of 
: · .. · 
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the sheer .growth and variety of demand, and conse,quent organisational 
set-up, thisomission is in fact less drastic if seen from the 
developing ne3,tion's point of view where growth and variety of demand 
is li:mi ted, and more· or less satisfied from oue or two locations. 
Another Eurocentric. view-point relates to the di starting impact 
of technological progress on location factors Sl'~ch as raw materials 
and transportation. The basic argument is that technical advance-
ment has ~ositively affected scale of production and productivity, 
. . 
·consumption patterns, ·mode of energy transmission, etc. For example, 
raw material is evidently exe.rtihg a decreasing pull on the location 
of mode·r.n western industry because refining· of raw material is more 
likely to take place on the location of material .·sou.rce. (4 ) Viewed 
differently, this should imply materiai orientat::.on at the material 
producing countries, much in line with Weber's least-cost ·treatise. 
For such countries the technological change that reduced. raw material 
input per unit of output, and consequently diminished the need to 
locate near soU.rces of raw material, is. not as strongly felt as in 
industr~alised nations. In the latter countries, ·more industries 
.are increq.singly becoming reliant on sub-contractors and components 
provided.by other manufacturers - 3. situation promoting new locat-
ional forces~ 
From the West European and American experience too, it seems 
that transportation cost is shmvi ng relative decline because of 
advancement in transport technology and the radical change of the 
structure· of industry where light industries with high value added 
are growing fast. In passing, D.:M. Smith excluded the 'emerging 
nations' from the ·effect 9f these changes and thus attached undue 
significance to classical ·location factors. He pointed out that 
the need to utilise basic raw materials, 
unskilled labo'lr and cheap so'.ll'ces of power 
makes these factors still ver.y important. (5) 
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Supportedby Alonso, Smith went on to magnify the role of transporta-
tion aS a detrimental factor Of industrial locati;On in 'deVeloping I 
countries in sympathy with classical location theory.C 6 ) It was 
' ' 
argued that transport surface would generally have a very distinct 
low point, i.e., the cost gradient wo-:.1ld rise sharply l;>ecause of 
limited m9-rkets.and location of .material, and low value added. The 
optimal location is accorcli.ngly more definite. ( 7)' Unfortunat~ly, 
such generalised statements often - reglect s:i_mple. facts. Firstly 
the 'emerging nations' are not completely isolated· from the influ-
ences and technology of the west. Many industries readily depict 
broad characteristics of the western style of production and were 
guided in outline by the changing technology. As H. Brookfield 
noted in 1974, 
many industrial undertakings in develo:;?ing countries 
.. co'Jl].d. not be isolated fro::n the dominating power of 
.transcontinental corporations and techno'structures. (8) 
Secondly, iri.dustry in developing countries is more likBly to be 
inclined to locate ·away' from basic raw materials, cheap sources of 
power or pools of unskilled labour. This is substantiated by the 
high degree of industrial localization-in the-P::::-ime Bases of 
'' developing countries. Thirdly, transportation silrfaces are not as 
they would tP.eoretically appear to be since p-ricing systems, profit 
.. 
ma.rgins :and discriminatory freight charges largely modify the trans.;.. 
fer surface. This point will be expanded in .-subsequent sections. 
However;·- the validity of location factors a$ en\lllciated within the 
least.;.qost theory, could. only be of some bearing on the location of 
first stage industries which use bulky and/or perishable inputs 
.. 
such as ores and agricultural raw materials with high material 
index. Even in this narrow area empiricism has not decisively 
revealed 6ompliance with the theoretical optimal location. In a 
. . . ' 
fairly re?ent study of large-scale, government.:. sponsored industry. 
of Sri Lanka.,· Y. Rasa:hayagam has shown the vast. deviation of actua.l 
location ·'from theoretical least-cost locations. (9) Rasanayagam is 
aware. of external economies which draw first stage processing 
indus~ries toward· ip:>ban centres. By contrast,. Kennelly 1 s study of 
·l :· ,·"; ' . ' 
1'1erican steel industry proved that there was consistency of actual 
lo.cati~ns with th~ th~oretical optimum. (10) 
The most obvious shortcoming of the Weberian model is the pre-
occupation with the individual firm, thus failing to explain aggre-
gative patterns which eire of prime con.sideration to 'deve!oping' 
nations •. :''Furthermore, material' substitution an¢! .efficiency of · 
material' use br~:lght about by advances in technology has created 
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new locatlonal forces. The emerging industries of 'developing nations 
are. a martifesta:~ion of this trend ·since they are overwhelmingly 
import-substi t~ftes,. consu~ng a wide variety and volume of s·emi-
processed. 'or 'raw' materials from ab;road. 
Upon a different abstract platform August Lasch tackled the 
same problem of the best location with a profound awareness of the 
ne.ed to .improve on.reality and not merely explain it. (11) He re-
. jected Weber.: in much the same way as Palander, Fetter and Hotelling 
did before hi;m. (12) The common ground between these theorists is 
their ac~rtowledg;emE:mt of the locational interdependence of· firms 
and .~he 'sp.atial vari.ation of demand. However; Wsch 1 s ·market area 
wa's the ·.f~rst .. general t}leory of location with' demand as the major 
spatial v~riable. (1 3) · Of prime concern in this theory_ is the ident-:. 
ification of the location of profit maximisation which does not 
106 
necessarily coincide with the least-cost locatio~. ( 1·4 ) The 
profundity· and ing~nui ty of the Market Area Theory is undo"'..lbted. 
Nonetheless~ it is attacked 0::1 two main fronts: logical inconsis-
. . 
tency, and'omission of cost, time, and human beho.vio:l.I'. Firstly, 
.. 
· the .pr;'edicted distribution centres will eventually grow to transform 
the uniform demand surface into an uneven one because of concentra-
tion. of popuiation, services, wealth and investment; thus contra-
dicting ,the· vt;ry assumption of an. homogeneous plane~ ( 1 5) Secondly, 
·:···· 
failing to incorporate the spatial variations of cost, :the market 
. . . . . . 
. area .wo~ld' only be a function of distance and demand w:hich is often 
unrealistic. Furthermore, the assumptions of even distribution and· 
identical tastes, technical knowledge, and economic opportunities· 
. . . 
grossly discard human behaviour as a factor of locatio::l. 
~rningo"'..lr attention toL~sch's landscape, it is poss:l.ble to 
envisage some specific similarities readily depict-ed in many 
developing .countries. For instance, the LBschia~ space. econom;y of 
dispersed ~griculture. and markets resembles in more than one way the 
e:X:port-i:rp:port ·model already o'J.tlined. Similarly, a large proportion 
. . 
of consunier~goods are produc·ed and distributed fro:n one location -
the Prime Base - in· much the same fashio'n as the postulated pre-
requisite of- the L8schian landscape. Moreover, final demand is 
concentrated, a9 is the case with the ~ssumed L()schi.an demand,_ 
al th.ough the larger proportion o.f the physical consumption does not 
. \ 
necessai'i_;t.y, take place in one location. This is !articularly so 
where ma:Lnimporters, wholesale distributors; and at a later stage 
of. development, i-ndustrial entrepreneurs, are all· in physical prox-
imit~.; 
· When-:considering· irregularities such as pricing policies, U~sch 
maint·ai~ed that such policies reinforc~ the ~axLmisatiop. of the . 
number of separate entrepreneurs and would further reduce the ·size 
of the market. (16) Pricing policies, as "Will be seen later, 
could 1:3.lso be an effective determinant of localization of market 
and entreprene~s. 
The limitation of Lasch, with specific reference to 'develop-
' : 
ing' countries is his neglect of situations where co:mpeti tors 
locate at the .same point. Oligopoli stic co-exi ~tence is a normal 
practice in many such. areas. 
. . ., . . . 
Like scale economies of advanced 
. . 
-. .· 
countries., oligopoly fun.ctions in such a way that· two· or three 
undertakingf:! satisfy·a wide market, and indeed in some cases the 
whole national market, thus undermining the very 'idea of regional 
establishments and markets in the LBschian landscape. According to 
L~sch, firms of similar products should repel each other and hence 
he ·fails to explain the 'situation of co-existence where the same 
market area' accommodates simiiar operations. ( 1 7.) 
on· the ·basis of' the analysis presided on so far, industrial 
locati.on· ·emerged at the two extremes; least-cost theory and profit 
maxi.mi sation .• · .There were many gaps to be filled and intermediate 
ground ·to be bccupied. Much of· the theoretical development .was 
. . 
either cosmetic'' in the' sense of reinforcing existing treatises,. or 
integrative, "With the objective of marrying the two ·approaches. One 
.of the principle developmer1ts in location theory associated with 
Weber, was the partial equilibrium approach expounded by Hoover. (1S} 
His P.epartur.e· from the simplified assumptiops ·of Weber was a concern 
with realistic details. Thus the question ofbest location, he 
maintaiped, m"':.l$t be ex~ended and modified to J.nclude the influence 
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of diminisping returns and consequently economies of scale and market 
area~ ... 
W. Tsard· attempted a general location theory, basing a good 
.deal of effort on integrative a·naly sis, by briJJ.gin~ toj5ether. Von 
I 
Thune.n, LBsch and Weber. ( 19) He rejected the idea of even distri-
bution of resources and instead introduced irregular concentric 
zones to the· L~schian landscape. Further, he .. fused location theory 
withthe substitution principle of economic theory as applied to 
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transportati~n,. labou; and market. ( 20) Furthermore, he. was concerned 
with refining available techniques, a matter that culminated in the 
introduc:tion of transformation lines and equal outlay lines.C 2'1) 
Scale _.economies too, were of great relevance to Tsard and are 
reckoned to. have more weight on location than· catered for by either 
Weber or LBscn. S.ummarising the effort of Isard, D.M. Smith acknow-
ledged the foll.owing: . 
. -'The combination of all this iri Isard '.s fin.al 
.diagrams probably represents the nearest thing 
· to tbe ·spatial arrangement of economic pheno-
, men a ·in the real world that deductive . ·cheory 
··has yet produced.· (22) 
Nevertheless~ Isard's. attempt is remote from the reali.ties.of 
. :· . . . 
d~velop'ing ·nations. His conception of price policies for example, 
. . . 
. is a·mere: treatment of an exception, whereas the. same conception has 
a paramount effect on location of 'developing' countries. As will 
. · .. 
be di-sclosed later, Sudan's experience of price policies h?-s profound 
consequE:mces on la.ca.tion' and indeed rio realistic· approach to the 
prob.lem of industrial location could isolate price policies from the 
underlying location factors. Of course, at a later date, in 1959, 
Isard reconciled w:i,. t~ regional growth, especially . ,.growth poles I 
when examining Wit:h Schooler the type of industry apd·location of 
majo:r inyest~~rii; through linkages between sectors in Pu.erto Rico.C 23) 
Economies of scale and agglomeration were critical in this ·latter 
analySis •. 
-Melvin Greenhunt( 24 ) differs in that he attempted to integrate 
the leapt..:;cost and locational interdependence theories by bringing 
together cost .and demand. His introduction . of '.psychic income' was 
·' . : 
piorieel,'ing th~ugh much of this concept remained to be developed 
by Allen Fred. ( 25) · 
Wha:t distinguishes D_.M. Smith is his ability to synthesize 
and provide a guide to empirical enquiry within the least-cost · 
frame; an approach that admittedly suits advanced industrial 
economies~ ( 26 ) 
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Indu-strial location in developing countries di spleys an 
essentially different picture. This is .because dynamic change takes 
place ir_1 ·a.. different· milieu, devoid of any industrial base· while the 
pro:-cess_ O.f cl_la'f:lge (what some scholars call moderr.ii sation) has for 
s~metini~ penetrated many" econo.mic fields,. such as the ·evolutions of 
cash economy, transportation systems, and consumption of imported 
goods. If only for this reason it is· superficial to isolate a few 
factors and 'de'em them responsible for industrial location in one 
place or~ another. 
,.·. 
- The geperal ·awareness of the need to identii'y special factors 
. of location for developing countries springs from the regional plan-
ning studies· especially W. Alonso in the mid-1960.' s. ( 27) Alonso 
points o·at th~ need to distinguish relative· development as a factor 
of'lo:c~ti~n(·2B) and couched Friedmann'~ centre-periphery in vJhat he 
termed the "big city or the hinterland location."( 29) If polarity 
iS a fact Of life in I deVelOping' COUntries, the historiC eVOlUtion 
. of spati?:l structure is crucial to the underst<mding of location in 
these couptries. However, Alonso's observations were not so sharp 
when .he cohsid.ered .the role of transport-ation' a factor to which he 
attribUted UDdU.e Significance in the specifiC CaSe Of· I deVelo'p:lng 1 
co:mtries~ . In his bid to explain industrial. localization, especially 
·at the ports:·of. developing countries,. he. postulated the existence of 
. . ' . .. ' 
transport surfaces with a very distinct low point, i.e., transport 
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cost rises sharply away from the central point,. thus producing 
a definite optimal location. Other factors magrJifying this tendency 
are tlle low val.ue added, imperfect articulation of the .pricing .system, 
and the socialised pattern of production. Obviously, these con-
ditions only hold true in the very special case of government-
sponsored industries. In fact there is a substantial number of 
industries where location :l.s guided by a well organised pricing 
.. • 
system and these contribute relatively high value added. As we 
shall see in subsequent sections, transportation is less significant 
in both cases than Alonso WO'.lld assume. 
One of the most longstanding oversights of industrial location 
. . 
theory is its detachment from. the proiific theories of regional 
economic gro.wth and regional economic planning. Yet the specific 
;elevance' to industrial location of concepts such a~ growth· centres, 
. the. dual economy, export base. and centre-peri.phery is only too 
obvi'ous ••. tn".gene~al theoretical terms these v~rious branches rec-
ognise. spatial differential gro·trth, and the dynamism of spatial 
change. In each, the socio-economic pro~esses culminate in the 
evolution of aggl.omeratic)ns and industrial localization. Nonethe-
less, the. regional differences should be mB.de clear·. The expo·rt-
base theory as applicable to North America isa case in point. Here 
the comJD.ercial relations with the metropole determines, ainong other 
thing~,. tp.e sp~tial arrangement of industry •. 0~ the other hand, 
while industrial· location in Europe has no_place for stage th~ories~ 
the· export..;.base. theory has much relevance in ~xp~_airiing certain con-
centratio~s of investment and industry. Similarly, the theory of 
economic dualism has much relevance to the development of inequality 
as a result of the co-existence of two sectors, one traditional and_ 
the ·other .modern. The latter is equipped with all the ingredients 
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of growth, such as the promotional institutions, manning and 
f;i.nancing. · For that matter, growth is geographically concentrated 
and by necessity unbalanced, especially so at the early stages of 
development~. Industrial localization is an effect within the spatial 
context of. this development. 
Equally significant is probably ·the centre-periphery concept 
developed by R. Prebisch within the context of int~rnational trade.C30) 
This was later formalised by J. Friedmarn in the core-periphery thesis 
wher~ the marginal returns tci the factors of .produ.ction differ 
greatly between. regions, and the centre which "act as suction pumps, 
pulling in more dynamic elements from the more static regions."(3'1) 
Region~l growth according to this thesis is· a prob~em in industrial 
location, ·and the core is seen as the centre of diffusion, access:-
ibili ty to :funds' information exchange as well as the place of 
h:l.gh ·growth rate, structural change and modern.is~tion. However, 
this is indivisible from the weakening of the peripheral economy in 
the form of net transfer of natural, human and capital reso-:.1rces to 
the core through market and supply systems, and administrative con-
. {32) . . 
t:rol •. · · In a similar sense, growth centres recast the abstract 
concept of growth pole*, delving into spatial polarisation through 
propulsive industries and econo~c linkages. 
On the same pretext too, is the singular spatial connotation 
of regionp.l ·econom...i.c .planning. Although regional. planning in 
advanced cour:itrie s after the mid~'1940' s was concerned with depre·ssed 
. . . 
areas, iri :many 'developing' countries it cam·e abo:1.t to relieve a 
nationwide depressed condition. _The difference however, is that 
* Aceordin~ t9 Darwent "the growth pole concept a priori -does n·ot 
· of"fer any e:x:pJ,.anation of· the location of the propulsive industry 
.in geographic space, nor of the conseq_uence of a pole having a 
particular. location in geographic space." (33) 
'1'12 
while in the industrial nations regional planning could explain 
industrial iocp.tion in isola ted spots, in 1 dev2loping 1 co:mtries 
it C01.,lid account for the pre-eminence of specific locations. 
·Beneath this lies the actual pro:notion of industry and progression 
of ·:Pre-industrip.l systems involving the special attention to 
sp~c:Lfic economic sectors which resulted in skewed economic grov-rth. 
This has invariably produced and is still promoting spatial polarisa-
tion far niore significant than yet acco:mted fo:r in industrial 
location studies. ·Thus :Lf growth is geographically unbalanced, it 
\'. , •• ' l,,,. 
is especially so in· the early stages of industrial developm~nt since 
planning ·.for indust_r:y ought to favou.r the most adequately served 
and deveioped.location~ In the· formative years too, as noticed by 
Alonso'· the need. for entrepreneurship, co·Qpled with meagre know-
ledge'. sparse transport facilities and the necessity o{ face to face 
communication reduced choice of location and ind;;ed enhanced local-
. .• 
ization. ·By probing all these forces, whether in the f:i.eld of 
. regional econo:dJ.ic :planning or economic growth, it lS possible to 
prbvid'e a' partial explanation for the spatial polarisatia.n of 
i.ridustr;y- in 1 developing 1 countries. It folloTATs·· that the problem of 
indu.striai 'lo~ation. could not be solved :Ln terms of conventional 
lobation :factors such as transport, market; labo;Ir etc. Probably the 
·most str:i,king illustration ·of the incapacity of the latter 9-pproach 
as appli~d to industrial location of African countries is provided 
by Ogendo in his study of Kenyan i.ndustries(34 ) and El-1'1ehdawi in his 
industriallocatiori. a~alysis of Libya. (35) While.the former is a mere 
.. 
cataloging df. industrial factors that affect the. location of indus-
tries.· (especially in Nairobi and 1'1ombasa), the latter deployed the 
que stionn'ai~e method, and rated each firm -?,ccording to. its score on . 
.. ' 
. selected factors and hence produced a ranked- factor location. If we . 
'. 
ignore ::th~ shortcomings of post-facto rational{ sa~iop., · bia~ed· sampling · 
and. the general unawareness of the real factors by the· firm, the 
net result is a false explanation of the compound mix of socio-
economic processes that underly the mechanism of industrial local-
ization. The rest of this chapter is addressed to the task of 
unravelling these forces as interpreted in the Prime Base theory. 
4.3 Location of the Import Firm 
The gro·:.1nd is now prepared for considering the location of 
,., "' 7: 
. I ! ./ 
one impoi::t~nt ·economic .activity in developing cquntries, a~d that 
is the import firm prior to industrial development. To begin with, 
the phem~menon of ·concentration of trade, P<?Pulat:i,on and a.·t. a later 
stag~, in9-ustry in coastal ctties was remarkabJe enough to warrant 
a sp~cial consideration, especially by 1'1abogunj~, (36 ) Alonso ( 37} 
and Breese.(3B) Hqweyer, in most cases this observation is often 
too·.casual and abstracted from its spatial and locational con~ext. 
· Probabl~. 'Alonso's treatment is an exception. He. stated in 1968 . 
the following: 
. . ·. ' .. 
. · A ,glance at world maps of population· concentration 
'· shows a striking pattern of coastal cities ringing 
. ,· the developing continents, while the .hearts of t:h.e 
continents· remain virtually empty. (39) · . 
In· Eit.tempting· to explain this pattern, Alon$o pajs special attention 
. . 
to accessabilit~ and inaccessability. If distance is considered in 
terms of specific routes; as is the case of developing countries, it 
follows that the average di!=Jtance between points in a country is 
longer .than distance. from the coastal location to these points. Thus 
the coas~al city ~ s the most central location for national di stri bu-
.tion of com:nodities.C40) By induction, a coastal city will also 
become c~ntral· for industries that depend on one material assembled 
. . . 
from·di8persed sources, or combining diverse mA.terials from diverse 
' :. 'J '. 
sources·. From· the demand point of view Alonso's eXplanation is even 
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more abstract, ·as he maintained that: 
••• the concentration of demand is often 
preponderant both because income is always 
more concentrated geographically than 
population and because manufactured products. 
are typically income-elastic, so that demand 
i•s more concentrated than income. Similarly'· 
in9-ustrial demand for producer goods will 
typically be concentrated at these points 
:[port cities]. (41) 
.. 
It is implicit therefore, that the development o:' a market· area 
and exterriali ties are the explanation for the. concentration o.f 
industry in the coastal nodes. However, there is little direct 
eviden.ce to support this. conclusion, and the very incidence·· of 
industrial concentration at inland locations undermine the whole 
argument~ 
.In· our bid to ~nderstand the mechanism that favo~e~ the grov~h 
' . 
of a Pri:ine Base, we first verify the location'· o·f the i:inport firm. 
Ifwe assu:me.tlie choice of a base-post at the time of. political 
annexat~on, ·this could either be a fresh location, an indigenous 
nucleus o.r a charter government post at the coast or elsewhere. 
- . . . 
From tl:iat·'base, military, administrative and economic operations 
.. , ., ·' ' . 
would be.conducted. Now, if in a hypothetical example, three import 
. . 
firms opted to ·locate at either P, B or c, as depicted in·a 'simpli-
fied diagram (Fig. 4.1), the margin of profit, i.e. , reyenue over 
cost,· wo~ld be of considerable weight (assu,.ll.ing the import firms 
are not .in business to make losses)~ If we further assume that 
i:rnportation .is only through a sea port, a.nd coast deliv.ery cost of 
imports is. the same· for all three import firms, and that an author-
ised profit II19-I'gin is granted over basic cost, say 400 per cent, 
. . 
and· ·further an f. o. b. system .i.. s invoked wh.e·re purchasers pay . for. 
. .· ' ,··. 
the' cost of transport,. th~n the selling price. will b-e the basic cost, 
plus profit', in. addition to transportation cost .to destinations of 
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Fig 4 ·I Location of Import Firms 
Coast Interior 
consumption. Evidently P could quote the same price as that of · 
B, C, etc., ~t these places (line P 1 Q1). Conversely, B, C, Q, 
'1 '16 
etc., could n·ot compete for the market to the left of their locations. 
. . . .,: . 1 1 1 Slmply, prlces B 0, C 0, etc., will be higher than those quoted 
by P. FUrthermore, it is only P which could wage a price war, sell 
at b.9:si.c cost at B, C, Q, and still squeeze some profit from the 
mono:poly'of.are.a to the left· of B. Neither E, C nor Q could afford 
to .do so. if they are to stay in business. In. fact, B, c, Q, will 
incur· extra cost in office expenses as· they req1+ire clearing agents 
or offices at the port. 
Since it· is necessary in any trading system to have a· hierarchy 
of distributors, i.e., wholesalers and retaiiers with varying tne3;rgins 
of profit",. their ·location reinforces the preference of one location 
to another' •. What· determines the location of this group acc?rding 
., . . 
to ·the· as-sumptions of the previous case? There is an· qbvlous 
inclination for wholesalers to reside at P, for ·~hey would be ousted. 
at ariy other· location if price competition arose. Besi.des, whole-
. . . 
salers tritending maximum sales could command the who~e market only 
.from point·P •. Once importers are well entrenched at the coastal 
poi-t ~ P, ·(a situation that often leads to widespread oligopoli stic 
practices), regional wholesalers, with lesser capacities and ambi-
tions could develop. This is only so because wholesalers have little 
flexibility to command or man:Lpulate the. p·rices of the_ import sy~tem. 
Moreover, P ·is a remarkable locati.o.n in that it would ·still command 
the • market e·ven. if we relax the assumptions of a constant transfer 
cost to di.stanc.e, and e.ven distribution of pQpulation. In the first 
instance,· tapering off transfer charges will_ ptill leave B, C or Q 
. at a disadvantage. Likewise, in a case of uneven distribution .of 
population P .could monopolise the market to the left of B however· 
. ·.· 
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meagre-the population in this segment, and thus could afford to 
sell at basic cost, as in the previous example. 
4.4 The Prime Base Near or at the Geographic Centre 
·That the Prime Base should develop at a coastal location is 
a logical conclusion of valid empirical standing, other things being 
.. '•' . 
equal. ·However, other things are often not equal. The occurrence 
' .. ,• ·.; . ' .. . . . . 
of an inland Prime Base, at B in Fig. 4.1 for example·, is' a real 
' ' . 
p6ss:l.bil;i.ty as manifested by the very existence.Jf Khartoum, Nairobi, 
etc. This is a· clear contradiction of the theoretical location of 
Prime Base developed in the preceding section. 
We now address ourselves to resolving this·disparity. For any 
. . . : 
one reason, or a number of reasons a colonial government. may have 
opted· to ioc.ate it.s seat inland •. This could be because of the con-
figuration of the. terri tory whereby it was more' strategic to stretch 
control from a central point, the prevalence· of' favou.rabl e ,climate, 
historical· reconstruction of a previous· pat-tern of location hier-. 
'•· 
'' archy, or~ th'e existence of a water~cou.rse, concentration of resources 
etc. Nevertheless, such a choice wo·:1ld by itself still fall short 
of creating a. commercially viable location inland·. To· activate a 
favourable climate for t~ade wo~ld thus entail ~he enactment of dis-
' criminatory· laws to negate the situation assumed in Fig. 4.1. Such 
· l.aws ,Play ·reQ.re.ss transfer charges and profl. t m<?-rgins, ·and. may extend 
to .conces'sionary acts to tip the balance' in 'favour of an interior 
location.. The. most striking illustration of this bias is probably· 
., 
' ' ' 
the ba'sing point system instanced in industrial locati.on literature 
by'the'..'Pittsburgh-Plus".· The mechanism of thls· system rt~as described 
' . 
. by l."'. Ghf~holm as. follows: 
. • • . the. basing-point system regards all of the 
·. "' 
·production of the co:mnodi ty in questio11 as 
originating from a single point, the basing 
point. Thus, a uniform ex-works price is set 
for all producers, irrespective of their actual 
eost 'of production, and the price that will be 
quo'ted to any consumer is calculated by adding 
to this 'base' p'rice the cost of transport as 
if the consignment originated from the basing 
point. (42) . 
However, the optimum theoretical location as a reBult of such a 
.:-, 
pricing policy ::j.. s rather· controversial. Clearly, a non-basin·g point 
.• ·:, 
. .. .. 
could ·sell. ·at a higher· margin . of profit if it happened to have a 
lower cost ·of production. Nonetheless, such a location may not reap 
the b~nefit of .scale economies in cases of price elasticity as 
pointed o"'.lt by Chisholm·. ( 4 3) On the other hand,· backward linkage 
,. . ' . 
indu.striE{S. will tend ·tO locate at the basing point as prices of in-
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puts are· at Iilinimum here' .and hence the development of agglomerations • 
. The grow~h of steel industry and fabricati~ns at Pittsburgh, to the 
. . . ' , . . 
detrime~t· ·of Birm.i.~gham, Alabama, is a welt known· ~xample. C44) 
:Reinark.ab~y, many· industrial location theorists:, includi.ng 
Isard, ( 4 5) Hciover/ 46) Chisholm, ( 47) Smith(4S) and Alonso( 49) have 
referred to the basing point system as a marginal case of l~mited 
impact '~n ·industrial location where and when it prevailed. Yet they 
ail fail.ed to grasp· the implication of. such a system in 'developing' 
territories where a basing point could pe a dispensing base of most 
commodities to th~ whole nation. The emphasis on oornmodities rather 
tha!l . .industries is intentional, and an important one; because in 
" . 
many developing countries import trade long prec.eded industry. 
Whether ·:arid how the a~plicatio~ of a basing point sy$tem had a vary-
' . . 
. ing .re S1U t on location at a different stage of economic development 
will be. verified with the Sudan example. 
For generations it remained obscure how it could be plausible 
tp trans-ship coJliD.od.i ties direct from Port Sudan to· Khartoum and re-
consign the port's quota from there. Anyone who encounters such 
an experience from within ·as J. MacManus of the Guardian did, can 
but wonder at the uncomprehendable nature of the practice. He 
observed on the eve of the Fifteenth African Summit Meeting at 
Khartoum in 19?8: 
Strange~y, the shortages are worse on the coast ••• 
'the plight of Port Sudan stems from the practice 
of freighting all food imports direct from the 
port to the capital inland. (50) 
And he fur~her noticed: 
••• the seasonal food shortages in the city [Port 
Sudan] have become acute and much food is simply 
not finding. its way back to the coast. (51) 
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It se.ems that the same practice was in operation in 1970 when the 
author was informed by the Ex-Governor of the then Red Sea Governorate 
. . . . 
that he had been pressing Khartoum authorities to dispatch back his 
governorate's consignment of wheat flour. 
The immediate relevance of these observations becomes clear 
when we discover the existence of a basing poi?.t system presumably 
in force since the establishment of the Red Sea line in 1906. As 
Khartoum was reinstated as the capital of the country·in 1898, it 
was decided by the British administration that it should also be the 
commercial centre (this in contrast to the case of Nairobi/Mombasa 
where the.latter was the port-cum-capital until 1905 when a move was 
made to Nairobi as the new capital of Kenya). (52) If unchecked, 
the price mechanism would assert itself in favour of Port Sudan in 
a fashion similar to that depicted in Fig. 4.1. To answer the 
practical needs of a commercial centre at Khartoum the pricing policy 
was adjusted in such a way as to establish Khartoum as a depot for 
all commodities and from there commodity prices rise proportionate 
to distance in all directions, i.e., f.o.b. prices (except when 
freight absorption is practised). Simultaneously, the author:Lsed 
profit. margin i~ calculated as a percentage on Kh.a:ptoum procurement 
cost,· including transfer cost, excise duties, insurance, etc., in 
what is kriowr.i as 'profit on c·ost to store.'. In other words, 
impqrters will collect profit on the total cost even though the · 
. purchaser pays in effect for transfer, duties aria insurance. This 
practice was referred to in a speech by the Director of Trade and 
Econ.omies in 1947. 
There is nothing m;y department can do to remedy 
]llatters for· the consumer [in respect of. high 
·prices] beyond considering the suggestion that 
. the present authorised rates of profit are too . 
high and that, in any case, they should .be based 
. as they are in Egypt on c.i.f. values instead of 
~n th~ cost to store. (53) 
The trading oo~unity's margin of profit thus included an ·extra sum 
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.. of profit, the maximu!ll of which is only attainable at the Prime Base. 
Importers and wholesalers at the port would clearly sacrifice this 
concessionary margin, while counterparts located inland, beyond 
Khartoum, 'could not reap the benefit of further transfer since their 
pri~e·s ·ar~ restrained by Kharto'.liil-plus prices·. 
Now consider this simplified example: Suppose an importer's 
ba.sic, port deli very; c .i. f. cost is LS.1 OOO·; transfer ·cost and 
inmir~nce.· to Kh~rtoum is LS.100, and authorised profit is 20 per cent. 
While the,im.Porter·• s selling price of LS.1200 at the port gives a 
profit of LS.200, profits for an importer who transfers his commodity 
to Jiliartoum will be LS.220 because of the profit on transfer cost 
whi:ch is paid by the purchaser. To formalise this situation and 
attempt to explain the local i. zation of import.firms and wholesalers 
at a:ri int.erior 1o~ation, B in Fig. 4.1, a graphical representation 
will ·be d~veloped as in Fig. 4. 2. Let the left hand side be the 
. D . 
coast, the. right hand side the interior, and the ·sh~ded lower bottom 
area the basic port of· delivery, ¢.i.f. price. 
Fig 4·2 Location of Import Firms Under Prime Basing and 
Profit on Cost to Store. 
Coast Interior 
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Notation: 
p 
B 
c 
p ·Q 
p1 Q1· 
pp1. BB1 
' ' 
OB1 D 
o1 c1 n 
o2 c2 D1. 
Port of importation. 
· · ·Prime Base at an interior locatiOn. 
An 'eccentric' interior location~ 
Transport gradient. 
Authorised profit on cost to store. 
cc1 .. Profit margin at P, B, C respectively. 
Prime Base price plus transfer charges. 
f.o. b. prices from 8. 
Hypoth~ti cal f. o. b. prices from C • · 
. .. 
The-following assumptions will be made:- local industry has 
not yet. started·; i.e., all commodities were manufactured outside 
the country~. 'imports through p only; a system of. profit on cost to 
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. ' :- ., '• . . . -~. . . 
store, · B is the store· or depot, and the point of origin of all f. o. b. 
prices to regional destinations. 
Again,~pplying the simple hypothetical example of three importers 
P,·B andC as in Fig.·4~2 ~twill be clear tha-cP ·scores a net profit 
over costs of 50 per cent. B' c' Q. will all be :_n the maxim"J.m profit 
zone of· 75 per cent. ·This· being so, because for: each unit dispatched 
inland up···to po:Lnt · B the trade profit will be calculated on total 
cost to B~ although transfer cost is _passed to purchasers as in f .o. b. 
systems~ . ·Now~ if we·. introd:tice the demand factor, a:pd scale economies 
. (in 'this: case' larger urii t distribution of a comnodi ty)' we enter a 
stage bf monopolistic competition. Supplier·B·cu'uld quote the same 
price as any supplier to the right, C, Q, (line OB1 D), while at the 
same ·time C (and with a sinrilar procedure, Q), could not compete in 
a;eas l~ft of C (line o1 c1 ) which is obviously too high a price. 
, . . , , r . , . . 
Consequently,: wholesalers will be inclined to favour. purchases .from 
B where t,h.ey command a larger segment of the .market area. Thus, C, Q, 
·.· .. 
would not patronise main distributors and will be forced to 
lo.cate at B~ · It will be no ted that C, for example, could not sell 
at t]::le higlie; profit I!J.argin o2 c2 Q 1 as selling prices are fixed 
., ': : ' ' 1 
by B' s price pl.us transfer cost (0 B D)~ Otherwise, it would have 
· been· more .profitable to locate at Q. However, if a firm at C were 
to sell at B ~t comparabie p;ices, it should contend with the much· 
lowered margin of pr()fi t of 25 per cent ~i.e. , the intersect 0. B 1 
. with C c1 , (not drawn in diagram). 
Unlike classical basing-point system where it is possible as 
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in tb,e case· .of .Birmingham, Alabama to sell lo.cal production at Pitts-
. . . ' . . . . 
bu~gh-plus prices, P in Fig. 4. 2 could not reap the price differential 
(P1 0)~. As stated pefore,. the selling price at any location is deter-
mined by basic cost plus authorised profits, and no more. In fact 
' ; . ,·· 
the policing of.the ptice structure is an integral part· of the dis-
.. ·'. : ,;·: . . ·, . . 
criminatory profit margins, basing system, and oligopolistic practices. 
. . ; . ' . . 
··,: 
Any Cl,ttempt: to undermine the delicate price structure would be met 
by sanctions and withdrawal of import licence by a vigilant govern-
ment •. -~ore significant however, is that wholesale outlets will find 
it more rem~J.nerative to locate at B, since maximum net profit is 
only :attaipable. here •. At any profit sharing ratio, wholesalers are· 
better off at .B thari anywhere else.· (This ratio is generally 20, 10 
'. 
and .. 5 per cent fo:r i~orter, wholesaler and retailer respectively). (54 ) 
Trading o:P;~rationl:? from P are not only at a lower margin of profit, 
but suffer a distinct shortage of wholesale o~tlets. It should be 
clearly stated 'that the .market forces were devised in such a manner 
. :· . . . . . . . 
. as to favour one location,· the Prime Base. Cfu:i:-. concern here is the 
very existence of such a system which still prevails and in the pro-
cess creates forces that sustain the grains of agglomerative growth. 
4.5 Location of Export Firms 
Export and import firms in developing countries are by 
necessity complementary. Their reciprocity is often attested by 
their spatial co-existence and functional unity. Thus, one firm 
could conduct both expo~t and import business. The reason for com-
bining these two functions is that both businesses are carried out 
within similar if not the same channels. A combination of the two 
is equally important because of the relatively higher risk element 
in export trade due to price fluctuation over the longer period of 
handling the produce •. As profit margins vary from one mode of trade 
to another, an export firm would consolidate its transactions if it 
also engaged in impor~ trade with a lesser riSk element and secured 
~ 
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commission. Also combfng the two businesses would cut down on office 
expenses and promote economies of scale with regard to shipment space 
and cost. FUrthermore, handling one or two products and commodities 
would enhance gains from specialisation as would indeed centralisa-
tion and pooling of resources in a business that must rely on well. 
defined hierarchies extending from local agents to overseas corpora-
tions. Since the location of· maximum profits for import firms is 
already defined, the location of the export firm is almost predeter-
mined. 
Nonetheless, the most important location factor for export 
firms is the low shape of the transport curve for the ongoing produce 
i.e., the gradient of the transport cost is rather gentle. As agri-
cultural raw materials are generally of low value added, they could 
not sustain high transfer cost, a fact universally accepted and 
catered for in the form of low transfer charges. It follows that 
export firms are usually indifferent to transfer cost because such 
cost is marginal to the trade and often shared by the producers as 
we have.already seen ·in Chapter Three •. Moreover, there is more. 
than one source of material and more than one ·product which will 
significantly add to the denigration of transfer cost as a factor 
of location in the specific case of export firms. One may, of 
course, compare thts to the benefits gained from locating in prox-
imity to other businesses, commercial banks, information and tele-
' . ' 
co::nmunication centres, which are localised at the Prime Base, :point 
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B in Fig. 4.2. Consequently any location other than node B would 
likely be a profit Iilinimiser/risk multiplier as urgent commercial 
contacts and transactions wo~ld be slowed down thus eroding trading 
chances and increasing running cost in the absence of the right 
services. As with the import firm, oligopoly has the spatial function 
of centrally commanding the information flow and the reciprocity of 
collecting it. 
·Having estabiished B as the Prime Base of import-export firms,. 
other concomitant forces develop to consolidate the pre-eminence of 
this unique ·location. Firstly, land value will start to rise for 
·real and speculative demand. Second, business profit tax will con-
stitute ar1 important proportion of the local government budget, and 
thus enable t:he extentiori. of the service sector at the Prime Ba:se. 
Third, high turn.;..over and profits will enrich tne commercial banking 
system and enable larger short-term credit and further investment. 
Fourth, op-the,.;.job training at most levels. of management, and at 
maintenance.workshops will.continually be con:iucted. Fifth; contact 
wi tl:). the d,utside world, and acquisition of new habits and consumption 
patterns will be conducted at B since the alie11 gro-:.1ps are engaged 
in the lo'cali sed export-import trade. Sixth, anri 'in connection with 
the expor~-import trade is the ar~ of brokers; middlemen,peddlers, 
and the·gr9wth of petty trade. Seventh, job opportunity, real or 
imaginary, will increase with the diversity o~ the economic 
activity at the Prime Base, thus rolling the ball of in-migration. 
Away from thePrime Base the export-import firms also necessi-
tate the development of regional centres or secor.dary bases as 
co1lectio:6 and di stri butio:~ o"J.tlet s. Of paramount significance, 
and detrimental to·l.ndustrial location is the fact that all these 
processes interact in a tl.me dimension comple·cely isolated from the 
. . · .. 
participation of i:ndustry. However, before introducing this sector 
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there remains a further comment on the progressive spatial inequality 
and social set up. · 
4.6 The Contribution of 'New Wants' to §patial Inequality 
A crucial aspect of the process of development and polarisation 
" . 
o,ften neglected in locatio:J. theory is the flush of new wants a 
developing country would face from the early days of contact with 
European civilisation. The traditional·and subs::.stence societies 
would be pervaded by commodities and articles which were either com-
. pletely new or preViously· fabricated by th.e community. To mention 
only a few examples;. think of a piece of soap or a box of matches. 
To the natives these were almost' supe·rnatural in utility and function, 
and to acquirethem has long become an o~session, and indeed, a nece-
ssity of life. On the other hand, articles subs·ci tuting for products 
alre13,dy in use ffilch as clothes, shoes, china-ware, (the list is end-
less.) were offered ·at better quality and durability. However, the 
principle.· leverage to the whole system of famlly di vi sian of labour 
was that the new .commodities had to be paid fo~ in cash. The societal 
. . 
fabric wa~ attacked at J.ts very roots. Agricu:Ltural products (inc-
luding ani_mal husbandry), the mainstay of the rural community, was 
drawn into a wider market and bartered for cash, thus paving the way 
. for new production norms and maldeformi ty of the di vi sian of labour. 
More exchange for cash meant also the ability to acqui~e more 
of the neyv- goo:ls. 
Natlirally, the first contact with the 'new wants' takes place 
not on a broad front, but on a localised main C..epot of importation, 
the Prime Base. The new-items originated here. Their prices were 
cheapest here, and their interaction and usability was tested at 
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this node, whence it diffused to the rest of the t·err.:Ltory. The over-
riding concern for more cash to pay for the new wants was incompat-
ible with the. traditional production of the rural .population where 
' . . ' 
low returns .fro::n agriculture could not pay for the diversity of the 
new wants. At both ends, the drive was mutual ar.d the Prime Base 
was the ).i:kely locat:ion to benefit. This was the case mainly· because 
of the earning differential between core and periphery. In the 
former, earnings.we~e more individual and regtiiarly received whether 
weekly or monthly, as against the collective income at the end of 
a long growing :season. Noticeably, the move to the Prime Base would, 
at least at the eariy stages, relieve pressures· un land and increase 
per capita income •. In turn this would enable the rest of the rural 
population to increase per cap'i ta intake o;f the hew wants.·. Further-
. . . 
more, the in-migration population v1ould have a social obligation to 
r~mi t a proportion of their income and indeed send back 'gifts' of . 
the. verY i terns aspired for. The chain reaction of 'this proc.ess was 
self :perpetuating as more consumption cons.olidab~d both importers in 
the Prime Base, and created a new drive to increase production· in 
the :rural areas .. It should be emphasised however, that the marginal 
income in the periphery was kept at.a relatiyely low level because 
of the low retl.lrns to agriculture through the procedures of inter-
. natiopal t.rade and unfavourable terms of trade. This feature was 
ulso an·important one in projecting the gap between the rural areas 
I 
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I • 
and .the Prime Base and enh::tncing· the move to the -latter. Needless 
to say,. economies of scale at the :(?rime Base were set up in response 
to increased dem::tnd both local and regional. . JVIore in-migration to 
.the Base creating cheap labour, would also lO'tJ'=r business cost, 
increase 'pro"fits and dividends, and enable payment of high salaries 
. . 
to managemeot, thus inc·reasing inequality and prep::tring a nev.,r gener-
ation of 'shadow entrepreneurs'. 
Whereas one finds th::tt the creation of new wants promotes a 
\ 
sequence of increme.ntal needs for new articles, it inevitably also 
produces E!C~rcity. Once the family division of labour and subsis-
tency h::ts disintegrated, the equilibrium of reliance on commo:iities 
from other sectors is difficult to attain as the· whole operation is 
at a level beyond the control of the local unit. Hard currency con-
tingE!ncie.s, protection· of local industry and the shortcomings of 
this sector, culminate in creating instant scarcity. The spatial 
context of new wants is sitnilarly r.eflected by scarcity, since the 
allocation of scarce commodities is centrally administered and often 
favours the interest groups and unionised masses of the Prime Base. 
The implication is also that supply and dem~d are not just the 
proVision of wants, but the process of acquiring import licences, 
and ability .to contact suppliers and credi to:,rs, etc. As these 
services are centralised at the Prime Base,. proximity to t]+is loca-
tion enhances trade transaction. I . ' 
Hav:tng conclu~ed that the Prime Base would be the locale of 
' ·, . 
import-ex_Port firms and the seat o.f central government, it is useful. 
to probe the dynamism of interrelated services whose location is by 
necessity geared to those functions. These related services could 
be ·grouped into th:r;'ee categories. Firstly, serrlces auxiliary to 
business· and trade which include insurance co.mpaaies, accounting, 
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auditing and book-keeping, storage facilities, banking and financial 
houses, consultancies and foreign trading missions, estate agents, 
development offices, hotel and ca~ering facilities. These tertiary 
activities are much neglected in locational and regional theory 
because they are predominantly a product of industrialisation in the 
West. Such services in many 'developing' countries preceded industry 
and were probably the most important single sector in terms of urban 
employment on the eve of industrial promotion. Secondly, to sustain 
an efficient central administrative function, the government depart-
ments and offices are also centralised. These include the central 
bank, central treasury, ordinance departments and central depot, 
.public works, trade and commerce headquarters etc. Thirdly, services 
related·to maintenance, training and social care, etc., reach their 
threshoicC: at the Prime Base in relation to the scale of business 
conducted here, and availability of facilities such as extension 
services. 
The particular significance of the spatial proximity of all 
these services is their enormous contribution to the local government. 
budget, which finances essential developmental programmes such as 
roads, medical care and educatio:::1. Hence the Prime Base in its en-
tirety is a process, the effect of which is cumulative, and through 
time leads to more linkages, innovation and economies of agglomera-
tion. The net .result is the magnification of income differentials 
between the rural ar~and the Prime and secondary bases. The process 
is still in progress, and the urban population of Sudan and many 
other 'developing' countries is increasing at a rate unprecedented 
in these countries, and possibly in the history of urbanisation. 
Within the Prime Base complex, one wou~d expect a well defined 
social set up congruous with the process of socio-economic change. 
I 
I 
Of specific interest is the existence· and influence of interest 
groups especially national_politicians and religious leaders. Both 
groups were engaged, to varying degrees, in the _government machinery 
and in foreign trade and agriculture. From Sudan's experience, it 
is noticeable that.the two rival religious leaders, referred to in 
the .previous chapter, developed their o~rm economic hierarchies which 
were centralised on the Prime Base and encompass the whole country 
'·. 
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thro:1gh: extensive systems of surrogates and representatives. Because 
of their national stature, the two leaders act0d, on the one hand, 
as ~arantors to Barclays and Bank Misr and on tb,e other, as partners 
·in the agricultural schemes, market gardens and foreign trad·e. More 
than 50 per cent of the proceeds from these regional schemes was 
securely finding its way back to the Prime Base: to further enrich 
its businesses an~ banks, .and consolidate its grip on the whole 
economic sysfem. · 
Sponsored by the two religio-us leaders and the intellegensia 
of the mid-1930's, the Sudanese national poli ti.cal parties emerged 
to assume ,the duty of enlightenment and political struggle. What 
. . 
concerns us from the location point of vlew is that all party head-
quarte:):'s were localised at the Prime Base where they could effecti v·ely 
woo .the.masses and earn their financial support from a spectrum of 
\ 
export-import firms. The centralised co-exLster1e.J.e of the parties 
at the Prime Base· is a striking manifestation of the gro·Ni.ng politico-
economic polarisati.o:p, and yet at the same time a powerful aid to 
:polarity.··, 
4. 7'. Promotion of Industry · 
' 
... . . 
Legislation providing for the promotion of industry in· Sudan 
was introduced in 1956. ·Several factors help to explain the wish of. 
the national .. leadership to embark on 1 crash industrialisation 1 
on the eve of independence. Fo.r one thing industry glittered 1:Ji th 
promise of higher standards of living and was considered the vehicle 
to higher natio~al income.C55) For another, nothing else than 
industry:, ·as Ro"!:)inson puts it, "Seems drastic eno'.lgh to cast off 
the mills:tones of population increase and falling. prices of primary 
producer 1 s· •.•• "C56 ) To these may be added the disadvantagesof an 
undi versified econo;ny of monocul ture. Industry was believed to be 
. . 
. . 
the panacea, the· way to. assimilate the advantages of. techn-Lca~ pro-
gress and equitable di stri but ion of income. (57) To enc·ourage 
import-substitution, a number of concessions were granted to private 
industry;· varying. fro:n tax-holidays, to reduction of iinport duties 
on raw material~ machinery and spare parts, provision of land at 
. . 
nominal pric~s et.c~ · The starting point in this sub section is thus 
the· identification of would-be entrepreneurs, the type of industry 
likely .to develop, and the concessions that r~la:te to profit margins 
arid price stiucture as a whole. It is only natural that local. 
industry· seeks protection from outside competition, and often secures 
it in the form of restrictions on imports of similar goods, the levy 
of high import duties, or through a complete ban on imports. Firms 
already engCl,ged in. :i_mport and distributive tr8.de were the first to 
fe~l the real threat of losing their businesses. For this reason, 
and because many such businesses were in contact with international 
suppli.e;r$ and were in a better· position to raise capital, the response 
to the en~ouragement of local industry was· likely .to be· evo~-ced from 
. 
1 shadow industrial entrepreneurs', i.e., b"..lsiness agents, merchants 
and/or family businesses which acco·J.nted for just ·under 90 per cent 
of al~ 'approved entrepreneurs' in operation in May 1966.C5B) 
· Since· it has already been established that the trading community 
would norma~ly locate at the Prime Base, the same locale would 
. ,· 
be the bed of ·n.ew ideas, and diffusion of innovation. Imitation 
is also manifested through this· clustering of shado·IIT industrial 
entrepreneurs since the .installation of one industry wou.ld mean -
i~ prote9t.l.on ip granted ~ the shut down of import business of the 
,· 
substituted commodity .• Direct involvement in industry would seem 
the only open door for competing in the new market stYuctur~. This 
phenomenon :was noticed by K.A.Hammeedin 1974, 
••• the imitated applications were mostly invest~ 
ments designed to produce goods the iroportation of 
which formed the basis of the trading businesses 
·.of some. merchants. These latter, when they were 
.riot· themselves the initiators of such projects, 
often reacted by submitting similar applications. (59) 
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Of practical bearing on industrial location were the concessions 
bestowed upon local industry by the Approved. Enterprise (Concessions) 
Act~. 1956,. and its' augmentation, the Organisation and Promotion of 
Industrial Investment Act, 1967. In effect this legislation enabled 
industry to operate within a sufficiently low basic cost an~ conse-
quently an attractive margin of returns on inveetment. These in-
clude a. reduc.tion of custom duti.e s on machinery, spare parts and 
raw matE:irl:al and components to not more .than 10 per cent of the 
c.i.f. value at port of delivery. The concession regarding !'aw 
material is important since lowering the cost of imported raw 
material' would' guarantee a comparable transfer class with local raw 
material., .··i_·;e~,. the transfer cost slope woul·d bE: a: gentle gradient 
tnus minim~sing the pull effect of local raw material, widening the 
disparity ·between this slope and the transfer gradient representing 
finished goods. FUrther reduction on transfer charge_ of raw material, 
both iocal and imported may also be possible through recommendations 
,'' .. ·. . . . . . '. (60) 
by the Mini $try of' Industry. . The differential transfer charge 
per unit betweep :finished goods (or imported commodities) and raw 
1. 
material is particularly bigh. 
Another significant aspect of the two industrial acts is the 
compliance with a defined str~cture of profit margins and pricing 
mechanisms. ·Since local industry was'still expected to. operate at 
a higher average cost than similar overseas in~ustries, government 
departments were directed to accept on local purchases the paying 
. ·, . ( 6'1 ) 
of up t'o 15· per cent extra on imported goods prices. Within. 
the free market however, the price of locally produced commodities 
is determined by the prevailing competing imports and the degree of. 
protectio~ .enforced. Fully protected industries are pioneer firms 
that proved to ''be co:mpeti ti ve to importables(price and quality-wise) 
and could sufficiently supply the local market •.. These were generally 
sub-groups of the food industry such as confectioneries, vegetable 
oil, biscuits, macaroni, vermicelli, soft drink~, etc. Prices were 
initially set .by those of imports and subsequent increases determined 
by·the Ministry of(Jo.mmerce and Trade. When the·quota system is 
implemented :lt. means that the local industry in question is not 
producing sufficient quanti ties. to meet local deruand and has to be 
supp~emented. The leading price would normaliy be the wholesale 
. . 
price at ·Khartoum; .plus freightage' and may va;;y with percentage 
transit .. ··d'Llti~s levied as a protection to loca1_industry. The role 
. . . . 
of the J.Vlinist~y of Industry in respect of setting prices is confined 
to indv,stries. that acquired the status of a ·fully protected· industry 
shortly. after operations started. Textiles, electrical applia,nces, 
and engineering industries are the outstanding examples. The pricing 
procedure w~s described by the I.L.O. in '1976: 
·-,·· I, ' ' • • 
When production is initiated, each unit [factory] 
.is obliged to obtain approval from the Ministry· 
. of Indllstry for its ex-factory prices.. The Ministry 
approves prices on a cost-plus basis, using informa-
. tion supplied by the producer for its operations. (62) 
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Although this is a precise de scription of the procedure, it is 
only enforced· on limited occasions. It is important to note that 
the import price and for that matter the substitute-product is 
. -. 
fixed aQcording to the Khartoum-plus system, and the margins of 
profit. on cost .to store. In other words, the price and profit 
structure of local industry will depict the same principles as in 
Fig. 4. 2. 
Supply -of eonsumer goods in sufficient quanti ties in rec~nt 
years proved.1lnattainable in the face of increased demand and res-
. . . I . 
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triction on hard currency •. This has established the law of supply· 
and demand, rendered difficult price control and pro~pted in many 
cases the growth of a black market. Such irregu.lari ties, together 
with scale and date of production, i.e. capital/turnover ratio were 
excluded .from the preceding theoretical foriiD~ation of the Prime Base. 
It is instructive to pursue the analysis of the location problem 
and price structure _with broad identification of the sub~industries, 
as presented in Table 4.1 •. A quick survey of the (sic) sub-order 
I 
industries, reveals the import-substitution of industries, which are 
predominantly geared to large input of imported raw material (inc-
luding sein:i;..fabric~ted/se:ffii-processed materia:l and components) •. On 
average,· the. proportion o;f imported material was .estimated at 70 per 
Cen·t .b th·~ I .L, 0 . ~976 (63) H . t . .t l" l t y e .. ~ •. ln .• • _ owever, lnduF> rl-es mos lke y o 
have ·a )o1N_ ii!lported material ratio are· public enter;Pri ses (such as 
caiming and preservation of fruits, sugar refining, tanning and 
cement), .or· non.;..basic industries pro:lucing fbr the immediate local 
market (such as bakeries, milk products, wood furniture, tiles), or 
non-final industries.(as in the case of leather, textiles and- vege-
table oil). Also forward linkage industries su~h as soap and sweets 
naturally dif3play a low imported material ratio. On the other hand, 
Table 4.1 
· . Imported raw material as a percentage .of mat.erial. input, an.d employment share 
·. -- of the Prime Base for industries ·using over 50 per cen.t imported material. 
Local raw I:p:~ported Importation Total · · Prime Base Prime Base-. 
Electric appliances 
Printing, Publishing and 
Allied industries 
Electric batteries 
Oil Refining 
Enamelware 
Paper products 
Footwear 
Plastic products 
Tobacco 
Paints 
Ready-made clothes · 
Chemicals (miscellaneous) 
Chemicals and Pharmaceuti-
cals 
l'1i sc~llaneo:is food prepFir-
ations 
Grain milling 
Soft drinks 
Steel furniture 
Hos_iery and knitting 
material material ratio employment- share· in · share 
(LS '000) (LS '000) numbers (per cent) 
o. 5· 
1.8 
2. 5' 
3-7 
31.2 
25-5 
117-9 
10.0 
87.0 
19.8-
2.8 
70.8 
21.8 
145-7 
1019 •. 0 
407-7 
222.1 
164 .. 1 
.. 2;;9. 6 
434.8 
113.9 
107.0 
915.2 
524.6 
1998-7 
154-4 
971-7 
198.4 
27-5 
255-4 
59-·2 
285~5 
1738.0 
-638-5 
325.1 
200.1 
99.8 
99.6 
97-7 
96.7 
96.7 
95.4 
94.4 
93-9 
91.8 
90.9 
87.9 
78.3 
73.1 
66.2' 
63.0 
61.0 
59.4 
54.9 
198 
1567 
86 
163 
1624 
520 
'1622 
127 
293 
98 
79 
451 
149 
738 
238 
968 
1622 
414 
198 
1567 
86 
1624 
520 
1622 
96 
293 
98 
79 
451 
149 
738 
238 
968 
1622 
414 
100.0. 
100.0 
100.0 
0.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
75-6 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
·1 00.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Source: Compiled from IDCAS, Industrial Survey, Sudan, 1969/70, 
Dairo, 1970, (in Arabic) _ · 
-.l. 
\.)J 
\Jl 
private indust.ri es producing for the national market, i.e. basic 
. ··. . 
industries which are one stage industries producing final consumer 
goods such as Wood, Paper and Printing - Sic m Group IV, Chemical 
' 
<;J.nd Allied Industries - Sic m Group V, and Metal and Electrical 
:Industries ...; Sic m Group VI, all have a high ratio of· imported raw 
material and evidently a material index round abc~mt one. Assuming 
that the imported mater~al ratio is over 50 per <::ent, the price 
struct.ure Wbllld not deviate much from that of imported goods, since 
. the profit 6n cost to store and Khartoum-plus pricing apply equally 
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to imported raw and semi-finished goods. Accordingly, one generalised 
prediction ~s that .such import sub$ti tutes, ·high on imported raw 
material wo~ld tend to locate at the Prime Base to maximise. profit 
margins ip a· similar fashion as depicted in Fig. 4. 2 for pre-industry 
' ",• - . 
import firms. · 
'To express the prediction about the inevitability of locating 
pri va~e industry. at the .Prime Base a few additions are superimposed 
. . . •' 
on Fig. 4.2·, together with the appropriate alterations to cater for 
the new conditions apd assumptions in line with-the prerequisites 
of an import-substitution industry (see Fig. 4. 3) ~ 
. . . 
Firstly' . the transfer. charge of raw. materials whether local or . 
imported is cheaper than for finished goods (imported as well as 
local) in the order of 1 : 5; this being the, avera~e differential 
as calculated frolli the freight rate book, 1959.(64 ) Lines PZ and PQ 
in Fig.:4~3 rep:resent the transfer gradients of imported and local· 
materl.al resp-ectively. Secondly, profit margins are determined by 
imported· _commodity" prices at Khartoum, plus a margin of 20 per cent 
above·. that margi-q - line P1 B1 D1 Thir<tly_, basic cost. does not 
. vary_ with Io.ca.-tion and sho1.1ld not alter proportional profits at 
different ·l~cations. Fourthly, other assumptions about even di stri- · 
·. Fig 4·3 Spatial Profitability Margins with Imported 
Materia I through Port P and Ubiquitous 
Local Material 
Coast 
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bution qf demand, profit max:imi sation, supply uf .the national 
market and constant freight age cost to distance c.re all. maintained 
as in Fig~ 4~ 2. 
The tbiee ·locations of P, B, and C a:re set ~gain in a series 
of diagrams, . firstly with ubiquitous local raw ma~erial as in Fig. 
4.3, th~n af G and B alternating in Fig. 4.4 and Fig. 4.5 with the 
following notation: 
p 
B 
c 
p 1· Q 
-... , . 
PZ, 1?Q . 
X B x1 
-Y c·y1·. 
Port of importation •. 
Prime Base at an interior location. 
An ipterior location relatively 'eccentric'. 
Transport gradient of finished goods. (Also 
P's.delivered price less profit). 
Upper limit of profit. ruarg~n (and in effect 
delivered price). 
Transport gradients of local and imported 
m.;tterial. 
B' s ·delivered price less profit. 
C' s delivered price less profit~ 
Now it is time to tackle the location problem of a single 
factory importing 50 per cent or.more of its raw material input and 
procuring-,loca:!-ly the rest of its material requirements. ·In other 
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words,- local material is assumed ubiquitous; and hence procurable at. '. 
no extra transfer.expense. Since the upper limit of profit is 
* defined, apd total :profit assumed proportional to· area in Fig. 4. 3, 
the p~ofi t:_ attainable at any one location is defined by the lower 
part· of the diagram- this represents .basic cost and variable transf~r 
cost of imported material as well as distribution· of finished goods • 
. Thus locating at B will yield a profit proportionate to area P1 D1 
x1 X. . On;. the other hand, locating at P will @;i ve a profit defined 
by P1 .D1 .Q1 P which is evidently less than B' s profit; in fact the 
* Since even dist.ribution of demand is assumed, sales quantity per 
· sq.km.· should also be even. Therefore, LS profit per unit sold 
cp,n·be made synonymous with-area. 
sacrificed amount is slightly less than e Q1 x1 B. Although 
an entrepreneur at P scoops a 'supernormal' profit (x a. P) because 
of 'phantom' freight, i.e., delivered price up to point atwhich' 
includes freight costs that are not actually incurred.C 65) In 
effect he cuts ba,ck on profit in the area of freight disadvantage 
beyond point -a.·. Now, considering location C! it becomes clear that 
profits to the right (c 2 D1 Y1 C) exceed those of location B (c2 D1 
X -1 g)':.bY the amount B has to cut back on profit_ beyond point h in 
the forin df· freight p. bsorption. However, c has not only to absorb 
freight to the -left ofh, but to lower profit '2 r-t1 if to from 0 to v 
compete at all at B 
' 
p· 
' 
etc., at a comparable profit limit. From 
the visual impression of the. spatial profitability margin it· is 
obvious that the loss of C to B left of h is larger than the gain~ 
over B to the right. Hence the clear conclusion under the stated 
. . 
assu.rilption' of local raw material ubiqm ty is that location B will 
provide the best. location of maximum profit • 
. But the situation of ubiquitous local material J..s grossly 
simplif~e9.~ Punctiform, supplementary raw material sources will 
now be conSidered alternatively at each location. By using a series 
o.f diagrams, we start with the assumption of loca-l material at 
the :port P (Fig. 4. 4). Both B and C have to incur procurement cost 
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of tran&£hipping imported and local material at a freight cost for 
each that amounts to one-fifth of that for freightage cost of finished 
goods.-··· Although P' s profit has increased substantially, if compared 
to the c~se .in Fig_-4.3, it could still be seen that B furnishes a 
highe~ profit margin per one unit sold. The advantage of B is even 
mo_re. visually pronounced when compared with: C (Fig. 4.4). The higher 
cost_ at_ Gi s not r~coiirpen sed by a corresponding higher profit. 
Agairi, _loqat,ion· B gives the right conditions for profit maximisation. 
Fig 4·4 Spatial Profitability Margins with both Imported 
and Local Materia I from Port P 
Interior 
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Alternatively we may think of C as the sotU'ce of local material 
.. 
needed to supplement up to 50 per cent of imported raw material 
(Fig. 4.5). As expected, P will extend its variable cost and thus 
shiit i fs deli very gra_dient . over p Q 1 proportionate to the cost 
incurred in transferring material fro.:n C. The effect on P is a 
furthercut onpro.fit and consequently makes it the least favourable 
location :ln terms of profit maximisation and ability to compete. 
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The contest between B and C is· determined by the low procurement cost 
WhiCh evens· OUt Variable COSt at both lOCatiOnS, While CIS Sa:Le_s at 
the area to' the. left are only possible at a much lowered margin of 
0 . . . 
profit (C c1 )~ · B 1 s gains over C are still detectable. Once more, 
a location at· B secures the most profitable operation as far as 
profit maxilnisation is concerned. In the event of monopolistic com-
petition and pri·ce cutting between B and any other location, say C 
or P, B will emerge with the highest profit possible under the above 
conditions and assumptions. Although C could :rllonopolise the area to· 
. . 1 1' 
the right o_f h, it co~d only ·sell at a profit just under h X Y C. 
This li~t is dictated by the possibility of B sellin·g at net cost 
to· the right of h (B x1 ). With the same argument, B could monopolise 
the area. to:· the left of h, albeit at a profit slightly lower than 
Y h B X. • Neyertheless, the latter area is evidently larger than· 
that of C, and the difference is the amount of.profit by which B 
exceeds C's .profits. Likewise, if P attempted to "J.ndersell B, it 
could'do so only to point a where .the two lines representing net 
factory··prices:inte.rsect(B X and P Q1). Actually·, P could make a 
profit proportionate to the area just under X aP. However, it is 
ciear that B. will have a higher profit defined by area just under 
a Q 1 X 1 ·B.· Thus in any duopolist competition ·oAtween B and· any other 
. . . ' . 
locati()n, B. gets a higher total profit. One· imp.0rtant fact is that 
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Fig 4 · 5 Spatial Profitability Margins with Local Material from C. 
Coast Interior 
competition will erode a large proportion of the authorised profit 
margins and confine profits to the lower portion of the diagram 
(Y h x1} ... -T~is may prove toQ low a profit to warrant conducting 
industry ·as the gestation period is longer than in trade, which 
meanshigher interest rates and higher risk. 
For the first private basic industry which rrocures more than 
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50 per cent of its imports from abroad, B will produce the highest 
attainable :i;>rofi t margin as sho·JIJil above. Subsequent basic industries 
with the intention of manufacturing a similar product to that of the 
pioneer f;irm will bP,ye to forsake a large proportion of profit 
(and so wOuld the pioneer factory) unless the new firm iocates at 
. . . 
B (the }=>rime· Base). It seems that the higher tht:. profit margin in 
a developing economy, the lower the tendency to compete • 
.Another important aspect of the diagramatic representations 
of the Prime Base is that· it combined demand and variable cost 
through the superimposition of profit maximum lines (the area so 
defined refers·both to area of sale, i.e. market, and also the profit· 
margin).· Hence profitability is not only a function of sales area 
a~ ·GreenhutC 66) ·and ~mith( 67) would have it, but a combination of 
sales area 'and price in proximity to variable· cost at di:f;'ferent com-
peting locations. In that sense, the locational interdependence is 
fully integrated as ·an· operational explanatory model. 
Consequently, the proposition that emerges is. that location B 
in the diagram (~rime.Base) is the location of tutal profits·maximisa-
tion. Monopolistic competition wo'U.ld tend to drastically lower 
profits for all parties. In any such competition however, B will 
be the location ofmaximum profit. For this reason, and since·larger 
. . . 
total profits are only possible in the absence of monopolistic com-
petition, proximity of entrepreneurs to each other is t.he most likely' 
I 
I 
situation· for securing the authorised profit margins. Since B 
is the location of maximum profit in monopolistic competition, it 
lS only logical that B should be the location of total profit 
ma:ximisatiori for aggregated industrial entrepreneurs. This con-
clusio~ echos the agglomeration tendencies explic,it in.Hottling.CE?S) 
. . 
. . · .. 
However, the discrepancy with Rattling's case is that duopolists 
could share the market if they locate symmetrically along the 
linear mark~t and thus they n~ed not aggl~m~rate.C 69) 
The high tendency for private basic industry to locate at the 
Pr:lnieBase (B.ip Fig. 4~3) is .evident from Tables 4.1 and 4.2. A 
variety of industr.les encompassing virtually·. all Sic groups and sub-
groups are exclusively Prime Base industries; This tendency could 
be explained in the light of the theoretical formulation expounded 
above·, ·apd it/ fact WO'J.ld. be predictable for the :rp.ajori ty Of the 
private industries which in any case import more than 50 per cent 
of their material 'inputs (as grouped, in percentage form, in Table 
4.1). The case of industries under the 50 per cen·t limit is some-
what different. Many of these. industries (Table 4.2) are forward 
linkage industries such as soap, bakeries, sweets, flour, and soft 
. .. 
·wood, whose major sU.ppliers are Prime Base firms whether predomin-
antly importers of raw material or users of local material. Notice-
ably, these indust~ies are also expected to. ~revail at secondary 
bases since .they are non-basics with a low threshold. This fact 
expla:Lns their omission from the Industrial Survey since they ar·e 
too ~mall .. to be included. 
·. Other industries which are not represented in the Prime Base · 
are source-base industries such ·as sugar refineries, canning and 
cement, with a highmaterial index and/or a hi.gh degree of perish-
abilitl. Conversely, they score a low:import-ratio and they. are 
mostlY in the public sector. One exception {s the .ootton-seed 
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Table 4.2 
Imoorted raw material as a 
of-the Prime Base for indus 
Cotton-seed oil 
JVI:i..lk products 
·Sugar refi.ning 
Manufacture of Leather 
Distilling and Wine 
Spinning and Weaving 
Cement 
Sweets 
Soap, perfumes & cosmetic-s 
Canning and preservation 
OI. fruitS and Vegetables 
wood furniture 
Tiles, cement blocks etc. 
Bakery products 
·Local raw Imported . Importation :Total Prime Base Prime Base 
material raw material ratio employment share in share 
(LS '000) (LS '000) ·numbers (per cent) 
5441.2 
65-7 
2169.3 
285.6 
·159- 7 
2840.1 
344.6 
1064.2 
1395-0 
119.1 
132.9 
·19. 3 
214 .• 5 
307.1 
4.8 
479.8 
76.1 
45.3 
686.0 
94-.-&--
447.9 
745.0 
. 48.6 
90.8 
12.9. 
170.5 
5-6 
6.8 
·18.1 
21.0 
22.1 
24.2 
27-5 
29.6 
34.'8 
40.3 
40.9· 
41.1 
44.3 
1854 
127 
5319 
521 
179 
6052 
522 
912 
1392 
448 
614 
114 
656 
. 1540 
127 
521· 
179 
6052 
879 
1392 
614 
114 
656 
82.6 
100.0 
o.o 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
·o.o 
96.4 
100.0. 
o~o 
·100. 0 
100.0 
100.0 
.Sm.1rce: Compiled fro:n IDCAS, Industrial Survey, .Sudan, 1969/70, Cairo,. 1970 .. (in Arabic) . · 
~ 
+=" 
\11 
crushing ind~stry. With a high material index arid low import 
ratio orie woul?- expect a source-base location. Nevertheless, 
. 
there .is a remarkable localiz:ation of this industry at the Prime 
Bas·e. Firstly, when this indus~ry started in the 1940's there were 
str1ct laws ·:p·rohi biting the storage of cotton-seed in the irr.lgated 
.Gezira for fear of cotton disease. Secondly, the relatively recent 
development of cotton-seed as an export commodity was _swiftly con-
ducted 9Y the already localised export firms of the Prime Base. For 
·m 
these :fir~s transfer cost was ~material, and only marginal if they 
were engaged in the seed crushing. Thirdly, cotton-seed oil was 
.. 
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. initially developeq. to satisfy a gro-wing soap industry overwhelmingly 
centrali-sed at the Prime Base. In many respects the complexity of 
these factors, and the rapid structural change of: this industry, 
makes it· an ~riteresting target ior a separate· tr~atment of industrial 
location-optimality as will be demonstrated in the case study-
Chapter Seven. The cotton-seed industry is also of :particular 
interest because it :is unexpectedly concentrated at the Prime Base. 
4. 8 Conclusion 
In the· :preceding discussion, an attempt was made to :provide a· 
··. '·, 
framewo~k for a new understanding of the considerable degree of 
industrial locali~-ation in the Prime Bases of ·• developing' nations 
.. ~. . 
with s:pecia.l' referenqe to Sudan. The task. inyolved was by no means 
an ·alternative between· explanations. Conceivably, the :prolific 
. . ' 
literature and various treatises of industrial location are by 
. necessity oriented towards the western model of development at :pro-
gressive :ppints on the time scale. But to accept such paradigms and 
:P~rsue · di.rect applicability to 'developing' countries is illl.lsory, 
. since the :paths of economic development are fundamentally dissimilar. 
The industrial location hypotheses are holisticly defined in 
terms of the socio.:..econom::..c organisation, and translated into 
processe$ and systems. The charter import-export development \vas 
too inflexible to accommodate industrial development.in dependent 
economies. At the time this was remedied, the export-import firms 
were well .. entrenched at the Prime Base·,·. and adeqnately slipported 
by the ··many .. attributes of the system especially distributive 
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channels, pricing and transfer policies. Consequently, the develop-
ment of:new wCJ;nts and the social set up were J?O~itively exploited as 
polarisi~g elements of.the system. Although the central :tenets of 
the· theoretical formulations were cast in a profit maxim.i sation 
framework, the interplay of other poJ.arising':p~oeesses su~h· as 
economic dualism and core-periphery are indivisible and equally 
:· ' 
valid •. Given the prominence of shadow-entrepreneurs - (traders, 
businessmen)·- already committed to export-import, and the very 
nature o:t ari · import.-substi tution industry, the new industrial firms 
I • 
wo·uld. follow the pre-existing localization of tlu s group, and the 
well-defined centralised service sector. 
'··· 
. . 
Apother consideration of the proposed theory is the graphic 
· represeri'tc1tion of variable cost, demand and profit margins. . It was 
shown that all basic private industry, in previo~sly dependent 
economies, would locate at the Prime Base in order to ~axim.ise 
profit. Since we are dealing with processes, time is incorporated 
only within the involution of the process. The 'incapacity of the 
Prime Base theory to predict is augmented by the pragmatic nature 
of the process. Nevertheless, the theory can accommodate to change 
over .a lo?ger span of time. Finally, the bringing together of 
vart~ble ~ost.,. demand and profit margins provides a much-needed 
~perational explanatory model for 'developing' countries. The long-
standing ·failure to do this, and the want of holistic explanation, 
reduced many genuine attempts at regional industrial planning to 
trial and error. 
I , 
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CHAFrER FIVE 
SPATIAL ORGANISATION OF INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY 
IN THE PRIME BASE 
5.1 · Introduction 
It will be clear by now fro:n the findings of Chapter Fo:1r 
that Sudan's industrial activity is highly localized in th'e Prime 
Base. Tp.e sheer volume and variety of this concentration calls 
for separate consideration. The main objective has been to.inv~:;st­
igate the various aspects of tbis concentration with ·special 
empha'si,s on spatial variations, ~ecialisation, arid industrial 
'structure at· the Prime Base· level~ · A co:nbination of a localiza-
tion co~ffi'cient and a location quotient(1) is. introduced iri the 
. . 
hope of r~vep.ling some of the spatial d'isParJ.ties and similaritie~ 
within the Prime· Base~ The underlying :Structure· an.d pattern of 
industry are closely examined and mea~red by ratios and co-
effici~nt s such as ·' th~ production-capital ratio.,, 'emJ?loyin€mt 
coefficient', 'capital density•( 2 ) etc., and depicted and ana~ 
lysed by means of a correlation coefficient computed from figures .. 
compiled from the Industrial Survey of Sudan; 19.69/70. ( 3) . A 
sketch: of industrial space will be made and appraised in its. ~ 
historic context and future trends examined with some reference 
to :ian's decisions. Physiographic setting, centrality· and popula..;. 
tion·growth in the Prime Base are unavoidablE realities that must 
also be· surveyed. The criterion of '30 and above' .workers 
adopted by the Industrial Survey, 1969/70, will be maintained here 
as an operational definition of firms under consideration. Fact~ 
aries so defined cqpstitute about 67 per cent of the country's 
in,dustry by number of firms. Availability.· of data made it 
possiole to .consider; besides employment, varjables such as ·paid-
:. ·' 
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up capital and gross value added. The particu~ar significance 
. . 
ot the Prime Base ·lies in the high values of 59~ 3 per cent, 40 
per cent and 56.6 per cent for these variabl~s respectively.* 
5.2 ·Geographic Setti!_!_g 
In any anaJ,.ysis of industrial activity sv much localized 
as that· of the Prime Base, it. is necessary to consider basic geo-
. . 
graphj,cal features .·such as nodality and climatic elements.·. 
'The Prim·e Base is a tri-partite urb~n cluster,· ·filling all' 
three angles.where the White and Blu·e Niles merge to· form the 
m:iinstream of the River Nile (Fig. 5.1). · Appa:r;ently the defence 
qualities and exc~llent wat~r-ways ccim.inended Rhar'toum. as the. 
military and administrative focus for the whole territory, and 
the fascination of the confluence of the Niles might also have 
·enhanced the attraction of the. spot. 
Another aspect of this setting :is the relative position of 
the Prinie Base.within.Sudan's climatic zones and geographic bound-
aries·~ . The Nile confluence occurs right at the southern fringes 
of the. semi-desert, and well entrenched wi thi.n the tropics giving 
,· .. 
the Prime Base 8fluasi-c~ntral location. This was enhanced by ·the 
~' , .. ' 
White Cl,nd Blue Niles, reaching to the south ~nd so1,1th~east, and a 
.. railway system stretching' n~rth, east and westward. 
5.2.·1 · Climatic Settin_g 
Climatic elements of special interest to· this study are temp-
. erature,: rainfall, !lumidi ty and wind. Invariably these climatic 
elem~nts affect dl.rectly or indirectly both Man and· 'hard:..ware I 
to the extent of essentially increasing str:uctural. and production 
. . . . . 
· cost-s. · Production quality may . suffer too. The precise effects of: 
these ·climatic variations on factory machinery. and equipment· have 
. . . . . .. ' .. 
* · Regio.nal conrp~rison is provided in Chapter 6~ 
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not yet been fully studied. One can imagine the extra costs 
incurred' ill standard tropicalised machinery; and the chain of 
problems involving add:l.tional costs anc;l time delay. On the other 
hand,· it. is easy to appreciate the need for s-pecially designed 
factory buildings to cope adequately with -climatic. ·factors such 
. as conti-acti.on. and. expansion due. to seas.onal and daily temperature 
ranges. ·. Indeed, reducing ro·~f heat:lng· and· P.roviding proper venti-
l~tion w{ th ~egard to ill8.Chinery overheating and .cooling systems, 
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is often.giving cause for concern. Furthermore, matters of con-
cern to m.ariufacturing are the excessive sola~ heat, the devastating 
' . . . 
du::;t-storm.s, the haboob, and the minimtim wet-bulb temperature 
. . ,, . ---.-.- . '• . 
requirements, all of.which are thorny problems that need· rigorous 
interdisciplinary research. 
Thci~gh regional:· climatic differences· are not profound'in 
Sudan, they will nonetheless interfere in the long·run to some 
degree with locational decisions. Obviously the present day 
industrial bias to the Prime Base overrules m8.ny such aspects and 
. neutralise's th8ir importance~ . Future industrial location choice 
wi11 no ::lo·:.1bt gi v~ more weight ·to environmental factors. 
5.2.2· P~ulation: chan~ and growtl}. 
The first national -pop'..llation census was conducted in 1955/55; 
·but for all practical p1J.rpo'ses, government ·est;Lm.ates .p'..lblished in· 
. ··- - . . .. -
Sudan .·Aimanac· and else~h,.ere d.o furnish an overall picture of the 
. . . . . . - .. 
magnitude and population gro:·;vth trends in the conurbation for the 
. ' .. . . -
pre-census period. As e:X.pected, an upward .trend of population . 
' . 
growth· .. is evident thought not uninterrupted. · Considering natural 
in.crease .·and immigration together, the popul~·tion growth was 
.fairly rapidfro::n 1905 to 1955 as can be_see~_in Table 5-1~ 
Table 5.1 
Total Population Gro;..vth of the Prime Base, 1905-192.2. 
'' 
.Year. -Khartoum . Bahri Omdurman 
1905' 8,000 2,000 48,000" 
1910 20,000 '7,000 43,000- '' 
' 
. " 
1915 32,000 16,000 "59,000 ' 
-~920' 23 ,ooo .. 16,000 50,000 
.1925,·. 32,000 . 14,000 "79,000' 
.. , 
1.930 50,000 22,000 104 ,OOC' 
··1935: 47,000 21,000 111,000 
·-1940 45,000 19,000 116,000 
1945' 60,000 30,000 117,000 
.. 
"195,0 80,000 '34,000 125,000 
1955 
. . . . 
93,000 39,000 ' :114,000 
Source:· '-Compiled by :El-Bushra,., E., The Khartoum Conurbation: 
An Economic and Social Analysis, Ph.D. Thesis, 
. London U:ni versi ty, 1970,: p. 92. 
During th~se. f:i.fty years, the population of-Khartoum mUltiplied 
nearly twelve ·times;· _O:indurman 2.45 times and Bahri 19.5 times. 
The varying population growth rates reflecte<i here echo. the basic 
f:i.gu~es . ." ·Nevertheless; one can pick some of. the differences that 
might' hav~ i~ part coritri buted to these. differ~~ltla:l rates~ 
. Omdu:r;'man,-.. the .capital of the I'1ahdi.$t ·State (1882-1898) 
still resembles African indigeno·:1s to·Nns. However, the increase 
was ,not. cl's dynamic or ·continuous as in the ·other two towns. Khar-
toum, the capi tai '· was increasingly creating chances through its 
diversifted e·cono:mic functions, in government ministries .and 
departments which-were almost exclusively fcmnd there, and .in 
fore~gn as w~ll as .local business and commercial undertakings~ 
]3e::i_ng pby.sically part of the conurbation, Bahri, with an estimated 
population of 2,000 in 1905, had seemingly more. :J:'OOm for new-comers, 
-· ... 
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even tho·u.g1l i.t was not creating as many chances .as the other. 
two centres in the pre-'.rJorld \Jar· Two period •. 
It· wo·u.ld be· erroneo\.1.s to think that i'ndustry itself attracted 
i~11igration ·in the ·Conurbation m1ch before '1956 simply because of 
the bare existence.of.industry at such a date. Nor wo'..l.ld it be 
. . . 
correct to assume. a major industrial influenc_e in that respect 
in subsequent years, as was suggested by El-2ayed El-fr~shra.C4 ) 
He concluded:· 
i~e. 
·The flourishing of commerce and trade.together 
. with the introduction of light. industries after. 
the end of the Second World .\Jar have been 
re spon si bl e for. the explosive expansion. of the 
Conurbation during this period. 
. . 
1945 - 1970. In hi. s argwnent El-B'..lshr~ ·adopted .the 'push' 
from the. countrysid~ co!lcept wh€m saying: 
:.· 
Nevertheless; more migrants continue: to ·po:ll' 
... into the urban area simply because of .un-
attractive conditions in the cou.ntryside. (5) 
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In effect, t:Q.e ert'u.pti ve nature of po:t>ulation in-flo·w by the '1960's· 
.cannot be· explained by singling o:..1.t one or t.wo factors. There was 
only. one basic fore~ at work and that. is the process of develop::nent, 
'm.:::>dern.j.ty' ·and change as seen in the prevlm:..:s chapter. It might 
. . . 
suff.ice ·to show the trend and magnitude of the population growth 
. r . 
rates in· the Prim~~ Base. The prelim.in9.ry results of the '1973 
. ' 
pci:pulation .. ceris~s :ha>ve been compared· with the .1955/56 figures as 
sho'wn .. in. Table. 5~2~(6) · Although the .table ::s se],.~-explanatqry, 
·the exceptionally high annual rate of p::>pulat~on gromh shou.ld be 
emph~sised. The differential gro·.Nth shm.ild, ·however, be read i.n 
the light of the above acco·u.nt. 
l:. 
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Table 5.2 
Prime· Bas·e: ·Population Growth Rates·, 1955-1973. 
:·.·. 
1955/1956. 1973/1974 
Urban Place ·Total ._ Per cent Total Per cent Annual rate 
'· 
~: 
.. ]?opulatiori Poplilqi;ion of gro·wth 
' 
··' 
per cent 
.. ,. 
' 
·.Khartoum 93,103 37-9 343,710 43-9 15.0 
·.· 
O;mdurinah: 113,551 46.2 .· 299·,629 ·37-5 9.1 
Bahri 39,082 15.·9 155-254· 19-5 16.5 
'J:'otal: 245,736 100.0 798,593 100.0 12.5 
.. 
Source: Commission for the Reconsideration.of the Provincial 
. ·Boundaries,- Final Report and Recommendations, No.1., 
. . . ' . . 
·Khartoum, :Apri 1 1974, p. 488 ~ 
' ~ .. 
'•. 
5t3 Industrial Activity Zoning and Patterns 
The . ."~tructur~l zoning of. industries within the. Prime Base 
is inte:resting in many respects. For one th,ing·, the industrial 
. land: klrocati'on conforms t'o ·:irban zoning regulated by the local 
government. Also it is of significance that a modified version of 
. ' . . -
industrial estate·h?-s.evolved in the late 1940's when the terms 
1 light I ap.d 1-heavy I. industry were. intrOdUCed· with specifiC reference .. 
to t.he amOunt ·pf land to be occupied. · Accordingly Bahri' s indus-
trial area was lab'~lled 'heavy' while the 'Kharto"im and Omdurman 
industrtal are~-s were 'light I • The industrial ?--reas of Omdurman 
. . 
and .Kharto·um were :situated on a site that ~as the combined advan-
_tage of being at minimum distance from·the city 'commerical core 
and at_the same time beyond the then immediate residential margins, 
in oioder to .'avoid the noxious character of the industrial area. 
The need to locate at a site near the market is lacking in the. case 
·.'.· 
of Bahri. Bahri's 'heavy' i~dustrial area was a superimposition 
and relates only to its own functional input and output needs 
within the context of the whole national market. The investment 
and production envisaged were extensive and Bahri's business 
circles and consmner market would have little impact on the choice 
of an industrial area. 
The pre-World War Two linear nature of settlement in Omdurman 
and Khartoum, with a north-soath axis on the Nile in the former, 
and an east-west axis lining the Blue Nile in the latter, would, 
according to the minimum distance to core hyopthesis formulated 
above, make us expect the industrial area to be located at a spot 
on the intersect of the town limit line with the perpendicular 
from the base line (see Fig. 5.1) .• In both cases, the immediate 
town limit was demarcated by conspicuous features such as the 
Omdurman kho~ on the western margins-acting as a physical and 
psychological outer limit, and the railway loop that encircles 
Khartoum. Unexpectedly, Khartoum's industrial area shows a 
slight.bias to the west of the point hypothesised. Two reasons 
can be given. Firstly, the optimum location described above had 
already been occupied by the 'Old Deims', the shanty residence 
of the town's labour force. Meanwhile, the expansion trend of 
the town southwards was clearly foreseen in the post-Second World 
War period.(?) Secondly, the inferior low land to the west of 
no value for residential purposes was incidently close enough to 
the central railway station to suggest itself as the 'new' 
industrial area. The railway line in Bahri offered some resembl-
ance to that .of Khartoum as a gro·~Vth limiting factor on the 
eastern fringe. Yet the same railway line seems to have had a 
powerful pull force when the 'heavy'industrial area was chosen. 
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The-opportunity for planning industrial areas was only made 
·possible· by· the. long perio:l of .delay before industrial growth 
began·. In the process of mo:lern economic evolution, other sectors 
·such a~ ·co::runerc.e. ~nd trade had appropriated their· physical places 
in the u..rban core·. . Any. new sector - in I this _case industry - had 
. . . . : . 
to struggle for space elsewhere outside this zone. Such 'tvorks as 
repaip:and mal.nt~nence workshops andhand~maq.e articles, such as 
s~eet, that: co--~xisted with other activities in. the C.B.D., were 
only_p§.~t-.·of other sector$· such as transport in the first case 
• - ... J • ' '. • • 
. . . ·. 
and. cottage industries in the second. The re.:.location of such-
. ", . ' ... 
works ·has tem:pted some scholars t.o think that there was _a contin-
\' 
uous :proeess of industrial zoning: 
·This tiPe. of decision-making (referring tQ 
the re..;.location of ho:me-rnade sweet to market 
. place) as well ·as zoning for new industry 
.. has been a contiti-uing process~ (8) ' 
Clearly the.niisconception and illogical classifications of. industry 
has led to th.is conclusion .• 
· It might be of interest to note that this tendency to :levelop 
separate industrial. zones is a COlllJilon practice in many African 
. . ' . 
· ,c:i..tie~,·:such .. as L.igos,_ L~9aka and Nairobi. (9) The· no:.~-industrial-
i sa:ticm: policies of. the colonial era incii'scriminately adopted in 
almost all African ter~itories, funnelled the p~o~ess to a point 
in time where there was no actual room in the central zone for 
: . ' . . . . 
inP:ustry' and. eo.Jipell~d, wi thi..n the context oi' modernisation' 
. ' . 
· zon:i;ng_.regulations that yielded this lo-6ati.onai pattern in Africa. 
IJ1_this::respect, the African cities strike .a remarkable ·contrast 
W:i'th .Far Easterri· and to a lesser degree, ·mddle· Eastern countries,· 
. . . ' . •' 
where'macb.ine-facto~y _p:roduction was incorporated within the ci~y~ 
rn· a span of between two and three decades, the industrial 
·,,_· . 
. gro\fth in the Prime Base demanded .much·more·space then the planners 
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first anticipated •. · Estimates of the three industrial areas 
of the Prime Base were put in 1971 at abo·it-1750 acres (7 Km2). (10) 
. . . . . 
The simultaneous gro"Nth of Omdurman Is industrial area with that 
of Oihbadda. ·township to the west, has sandwiched the industrial 
. . ' ' 
area and r€md.ered its· expansion w~stward rather ·1imi ted, though 
linear growth is possible. Kharto·;L1l industrial area had _practi-
cally -re9.ch.ed its limit in the late 1960's •. No·IV it is endangered 
by the. r~currenf Wh.:fte Nile flood waters frum the weE?t, and en-
circled_py resideptial and business buildings and the railway 
station~ Reclamation of the low flood land has been contemplated 
but the overhead ~~-sts may well prove insuperatle •. As an alterna-
tive, >tp.e .stretch· of flat land at. Al-Kalakla to: the so"J.th has been 
' . . . ' ~ : . . ., . . .. ' 
so·:2ght. · Bahri' s industrial area is rapidly filling the allotted 
land and slowly ·encr.oa.ching upon the ·surrounding agricultural land 
on the- north and. east. Most likely the latter will_ be sacrificed 
for the dynamic exp.insic:)Il of the former. 
. . 
. . 
Unfess strict measures are enforced to cuib the indiscriminate 
. . 
· industrial .expansion in the Prime Base, the· problem ·of new· indus-
trial areas and re~locatio~ will continue to be a profound feature 
o'f the .. ever· remoulding urban space. 
5.4 ·. Structural A~y_sie,_of the Industrial Acti vi t;y_ 
· .. The .focus of this section is on the array of production 
.fa,ctors.and ·their structural impact as perce~ved in the spatial 
conte~_t. :tn.a sense thi·9 is analogous to processes in architecture 
and pl __ an~ing.. Whatever the archi teet likes to express has· to ~e 
in pro·portion With. the available space. Mo.st'likely . size-structure 
and display varies,with standard usage and utility. Likewise, the·· 
' . . . 
analysis attempt~d h~re is -the ·broad identification ~nd appraisal 
. of . thE; .different .·scale ·of· industrial ~nits tnat make different 
demands for larid, services and production factoEs. In fact, 
. ; . . 
this may necessitate certain optimal site and market areas and 
hence confine the location choice to where those optima are 
satisfied. In. that respect, industrial structure has a pr,eci se 
spatial meq.ning. Within the Prime Base an e:xPort;...base~ industry 
will, theor·~tically, respond differently to locational forces 
~' . . ' 
from an import ·substitut'e industry. Accordingly, one would expect 
export-based industries to be specfalised, large-seal~, serving 
national as. well ap international markets~ Because of their scale 
and functions, and .possible affiliation to overseas corporations, 
they would-normally seek lncation at the spacious and better 
served si te·s at. Bahri • 
. . The structure conc~pt hitherto outlined has secured little 
attention in geographic industrial 16catio"-qal. analysis' partly 
. . 
because-of the ~p:parent lack of spatial content and_partly because 
structural arialysi s of the industrial activity has for. long b.een 
the ·domai·n a·f economi.sts. · In subsequent sub....;sections the structure 
and .. siz~~structure. a~e identified and treated. on the broad 
. . . 
CODUrbati()n IS indUstrial acti Vf ty leVel and then On the indiVidUal 
industrial groupi~g level. 
· 5.4_.1 ·:Structure of Input and. Production 
A correlation coefficient.a:qalysis was run to test the 
degree. of a.spociation between some coefficients· and ratios, com-
puted to' .. broadl;y: identify structural inputs and production varia-
. . . . . . . 
tions ·and measure labour and capital productivity in the Prime 
Base~ These coefficients are themselves derivatives of stand?-rd 
var;i.abr'es and are used to detect industrial productivity as applied 
in our case to· one hundred ·and three factories. The result is set 
'. 
out in a.eorre.lation.matrix, together wi.tha }_i_stof ten I • var1-
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ables', in Table 5.3; 
It lS possible to·single out five strong correlations, 
significant. at the o·.001 level.· These are ·positively between 
production-capital ratio and employment coefficient, A and E; 
. . . . . . . . . 
capital coeffi¢ient and .labo:1r intensity, B and H; . capital 
i~t'en·sity a:bd capital density, C and D; capital density and 
·_,1·. , .. 
'macl;d.nery' · co~fficient, D ·and I; and production-labour ratio 
and laboi.lr productivity F and G.. Some other fairly strong c~_rre­
lations are also revealed and marked by dashed circlesin ·the 
matrix. 
.. 
· Wheri manipulating. different· inputs and production factors 
in industrial undertakings, one .is looking for the optimum propor-
tions.of.both, whether.the objectives are absolute profit or profit 
at social p'rlcE:; •. Yet the right factory optimum is a highly theor--
eticaJ .conception. bne should nevertheless·be concerned with 
depicting the gener~ trends and understa~dir.g their broad conno-
tations~·. Any. inference of cause and effect has to· be disregarded 
when interpreting th~ above correlations.. ·Such implied relation-
ships may confirm what is previously suspected however. (11 ) A 
'high :•machinery' 'coefficient, for example, does theoreticaliy 
. . .· . . . 
mean a high·iaoour.prodtictivity and the connection might likely 
be inferred • 
. ,Soin:e: of the mo.st ·obvious· observations that. can· be .niade are 
pre·s~n.ted. ri.ght a~ th'e out set. They come into two distinct though 
. associat~d. packages: 
i. • 
(a.)· Labou;r Productivity: 
'; .· 
... 
Labour produc:tivity as mea8ured by the urits of value added 
. . . 
per employee is indifferent to both capital density, i.e. capital 
. . . . 
unitsper· employee.; and employment coefficient which is the number 
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Table 5-3 
Matrix of correlation co·efficients (Pearson .product-moment ) for t-en industry.coeffi.cients 
· Variables· 
A. Production-capital ratio: 
Value add·ed per capital· 
I • • 
. B. Capital coefficient·: c·api tal 
per value added 
C. Capital intensi:ty:. Capital 
per :t>roduc·tion va:lue 
D. Capital density: Capital 
per employment · · 
· E .. ·Employment coefficient: 
Employment per capital 
F. Labour productivity: Value 
. added per employment 
G. Proauction-labour ratio: 
. Production value per employment 
H. Labour intensity: Employment 
pe~ value added 
I. Machinery· coeffi-cient: Machinery 
& equipment per employmen~ 
. .• . . 
J. Production-machinery ratio: Value 
added per machinery & equipment 
A .B.: c D E ·F n· H. I· J 
-0. _27 ·-~-~-~: ~~-~ :7? i ~~1_': @ 6. 31 0 .1·6': -0 .-1.5 -6. 25 0. 11 . 
. ~:9_-~-~: :o_·?-~':-0 .. 16 ~0.26 -0.14 @ o~-11 -0.04 
.. @·...:0.24 -0.24 ..;.0.2.7 0.13 0.17 -0.05 
·:~0:37~· 0.15 o.24 -0.05 ~-0.06 
~0.21 -0.12 0.08 -0.33 -0.02 
@.;:6: 37~· :o.-4q_-, 0.17 
___ .., .... __ _ 
, --- .... 
-0.22 <0.49; 0.01 
- - ,. " 
-0.07 -0.03 
~o~ 13 .· 
Note: ~ Strong correlations at the 0.001 level of significance 
. :, _ _,. ~ Fairly strong correlations at the 0. 01 level of significance 
Number of factories - 103 
So·q.rce: Compiled fro:n data in Appendix 5.1 
~ 
Q) 
'n 
of employees per unit of capital. Consequently, one may fairly 
state that neither labou·r,....intensive methods· nor·capital-intensive 
techniques affect to any significant degree the ?erformance of 
labour productivity as seen from the dafa in hand. Curiously; 
the implicB:tions.of -these i·nsignificant correlations are. even 
. . ., 
more serious. than. t.he signi fi'cant ones. 
The _inaccordance of capital density with ·labour productivity 
i spro.bably·_~ndicati ve of inactive capital participation in direct 
producti6n ·arid/or under:...utili sation of in stalled. capacities. 
. . ' ' . . . . 
while tb,e i~tter is difficult to quantify beca~se of data inade- · 
. . . . . 
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quacy, the :f~·rmer,.is .suggested by the fairly hig1l. positive correla-
tion 'coefficient of 0.40 between .labour prod'l:cti vi ty and machinery 
coefficient (Fig. 5.2.i.). This means that although capital 
. . 
' . 
density' i~ not associated. with labour producti vi_ty, the proportion 
direc'tly i:qvol ved. in production, i.e. machinery ,9.nd equipment if 
. . . 
high,· is 1)0 si ti vely associated with higher labour productivity. 
An extreme example that vividly reflects this tendency is shown 
by ~ 'miik product-s ·factory.· In that concern, fixed·. as-sets are 
loaded with exten.si:ve_ agricultural land· values.·· Any ratio invol v-
• l . • ' 
ing capital >will produce astronomical figure~. , Such results have 
caused. much concern in ·the Industrial Survey, S1.:dan, 1969-70. (12 ) 
Obviously,. the inclusion of agricultural land values in paid-up 
·capital has pass~d unnoticed in the survey. The existence of idle 
·' . . . . . . 
C?-paci ty in .high capital density firms is now suspected; · and 
might.·weli p.ccount- for a large proportion of the indifference of 
the correlation •. The·many problems of raw material, transportation, 
· p:toteetion f;om foreign competition, etc., a.~d the operational 
probJ,.ems are .all rriany~ reasons adversely affecting capacity. In 
... " 
anticipating these problems the entrepreneurswould minimise 
margfnal uncertainty by locating at.the.Prime Base, since under-
Fig. 5.2 Scattergrama for the Prime B!!.ae industries on the following coefficient In 
(i) Laboar productiVitJ' aDd machi~:~er.r 
coefficient 
(F II.Dd I), r • 0.40 
(ii) Employment coefficient alld Labo:.u-
producti vi t;y 
(E lllld F), r .. -0.21 
t.(.OlfT:IoGIO& .. (i) t:.ort<I'Ofj " ;: ~~~:.,~--. ~~::~7 
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capacity is assumed to be more serious in regional localities 
where services and distribution channels are less developed. 
The dissociation of employment coefficient with labour 
product.ivity is· also interesting. It clearly emphasises the 
~eneJ:'al:i.ty of 'labour-intensive' attributes. Labo·ur-intensive 
method~ of production depend not only on the number of employees 
but on the' division and organisation of labour, and labour price. 
This widens·. t;he range and c;reates enormous differences between 
industries ti.nder the same 'labour-intensive' title (Fig. 5.2.ii.). 
The likelihood of any sound co-ordinated relationship between 
labq:.1r productivity and employment coefficient is rather difficult 
to attain. 
Turning now to the consideration of significant correlations 
with· iabout pro"ductivi ty, one ·can single o"'..lt the production-labour 
ratio as the; most conspicuous. This is shown by a positive· corre-
lation. coefficient of 0.68. Perhaps the most ·fundamental thing 
about. thi-s. relationship is that it actually quantifies the educated 
guess that whenever costly inputs are involved, m<:magement and 
labour are e:Xp~cted to be more skilled and generously :paid. This 
. . 
means that a spinning and weaving mill will' other things being 
equal, have a higher. production-labour ratio ·thaD say, a soap 
factory. . Wh:ll.e the former is specific in its locational needs, 
i.e. the extensive better served Bahri's induE"trial area, the other 
is indiff.erent: (Fig. ·5.2:-iii. ) •. 
. ···. 
(p) ··Capital :Productivity: 
·T:Q.e line drawn to show the magnitude of capital productivity 
i.e. production capital ratio, is the ;Lntensity of value added 
produced per one uriit of paid-:-UP capital. Agc..inst this, one can 
roughly· judge whether the capital invested is producing the de sir-
168 
able value added. Evidently, in all three coefficients 
introduced to gauge capital performance, t~e association with 
production-capital ratio is inverse. Any increase in capital 
per employee,.for example, is associated with_a lowering of value 
. ad.ded per .. capital'. the correlation coefficient being -0.41 . 
. (Fig. 5.2.iv.). Again these results confirm that capital has not 
been·fully utilized for productionpurposes, and in part suggest 
the prevalence of idle capacities. As a matter of fact, under-
capacity is underlined by the-inverse though rather less-signifi-
cant relationship between .production-capital .catio and machinery 
coefficl.ent. A .closer look, however, will reveal that all fact-
ories experiencing low capital coefficient;are largely putting 
.. / 
•.. •·..• ! 
capital to UE)es other than dir'ect production. A large proportion 
of ·cap.it~l·· is ofte:h" locked in stocks, land or buildings. The 
bulk 'of'. such factories are incurring losses and incidentally all 
but a very few of them locate at Bahri. 
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The connections of capital and labour productivity can clearly 
beseen in.three cases involving employment. Firstly, the strong-
est ·association ·in ·the matrix is between· capital coefficient and 
labour intensity .(r o::. 0.86). ·An increase of capital per one unit 
. . . . 
of _value ·added is matched by a·proportionate increase in the 
employment number needed to produce one unit of-value added. 
. ' 
. Secor:1d:J.,y ~ in cases where labour..:inte~si ve metnods of production 
· are adopted, there is a strong positive correlation coefficient 
with ;P'roduction capital ratio.. Lastly, a fairly high positive 
correlation is also depicted for the association between labour 
.pr~duct;ivity and production capital ratio •. These generalisations 
will be further ·e:x:plored in the subsequent chapter as the same trend 
1s more ·or J,..ess maintained. 
5.4.2 Sectoral Structure 
The investigation above into the structure of input· and 
production deals with a wide spectrum of industrial activity. 
The extent tq which the sectoral structure differs from the general 
. . . 
industrial pattern is now examined according to the specific indus-
. ' . 
trial orders of the Standard Industrial Classification, modified, 
(SIC rn). An interesting facet of this exercise is to identify 
' . 
similarities or dissimilarities amongst the various industrial· 
sectors in pespect .of their .input and production factors and· to 
assess, in general. terms, whether any partiqular industry gro-J.p 
or grou·ps have influenced the overall pattern of industry. 
By way of brief overview however, one should.' at this jun.cture, 
refer to- ·t:he ·seven industrial sectors and their representation on 
five variables. (see Tabl ~ 5~ 4). A two-sector. do:ninance favours 
Food, Drink. and T~bacco, a6d Textiles and Ginning (SIC m Gro·~ps I 
and II). Indeed more than 50 pe.r cent of the Prime Base's 
indus~rial 'activity measured on any one variable is contributed by 
these two industrial sectors. So:netimes this percentage reaches 
70 as is.the .case with paid-up capital. If Leather and Foot-
wear, and ·wood, Paper arid Printing (SIC m Groups III and IV), were 
included With SIC m Groups I andii by virtue of their initial agro-
inpU.t, .the p:lc~ure will be one of overwhelming concentration in 
agricultural' processing, well in the order o! four-fifths. This 
.. 
bias clearly exemplifies the embryonic stage_ of· industry in the 
Sudan, and .more significantly perhaps, emphasises the contribution 
. 9f factors other than cost minimisation which determines the loca-
. tion -of material base· industries at the Prime Base • 
. ·.A correlation coefficient has.been co:mpu,ted, wherever possible, 
for·each .individual SIC m group. Each such g:roup it is evident,. 
-Table 5.4 
:The industrial sectors by five variables as -absolut~ ·numbers. (LB.' 000)- and -perc·entages 
Industrial Sector 
.. _ (SIC m Group) 
Food, Drink and Tobacco 
' (SIC m I) .. - . . . . -
Textiles. and Ginning 
(SIC m II) 
Leather and Footwear 
(SIC m III) 
Wood, Paper and Printing 
(SIC m IV)- · 
Chemicals and Allied 
(SIC m V) 
Metals and Electrical 
(SIC m VI) . 
Cement·, Tiles, · Glass. etc. 
(SIC m VII) 
--Number :of 
employees· 
& per cent 
;541-5 
(24. 71) 
6502 
(29.67) 
2203 
(10.05) 
2916 
( 13.31) 
2187 
- . ( 9- 98) 
2490-
( 11. 36) 
201 
(0.92) 
.Paid--up-,. -Gross valu~ Production·· Wages. and _ 
capital ad(ied •· value .salariecs . · 
per cent per cent per cent per -cent 
.5207.7 3110.2 - 15603.8 1930~ 9 
(22.60) - (28.00) (41.30) ·( 32. 20). 
10675.2 . 3124.1 7319.9 1471.1 - - -
(46.40) . (28.10) (19.4) (24.50) 
--
21?5.4 1604.3 4560.1 704.4 
(9.50) (14.50) ( 12.1 ) ( 11. 70) 
. 2525.9 1215.6 2629.6 777.1 ( 11. 00) (11. 00) (7.00) ( 13.00) 
1340.5 1053-3 4580.9 633.4 
(5.80) (9.50) (12.10) ( 1 o. 60) 
'780. 8.-
- 927~4 2960.3 420 • . (' 
(3.40) (8.40) (7.80) (7.00) 
290.0 63.5 169.8 - 62.9-
(1. 30) ( o. 60) . (0.'40) .... ( 1. 00) 
Source: Co'mpiled from IDCAS, Industria_].._ Surv~ 'I_ Sudan, ·cairo, 1969/?0 
. -- -- ~--- - -- ---·- -
See data in Appendix 5.1 
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has distinct labour and capital productivity, depending on the 
initial input factors, the complexity of manufacturing, and pro-
duction outlet •. 'Machinery' coefficient could for example be very 
essential.in raising labou.r productivity in or.e group, though may 
have little· significance to another. Pin-pointing these disparities 
Will. be the concern on this sectoral analysis. . 
The essential difference between groups.which·are controlled 
by tb:eir respective response to labour and CP.pital productivity, 
are ·pr6du¢ed in a series· of scattergrams (Fig. 5~ 3, for matrixes see 
Appendix 5. 5) • The ·following features may be ·noted: 
(i} The only group where higher labour productivity is 
associated· with an. increased capital density is l"'etal s an.d Electri-
cal Industry. (SIC m G:t•oup VI)· (Fig. 5. 3.i). The correlation co-
effJ.ciemt ·is ·o~60 :at the ··o.01 .. levei. Two· important· sub-groups here, 
are the assembly of electric appliances and enamelware. ':Phe im-
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ported inputs for these assembly industries: are either semi-finished 
o:r .'knocked down' parts to be fitted, thus simpii:t'ying operations, 
minimising r~sk, .and consequently the chances. of profit are better. 
A rather complicated situation develops where the machinery co-
. ' 
efficient· is unexpectedly .indifferent to labour productivity. This 
should however, be read in the light of the fact that :Cos\ of 
machinery and equipment for some concerns exceeds the values of 
. paid-up capital, indicating an error in· the original figures of 
the Indu~trial. Survey~ 
. (ii}. An increased 'machinery' coefficient, if not pushed too 
. . 
far, Will ... most likely,, give· higher labour productivity. This con-
ception· has .not been verified by the data man~.pulated except in 
. . 
SIC in Group T, Food, Drink and Tobacco, (r = 0.63 at the 0.001 
leve;L, Fig.5.'3.ii)~ An equilibrium hasbeen struck between 
production input c:nid applic.ation of 
Pig. 5.3 Bcattergrame for the Prime Ba.ee induetriea by industrial gro'..lpa on 
the following coefficientaz 
(i) BIC m Group IIIz Earplo1ment 
coefficient and Production-
lllillchiner,y ratio 
(E and J), r • 0.86 
(ii) BIC m Group Illz Production-
capital ratio end Production-
Labour ratio 
(A and G), r • 0.92 
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(iv) BIC m Group VI: Labour productivity 
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machinery; and probably evince that this industry is stable and 
mature enough to obviate many adverse conditions affec~ing other 
groups. Although t~e intensification of machinery coefficient 
has not been pai'red by a significant increase. of labo-:.Ir producti-
. . 
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vi ty. in, SIC m Group . II, . there is a well defined inverse association 
between labour intensity and machinery coefficient, ·i.e. if the 
unit value of machinery and equipment per employee is increased·, 
then one _should expect a decrease in the number of employees 
needed to pr~duce one unit of value added •. However, this do~s not 
amount to a. po si ti ve increase· of productivity per employee. 
Anothei' .strong inverse correlation coefficient for SIC m Group II 
is .betw.een machinery co.efficient and production-II!achinery ratio. 
Taken toge"t!h~r, the two negative correlations consolidate the con-
clusion· about under-capacity already referred to above • 
. ·· ., ' . . . . 
(iii) An interesting association between employment co-
efficient and produ~tion-machinery ratio tells us, in the case 
of Leather and Footwear, and Wood, Paper and P.r::.nting, that an 
~ . . . . 
increase· of employment per unit of paid-up capital is strongly 
correlated with increased value added per unit value of machinery 
and ~quipment. ·In hath groups a decrease .. in machinery and equip-
ment per employee is also associated with an increase of value 
added per machinery and equipment. These two ~orrelations suggest 
an increase of productivity with labour-intensi·re tendencies in 
. . 
SIC m Groups III and IV. 
(iv) The inference of high· production value per employee 
has already been dis~ussed. Special attention is given here to· 
the sectoral difference·s. It is now poE) Sible to single out 
SIC m Group III as .having high positive correlations between 
production-:-labour ·ratio and production-capital.ra.tio, production-
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machinery ;ratio and employment co efficient ( :Fi:-ss 5. 3. iii and 5. 3.i v). 
This emphasises the difference within the group between well 
organised concerns such as Bata·; and other smaller plastic 
shoe factories. As a result, productivity does not increase 
simultaneously, nor does the machinery coefficient. 
5.4.3 Size Structure 
A structural analysis of industry by size 1s essential on 
the regipnal basis· as well as the· Prime Base level. Evidently, 
there is a high concentration in the Prime Base of large-scale 
industries as defined above. However, our terms of reference are 
the mere 'identifica~ion of the differentials ih performance as it 
v:aries w{th size-class 'and size-structure preference within t:tie 
li.mited :choice ·b~tweeil Khartoum, Bahri and Omdu.rman. Size classes 
. . .. 
are decided upon by th'e number of employees both. in the production 
lineand management. Equally important parameters are paid-up 
capital, gross value added, production value and wages and salaries. 
Four size-ciasses are identified and specified on an inevitably 
arbitrary basis, though the stratification acc.:>rds to the conceptual 
range·' of small to large. Thus 30-99 compose· tl1.e first class, and 
ir(the. Jruddle ·lies class two and three. wi tp. employment figllres of 
· between 100-299 and 300...;.499 respectively. Employment beyond that 
range is include~ in class four. 
Now~ considering B:ll SI~ m gro"..lps by size-class as depicted 
in Appendix 5.4, one can immediately identify the higher concentra-
tion of employment, gross value added and particularly paid-up 
capital in size-class four. I"'ore than two-fifths of all labour 
force, more than half the paid-up capital and nearly 45 
per cent of value ad.ded are contributed by this size class. In 
ter:rrls of absolute number of firms, this class :represe.nts only 5.8 
per cent of total industrial establishments. Conversely, size-
class one features a disparity, 1,1/i th a high number of factories 
and low perc'ent share on all five variables. 
In an attempt to measure some of the industrial structure 
and summarise industrial verformance \vi thin the framework of the 
size-~lass, the. same coefficients as those in the matrix (Table 
5.3), are manipulated and presented in Table 5.5 as ratios and 
coefficients derived fro~ the various variables already specified. 
A spec-ial note should be made of the generality inherent· in any 
result~ attainable. Firstly, because a braod ·spectrum has been 
examined;· seven major industrial sectors are grouped together~ 
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In any· size-class, a diversity of sub-group ivdustries exist. 
Secondly, there are no optimal productivity values for size;_classes, 
i.e~, no S:pecified output for any particular industry. In the 
light of the· ir!formation obtained from the matrix (Table 5· 3), 
and size-class analysfs ·hitherto attempted·, o~e hopes to further 
the analysis of the industrial strllcture through a size-structure 
examination. 
Outstanding among all classes, size-class three performs on 
the extremes. ·Henceforth, it attains the hi·ghest production -
· .. 
capital ratio,: the highest employment coefficient and conversely 
the lqw&~t capital density. ·In fact, all of these ratios are 
.\vi thin the bounds .of the ·correlations in Table 5. 3. The only 
clear ex;eption is the high labour intensity v.hich,unlike the 
gener~:J_ :trend,·corresponds to a low capital coefficient. Probably 
this tendency, together with the low capital density and high 
emp,loyment coefficient, indicates the labour-intensive predomin-
anc.e in this class. Equally important is th(; re1ati vely small 
fi~re for labour I?roducti vi ty arid is associated with a low man/ 
hour :production a!)d lower wages. When examining industries of . 
Table 5. 5 
· Industrial structure by size-class, usin·g ten coeffiqi·ents .and .ra:tios~ 
--
Size-class. A B c D . E** F G . H* * I J 
-
30.:..99 0.47 2. '1 0.59 901.6 1.1 422.0 . 1530.4 2.4 537-1 0~78 
100-299 0.56 1.8 0.43 1015.8 0.98 566.7 2372-5 1.8 793.2 0.72 
300-499 0.64 1.6 0.35 674.4 1.48 434.1 1906.7 2.3 598~4 0.72 
I 
I 
[ 500 + 0.42 2.4 0.95 1294.3 0.77 539-3 1369.5 1.9 941.5 0.57 
I 
* Letters refer to variables in Table 5. 3 
L7 {!__.tb-
** EnvloyeP per LS'OOO oi capital 
~ 
Source: Compiled from data in IDC;AS, Industr:h_C!_LSurv~_,__SuC!_~n__.L ~_2?9~70, Cairo, 1970. 
see Appendix 5.4 
-~ 
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this class, almost all concerns employ labo·~'.r 'intensively' , 
specially at the production line and packing end of the process. 
Examples of these industries are soft drinks and beer, enamelware 
and leather and footwear. 
The relative•labour concentration in industries of size-
class three, is paralleled by capital concentration in size-class 
four. Judging from the trend in Table 5.5, class four diverges 
only slightly from the general pattern. Hovvever, when it does, 
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it dist.lnctly reflects the disparity between input and production. 
The high capi tai investment per employee is pro:lucing low value 
added· per unit of capital and at the same time labour pro:iucti vi ty 
is comparatively low. Both indicators suggest under-capacity 
possibly as a. result of operational problemu. .This situation is 
made more clear when comparing the petter iabo'.lr·pro:luctivity and 
. . 
. . ' 
labm.1r-intensi ty scores of size-class two. As. a matter of fact, 
. . . 
class two looks more like securing the best rur:ning. Here, one 
sees the combination of a high capital density, labour productivity 
and production - ~apital ratio. The very high production value per 
employee is worth noting, especially in conr1ecti on with the low 
capital intensity. 
Some of .the characteristics above describ~d, of the size-class 
. . . 
three.and four, have-been taken up by size-claEs one, where for 
instance, labour-in~ensity is slightly higher than in class three, 
and the correpponQ.ing figure for capital coefficient is just on 
line with that o:f class four. It will be recalled that this -is 
the same tren~ expre_ssed by the highest positive correlation between 
thepe two variables (Band H).in Table 5.3. Labour productivity 
is the l~ast for all classes, and so is 'machinery' coefficient 
. . .. 
and capitai density. These should be analysed in a manner similar 
to.that qf class three, though w:Lth a less distinct labour-intensive 
operations. To a certain extent the capital and ratios connected 
with it are high, while at the same time, machinery constitutes 
o::~ly a little proportio::~. This is evident from the ratio of 
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value added per machinery and equipment and the production - capital 
ratio~· The form,:;r is the highest amongst all classes and. the other 
is slightly above the lowest figure. 
5.5 Industrial Localization and Distributio::~ within the Prime Base. 
So far, analysis has been confined to the broader aspects of 
industrial activity in the Prime Base. Spatial distrib~tion, 
quantification of disparities and simi..lari ties in the three towns 
ar~ the ~aib theme of this section. 
5. 5.1. Industrial Localization 
< 
Th~ ·overall pattern of man-:~facturing industry in the com,lrba-
tion, and the general impression of ind.ustri al a·cti vi ty measured by 
numbers employed, paid-up capital, gross value-added, production 
value, and wages. and salaries is one of mal-distribution favo·:.1.ring 
Bahri, as will be seen from Table 5.6. Bahri's share on any one 
variable is at least more than two-thirds of the total for the Prime 
Base. Because of this, Bahri earned the tit.le of the workshop of 
the conurbation. The strong preference for Bahri is a direct mani-
festation of conscio.as urban planning and funcr-ional zoning. 
Industries. of the type developed du.ring and after the Second World 
War ha.d ··created the need to-a11portion some of the. urban land to 
accommodate in.dustry' and storing facilities. An extensive land 
was a pre-requisite because of the bulky nature of the products 
stored arid pro.:::,essed. There was also urgent need for extensive 
open-ditch dumping gro·:mds specifically necesso.ry for the industries 
of this period, e.g., vegetable oil pressin·g, soap .makLng and beer 
; 
Table 5.6 
Prime Base modal industry structure by five variables 
(As percentages) 
Variables Bahri Khartoum Omdurman 
Employment 67.02 23-93 9.04 
Capital · 80.38 '15.13 4.49 
Gross value added 73-43 20.75 5-94 
Production value 75· '15 '18.35 6.50 
Wages & ·salaries 73- '16 20.03 6.81 
Source: . Compiled from data in IDCAS, Industrial 
Survey, Sudan,1969/1970, Cairo, 1970. 
--
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manufacturing. · The fact that the raw material fnput and produce 
were both bulky confined choice to areas within the Prime Base 
well served by railway. At the time of considering where to locate 
the heavy industry area neither Omdurman nor Khartoum w·ere eligible 
for that description; Omdurman· was never served by railways, and 
Khartoum could not offer space within the vicinity of the railway. 
In fact, in the latter, the Old Deims were lining the railvray and 
plans for new expansion were underway. Conversely, Bahri had much 
land to spare in the neighbourhood of the railway station and still 
far enough py that time judgement from population concentration. 
Bahri was .ihd.eed a well considered choice and in some respects 
resembled industrial move to suburbs in industrialised countries. 
However, one further point merits note; as data understudy dis-
cards factories employing less than 30 work-:;rs, ·there must be 
an intrinsic bias to Bahri which by definition c~ters.for larger 
industri e.s. This is even more sal i. ent when con sideti ng other vari-
ables such. as'paid-up capital, wages and salaries, gross value 
added and production value (Table 5.6). 
5.5.2 Coefficient of Geographical Association (Cg) and 
Location Quotient Analysis ~L.Q.) 
It is necessary to dwell, for a moment, on the formulation 
and validity.of the two localization indices we are about to 
implement: 
1. The coefficient of Geographical Association is a simple 
numerical device whereby one can examine the degree of concentra-
tion of any industry or industrial group and compare its percentage 
distribut:Lori by area with other similar industries or groupings. 
This is normally calculated on number of employment~ Besides 
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employment, one attempts to use other variables such :::ts capital, 
value added etc.· The form.:l.l expression is a modified version of 
P. Sargant Florence's coefficient of localization as fonrarded 
by D.l'1. Smith. (13) 
where 
n 100Xi 100Yi 
Cg = ~ 
.) ____ 
i 1 Xt Yt 
-
Xi - variable value for a given industry X in the i th 
area subdivision~ 
Xt = total regional 'variable value' of indu9try. 
·· Yi = 'variable value' in all industry in area i. 
Yt = total.regional 'variable value' in all industry 
II· the vertical brackets indicate the modulus or absolute value 
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of the expression within, i.e. the differences irrespective of 
sign".C14) Another available measurement is the location quotient 
·which describes. the relative concentration of a particular industry 
in 9. region as co~pared with other industries. It is calculated 
by compari.:n.g a region's share of an industry percent, whether 
by employment, capital, value added, etc., w~th that region's 
total industry average percent. If, for example,· the share ot · 
Omdurman is 30 per cent of the capital for food, drink and 
tobacco, and 60 pe~ cent for the overall industrial activity, 
the .location quotient for that·group of industry wo:rld be the out-
come of dividing the first percentage by the second, i.e. 0.,5) L.Q. 
One may conclude accordingly that Omdurman.' s share in this groap 
is less than proportionate, whereas a figure mo:-e than unity 
would mean a· share more than the expected proportion. 
These two indices are applied concurrently, rather than 
.separately, to enable portraying a more meaningful picture·as in 
Fig. 5. ·4 • One can easily spot which industrial group is more 
localized, and read corresponding L.Q. values that points to 
where that concentration occurs. The picture is perhaps even more 
interesting when considering five different variables and their 
variation within one group and all groups of industry. The start-
ing point, when analysing these values should, however, be the 
full awareness of the underlying shape of 'platform' on which the 
index is moulded, i~e. keeping always in mind that the average per-
centage values for each region are being used as base-lines (Table 
5.6). What we are in fact detecting by these indices is the degree 
of oscillation from an already existing line or 'platform'. So 
if that line is originally biased to one or a few urban places as 
might be the case with industries in developing countries, the fig-
ure for localization could sometimes be mis1ead.ing if not used with 
caution. K.M. Barbour, for example, was surprised, using the co-
efficient of localization, to see that in Egypt, ".~.Group I [food, 
drink, to~acco] is least like the national pattern, although its 
products are consumed by. all •• " ( 15) and seemed puzzled by the ·fig-
ure for the coefficient of localization of that group, which ex-
presses a concentration of a regionally dispersed industry. To 
resolve ~his seemingly paradoxical situation one should think of 
the overall pattern, which in the case of Egypt was one of a general 
industrial localization in few urban places. Any devia~ion from 
this line or 'platform' as happened with Barbour's Group I, wo'..lld 
inflate. the deviations from the base-line anCl. consequently lead to 
a local-ization figure rather than an expected one of dispersion. 
5.5.3 Industrial Distribution and Pattern 
In the preceding two subsections, the lop-sidedness of the 
industrial distribution within the Prime Base has been attended to 
Fig.5-4 COEFFIClENT OF GEOGRAPHICAL ASSOCIATION (Cg) AND 
LOCATION QUOTIENT ANALYSIS (L.Q.) FOR ALL SICm GROUPS: 
1969-70, ON FIVE VARIABLES- FOR THE PRIME BASE. 
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in. a more general way. Some measuring devices Lave also been 
verified against their theoretical validity. Under the p~esent 
heading, the distribution of industry and the underlying ,reasons 
for difference is analysed. The distrih:.Itiori is graphed to 8ffer 
a visual impression, a swnrnary and contrast of the seven industrial 
SIC m grm1ps and on five different variables, (Fig. 5.4): 
1. Food, Drink and Tobacco (SIC m Group I): 
The first thing one notices is the high degree of accordance 
of Food., Drink and Tobacco (SIC m Group I) with the general trend 
. . \~ .. 
of industrial distrib'J.tion, ·that 1~ roughly around a standard 
lj_ne .repl,'esented by values of 67.02 per cent for Bahri, 23-93 per 
cerit for Kharto·xn and 9.04 for Ql..nd.urman, (see Tabie 5.6).· Any 
o scillatio~ '.from that general trend as that of employm~nt,. may 
be picked up and analysed by values of the location quotient as 
in (Fig. 5-4-i). Thus employment in industry Gro:1p I is slightly 
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more localized because Bahri 1 s share of employment in this group 
is.less than the overall optimum percentage. At the same time 
Khartoum is having more than its· standard share. Kharto;nn industries 
in this group are do:Uinated by mineral water sub-gro:1.p (more than 
50 per cent of labm.lr· of the group), and confectionaries, of 
the type ·established after World War Two, ann before Independence 
( 1956). · These industries tend to be labotlr-intensi ve in the sense 
that it requireS mor~ hand.S _on the I assembly I Jine .and packi_ng 
stages. The machines are comparatively less. sophi. sticated· ·con-
sidering that they were installed before 1956. 
Another disparity to be noticed is the slipping sha:;re .of 
Khartoum's c13.pi tal outlay as opposed to the employment and as 
indicated by location quotient of 0.88. Considering again, the 
time element, it is more likely. that the value .o:f.'· paid-up. capital 
s actually far more than suggested by present-day valuation. 
In the absence of any proper price index valuation, the whole 
capital calculatio~s are inclined. to be less accurate; a dis-
crepancy intrinsic in the basic industrial survey data. The 
production - capital ratioalso tends to be proportionately high 
in this in~ustry at· Kharto·J.m because of abov;e, in addition to 
the stability of pro.:luction acquired thro·J.gh time, e. g. managerial 
expertise, protection from foreign·coJlpetiticn, financial backing 
of bankers, well-defined marketing channels etc. Within the 
narro·t~ margins· of variations in this SIC m group, the sliE;;ht excess 
of wages and salaries at Bahri is indicative of the level of· skills 
and management involved. This may not alway,s hold true,. as :j_ t has 
been reported that inflated salaries were paid for employees prior 
to confiscation and nationalisation in 1970: 
~he.committee has noticed the extravagant nature 
of wages, salaries and gratuities paid to the 
employees of these co:npanies (referring to in-
·dustrial firms), and h8lieves that these companies 
resorted to such practices as over-payment to· 
lower their taxable profits. (16) . • 
2. Textiles and Ginning (SIC m Gro:1p II): 
Khartoum industrial area is devoid of ar_y textile mills vTithin 
the size range under consideration. By the tiwe non-industrialisa-
tion policies were revised and adverse sanctions were lifted, the 
Khartoun light industrial area was already crammed, and conversely, 
a spacio·Qs sui table urban industrial zone. hnd opened at Bahri for 
such in:lustrial undertakings as the two largest textile mills of 
. . . 
the co·U.n.try, the Sudanese T~xtiles Industrie8 Ltd., and ·the Khar-
. . ' 
toum Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd. Both fc>ctories·were estab-
1i.shed in the. 1960's and the obvious. location within the tri-
partite capital was in the 'heavy industrial area' at Bahri. They 
ti,pped the balance· on all variables in favo·,ir of tmt locale. 
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Although the figures for the coefficient of localization shows 
concentration on all five variables, still these coefficients 
s·eem far less than is suggested by the very high percentages. It 
must be remembered that our comparison is with the overall trend 
'' 
for all three urban places. Bahri's degree of participation is 
also reflected by the location quotient figure of more than unity 
· attained on each variable. The same index gives a figure of around 
0.6 for Omdurman textiles on all variables. _This industry is just 
fi·;Lling a tiny proportion of the town's industry,· although- Omdurman 
was, and still is, the country's leading wholesale market for grey 
sheeting and the traditional ·producer of native .clothes. Omdur-
man' s textile industry has not grown large enough to absorb the 
traditional skills already existing, .particularly in the native 
production of toub, the ·national women's c::o stum$ ·, and tailoring·. 
3. Leather and Footwear (SIC m Group III): 
Distribution of leather and footwear would seem to oscillate 
sharply- according to the- variable dealt with. If capital and value-
added were·considered then the verdict is one uf industrial con-
' ' 
centration for this industry group. With the other three variables, 
a clear pattern may be observed. The identified localization of 
capital is primarily the result. of a deviation from the expected 
trend in both Khartoum and Bahri. Althoagh the overall average 
capital ·share of Khartoum runs at 15.13 per. cent, her proportion 
for this industry is- maintained at 41.4 per cent. Similarly, 
Bahri's-capital share is far below her average of 80.38 per cent. 
Judging: from adjacent- values of location quotient (in Fig. 5. 4 ) , 
K}J.artoum' s- high location quotient of 2. 74 clearly points to the 
g_en~rai localizatio'n of leather and footwear. In fact, the Khar-
toum Government Tannery, with a paid..,. up capital of LS. 897. 300, 
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has largely contributed to these imbalances. The localization 
of capital at Khartoum has not been paralleled by a correspond-
ingly high value. added, because the same establishment is produc-
ing little value added and reducing the Khartoum location quotient 
values to 0.56. This disparity suggests that the tannery is 
experiencing some difficulties. Raw material procurement and 
technical and managerial problems are believed to be the foremost 
reasons.C17) Comparing labour productivity of the tannery stand-
ing at LS.412 per employee, with LS.1100 per employee for the 
Sudan leading footwear producer, Bata at Bahri, one can only con-
firm what has already been figured out. At the same time, the 
very high labour productivity in Bata is solely responsible for 
the industry localization shown by the index for value added in 
(SIC in Group III). This last industrial concern is one of the 
largest modern factories in Sudan -nationalised 1970), well-
organised on managerial level and has benefited from international 
experience which avails itself for regional branches all over the 
world. Probably such cooperation is still maintained. Other 
reasons that might have helped are the effective protection from 
foreign competition by limiting imports to an annual quota, the 
partial satisfaction of raw material from the local nearby Khartoum 
Tannery, and the ever expanding market; beside the special atten-·. 
tion given to training both on-the-job and in Bata's specialise~ 
training centre at Bahri. 
Omdurman has no doubt got many advantages ·for a leather and 
footwear industry •. The most obvious are the traditional experience 
in both tanning and shoe-making, the traditional market for hides 
and skins and the major raw material catchment pool, especially 
after the installation of the largest modern abattoir. Omdurman, 
however, has failed to draw large concerns, partly because of the 
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intrinsic 'light industrial area' limitation ~nd partly because 
of the lack of sewerage facilities. Availab{l:i_ty o·f sewerage, an 
o'!::lvious necessity for such a noxious industry, 3Xi sted only at 
Khartoum and- that was reason eno·:1.gh to locate here, albeit. so.:ne 
distance from the light industrial area. The advantages .of Omdlir-
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man recorded earlier on, have had their impi·int s on this industrial 
g.ro:xp as.reflected on o:1r graph by significant location quotients 
for employ1Ileht and capital (see Fig. 5. 4 , g~a)h iii). 
· 4. wo·o·:l, Paper and Printing (SIC m Group IV): 
Certainly, the most clearly identified localization of 
industry in_ the Prime Base is Wood,· Paper and Printing (SIC m 
Gro;.lp IV, see Fig. 5~ 4 , graph iv). As an immediate expression of 
thi.s localization the values of Bahri· swing drastically belmv its· 
overall industry p9.ttern and conversely, Khartoum's score shoots 
high beyond its normal industrial participation. To a lesser· 
degree, Onidurman experiences a similar trend to that of .Kharto211. 
The whole difference in Wood, Paper and Printing (SIC m Group· 
-IV) is probably attributable to the concentration of printing and 
publishing ho·J.ses at Khartm11Il. This sub-grm.Jp is legitimately a 
'big;...city' activity. Throu.gh.o-..It this century, Khartoum ~as always 
been the focus of cqm.merce and business and ·residence of foreign 
trade agencies and the seat of a.ll central government departments. 
In that resp?ct alone, the capital had to cater for both public 
and lpri vate printing and publishing needs. For quite a time, 
Bahr1 and Oilldurman were devoid of the need fer such a specialised 
industry.' When the two latter cities caught up. with demands, 
. . . 
printing 'and publishing was well entrenched in Kharto-:.lm and 
factorsof geographical association were creating more and-more 
. . . ' . 
concentratio:1. Interestingly, these printirg and publishing 
houses were first located on the then o·J.ter rims of the city 
core (CBD), and still maintain that position, altho·J.gh the 
physical market area has expanded to engulf.their old premises. 
Outstanding among the printing and publishing sub-groap is the 
Government Printing Press, engaging nearly a-thousand employees, 
i.e., two-thirds. of all printing labour force in Khartoum,_ and 
more than one-third of the capital outlay. All five variables 
maintain a high and even line of localization extending beyond 
the 40 coefficient of localization limit. Wages and salaries 
are slightly more localized, and this is probably due to the con-
centration of re1ati vely well paid skilled lab·:mr necessary to 
the printing trade~ 
Omdurman is well represented in this SIC m Group IV and is 
well known for its quality wooden furniture and traditions. 
Kabbashi and Issa furniture workshops, supply.a large proportion 
of the tri-partite capital's ever increasing demand, and .together 
they employ about 65 per cent of total. capital outlay in 
this group. Incidentally, capital in this same group, as measured 
by tl:le ~ocation quotient figure of 1.8 for Omdurman, is more local-
.ized t~an all other variables. 
· Of ·all industries, SIC m Group IV is the least represented in 
Bahri as shown by the small values of location quotient. On all 
five variables the location quotient score is :._ess than 0.5. This 
under-representation is, in part, responsible f~r the high values 
of the coefficient Of geographical aS$OCiation as was noticed 
_above. 
5 .. • .··Chemicals and Allied Industries (SIC m Group V): 
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For convenience of classification, the greater portion of the 
chemical industcy includes a diversity of concerns whose production· 
ranges from pharmaceutical goods and plastics to perfumes, soap, 
laundry blue., and paints. Omiurman seems to ej}lerge as rather 
important in this SIC m order. The proportional share of this 
gro·J.p as compared with other Omiurman industrial activity, reflect 
how important :to C)mdurman this group is. The result is a high 
location quotient ofmore than 3-5 on capital and more than 3 
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on wages and salaries. The latter quotient is probably more than 
o:1e would expect. This is probably explained :J.m.vever, by tb,e high 
number of expatriate workers in the perfumery industry. Employment 
figares are comparatively low and that is because the overall struc-
ture of industry in Omdurman is labour-intensive. 
It in:ust be rioted that Omdurman' s chemical· and allied industry 
is mainly confined to co:w:non soap production., ·laundry blue, and 
perfumes. The acquaintance of Omdurman wholes-1lers and importers 
with the t·radi tional market, its taste and volu.;ne, has tempted 
many such entrepreneurs to enter this field of ·very limited margins 
of risk. The capital city with very little share on thi. s industry, 
had neve.r been able to compete with Omdurma:ri for comni.on soap and 
perfumes since the early days of this industry. Khartoum merchants 
have· not cared fpr a trade .whose market was very well-defined and 
in effect monopolized. By the time large. concerns interested them-
selves in the same or similar lines, Khartoum industrial area was 
clearly unsuitable and repulsive. The spacious and lucrative 
Bahr:j. industrial area suits all p~~rposes. 
Meanwhile, the chemical and allied industry is slightly under":"" 
represented ih Bah:):'i on all b'J.t the employment variable. Soap 
manufacturing, a labour-intensive industry, is probably mainly 
re$pons{ble for balancing employment location quotient values. 
Othe:rWise, the pharmaceutical branch i. s still ·nascent, and either 
deals with packing imported medicine or producing simple drugs, 
the inputs of which are also imported. The same.applies to 
paints. 
. . 
No·..v it becomes clear that the high concentration depicted 
for Omdurman ha.s ensured a detectable degree of localization, 
espe~ia~·l.y on wages and salaries (see Fig. 5. 4, grap~ v). 
6.. Metals and Electrical Industries (DIC m Group VI): 
It may be noted that a relationship does exist. in this group 
between the pattern of distribution within the tri-partite capital 
and the functional sub-gro·:1ping. In respect, three categories 
may be taken into account: 
a. Transport equipment, maintenance and repair works and 
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· ~rrigation constructional works. In both cases,· engineering 
•.. was directly geared to the export ecvnomy. Such activities 
:were naturally some of the oldest industrial undertakings . 
connected With Kharto·:l.ID. and Omdurm::m light industrial areas. 
b. Electrical appliances· such as refrigerators, air condition-
-ing and air cooling units, and electric batterie?: These 
industries may be referred to as import-substitute assemblies. 
The assemblage industries concept is neiV in the country and 
dire.ctly or indirectly involves foreign companies. The 
·most likely location is Bahri • 
. c. ·Enamel and Hollo·w-ware and metal furniture. This is a well 
distributed sub-group a:q.d reflects in some ways the universal 
dhan~e of taste and an inclination to use even more of 
these items instead of wooden furniture for example. The 
factories of this sub-group are fa~rly well distributed 
within the three to,..vns. 
The general magnitude of industrial distribution in this 
group, as detected by the coefficient of lucal{zation, features 
a relatively heavy concentration of capital produced concurrently, 
. . 
thfstime in both Khartoum and Omdurman, (see Fig~ 5.4, graph vi). 
On.the other hand, paid-v.p capital for the electric· appliances 
assembly at Bahri has proved to be belo·w the general trend of 
cap~tal. outlay. in the town. Marked localizations could also ~e 
seen for wages and salaries·and production velue. In e~ch case 
a co:rresponding location quotient consolidates the pattern already 
notice(i... 'I'he near normal employment distribution is indifferent 
to 'tJages and salaries values; a. disparity that reveals the 
character of a well developed employment structure, whereby, 
better pay is always expected. 
7· Cement, Tiles, Glass~ etc., (SIC m Group·Vli): 
To complete this analysis by industry gro~p, we now turn our 
attention to cement, tiles, glass, etc., a g~oup well under-
represented in the tri-partite capital for vario~s reasons. Cement 
is· conclusively a raw material-based industry and its absence in 
the' P'rime Base is understandable. Bricks, a very essential build-
. ing mate'rial .for. the fast growing conurbation' are still produced 
. . 
by· simple traditional techniques in the vicinity of Greater Kh9.r-
to·Lim. Thirdly, tiles are generally produced on a small scale, 
where a score of employees, below 0:1r chosen workers lim:i t, could 
most likely more profitably cover the market. Omdurman is void 
of any such industry with over 30 workers. W)1.ereas Khartoum 
i.S represented byBittar's Cement ·and Mosaic Floor Tiles factory 
and Bahri with the Sudanese Glass Company. Incidentally, a dis-
proportionate localization of wages and salaries is quite evident. 
Clearly,· the latter factory is employing skilled labml.rers and· 
193 
194 
still paying more for workers who are subjected to the open 
furnace blaze. 
5-6 Conclusion 
The Prime Base is the nerve-centre of the country's industrial 
enterprise. The particular significance of the Prime Base is the 
well-developed sectoral structure. All indust::.: .. ial groups are rep-
resented within the full range of the demarcateJ size-class. This 
is a clear indication of the wide extent·of the market served, 
which is by no means confined to non-basic industries. Of.the 
major industrial sectors,·· agro-industrie s are dominant, with a 
share .of more than fo:J.r-fifths on variables such as paid-up capital 
and employment. Industrial cone entration of tJ.li s de scription must 
.suggest a nascent stage of industrialisation and probably a belated 
start. More significantly, the localization of a diversified agro-
industry suggests procurement of raw materials, often with a high 
material index, from regional material so·;rrces. The validity of 
the least-cost theory is accordingly challenged. 
Al-though the wide data grouping of industrial orders is an 
obvious shortco::ning, it has nonetheless been possible to identify 
the variations in performance and indicate where they actually 
occurred. An example is the high labour productivity in SIC m 
Gro:1.p.VI attributed to the assembly of_semi-finished parts of the 
metal and electric industries. ·similar trends in the. food industry 
group ismainly a.·result of sound performance in the well-established 
J 
vegetable-oil mills which compete for national and international 
markets. Likewise, the size-class structure shows some disparities 
between .di,fferent scales of operation,. and it is possible to single 
out the.m.iddle size-classes ('100-299) and (300-499) as relatively 
more efficient. This feature is not uncommon in some developing 
countries· where low costs of production factors coincide with 
fairly developed internal markets and co::npeti ti ve prices at 
neighbouring territories. 
The overall capital performance is weak, pointing, among 
oth~r things, to redundant capacities. The locational implication 
of this t$ndehcy is important since entrepreneurs would normally 
tend ·to. minimise risk by locating at the Prime Base which offers 
.. 
the best.available services and well developed distributio~ 
channeis. • · The chances of inadequate use of capacity are even 
higher in regional. areas in the absence of specialised services. 
Equally important is the business/industry mentality which seeks 
to acquire. extensive industrial land at basic .pric.es. In the Prime 
' •. ·' ; 
Base; land is a valuable asset which could provide security in· case 
of failure of industrial ventures. Moreover, .industrial land 
functions as a security at the Prime Base's banks, and sometimes 
remunerative if partially rented.C1S) The external cha~acteris­
tics of a· new urban industrial area were largely determined by the 
specific requirements of the individual industries developed during. 
the late 1940's. Thus matters 13uchas provision for disposal of 
effluent, storage capacity and scope for futur3 eX:pansion were 
ess.ential attributes. Bahri satisfied these requirements, and in 
the process particularly high concentration of industry developed 
· attesting that Bahri is probably the real heart of Sudan's industry. 
Nevertheless, localization of some industrie::: by virtue of narro;y 
speciali.sation does occur elsewhere than Bahri. · Printing and pub-
lish;ing is a case in point. On the other hand, Omdurman' s industry 
is seen to· be far· less significant than it ought to be. The data 
bias inherent in considering factories of thirty-plus workers 
appears to deprive Omdurman of its importance as·a centre for 
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sma.ll· industrial units. The fact that relatively high 
industrial investment occurred in a short spnn of time must 
g1ve the Prime Base a high industrial growth rate compared to 
general industrial investment in the country. This in many 
ways emphasises the growth potential of the Prime Base. L9.stly, 
the quantitative measures adopted are not in any way ideal. 
Indeed, the limitations of localization coefficients and location 
quotient are cited in many texts, the major ti.screpancies being· 
the variation of results with classification of industrial 
orders and in areal. divisions. (19) Nonetheless, the harmful 
effects are reduced·by creattng base lines to gauge actual 
oscillations and by recognition of shortcom5.ngs. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
INDUSTRIA.L LOCATION PATTERN AND DISTRIBUTION 
6.1 Introduction 
Tne inquiry in this chapter focuss~s on industrial distribution 
and st:!;!ucture in the. country as a whole. The e1idence presented 
thus far suggests considerable localization of Sudan's industries 
in the Prime Base. But despite this, the fact stlll remains that 
where industry occurs out side the Prime Base it has local signifi-
cance as well as strategic importance. 
One is enco~raged by availability of data to consider again 
multiple variables on value rather than volumet£ic basis. The same 
. industrial code and threshold of 30 and above workers adopted in 
. Chapter Five are maintained here (see Appendix 6~ 1). 
6.2 · Industrial Location Pattern 
The geographic pattern of industry 1 s expressed by the differing 
degrees of disperaion or localization extending both spatially and 
through. time·. In the space dimension attention has already b.een 
given to industrial localization in the Prime Base. What remains 
to; be seen is how such concentration affects. the·locational patterns 
of the vast surrounding territory. Two distinct patterns of indus-
trial growth emerge away from the conurbation. ·Firstly, the 
industry in. the regional centres, and secondly, ·the patchy one-
factory industries a,ssociated with the agricultural base of the 
rural areas (see Fig. 6.1). 
6.2.1 Reg.ional"":'Centre Industr;z 
·Arriving now at a consideration of the industries that.dot .the 
Fig.6·1 INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT AND PATTERNS 
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regional towns and sub-towns, it is pertinent to recapitulate 
tlie mechanism operating on the Prime Base. ~·he underlying colonial 
model of.administrative nodes, trade and non-indu~trialization 
commitment has m:.1ch influence on the creation o.f regional centres. 
Some of the apparent patterns are directly connected with the arti-
ficial smoothing of.space friction, and the creation of efficient 
distributiOn and collection channels thro"J.gh the hierarchy of the 
regional centres. At the same time movement has been severely dis-
. -
torted by the ingenious device of 1 profit ·on ·cost .. to store 1 and 
basing point.whereby the Prime Base became a profit maximization 
lo'cation and the commodity prices increase according to distance 
from. Khartoum depots. When industry was promoted later on, this . · 
proved to be a deterrent ·to industry outside the conurbation as much 
as an encm.1ragement to industrial localization in the Prime Base (See 
chapter 4). 
Previous analysis suggests that the two-way flo~ of trade had 
to create secondary bases with some services and functions necessary 
for.any futlire industry in the regional centres. It could further 
be argued that processing as it stands in regional centres is pre-
dominantly basic-industry, serving the co"J.ntry-wide market. However, 
low-order industries such as bakeries, brick~making etc., are develop-
ing fast and non-basic market elements could b~ seen.as in the case 
of l"'edani; though these elements are as yet a long way from being 
st:r;ongly ·felt. In this respect the diversion from the economic-base 
theorJ is notable since the structure or pattern .of industry is not 
inferential from the population size of a town or sub-town. The non-
industrialisation commitment applied equally to all places. 
Ev~dently·, the subsequent sparse disorderly growth of regional-
centre industry rests on two basic criteria. First, the regional-· 
centre has to be a supplier of the main operational inputs if 
manufacturing industry' is to locate there. The best example is 
Umm Ruwaba oil seed mills, which 2-luster aro:md a production centre 
of ground nuts and sesame. Seco~1d, industrial budding aHay fro::n 
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the conurbation co~~ld only be feasible if the mechanism that favours 
the Prime Base is profitably neutralised. ·Ex-factory price at ·a 
lorry-assembly concern, for example, will be far less at Port Sudan 
than .·in any other location, other things being equal. The m~chanism 
of profit on ·cost to store will be checked since a lorry could trans-
. ' ' . . 
po.rt. ii tself', and more than compensate the 8xpense of mo7ement to 
inland destinations by the ·ship~ent of a consignment from .the ~ver 
congested port. 
Another obvious choice of locat1on is the petroleum refinery 
at·Port Sudan as the-o'!Jvious water front break-of-bulk site. The 
construction of extra depots for crude oil at an inland terminal and 
the transport of the bulky machinery are unn9cessary costs than can 
simply be avoided by lo0ating at the port. Diseconomies in the case 
- . 
of an inland. ·refinery. are also related to loadj_rig, ·unloading and re-
loading of oil, since reverse-hauling of refined petroleum to.the 
eastern regio'n and re-exporting of products that either need further 
'cracking' or manufacturing are ~navoidable.· ·But more important is 
the? fact. that the lqcal products of the refinery··were exceptio::1ally 
treated as·though_they were imported goods to bepefit from the 
'profit -on· cost- to E?tore' concession. An important incentive to 
locate at the conurbation was simply nullified. It is am11sing ho',.;r-
ever, to· noticehO'J'J the 'profit on COSt -to store' applies to ·the. 
petroleum products. ~ver and above all other processing costs, ~ 
ten Qer cent~~ofit on transportation cos~r metric ton is added 
. to the .total cost.C 1 ) It is this sort of inexplicable decision in 
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'developing' countries that sometimes invalidates locational 
factors. 
6.2.2 One-Facto£Y_Industries 
Direct . state control ov.er the spatial decision is a principal 
factor in the creation of a distinct pattern of industries outside 
the.Priine Base. The degree and nature of government involvement .in 
p-q.biic manufacturing enterprise changed with the attitllde of alter-
nating'governments. Thereis ample evidence to suggest that the 
p~rty government that succeeded the condominium rule had practically 
exci~ded the.possibility of the participation of the public sector 
. . 
in industry. In the annual budget of 1957/5R only Ls. 37,000 ·were 
allocated to mining and industry.C 2 ) 
The.views of the military government that took over in 1958 
were q~ite different~ An earnest quest was made for industrial 
financiers regardless of their political affiliation. Whatever 
was forthcoming ·was to form the first nucleus of the .public manu-
facturing enterprise sector • 
.A. .new. mode of industrial planning and dev8lopment in the 
public industrial enterprise was prominent in· the 'I'en Year Plan of 
Economic and Social Development, 1961/62 - 1970/71. ·The task was 
to ·strike a balance between many opposing aspects. In the forefront 
was the move to bring together the operations of both public and · 
private sectors under the same system. UnlLp?.· the charter govern-
.. ment, · the· new p'.lblic sector broadened its fi elrl- of activity to 
include ·industry, and took full responsibility of direct management: 
~eng-term ·loans from the Soviet block were negotiated alongside 
·bankers credit from 1-J est Germany. ( 3) · 
In essence· ho'tJever, this ·realm of development was p~rticularly 
a restoration of the short-lived liberal colo~ial thinking that 
coloured post Second World War. In ~ddition, the military regime 
. . 
blended the la.issez-faire doctrine with the essence of the central 
·, 
planning growth model •. Yet the underlying colonial system of 
economic transactions and economic institutions was still in 
operation • 
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. . Tb,e central theme of the new departure ~r~-~s the urge to score 
instant. :i,.dentifiable progress within a short span of time~ . :Admit-
tedly.there was a severe lack o.f infon:nation on the courit:ry's 
resources and .potentialities. But this was ·not an insuperable task 
to a mil~tary government: 
This should not however, mean that.we should 
wait until such data is available •••• but 
should mean that economic planning sho·:1ld pay 
reasonable attention to research·~nd explora-
. tion as .well as the use of all. kno-ND resources 
and potentialities and their full development. (4) 
What·. was ~eckoned to be known resources and potentialities· consti-
tuted ari ·important factor in the choice of industries, and the · 
ioGation.decisions, and :l.ndeed the pattern that eventually emerged. 
Hence the numerous projects and proposals that were collecting 
in the Board of Economics and Trade, a colonia.l econoraic intelligence 
agency, were exhumed, dusted and used selectively. Considerable 
attention was given to industries whose raw materials were assumed 
to '!::>e bountiful in the natural environment. No further capital out-
. lay for irrigation,. land or research is needed, and no time should· 
.be· waE?ted! Co::~sequ.ently the gestation period could thus be held 
to the .. bare. minim~: in localities that offer the lowest initial 
· cost of operation~ The rationale of optimum location was even less 
convincing to the private investor whose worries were attached to 
:maxLmizationof profit. As we will see in Chapter 7, the unit 
cost of production is not always paramount~ The argument tb,at .. the 
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social-cost~benefit in public industrial .enterprlse could be 
more significant than absolute monetary profitsis rather contro-
versial, and aQ.m:.i. ttedly difficult to gauge. However, on the evi-
dence from the new measures of the public sector participation, 
it is possible to see that the one-factory indu.stries tend to 
locate according to the broad regions of south, west, centre, 
east and· north. Nonetheless it is difficult to say that this 
'regionalisation'.of industry complies with a plan to create growth 
centres in secondary bases in the rural areas.· 
6. 3 Industrial· Di stri but ion : Regional imbalance 
The· distribution of industries in Sudan il~ustrates the strik-
ing region at imbalanc·e between core and periphery. Focussing 
·' 
ini tia:Lly. on'' the Prime Base in'dustries should not obscure the· signi-
ficance attached to regional industrial occurrence. The apparent 
lack of strong cohesion between the patchy regional industries 
. . . . -
makes it even ·more. necessary to examine the diversity of locational 
.. , . 
. factorFJ as eXpressed :by this dispersion. At a closer look therE! is 
even lei:is ·concentration of industries in the Prime Ba.se than is 
normally assumed. The often quoted concentration figure of more 
than 72 per cent for either employment or value added is evidently 
. a _product of gros·s imprecision. (5) How this miscalculation is · 
manifested in the Industrial Survey is e"Xplained by the invalid 
comparison between regions and core industries. Where size-class 
3~-:-99 employees is incorporated in the percentages for the Prime 
Base; ~his.si~e-class is admittedly excluded.from the totals for 
.. the rest of the country. Adding to this inaccuracy is the exclusion 
of a significant regional industrial sub-sector, that is cotton 
\ ' ' 
ginning, even though many ginneries are emplcying above the 100 
'· 
employees_limit. 
Needless to say, a perfect figure of the centre-periphery 
ratio is never. attainable. A complete indust1.·i '3.1 survey is basic 
for this goa;L. However, within the bounds of av9.i1able data, the 
use of· a uniform set suggests a marked difference from the already 
established proportion of ratios of industry in· the Prime Base. 
Correct figures are possible to ~rrive at by including the r·esults 
of th~ survey convened by the Stati sties Department in '1970 for 
.
·regl· .onal. ·· ar·e, as. ( 6 ) Our manipulations cover 90)er cent of the 
. . 
country's ma:hufacturing industry. 
' . 
. . 
In ~ontra:st· to the 72.6 per cent concentration figure 'for 
employment in the Prime Base, one gets a corresponding figure for 
employment concentration of . 51. 3' per ·cent. lf. four-fifths of the 
uncat~red for ten per cent employment of under thirty factories is . 
loc·ated in the Prime Base. (this ratio is based )n .information on 
'operating factories' prepared in 1970 by the 1'1i.nistry of Industry 
& 1'1i.ning); the total percentage for the con~rbation Will be 59. 3. (7) 
Using the' same .procedure a figure of· 56.6 is computed for value 
added instead of the 77.1 concentration given iri the Industrial 
Survey~ (B) Adding a third variable, paid-up capital, will pr:o-
gressively lower the· impression of the Prime Base's industrial 
pro.minence. It is interesting to note that the Prime Base's share 
of p~i<]_-up ·capital fo~ industries employing 30 and more is only 
40 per cent. If one·assumes that the factories with under 30 
workers engage 20 per cent of the p9id-up ·capital and ·again 
a9sume · .. four-fifths of that to be in the PrimA Base, the overall . 
sJJ.are of. the Prime.· Base would still fall short of 50 per cent. 
A useful ~nd rarely-used method of portraying multi-variants 
in distributional studies is conveniently made possible by a 
Mercedes device developed by K.l"'. Barbour. (9) It is now easy to get 
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an· im·mediate impression of the built-in regional differepces on 
the compound mapping of employment values, paid-up capit~l and 
value-added. The picture which emerges in the .distribution map 
(Fig. 6.2), asserts the presence of industry in one form or another 
in almost all Sudan's provinces. 
. . 
However, the significance of industry t0 a. region or a province 
varies with the underlying economic structure, the stage of the 
... 
region's development and a myriad of other constraints. The pro-
. ... 
lo:hged'isolation and political unrest in the. southern region' for 
instance,. p:[>oved to be .a deterrent to any sort of serious develop-
ment. The saw-milling, a speciality in tbis fore~ted region~ had 
to 'be heavily guarded to operate at near prohibitive ·costs·. Simi-
·larly,' the Nzara Spinning and Weaving factor.Y, ·estabiished in 1951·, 
.encoUntered ·serious :Problems for the lack of· security for cotton 
growers. For some time cotton was trans-shipped from the Nuba 
Mountains .some 960 Km· from Nzara .. 
Again~t many odds however, the military government of 1958-64 
had chosen Wau, the ·provincial capital of Baher-e·l-Ghazal, for the 
1 
. . . 
locatfon of one of the Russian supplied· fruit canning factories. 
Raw material was thought ·to be plentiful though this proved an ill-
conceived·assumpt:lon~ ·Consequently, the factory· encounters grave 
problems~· .This factory largely resembles the one-factory industries 
category and is a. goc;>d example of. the bigh capital outlay per 
·employee. ·Another feature associated with t~i.s form of investment 
is the low ·value-added per unit of paid-up capital. Both the rela-. 
. . . . 
ti vely high capital density and low production-capital ratio are · 
features :repeated in almost all the one-factory industries through-
. out ·the .country (see·. Fig. 6. 2). The re.asons are indiscriminately 
related to .basic raw materials shortage, and managerial inefficiency. 
: . . 
This applies to many· of the public "Sector' s. i:1dustri e s. Within this 
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sector, however, Khasb:n-al- Girba sugar factory stands as the 
exception. This factory sets the record of maximum-capacity 
production~( 1 0) For this consideration the relative low production-
capital ratio reflected in (Fig. 6.2) is particularly u~expected. 
The disparity is explained by the high production fac.tors which 
minimise the margin~ of profit. Further, the factory is deprived 
of higher profits by the unrealistically low prices .because of the 
governr,nertt 1 $ monopoly practices over sugar'trade. Another feature 
t~ be n~ticed. is the high employment in this, .factory. l"'o·st likely 
the sugar p~antation workers were erroneously included in the total 
indust:rial employment. 
The only firm in the one-factory industries gro"..lp with a va~ue­
added.p~rcentage in excess of that for capital is a ginnery in the 
Blue Nile Province. In ·fact this is a common featu.re of all but 
·two of the ginneri es. The labour-intensive .nature .of thi. s vJell 
estaq~ished primary processing industry plus a tendency to operate 
ro:md ··about full •capaci ty are all factors 'increasing the chances of 
higher.V;alue-added~ By contrast, the two ginneries with low value-
added are both I Capital intensiVe I • l"'oreOVer' the 'precariOUS nature 
of production factors in a flush irrlgation area and .a marginal 
rain-fed land are bound to render the availubili ty· ·of raw· cotton a 
matter of chance .for these two g:inneries, and frequently gives rise 
to undercapacity rupning. 
In. .. t:t).e process of summing-up total scores of industries to 
form' an.overall distributional picture, the strong character of 
one-fCJ,ctory industries becomes apparent in some provinces. Indeed 
the main drawback of the 1'1~<,!~§. :map is the averaging process-
(inherent in the totals) that gives a somewhat crude -picture. A 
strong·:indication of this is sho~.Nn in Fig. 6.2 by the total per._ 
centage of the G~zira Province and again reflected in the triple-
variable·ratio$ within the province. Immediately the inflated 
slice of ·paid-up capital is detected. The major contributor to 
this picture is the ·Guneid Sugar Factory·. Operating along. two 
extremes, the factory has the highest paid-up capital outlay in 
. . . ' ~ . ! 
the country and indeed the lowest V9.lue-added 0.:1 record. Both 
features are well exemplified in.the Mercedes map for the Gezira 
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Prov1nce. Among the many factors co::~tri buting to the problems of· 
the Guneid factory is the tenancy system that commands a flat rate 
payment per feddan (1.04acres).C11 ) It is interesting to note 
that the sugar plantationwas super-imposed 0n the already existing 
' . 
cotton. scheme and inherited many of the land tenUre and production 
. (12) . 
sy stem.'s> . lli sman?-gement is also frequently cited as one of the 
adverse factors. (1 3) 
Turning now'to the regional-centre industry where one-factory 
industries do not exist, a conspicuous feat1.1.re in contrast to the 
one-factory·industries is that the aggregate ,production-capital 
ratio is always above the unityfigure~ Almost all factories in 
this category are privately owned and are chiefly dealing with 
. . . 
simple processing. where large profits are the main· incentive for 
the private venture ·• This could be· 'seen in Southern· Darfur and 
Northern !Cordofan Provinces. The Gezira and. White Nile Provinces 
. might have been included in this group as we~,l, .if not for the 
. . 
adverse ·effect of the one-factory industries. As a general rule, 
there is a tendency for the regional-centre industries to be 
'laboQr-intensive', a matter closely related to the nature of the 
simple manufacturing processes and cheap lahour. Low.processing 
·costs co:'..lpled with labour-~ntensi ve tendencies contribute ·to an 
. increased value-added. ·This does not mean that 'capital-intensive' 
operations auto:rp.atically produce low value-added. On the contrary~ 
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where ·capital-intensive operations are run on an efficient basis 
high value-added could also be expected. As a matter of fact two 
capital-intensive undertakLngs in the Red Sea Province and the 
Nile·. Province produce a completely different M'.ercedes ma;e. Besides 
the higher production-capital ratio, capital per employee is also 
high •. This pattern too, co~.1ld be taken as indicativ~ of efficiency 
and higher utilisation of available capacities. 
A magnified version of the regional-centre industr.y is quite 
cleariy pr9,jected by comparing the relative:significance of tb,e 
three ,V(3.riables for. the Prime Base. The underlying sim.ilari ty of 
' . 
the combinations of variables broa~dly reflects the industrial 
characteristics and the driving forces behind private sector.' s 
industries both in ~he core and periphery. It bears repeating, 
ho~eVE:)r, that in a large population of diversified factoriesas in 
the case. of the Prime Base,· a situation app~~rs to exist where low 
employment in some factories is compensated for by high employment 
in others and likewise high value-added in some.factories is eroded 
by low value..:..added in others. 
6.4· Industrial Localization 
(i 
To. develop the discussion on industrial,location beyond the 
level of generalisation hitherto attempted·a coefficient of geo-
graphical associati9.n ~as been used to .show the.localization or 
dispersion of ea.ch ::j_ndi vidual industrial sector. It shm.lld be 
remempered however, that the values obtained are based on a thres-
·hold of· 30 ·and aboveworkers referred to earlier. In addition 
i~. ought to be emphasised that the coefficie':lt of imustrial local-
., 
ization.ts apparently devoid of the spatial. context as it just con-
veys comparison between different induptrial groups. Sometimes 
thi$ dtscrepancy. is mitigated by the coefficient of specialisation. 
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As meptioned before, the latter coefficient_luses m1ch of its 
sharpness when applied to 'developing' countries. The reasori:i.s 
that a single remote factory with a few workers WO'J.ld produce a 
very_ high .degree of speciali satio::::~, a si tuatio::::~ which i. s obviously 
fal~e~ A deeper look irtto the coefficient of i~~aliz~t{on, ~n the 
other .hand, might prove rewarding. In fact it is possible ·to 
answe:r. ~hy and where.does the localization occur. As the coefficient 
of indu~trial localization is largely governed by the degree of 
deviation of each variable from the average of the sub-groups, it 
is possible to isolate each individual deviation and graphically 
portray them above ancl belo·.rJ a b:rse-1 i.ne that represents average 
values for. each sub-region. A ser~es of graphs has been constructed 
accordingly for five industrial groups for P,mployment, capital and 
... ~ 
value-added (See Fig. 6.·3). However, one pro'blem emerges in the 
schematic representation, as some locations·· are devoid of particular 
industrial .groups. Although their scores count in the ·form'ilA. tion 
of the coefficient. of localization' it is ig:ho:red in the graph, 
and .brokep. lin~s throu.gh the base-line are ·drawn to indicate· the 
non-existence of the industry_ in question i!1 the localities.· This 
. . . 
would .also ::nean ·that the adding-up of deviations. regardless of.the 
sign and dividing by two would not result in the exact coefficient 
of localization. Nonetheless we can depi·ct "the variations in the 
graph where they re~lly matter. 
Except in .the case of two industrial groups - SICm Groups I 
and II· -·using ubi qui taus or semi.-ubiq_ui taus· inputs, all other 
. , ,. 
industrial groups tend to localize, as measured by the nUllber Of 
. . . 
. . . 
eniploy.rri.ent, paid-up capital or gross value-added. In 90rne cases 
the hi.gh localization is a result of a one hundred percent concen-
tration in the Prime Base as in the case of Leather and. Footwear 
(SICm Group· IIT) ~ and Wood, Paper and Printing (SICm Group IV). 
Fig.6·3 
Graphic Representation of the Coefficient of Localization for five Industrial Groups* 
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Notic.eably thi. s form of· localizatio~ does no·+; produce the highest 
coefficient simply because the average, orplatform, of the Prime 
Base is· so high that a one hundred per cent figb.re will deviate 
.. 
only slightly from an already profo·:.md share. 
. .. 
WI thin the same range of high localizat1on, Ceme.nt, Tiles; 
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Glass ·~tc~ (SICm 3-roup VII), records the highest localization as 
will be.seeri','in Fig 6.3~v). As. was noticed f'·arlier on·in Chapter 
5, this. industrial· group is the least significant of all·indvstries 
. . 
in the I'rime Base. Understanding this, we. e:x:pect to ~ave. two sharp 
.. 
· diverg~pcie.s fro:rn the average; one at the Prime Base and. the other 
in the remote. areas·. where ·a· reso·J.rce-base industry is so sign~ificant 
that the deviat:Lon value far exceeds the nodal ,share in such a 
.loGality. 
A third pattern of high localization deveJcips where a secondary 
base shares.importance with the Prini.e Base. For locational factors 
already discussed in this chapter, Port Sudan.emerges as a collpetitor 
to the core ·in Chemical and Allied Industries. and Metal and Electri,-
. . 
cal Indust:ries (SICm. Groups V a·na VI), (See Fi'gs. 6~ 3.iii arid i v). 
. . . 
At the other e:xtreme,Textiles and Ginning and Food., Dl"'ink and 
Tobaqqo,. register low coefficients of localiz'ation. It is o:1ly 
expec,ted_ that primary industry is the simplest form of manufacturing 
.and is geared to the~ production areas. With· a long history of 
. . 
cottonproductio~, the country is dotted wit:h ginneries. The commit..;. 
ment to ::process .local raw material after 1959 plus the emergence· of 
some regions as foo::l processin'g centres hav:.e widened the processing 
' ba~e. to ·cover several districts •. 
For ·the purposes of distribution and .analysis, it suff.ices to 
. . 
m~riti,on:the spatial variation of the·coeffici~nt as calculated on 
each individual variable.. For example, a s~.ight localization is 
detected. for SJ:Cm Group I on capital and employment (Fig.·6.3.i). · 
·.·' . 
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The rea·son ·is· clearly the low figure of 20 .. ·per cent below 
the overall average. of the Prime Base on both variables, together 
with high values for provincial sugar.refinery with· large sums of 
capital investment and similarly high job enrolment. Converse;L;y, 
the va.lue-add.ed runs closely along the base-line to give a low co-
efficient of localization. Besides, this feature is also indicative 
of SOIDE? . 'structural characteri sties. For. instance, the . conurbation 
is doing better. on value-added than capital and. employment' ·a 
situation o:pposi te to that of· the provincial aleas 'where value-added 
ts· far iess than would normally be expected :from the inagni tude of 
capital ·or. employment. This confirms what ha~ already been said 
about tl:ie. operational problems eiJ,countered "Qy tp.ese rural fob·i 
industries. By contrast, SICm Gro,;p II (Fig •. 6.3.ii) shows a rela-
tive localization of capital. This time the share ·of the Prime Base 
. . . . . 
is a high pos:Ltiv~ one, produced mainly by the hi'gh capital out-lay· 
in the spinning and weaving sub-gro"'ip. 
A distinct tendency of the variable-to-va~iable cm:~.parison is 
·offered by Chemicals and Allied Industry (SiCm Group V Fig. 6~3.iii.). 
. . . 
· Qn the qne hand, the localization on the employment varip.ble is 
~ainly a p:roauct of 'labour-intensive' practices in the Prime Base. 
On the other hand the high capital localizatiouis due to capital 
concentration in th~ Port Sudan Oil Refinery. Again value-added 
reflects the contrast between the efficient -rui:ming of the refinery 
and t'l;le inefficiency of operations in the Prime Base 1;3ho·.vn by under-
,avf3rage. values. 
. . . 
A·iioticeable feature in SICm Group VI.(Fig. 6.3~iv), is the < . 
' . 
· high employment percentage· for the Prime Base which far exceeds the 
average•. This is explained by the nature of the assembly industry 
·of. refr:l.gerators and air co:)lers and air conditions and the· 'labour~ 
intensive' enamelware industry and metallic furniture. On the 
other hand, iorry. assembly at Port Sudan sh0ws all signs of a 
newly established capital-intensive industry where C?J.pital percent-
age i$ rather high and exceeds that of value-added • 
. An~ther interesting featu~e is the disparity between the 
. . . 
operati6ns .of· thet~o c~ment factories (Fig. 6.3.v).' The Nile 
. . . . . . 
Cement. Factory at Rabak (Kosti), a recent establi shlllent, reflects 
all the.problems of a n~w: mixed sector starting with organisational 
disorder, to the extreme of sub-optimal leGation. The Atbara Port-
land Cement Factory (Atbara), established in 1946, looks :more 
mature·c:~.nd well established as is manifested pya h.igh production-
. ... ' 
capital ratio, i.e. value...;added :per capital.· .. From the foregoing 
analysis it might as .well be concluded that it is possible to gain 
a wealth of information and more insight from the solid ·figures of 
the coefficient l.f .we loo~-c beyond the n:.llll.erical :expression to the 
original eiements that underlie the bare figures • 
.. I 
·In the analysis of industrial structurE"' in the previous· chapter, 
three st.ructural BUb-levels were scr.utinised·. The first relates to 
the aggregate input and pro:luction of the in{ustrial activity in 
the Prime Base. Sec.~oral configu.ration and siz.e structure were the 
. other two· levels. One of the advantages of that procedure was to 
bring ·to:gether elements of production factors with those of locat.:. 
. ~ . . . . ' 
. . 
· io!la~: factors~· In the subsequent sub-secticms all three levels will 
be examined separately. 
6.5.1· Structure of IndustrL: Some Generalisations 
For the :present purposes much of thi$ sub..:section will be' deal-
ing wlth struct:t.lral asp~cts of regional industries as they intertwine· 
... 
with the actiyi ty of the Prime Base and· in a manner similar to 
the treatri:J.e'nf ·C1pplied before.* 
The incipient. industry throughout the provinces is much tied 
to raw materials, and in that respect it i·s expe.cted to sho·11 some 
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differe:nt st;r:uctural .copfiguration. This conception is tested 
~gainst empirical evidence lR.ter on, when svme 1mb-industrial gro~.1ps 
are· examined more clos~ly~· But for the presunt, an immediate im-
pression on t,he general disparities and similarities of·the struc-
. . . 
tural aspects of the region.~l industries and that of the Prime Base 
is off~~ed. If the Prime Base's correlation ·matrix already dis-
cussed is compared with the one for all Sudan·;·s industrie·s, it will 
prompt: the folloNing observations: 
( 1 )" ·The coefficient of correlation between production-capital 
i:-atio and employment coefficient (A .and E),. r ~ 0.62, is 
identical to the figure for the .Prime Base (See Tables 6.1 
and 5.3) .. : By going back to the sc.attergram,(;Blg~ 6.4.i), it 
will be. seen that the same. extreme values of a tea packing 
factory· and a woo·d workshop,. both locat~d ip the Prime Base, 
. . . . 
·still influence the correlation for the whole co' .. mtry • 
. ··Another similar form o'f heterogenei 4Y ··where two non..: 
comparable dots are far apart in the chart, is again ref-
·lected in the scattergram for production-capital rat1o and 
labour·productivity (A and F, Fig. 6.4.:Li).· · 
(2) ·It 1s also possible .to see a similar d.iscrepancy when con-
sidering the differences. For example~ capital intensity 
and capital density (C and D, Fig. 6.4.iii) have a lo·11 
------. -----...,--------------·---·-----.,...------
* The·Guneid Sugar factory.was excluded from computations of correla-
tions.and.scattergrams because of its discorting effect·o:n·some co-
efficients due to disproportionate capital investment, .and 
simLlarly. extremely high negative value-added •. · 
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. (3) 
eorrelation for all Sudan whereas a :'ligh figure is 
recorQ.ed·for the Prime Base. The incl~sion of the oil 
~efine:ry and the Port Sudan saltern, two factories at 
opposite poles in the Sudan chart, ha.s greatly determined 
the $udari overall coefficient·. While production value in 
. . 
the·~ormer is extremely high, the saltern production-value 
is obviously O? the other extreme. I'hus. any relationship 
(, . . . . . . 
involVing these variables will'directl,y reflect the dis-
parity. in the form·of a low correlation. 
A. clear. example of heterogeneity is also provided by the 
. ., . . 
fairly strong_ correlation of r. = 0.59 petween capital 
. density and labour productivity (D and F) in the Sudan 
· ma~rix. (Table 6.1 ). The dot represent~.ng t.he oil. refinery 
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is evidently far removed fro:a:t the other.3 and thus .responsible 
for a false correlation (Fig. 6.4.iv)~ 
(4) ·Nonetheless, the -inclusion of -the provincial industries 
does consolidate some alreadY-existing trends in the conur-
bation. :For instance an increase of value-added per employ-
~ent (F and G) increases simul taneo"'.lsly with an increase of 
. . : . 
pr~ductio:1-value per.· enr..;>loyee (Fig. 6.4~v). The inference 
is again ·confirmed for all Sudan and would have. be~n even 
' ' 
stronger b"'.lt for the exceptionally high value-adde.d per 
employee for the oil' refinery which is not matched with a 
corresponding high production-labour ratio (See Table 6.1). 
· 6;.5.2· · Internal Structural Configuration ·: Some Selected 
Industrial GrO"'.l£S 
Textile and.Ginning Industry, and Food, Drink and Tobacco 
(SICm G.:rou:ps II and I) are selected to provide a. cl,ose-up structural 
. ' . 
·Table 6.1 Matrix of correlation coefficients Pearson Product-moment) 
for eight industr1a1· coeffic1ents Sudan 1ndustries ~ 
Variables: 
A. Production capital ratio: Value· 
added per capital 
B. Capital· ·coefficient: ... Capital 
per value. added· · 
C. Capital intensity: Capital per 
production value· 
D. Capital density: Capital per 
employment 
E. Employment coefficient: 
Employment per capital 
F. Labour productivity: Value 
· added per employment 
G.. .Pr.-e-duct:i,on-labour ratio: Pro<J..uction value 
pt;r·employment 
H. Labour :ints..:1sity_: Employment ~3r.,Value add·ed 
Number of factories - 153 
A B c D E . F . G H 
-o~ 26 _-o. 29 ~o. 31 .. 0 o. 20 -o.16 -0.19 
0.30 0.17 ....:o .• 14 ~0~17 -0.14 @ 
0~28 -0~17 ~0.14 -0.20 0.14 
:::-o.-34~ Q :0:35', o.o8 
'----"' ~ ...... _ -; 
-0.16 -0.13 0.05· 
.g-0.24 
. -0.21 
Note: . Q Strong correlation significant at 0;.001 level 
, :---, 
' \ 
...... - -, 
Fairly strong correlation significant at 0. 01 level 
1\) 
1\) 
0 
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explanation of the internal industrial configuration. The 
criteria for this selection were· as follO'II'lS. Fir_st1y, the clear 
dominance. of these two industrial groups on all five variables. 
Together -they· comprise 70.3 per cent of the country's industrial 
employment and 78~6 per cen~ of capital (see Table 6.2). · Secondly, 
these two groups best resemble the resource base of the rural 
areas, thus creating a .fresh opportunity to conside;r .the operational 
and structural performance of the bulk of rural.· indu$try. · 
.. ' ·... .. . . . . . 
A first step towards introducing the stru.ctural differences in 
these tw~ group~ is to acknowledge the· respective per.centage sh~re 
of each group.. As O':.li' calculations inc"iude some factories, which 
were not accounted fo;r by the Industrial Survey-(1969/70) there. is 
. . 
bound to·be some difference in the total percentages, while the 
·. 
percentages fo:r:- employment and value-added in the Survey stand at 
40 per cent and 33 per cent· for SIC m Group I and 26 per cent and 
30 per cent for SIC m Group II; corresponding employment percentages 
that include ginneries and some public enterprise factories is 
nearly ·equal for both groups standing around 38 per cent. 
Al ternati v·e value-added percentages for SIC m Groups I and II 
after the inclusion of those factories unconsidered by the ·Survey, 
are 45•4 per cent and 23~7 per cent respectively. To complete 
the picture, capital ;for which no percentage is given in the Survey 
stands at 47.4 for Food, Drink and Tobacco, and 35 per cent for 
Textiles and ·Ginning and Leather and Footwear. 
6.5.2.1 Size-Class Structure for Food, Drinl.: and Tobacco, and 
Textile and Ginning (SIC m Groups I and II) 
Some- insight into the industrial structure o;f the· country may 
· be gained by examining the size-class structures of the two dominant 
·.' 
Table 6.2 Sudan industrial .sectors by five .variables as absolute- numbers and percenta·ges . 
... 
' ' 
Industrial secto:r;- Number of Paid-up . Gro.ss value- Production Wales and 
(SIC m Group) employees capital and added 13-nd · . value and salaries and· 
' ' 
and per cent per cent ·per cent · per cent per cent 
'' 
. Food,' Drink and·TobaccO. 14715 272610 3 .4678.4 29700.9' ' ' 3504.6 · . 
· ( SIC m :I ) . . · . . ' ( 38. 3) (47."4) (23-7) ' (46. 2) (35- 9} 
,. 
. Textiles and Ginning 12304 17966.0 7369-7 12644. 5' 2721.4' (SIC m II).· .• (32.0) ' ( 31 .• 2)' (37-3) (19.7 .· (27.9) ., -',' 
.' 
Leather and Footwear . 2203 21?5.4 1604.3 4560.1 704.4 ' 
(SIC m III) (5-7) (3.8) (8.1) ( 7.1) (7.2} ' 
Wood, Paper and Printing 2952 2577-1 1229.4 2649~4 782.0 
. (SIC m IV) (7-7) (4.5) (6.2) (4.!) (8.0) 
Chemicals and Allied 2505 3643.2 · .. 2555.6 7512.1 '1096.8 
(SIC m V) (6.5) (6.3) ' (12.9) '(11.7)' (11.2) 
-----
Metals and Electrical 2648' 1248 .. 5 1450.5 '' 5276.6 539.8' ' ' ' 
· (SIC m -VI) 
' ' 
(6.9) '(2.·2) (7.3) -·: .. (8.2)'. (5.5) ' 
'· 
Cement, Tiles, Glass etc 1082 2620.8 881.5 1996•0 411.1- ' 
(SIC m VII) . (2 .• 8) (4.6) (4.5) ( 3 •. 1) (4.2) 
·so·~rces: Compiled from (1) IDCAS,Industrial Survey, Sudan,.1969/70, Cairo-, 1970. 
(2) Stati sties Department, Sudan Regional· Industries,· 1970/71, . 
compiled by the 1'1ini stry of Industry and 1'1ining, Khartoun1, 1971. 
1'\) 
1'\) 
1'\) 
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industrial sectors. The. size-class structure as presented. here 
Will help to detect the degree of concentration. ~f c~pital, value-
added. and employment. A high degree of concentration of the input 
and production factors in a few large-sized .. firms will mean that 
the.industry in question is more orientated· to ·the national markets 
than l~cal'demand~. 
If the :inclination is for concent.ration ir.. small and medium 
firms, we concl't.,1de that the. industry 1 s of the no:1-basi c order. 
This will also furnish a clue.to the stage o.f groiVth of the 
industrial sector, . its imprint on the. overa}.l industrial structure, 
and will glve a fair idea about . the trend· oi growth. ·For a visual 
. ' 
illustration of these ·concepts Lorenz curves Wr-:3re constructed to 
depict ~he .:Proportional structural compositiotl of size-class 
(Fig. 6.5)~ , . 
It is clear fro::n the out-set that the structure of the two 
indust'rial groups differ considerably in thE- degree of their depart-
ure ·from the·lih~ ~:x:pressing optimality. The Textiles and Ginning 
_·. . . 
curies. of· erriploymerit, capital and value-added. <lre all related to 
one .another and are sharply sagging (Fig. 6·.- 5· ii). l'1ore than 80 
per .cent of any one of the three variables is confined to. the four 
largest :fc=lctories. Such a. hi·gh concentration in many 'd:eveloping' 
countries is' associated 'Wi ~h primary and secondary processing. for 
internation,al .-ID.arkets and basic local deman4s ·for cheap goods. Both 
signs· are indicative of a weak sectoral base. Industri·al link~ges 
are virtually lacking and skills only comply with preliminary stages 
of manufacturing.· Cotton ginning is the most dominant and the best 
ex9-mpl e. ·. 
·. ·.With a w:Lder _range of sub-groups and p1·oducts, food industries, 
seem to,show so.me of.the .basic features of a reiatively integrated 
irtd1,1strial ·sector. Alongside large firms that prod.uce. for the 
... \- .. 
Fig.6·5LORENZ CURVES OF INDUSTRIAL LOCALIZATION: SIZE 
STRUCTURE ON THREE VARIABLES FOR TWO INDUSTRIAL GROUPS 
( i) 
FOOD, DRINK AND TOBACCO 
(S I Cm Group!) 
-
. 
. 
. . , -... --
. . ., --
.. ·...- ., 
... ..... ~ ... -... 
.,"' 
. 
. 
,. / 
/ 
/ 
(ii) 
Percentage TEXTILES AND GINNING 
/ 
/ 
/ 
of E.C.V. (SI Cm Group IT) 
:oo 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 . 
~ INI 
t0 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage of Firms Percentage of Firms 
··· · · · E=Employment C=Capital ----- V=Value Added 
Class Size 1 30-99 Class Size 2 l00-299 Class Size 3 300-499 
Class Size 4 500+ 
I\) 
I\) 
~ 
national market there co-exists a range of .small and medium 
factories thB.t are in many instances covering non-basic demands, 
i.e •. local urban areas, such as bakeries, ed1ble oil mills, and 
confec~ioneries etc. ··.The impact. of. the small :1nd medium-size 
factories oi this group is very clear in the Lorenz curve. The 
sagging effect noticed for Gro~p II is slightly ·eased for Group I 
and the curves are relaxed to positions nearer to the diagonal •.. 
This is markedly so for value~added (Fig. 6._5.i) where size-classes 
one and two represent 80 'per cent of the number of factories an'd 
produGe aboutthe same percentage of value-added, 36 per cent of 
. . 
employment·and 28 per cent of capital. 
It is now clear that a relationship between. the ·different. 
production' factors co:1ld roughly be approximated.from·respective 
. .'' . 
percentag·E?s in.the Lorenz curve. An obvious example .is size-class 
two of the food industries where more than two-fifths of value-
added in SIC m ·Group I is produced by this size~class. Yet the same 
. siz·e-class em_Ploys one-fifth of the capital 'wpj.ch. means a higher 
. . 
product:i~o~-capftal ratio. But the main discrepancy with the Lorenz 
225 
curve is that one. is dealing with total.s and co.n s:iderable generali sa-
tions ar~.being made. One factory with a hi[hValue-added could 
result in a situation, similar to that we have just seen. A more 
rigorcn1s .·approach 'is attempted in the next sub-section however. 
. . ' . . ' . . . 
6. 5~ 2.'2 · · In· ttt .and Pro.duction 
Textiles and Ginnin 
.. :. 
and 
. .. 
The. internal stri.lcture of input and production of the two 
indust.rial groaps now under consideration co:1ld he appropriately 
scrutinised by ·looking into the separate corr~lation .matrices com-
puted on eight variables (see Tables 6. 3 and 6 .. 4). By examining 
j.nc1ividu.3.i factories one notices that the picture is not· at all as 
Table-6.3 Matrix of correlation coefficients (Pearson P:roduct-mom~nt). 
for ei ht industrial coefficients (Food· Drink & Tobacco, 
SIC· m Grou . I Sudan lndustries ~ 
... ' ·vari"a"bl e s: 
·. A. :Production ca:pi tal ratio: 
added :per capital 
VaJ,·ue 
B. Capital coefficient: Capital 
per val~e ~dded 
c. Capital intensity: Capital per 
production . value 
D. Capital density: Ca:pi tal :per 
employment 
E. Employment coefficient: 
Employment :per capital 
·F. Labm.li' :productivity: Value 
added :per employment 
G. Production~labour ratio: Production value 
·per employment · 
H. L9.b6ur irite~sity: Employment per va1ue added 
Number of factories - 60 
A B C ·n ·. E· F G. H 
~0.22 ·.:;.o.24,'~q~§~· @ .~o~3~,' 0.25 -o.2o 
0.25 0.28 -0.18 -0.18 -0.19 -~ 
/ . ' . . :0.32,~0.20 -0.23 -0.25 G.12 
- -,. . 
~ 0.13 0.18 -0.05 
-0.18 -0.23 -0.03 
~ /·---
~:-:~ ·_3?;~ 
-0~29 
Note: 0 Strong correlation significant g_t .. 0 .. 001- level · 
- --
, 
..... ._ ... 
Fairly strong correlation significant at· 0. 01 level 
f\) 
f\) 
()") 
Table 6.4 Matrix of correlation coefficients (Pearson Product-momer;it} 
.··for ei ht ·industrial coefficients (Textiles and Ginniri , 
SIC m. GrOup II Sudan industries • 
Variables: 
··A. Producatiori eapi tai ratio: Value 
added per eapi tal ·· .. 
.B •. · Capital c.oeff:Lcient: Capital 
per value added · 
c.. Capital_ intensity: Capital per 
production value · 
D. Capital density: Capital per 
employment 
E. Employment coefficient: 
Employment per capital 
F. Labour productivity: ·Value added 
. per employment 
G. Production-labo~r ratio: Production 
value ~er e"'lployment 
H. I·qbou.r int en si ty: ET"'pluyment per 
value added 
Number of factories - 20 
A B 
.. 
. c D. F G. H 
~~~~c(54~ 
. . -.-- . 
E 
0.48 
.. ~,.,--- ..... 
0~40 0.15•..:.0.52 .• 
. . . ....... -- - ~ .. 
8 .0.18. -0.31 .·:~-?~0~· ..:0.34 .§ 
0. 30 .:..0.45 -0.35 -0.39 @ 
-~. 0.43 ,"0.-59'•-0.13 ~ '--~ 
-0.39 -0.36 0.02 
~~~0~~?.· 
-0.47 
l'rote: 
-
Q Strong correlation significant at 0.001 level 
,. 
' 
,' Fair1y strong correlE!,tion signifl-cant at 0.01 level · 
' 
1\) 
1\) 
--...] 
might be suggested, for example, by the wide g . .lp that exists 
between the total percentage share on capital-and value-added 
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of food industries (Table 6. 2). In fact one factory in this sector 
produces the highest production-capital ratio which is in contrast 
with a score of very low added values resulting from poor perform-
ance of .soillt3 public sector factories. The presence of such a dis-
parity is bound to result in a low coefficient of r "" -0.24 for 
production-capital ratio and capital density (A and C, Fig. 6.6.i) • 
.A stronger negative correlation between production-capital 
ratio and capital· density is featured in the Textiles and Ginning 
group. ( r .;..·· ~0.54) (Fig. 6.6.ii). The situation that arises is far 
from the ideal one. Instead of a presumed increase of production-
capital ratio ·JJ:ith higher capital intensity, oue is faced with the 
odd. situation of a decreased pro·:lucti vity when capital intensity 
is increased..· By going back to each individual factoTy one can 
single out the firms that sho·..v a tendency to~Vards inefficient 
·operatio:J.s. As a general rule one vvould suspect redundant capacities. 
Alllong the many adverse factors, occasional unavailability of raw 
material is indeed the most profo·J.nd. A case in point is the 
g.~nneri~s relying· on rain-fed cotton. Severe fluctuation of 
pr.oduction is directly related to the .precarious rainfall. One has 
to remember that a ginnery's capacity WO'J.ld initially be decided 
upon by the average annual raw material production. Marketing 
pro~lems could as weil be cited a~ in the case of ready-made clothes. 
Thi$ industry CO'J.ld not secure :protection because it was only pro-
ducing a fraction of the local consumption and obviously could not 
co~pete with the cheap imports. The elasticity of price is a key 
factor to competition in thi. s trade. However, such an in.verse 'l 
.corre.latipn should not mean in any way that higher employment per 
unit of capital would automatically produce the desirable production-
229 
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capital ratio. As a matter of fact the coefficient of correlation 
between employment coefficient and production-capital ratio is 
only r ~ 0.48 (Fig. 6. 6. iii).· 
In contrast, the employment coefficient fvr food indu.stries 
relates fa:i,rly well With production-capital ratio (r - 0~58). 
L=i.bou'r~intensi ve practices are comrnon in tms sector, especially 
,. ' ', .. 
the packing sectio:1s and. packing firms of food industries. Never-
theless the c.orrelation of .(E and A, r -= 0 •. 78) is higher .than would 
be expected because. a dot representing a soft drink factory is far 
apart in the chart from the rest with the inev..i.·table distortion 
~ffect. (See Fig. 6.6.iv). 
A co::nmon feature· of the two industrial .gro.Llps studied in this 
. ' . . 
sub-sectio:l is the high coefficient of correl?-tion between capital 
coefficient and labb:u.r intensity (B and H). Thus high employment 
per unit value-added indicates the high capital investment per unit 
of value-added. The clear inference here is that value-added is 
I . 
far lo;.rJer than it should be. The main factors that could bring . 
abo'J.t such a state of affairs are connected 'with operational' prob-
lems, raw material·sliortage, poor management, and probably low 
. . . . 
performance and skLll of labour .. In a few ~ases market problems 
. . 
could be suspected. Ho·.rJever, a po si ti ve co~·reJ.ation of r =- 0. 73 
between capital intensity and labour intensity is only profound in 
the case .of Textiles and Ginning, attesting to .a complex situation 
where large sums o'f .capital are necessary in weaving and spinning 
even though the product is cheap fabrics wit;h comparatively.low 
· prqduct;Loh value. Such an operation seeks ~heap cas'LJ,al and semi-
skilled labour, a.nd in so doing it increases thE? number of workers 
·. per unit of value-aQ.ded. The occasional under-capacity experienced 
in this sub-group and the disproportionate figu.res for one particular 
factory. might·have acted as a reinforcing factor to produce this 
high significant correlation (Fig. 6. 6. v). 
6. 6 .Conclusion 
Variations in space of industrial acti v~. ty on a regional 
basis only recently began to show some character. .The underlying 
pattern closely resembles the particular morphology or industry 
in the regfonal centres and rural areas in contrast to the agglom-
' ' 
eratl.ve tendencies in the Prime Base. There is real evidence to 
suggest that the pattern.of·Prime Base, regional-centre and one-
factory will persist for some time to come. 
However, the .. in?-ustrial distribution is Elvmys subject to the 
dynamism·of 'modernity' and geared to opportunities that come with 
the change ·of eco~o.:nic systems. The p·roportions of industrial con_. 
centration will probably be disrupted and soon curbed to a lower 
figllre.:.· However, this does·not mean that ru::ral areas will acquire 
the· diversity and complexity of t.he Prime Ba.3e industrial activity. 
In tha·t respect the gap may even widen. Thus the basic difference 
between rllral and P~ime Base industry lies in the structure ·apd 
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. stage of'development. Whereas a few large projects of the periphery 
type :mB:y' strongly bffset the dominance of the core percentage-wise, · 
. ~ . . 
the Prime Base gains its strength from growing in.ternal and external 
economie'S and linkages within the industrial and commercial sectors. 
Tl:Li.s tendency was. tested for Sudan industry b;y examining operational· 
and structural configuration. It was established that the relative 
·significance of countryside industry stems from the scale of opera-
tion of ind.i vidual factories of the one-factory. type. Large ;public 
' . . . 
industr{al enterprise to process local mater::.al defines the basic 
nature of the strllcture of rural industry and the primary stage of 
operat.lon. In ·that context, and possibly with regard to cost rather 
that profit rilaximi.zation ~ raw material exerts a decisive pull. 
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At the same time the business/entreprene~r enterprise in the 
.Prime Base demands a different set of fin,g_nr.ing, margins of profit-
ability and cadre~ However, operational problems are not necess-
arily different - they illight only vary in magnitude and persistence. 
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7.1 Introduction 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
INDUSTRIAL LOCATION ANALYSIS: 
A CASE STUDY OF COT·I'ON-SEED OIL 
Any high concentration of industry like that of the Prime 
Base is perhaps sufficient evidence of profit maximisation. The 
relative industrial diversity, and high degree of locational free- · 
dom that paradoxically gathered private industries together. is 
clearly not typical of production-cost variarility, and would 
hardly fit a least-cost model. For that matter, the optimum 
location of many m9.terial-oriented industries,· Nhether local or 
imported (with Port Sudan assumed to 'l;)e the matet'ial source), would 
have been at the material source away from the Prime Base. 
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In Chapter Four mention has already been made of the unexpected 
localizat:Lon of cotton-seed industry in the Prime Base. It would 
be proved, according to measurable variables such as transfer cost 
and profitability· margins, that a location away from the Prime Base, 
for instance at the material source, would give· ':righer profits. In 
the ·specific case of a bulky raw material such as cotton-seed, one 
would expect the coincidence of the theoretical least-cost and profit 
max:i.mi sation (as specified above) within the vicinity of the material 
source. 
Ho:wever, to quantify the sub-optimality of the· present local-
ization of this industry as measured by material procurement cost 
and distribution cost,will only confirm the existence of other 
location factors that maximise profit at the Prime Base in spite of 
transfer cost considerations and authorised ~rofit margins. 
As. yet these factors were only generally embodied in the Prime 
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Base Theory. The principle purpose of the present enquiry is 
thus to provide a deductive framework specific to the cotton~seed 
industry alongside an empirical testing appropriate to the 
production-cost variability. These objectives are not by necessity 
contradictory. In fact a deterministic model is GO:mplemE.ntary ·. 
since there is ample evidence to suggest that planning for industrial 
development in both public and private sectors, as seen from Sudan's 
socio-economic development plans of the 1970's, vTill be conducted 
by the central government bodies, along lines of central planning 
systems. Already priority is clearly given to processing agricul-
tural· and mineral resou:rces and expansio:1 of prod.uction. Indeed, 
the conc·ern to make fuller use of available resvurces may force 
cost considerations. However, this could not possibly be effected 
without.a basic understanding of the current forces that undermine 
least-cost locations. 
7.2 .Selection of an Industry 
Iri our attempt to check against optimal·location, either a 
public or private industry would have served the purpose. But we 
' 
a1ready.know from the .distribution pattern of indust·ry presented 
in Chapter Six that public enterprises, in the main, conform to 
the general principles of processing raw mat-:;rial at their base and 
are predominantly guided in such involvement ~y.considerations of 
cost minimisation and social cost benefit. However the incompetence 
of m8.ny such enterprises is only partially connected with locational 
factors as·such. The gross mistakes in this sector referred to in 
Chapter Six were mainly a matter of m.Lsjudge:ruent of the quality of 
.the raw material or miscalculation of the av3.iiapility.of the raw· 
material in sufficient quanti ties througho~t 7:hG \ason, Or invari-
ably through the life-span of the factory. In some cases the size 
of the plants were basically disproportionate t9 the assumed 
exploitable raw material. Wau fruit canning and Babanousamilk 
processing factories are good examples. 
J:'Iore meaningful however, is to set tl:le empirical problem 
against a selected private industry where corlsiderations other 
than. cost minimisation were paramo·~.mt, and where the movement of 
the raw material t_o plant entails unnecessary C·)sts because of the 
bulkiness of the material. An added advantage w~uld be to further 
our understanding of the 'Prime Base Theory'~ The Cotton-seed 
processing industry is therefore probably the best fit for th~se 
reasons and the set objectives. 
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The Cotton-seed oil industry is well-established in the private 
sector in the Prime Base some 200 Km away from ~he main material 
source. With a material index of 5.7 for the cotton-seed, the 
question posed now, is whether this industry would still locate at 
the Prime Base even though we relax the assumption that profit 
maXimisation is the motive of entrepreneurs. A negative answer 
will form the pri:tne hypothesis of this enquiry, i.e. , the exl sting 
concentration is sub-optimal and consequently L.1efficient insofar 
as niinimi sing production cost. 
7-3 Raw Material Consideration and Local Crushing Possibilities 
As·a by-product of the ginning process, cotton-seed production 
is punctiform and g.eared to cotton acreage and yield. Thus the plant-
ation system created to produce a fine grade fo£ export had also 
produced top quality cotton-seed that involves little or no extra 
cost. While the price of cotton lint is seven or eight times that 
of the seed, it only constitutes one-third of the seed cotton by 
weight.C 1 ) Clearly then we are dealing with a bulky and a compara-. 
tively low value commodity. However t~is fact.conceals the 
real value of the product. Aided by international trade and 
marketing practices, the cotton-seed prices were determined on 
feed-stuff value and consciously ignored the more valuable oil 
content of the material. For this reason and for the generic 
quality of Sudan's fine grade produce i.e. higher oil content and 
baldness of the seed ·that requires no further c(, st on delinting, 
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and for t~e initial low production cost and the subsidised rail 
freight rates; the British crushing industry practiced an exclusiv·e 
monopsony over the Sudanese produce during the period from 1913 to 
1940. ( 2) This monopsony was only to break when sea freight was 
curtailed during World War II and for even more pressing considera-
tions, priority over the seed was granted to Eg;ypt where the Middle 
East Force was centred. 
After the war the British feed-stuff industry could not adjust 
to the new material and transport price structure and was very much· 
affected by the temporarily declining internal .arid West European 
dem.9.nd, as the livestock population was greatly· reduced during the 
war. By then Egypt ~o~ras ready to take over from Britain and in fact 
became in 1943 the leading importer of Sudanese 6otton-se~d. Ironi-
cally enough, Sudan became the world leading exporter of cotton-seed 
from 1943 to 1·963 at a time when she was only producing one per cent 
of the world cotton. In 1944 the Sudan was supplying about 84 per 
cent of world demand. (3) This position was made possible. only in 
the absence of local crushing facilities while other traditional 
competit~rs such as Egypt, Brazil, India and China were developing 
their. own local cotton-seed oil industry. This option was almost 
impossible in Sudan in the shadow of the non-industrialisation 
coiiDni tment, and for some other uncommon factors rather unique to 
this industry in Sudan: 
1. The local market for edible cotton-seed oil was rather 
marginal if not at all existent before 1955. The out-
put of the traditional crushing industries of sesame and 
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. groundriut not only covered the market but were. preferre.d 
to other edible oils. As we will . see later this situation 
was to change as a result of a changing taste and·price 
differentials. 
2. .Given the prevailing market conditions stated in No. 1 
above, an unagreeable situation arose whereby contenders 
to p~oduce locally faced fluctuating uncertain external 
outlets, and saturated internal markets. Thus the com-
par9.ti vely stable cotton-seed price 7 of the traditional 
markets paid off more to the exporter. ·of the produce. This 
state 'of affairs has drastically changed since 1956 as ·will 
be discussed later. Meanwhile, the inability to process 
locally guaranteed a further push-dovm of the buyers' mono-
psony price of cotton-seed. Furthermore, the seed was not 
only considered a low value product but a disease carrier 
infectious to the cotton plant. Hence the seed was deemed 
an 'evil.' that had to be destroyed before the following 
.season, or used for suction gas fuel for which there was 
limited use, or other-wise exported~ 
Details of cotton-seed export figures a:r:e sho-wn in Table 7·.1 
and p,rovide a chronological dating of the de7elopment of the local 
industry. Although the industry started just in the late 1940's, 
the year 1964 wltnessed the breakaway from the excessive exportation 
pattern, and earmarked the new t.rend towards establishing the local 
cotton-seed oil indus~ry (see Table 7.1). The balance between annu,al 
. ~ . . 
Table 7.1 
Sud·an export of cotton-seed, oil and oil cake,. 1943-1975. ( '000 tons) .. 
Year Cotton- Cotton-
seed seed oil 
1943 113-70 
1944 . 136.10 
1945 125-90 
1946 74.20 
1947 89.50 
•1948 90.40 
1949 102.90 
•1950 97.40 
195'1 .'1'12.10 
1952 92.30 
1953 118.50 
'1954 106 .. 00 
'1955 100.00 
'19 56 1 51 • 90 
1957 '185.80 
'1958 53-40 
1 9 59 '1 59 • 80 . 
0.23 
3-15 
4.81 
4.98 
5-05 
4-25 
4-33 
4.03 
5-75 
'1 .46 
'+-93 
Sources: Compiled from (1) 
(2) 
Cotton~seed I Year Cotton-
oil cake seed . 
6;27 
'15.49 
'11.45 
8.8o·· 
21494 
'13.'13 
28.80 
36-58 
24-38 
45.49 
1960 93.00 
"1961 117-30 
1962 203.70 
1963 152.'10 
'1964 47.30 
'1965 65.30 
1966 47-30 
1967 32.20 
1968. 36.00 
1969 112.00 
1970 84.50 
1971" 99.80 
1972 2'1 .80 
'1973 15.10 
1974 4.60 
1975 -
Cotton- Cotton-seed 
seed oil oil cake 
3.16 
6.30 
6.32 
n.a 
10.10 
9.80 
9-65 
7-59 
12.43 
13-32 
18.40 
34-33 
30.98 
19.80 
'1 0. 70 
"48-35 
52-31 
82.37 
95-90 
109.40 
123.4 
'133.6 
'1'15.93 
167.79 
129.81 
179-10 
153.-7'1 
'149.85 
115.96 
42.47 
92.80 
.Department of ·statistics, Foreign ·'J1rade Statistics,· 
Khartoum, (Various Issues). · · 
Bank of Sudan, Annual Reports, Khartoum, (Various 
Issues). 
1\) 
\>I 
\..() 
cotton.;.se~d production and export is taken to mean local utilisa-
tion of the -seed for oil production, plus the small amount retained 
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for sowing. Only ten years later in 1974 export of the seed was 
altogether banned and still the average annual produce of_ black 
cotton':"'"seed falls short of satisfying local demand. For details.of 
recent production and analy si. s of seed cotton see Tables 7 ~ 2 and 7. 3. 
An explanation is now needed to verify the seeningly contra-
d:Lctory suggestion already ·made that it pays be-';ter for exporters 
to export· than to process locally. The rapid swltch from. one form 
of economic practice to another as exhibited by this industry.is a 
testimony to the sensitive balance of internal and overseas changes 
of demand patterns, price structure and climate of investment, and 
how industry reacts to them. 
A. close reconstruction of the then prevaiL .. ng circumstan.ces 
that· culminated in establishing the local industry is necessary; 
of utmost importance~ before going into further details is the fact 
that cotton-seed oil in Sudan was exclusively developed for indus-
trial usage in soap manufacturing. (4 ) Severe limitations were ·imposed 
by war conditions in the 1940's on supplier·s and importers .of soap 
as a result of scarcity of tallow and the excep·cionally high prices 
that follow the mechanism of supply and demand. A petty sort of 
soap manufacturing thus started in Sudan, utilising the available 
bat relatively expensive and valuable supplies of edible oil. 
Atroon, ·a local pubsti tute for caustic soda was widely used •. Even-
tually_ cotton-seed oil was so'J.ght as a -cheaper substitute and a new 
avenue for local industry was opened by the ex_pdnding local demand . 
and the naturally protected markets. By the·ea:rly 1960's cotton-
seed oil for industrial use and food and margarine was gaining ground 
in Sudan and the nearby Middle East as prices were relatively stable 
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Sudan cotton production by variety, area and so~rce 
rsourc~ --Variety 1973/74 1974/75 Area· Production Area Production 
(Feddans) (Metric tons) (F~dda,ns) (Metric· tons) 
Gezira and Egyptian '589,573 417,418 588,441 383,075 
Mana gil .. 
Agrarian Egyptian 234 '71 0 131 ,469 234,524 132,420 Reforms· 
Upper Nile Egyptian 21 '000 5,052 24,570 6,450 
Total 824,283 553,939 847,535 521,945 
Khashm el- Acala 109,535 59,992 108,895 61 ,645 
Ghirba 
Toker .· Acala 33,250 7,623 54-,000 11,450 
esSuki Acala 33,875 12,991 34 '165 19,340 
Guneid Acala 14,-903 12,760 .14,923 8,312 
Zeidab Acala 4,750 914 6,642 3,102 
Gash Acala 
- - 945 401 
Total 196,313 101 ,280 219,570 104,250 
Nub a American 124,423 9' 510 108 '528 10,310. 
Mountains 
Abu Habi:L American 478 40 . 3 '183 414 
Gedarif American . 20,550 3,606 . 27~000 3,564 
Habila Alnerican 21,930 1,600 7,810 1,757 
Equatoria American 6,000 540 14,000 1 ,568 
-Total. 173' 381 . 15,296 160,521 17' 61'3 
-.. 
Grand Total . 1 '193 '977 670' 515 1,~27,626 643,808· 
Squrce: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and National Resources, 
Current Agricultural Statistics (CAS), Vol~1, No.1,· 
Khartown, .July, 1975, p. 5. 
.. 
I 
Table 7-3 
Analysis of seed cotton to its con sti t-u.ent s; 1963/64-1972/7~ 
(Metric tons) 
Years 
1963/64 
1964/65 
1965/66 
1966/67 
1967/68. 
1968/69 
1969/70 
1970/71 
1971/?c 
1972/73. 
Lint Scarto·and Seed. Waste or ·Total 
linters loss seed cotton 
·106,045 .151.9. 199,563. 2946 ·. 310,0?3 
151,297 2168 284,722 4203 442,390 
153,501 2199 288,870 4264 448,834 
183,495 2629 345,315 5097 536,536 
180,188 2582 339,090 5005 526,865 
224,101 3211 421,730 6225 655,267 
230,845 3307 . . 434,420 6412 674 '984 
249,963 3581 . 470,399 6943 730,886 
234,271 3357 440,P68 6508 685,00) 
. 190,018 2722 357,589 5278 555,608 
Ten Years Average190,373 
Per cent 34.20 
2728 
0.49. 
358,256 
. 64.36 
5288 
0.95 
556,645 
100 
Sm:rrce: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and National Resources, ·Year 
Book of Agricultural Statistics,_ Kb,artoum, 1974; :p.24 •.. -.-
1\) 
.p 
1\) 
as a result·of the monopsony referred to ::J.bove. In contrast, 
. . 
sesame and groundnut production fluctuated sharply and demand 
was expanding in pace with population growth, a .. gradual change 
of taste, and an expanding soap industry. 
Expo.rt-import compani~s and traders were naturally closely 
watching the changing trends and were first to appreciate the new 
. . . . . . . 
poss:Lbilities opened by government legislation in 1956 in a bid ·to 
encdu.rage :the private enterprise to invest ir~ .industry. The host 
of concessions granted by the Approved Enterpri·3es Act, were just 
right to create the assurances needed. These concessions raised 
profit margins to· new heights. For exporters and traders thus {t 
was not only· a matter of survival but of creating an opportunity 
to cherish and expand profit. As one· is able t9 calculate the 
profit diffe·rential between exporter's returr.s. and manufacturers, 
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the profit margin· difference as will be se·en in, Table 7-4 is well 
above .3:1, in favour of local cotton-seed crushing. (Table 7 ~4 is · 
based On 1967/68 prlces of cotton-seed ex-ginneries, export price 
f.o.b.· Port Sudari and ·ex-factory prices of semi-refined oil and .· 
oilcake). Equally significant .evidence is the. 'rush' created by: 
local entrepreneurs to establish oil mills irJ Sudan. By 1975 about 
285 factories were approved by the Ministry of Industry-for oil-
bearing seed .. crushihg. ( 5) 
It is eyident now internationally that the location of·maximis-
. ation of profit has for the first time coincided with that of the 
.least cost i.e., being the obvious least cost location, Sudan was 
betoming the' region of p;rof':i;t maximisation ratb.er than the 1[nited 
Kingdom, West Germany or Egypt. On the regional level, the concen-
tration of the. cotton~seed industry in the Prime Base is only a· re-
flectio!l of the forces that made it feasible to :trans-ship cotton-
. ' . . ! . 
. .'. :;'i· 
. ,'•, 
Table 7·'±. 
Profit margins on cotton-seed export and local processing 
of one ton, '1967/68 '(LS) 
., 
,---
,. 
Cotton-seed ( '1 ) (2) (3) (4) ( 5) (6) 
Export· .. '18.45 4·. '15 22.60 24.73 2. '13 9.42 
Local pro ce ssingl . '18.45 6.4'1 24.86 * 3'1. 50 7.26 29.20 
1--· 
* Includes oil and oil c~ke 
('1) Ex-gi~ne.ry price of black cotton-seed · 
(2) Transport and other expenses or production cost 
(3) Total cost ('1) plus (2) 
(4) . Price per· ton f.o. b.· Port Sudan or ex-gi.nne.ry, 
plus oil cake 
(5) P;r;-o'fit 
(6) Profit per cent [(5)/(3)] X '100 
oil 
So-:1rce: Compiled from IDCAS, Report on Productivity, 
Technical and Managerial Developmen~ of 
Vegetable Oil Industry and Allied Products 
. in the Democratic Republic of the Suc'.an, 
Cairo, '1970, Vol.1, pp.-'120-140. -
·' .. : 
. '~ .. · .... 
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. '-• . 
. , . 
seed thousands of kilometres away from the least-cost production 
area. 
The evolution of the cotton-seed industry, as may be gathered 
from the above discussion, was directly connected with margins of 
profit and market forces. It was then the export-import companies 
and traders, well established· in Khartoum and well acquainted 1vi th 
. . 
the practices a·nd 'tricks' of export trade who -.Nould be fle:x;ible 
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enough to. re-orient to the new profitable opportunity. At the same 
time it was these agencies and agents who were in touch with 
. ~ . . ·-
commercial banks, and later in 1962 with the Ihdustrial.Bank. For 
this. credi t;_worthy group; short term loans were. relatively easy 
because of_the quick·turnover of the cotton-seedindustry and th~ 
little risk .lrivol ved in a simple one operation industry that demands 
little skill. 
On. the other hand, the very fact that the cotton-seed was. 
established .in the first place to satisfy soap manufacturing, one 
might expect that the .. , new' industry would inherit all the symptoms 
of an irriport-substi tute ind.ustry. The· forces of the Prime· Base and 
the efficient distributive system renders an:r other location th:m 
.the conurbation a place of .profit restrictions. 
Lastly~ the.t:ransport cost of cotton-seed,- like many ·other 
export products was heavily subsidised to promote a profitable and 
competitive· industry overseas. For an exporter, much avvare of the 
internal and external· price stru.cture and differential, and much 
involved in handling the produce to Port Sudan, the freight cost 
. ; . 
would relatively mean little and practically he.Ve no significance. 
. . . ' 
Khartoum 'iJ:aS only .a lay-by or a depot on a long transit line. At 
the initial· perio:i ·of cotton-seed industry development, the market 
forces were still uncertain; thus some time precedes a decision 
246 
.on whether to export, process locally, or partially sell lo.cally. 
The local market demand was determined by im.;ernational prices and 
' . 
the. commanding local prices. The latter was in turn closely associ-
ated with availability of other oils (sesame and groundnuts) and the 
capacity of the soap manufacturing industry. Considering the grow-
ing competition, and the advantage of prompt delivery·of the raw 
.,.. 
material, the transfer charge to Khartoum wau practically a profit 
bearing factor rather than a cost penalty. §or the same reason ·it 
was and still is possible to trans-ship cottorJ-seed almost a thousand. 
kilo!netres to :?ort Sudan for processing there. .A reinforcing factor 
in the latter case i's the fact that Port Sudan is mainly erigaged in, 
processi'9g ·for the international market where manoeuvreabili ty and. 
. .. 
profi tahili ty are synonymous. Thus the gove:i.'nii).ent regulation that 
seeds shoul(lbe removed from the Gezira before mid-June gives prior-
ity to seed transfer and thi.s coincides with th~ inte:restsof Port 
· Sudan's entrepreneurs. Otherwise if such an incustriali st decided 
to crush ~t the material source, he would be faced with the un-
certainty of transporting his oil due to the rainy season and fre-
quent· flooding of the railway line and could thus be unable to reap 
the benefits of prompt delivery and the usual hlgher prices at the 
opening of the season (this is generally so because the ec;:r-ly amo·:mts 
that enter :the market are limited). 
It. i$ interesting to note that the provision of cheap and, .ex-
tensive pieces of industrial land in the Prime Base would mean more 
to the trader or exporter (who now becomes an entrepreneur) than is 
normally assumed. Such a concession would result in a reduction of 
storage costs for cotton-seed for local crushing, and moreover 
provide a hands.ome return on cotton-seed for e~ort and other export-
able primary products. Although the Ministry of InO.ustry is aware 
of this practice~_and considers it an offence( 6 ) it could hardly 
do anything .about it as the Investment Act was: :primarily a ~on­
cessionary one and the general sentiment was to encourage, not to 
deter! 
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Although.the storing function of'Kharto"J.m and the market mech-
anism (as· distinct from market area) are inseparable from the Prime 
~ase. Theory advanced above, two more locative factors, one repulsive 
and the other co~ulsive, may be distinguished. 
Firstly, for a long time cotton-seed storage in the irrigated 
Gezira was prohibited throughout the growing season (mid-June· to 
m:1_d-Deceinberf as a precautionary measure against cotton disease. 
Apparently· ;the pink bollworms stay dormant inside the seed and fail-
ure to ·.cure or otherwise remove the seed altogether fro:n irrigated 
land would increase the risk of plant infectio:l in the followipg 
season. This does not mean ho·we"irer that it is not possible to 
process at such areas. As a matter of fact one mill produces at 
Medan.i but apparently some extra cost is incurred to provide for 
the fumigation· at a cost of P.T.35 (LS 1/100) per ton paid to ~he 
pest control section, which carries out the methyl bromide treatment 
on behalf of the mill owners.(?) 
Al tho·:J.gh the cotton-seed industry was only. developed in the 
late 19th. century in America the modernisation that followed in 
production techniques and diversity of products. and use is startling. 
. . . 
Thus a :whole spectrum of technological development was waiting 
tr~nsplant to places. where the industry had c-nly recently started. 
. . . . 
Modern machi.nes could increase the percentage extraction of oil and 
delinting and probably decortication machines put all the white 
·cotton-seed to proper use. The problem of undercapacity could also 
be tackledby introducing a multiple process where oil bearing seeds 
other than cc)tton-seed co·:.1ld profitably be produced by the same 
machine. 
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Secondly, the oligopoly status acquired by the pioneer pro·-
cessers has been challenged in the mid.:..1960's as a result of the 
general awareness of the opportunities opened in·this field. New 
dimensions were added as competition began to intensify and new 
.frontiers were' reached for to cope with demar.d.. Inevitably the 
limited apriual cotton-seed production had to be'rationed and.under-
capaci ty was b'ecoming common practice in the 1970's. This further 
reduced the .profitability margins. 
· Another· point worthy of note is that the soaring competi ti6n 
necessitated up-grading the quality of oil to competitive inter-.· 
national ·standards. Deodori sation and bleacld ng are now essential 
as the local and foreign markets are e~panding" and as the super-:-
vision of the Ministry of Industry and protection of consumer are 
becoming tighter. A new system was introduced in1973 whereby the 
amount of'· seed allotted to a mill was directly connected with the 
level of inechani sation, and also a new department was created to 
check quail. ty specifications • 
. All thi. s· dynamic change concerns us in our locational analysis 
is two ways: 
1. ·.Higher labo·.ur and management skills and standards are in 
.demand in pac~ With the new developments and the Prime Bas.e 
more than .anywhere else is by sheer inertia well .equipped 
to cope. 
2~ .The new magrti tude of investment prefer·red well established 
distributive channels, and the Prime Base and to a lesser 
· ext;ent, Port .Sudan provide these requirements. 
. : . 
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The Cost·of Production 
------ -
Before proceeding to a proper transfer analysis it is 
pertinent .to consider operational and production costs of the 
cotton-seed industry. Fortunately it is possible to give actual 
figures asproduced in the IDCAS report on the vegetable oil 
'ind11stry (1970) for a standard processing of one: ton of cotton-
seed.C8) Ten mills were closely observed in 1969 and product:i,.on 
costis summarised in Table 7.5., together with the average produc-
tion cost. The first thing to notice is that eight out of.the ten 
' . . \ 
fa~tories are located in the Prime Base. The other two (Nos. 9 and 
1 0) are. export-oriented mills located at Port .Sudan. The signifi-
cance of this observation is to establish· the fact that there is a 
sharp variance of.production. cost of each-individuai item ·N.Lthin 
the pame 1ocation' and under almost identical p:roduction environ-
ments. The best example is the cost of raw material which.·varies 
considerably for mills at one industrial areR although prices are 
fixed.· Si:inilarly one can pick ·1xp high values f.or wages and salaries 
. . . . 
in Factory No. 8 and interests at LS. 4.68 per ton in the same con-. 
. . 
cern, or the ~xceptionally high figure of LS. 6.815 per ton for 
. . 
sub.-contractors in Factory No. _1. Besides the natural v~riance ·of 
cost due to differing dates of starting the operation, there may be 
. one of. thr.ee· other explanations; either the:!'e are miscalculations 
or deliberate inflating of production costs, ·or alternatively, . 
gr~ss inefficiency. The one fact that remains is the incompar"':' 
ability of production cost even at one point in space. Conversely, 
the similar raw material cost of two locations about 800 Km apart 
supplied from· the same area must be a strong indi.cation of mislead-
ing calculations. One could hardly expect t:1at transportation is· 
free of charges. An· average has been calculated in .the last .column· 
· Table 7· 5 . • 
.Producti.on· cost per one ton in ten· cotton:...seed oil tilills (Nos.1-10) ·(LS)·, 
Item. ; . ( 1) (2) (3) . .(4) ( 5) {6) (7) (8) (9) (10) Average· 
Production 
cost 
Raw material '22~677 20.000 29.415 22.240· 27-750 21.322 18.960 24.790 21.453 22.064 23.041 
Packing 1.419 1.440 1 ~465.< 1.690 1 • 262 .. . 1 • 398 .. 
-
' :2.384 0.097 0.312 1 ~147 
I1aintenance and 0.360 0.150 ·o. 530 0.358 0.805 0.143 .0.873 0.091 0.615 0~393 s:P are parts 
OtP.er material 0.726 1 ;.085 ' 1.028 0.884. 1. 502 0.821 1.825 1.639 0.996 0.447 1.095 
Power electric- 0.018 0.005 0.031 0.029 0.359 0.018 - 0.064 0.026 0.008 0.053 ity and fuel 
Contractors and 6.815 0.600 0.362 0.804 . 1 .263 - - - 0.985 sub-contractors - -
Other expendi-
-
1.235 1.855 4.452 0.696 0.446 1.375 . 2.299 4.627 0.438 1.742 
.ture 
Wages and 3.122 1.005 2.494 2-776 3.210 2.053 2.600 .6.557 0.835 0.775' 2·543 salaries 
.. D8prc:c;iation '0.44~. 0.550. 0.842 0 9~·.~ !- • ./ 0. 511 1.429 1 .·9'13 ·0.958 1.922 0 '624 ' 1 .01 3· 
Interests 1 • 64 7 . 1 • 500 1 • 1 53 ' 0. 8 32 0.914 3-214 0.400 ..4.684 1. 229. 0.985 ·1.656 
Taxes and duties · 0.169. 1.200 ·- 0.102 
-
"':" 
-
0.021 
- - 0.149 
Inventories etc 0.152 0.270 - 0.088 - '0.072 - 0. 5"11· 0.226 0.010 0. ~133 
Tot~l Pro~uction 37-547 29.040 37-319 34.775 37.009 32.571.28.275 44.581 31.504 26.280 33-890 cos per on · · · 
Source: I DC AS, Ibid. , pp. 74-89 
1\) 
\Jl 
0 
Table ?.6 
Average annual_9]2_erating costs for ;processing one ton of 
cotton-seed {~l!2_* 
Item Actual average Adjusted 
for three leading average 
oil mills cm;m ton) (.n/m ton) 
l'1anageinent 119 . 72 
\vages arid E;alaries 2270 1842· 
Contractors· 667 452 
PoNe~& ele~tricity 79 504 
Fuel 247 210 
Chemicals 265 202 
Maintenance and 435 38T spare ;parts 
Internal ·communica• 220 95 tion 
Rent and taxes 96. 78 
Insurance 132 132 
Interest 1_563 1490 
De;preciatl.on 980 870 
Other· fixed 110 80. 
expenses. 
:· 
Annual processing 7683 6414 
·cost . per ·one ton 
Source: IDCAS, Ibid., p.136 
\ 
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to give a rough idea of the overall production cost vvhich stands 
at nearly LS. 4.34 per ton of black cotton-seed. It is interesting 
to note that the cost of the· main raw materie.l :Lnput plus infreight ·. 
cost of the material is almost 68 per cent of "ti1e total cost. 
At thi. s point we now turn our attention to. the annual operating 
cost for the.processing 6f one ton of cotton-seed, (T~ble 7.6). As 
with production cost there is the inevi.table c;lisplay of disparity 
for different mills. To arrive at a reasonable average th'e IDCAS 
report selected the leading three mills, and discarded the odd value 
from each item to produce an. adjusted average.· Thus the annual 
operating co.st ·acc·ording to this procedure is LS. 6.414 per one ton 
of cotton.;;.se·ed. If we add the average transport cost to operation . 
cost we clearly see that transfer cost accounts for nearly one-fifth 
of' th~ total< operation cost. 
7-5. Selection of·Alternative Locations 
. • I • • • . • 
The mere fact that .a source-base industry li~e that of cotton-
seed is primarily conducted.at the Prime Base is an open invitation 
for testing theoretical alternative locations on the basis of the 
. . 
spread of the raw material. Six possible locations, including 
existing ones are chosen, Hassaheisa, 1'1aringc:.n, arid Rabak are major 
ginning centres; Serinar and Port Sudan are sma~l seed proC!-ucing 
areas and .fin.ally the Prime Base by virtue of the existing concentr- . 
tion (see Fig. 7• 1). The choice of Port Sudan is mai.rily because of 
. . . 
the.growing·specia'Iisation ·in export cotton-seed oil, while it is 
the destin'ation of all exportable oil (See Fig •. 7.2). 
· 7~ 6 · Comparative Transfer Cost Analysis 
The second part of this analysis is directly connected with 
253 
Fig. 7·1 TOTAL GINNING CAPACITIES AND PRODUCTIO'J OF BLACK COTTON-SEED 1973 
---------, 
NORTHERN DARFUR 
NORTHERN KORDOFAN 
• 
• 
r'\ / ... ,_/ ---...__r-r 
• 
/ __ \ 
S 0 U T H E R N K ORDOFA N 
SOUTHERN DARFUR 
• 
'-, 
EL G HAZAL 
\ 
..... 
'\ 
\ 
I 
Total oinninQ t Produclion in 1973 
capacity as a as o percentoQe . 
percentooe of total capacity 
Sourct1 .- Compiled lor reports in lhtJ 
Ministry of lnduslry, Sudan, 1973 
• 
.... , 
\ , __ 
------, 
\ 
' r:__p. 
'\... I ' 
..... _.) 
E a u -----0 R A 
REO 
·s £A 
• Main Ginning facilities 
and alternative Oil Mill 
locations 
N 
t 
K~ 4~ 
M~ 200 
I Khartoum Complex 
2 Hossoheiso 
3 Moringon 
4 Robak 
5 Sennar 
6 Port Sudan 
Fig.7·2 SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF COTTON-SEED OIL BY PROVINCE,I973 
..---........ ---------, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
r-~-----·------·--·------~ 
NORTHERN DARFUR 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
\ NORTHERN 
\ 
KORDOFAN 
\ 
" ~. a ; 
..... ( ~ J 
'--L ( 
'\ I 
< I 
1.._ \ ..__, 
~­
\ 
\ 
\ 
SOUTHERN DARFUR 
SOUTHERN 
~ 
\ 
\ 
'-, 
I 
EL '-, 
' I I 
l..., 
\ 
I 
'~, 
254 
N 
f 
0 Km 400 
Mls 200 
empirical research on the variability of transfer cost of raw 
material·and distribution of output from the alternative locations 
chosen •. Some co~nent is however needed, on how the figures of 
the tables below were arrived at. By necessity, too·, some assump-
tion s, arid indeed some onii ssion s were made: 
·. 7. 6.1 .. Raw .:rvaterial and Production 
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Although the country produces both black and white cotton-seed 
(the black cotton-seed produces more oil and n.t:lcds no delinting) the 
industry depends mainly on the black variety. 'lhe small amo·:mt of 
white· cotton-seed that enters the industry is ignored. 
7..6.2 Freight rates and Mode of '.rransport. 
The. main assumption made here is that. it is cheaper and more 
convenient to trans-ship by rail rather than road. In fact all six 
localities under examination, and all but tw:o o:f the secondary bases 
are well served by rail. The new Rail Freight Rates Book of 1974 
is used for the calculations of transport cost of black cotton-seed, 
cotton-seed oil, caustic-s1)da and tin sheets. (9) A special cheaper· 
rate for ·export-oil is possible to attain because tank wagons are 
used. For the transfer of oil cake calculation {s based on the 
Freight :Rate Book of 1959 in the absence of any specific rate in 
the new book• 
7.6.3 Oil Production Coefficient 
i. For convenience, the oil content of the black cotton-seed 
i.s calculated on the basis of the standa:_"'d 17.'5 per cent for 
oil a.nd 80 per cent oil cake and 2.5 per cent wastage.C10) 
Obvim~sly these percentages vary from one mill to the other 
according to· the efficiency of the operation. 
11. It is also as·sumed that all mills will produce and 
trade in semi-refined oil. 
ll.l. Accordingly the caustic soda requiretLent s are calc~ated 
on the basis of one Kg per ton of cotto:::.1-seed. This 
figure is a· rough estimate based on the needs of one 
factory. 
i v. The m6 st common form of packing is tin cans (capacity of. 
83 Kg). Evidently, it is cheaper to· tranS:port tin sheets 
than empty tins to inland destinations from the port 
(because of the redundant weight of the wagon load in the 
case of empty tins). Thus it is assumed that the manu-
facturing of tins takes place at or in the vicinity of 
the productio~ location. Again a fi~ure of 10 Kg per t9n 
o~ cotton-seed is needed). (This estimate is based.on one 
factory's requirement). No margin is .'Ilade for the amount 
that would be exported in tanks. 
7.6.4 The Demand Factor . 
i. Only one estimate for 1973 and 1974 nationwide consumption 
pattern is available.C11 ) However, the validity· of th~se 
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figures is doubtful as they are based ')p the gross average 
rural and urban consumption· produced by the Household Sample 
Survey 1967-.68. Each province's population as in 1973 is 
multiplied by the same two averages.· The alternative 
adopted here is probably more reliable. The same 1967/68 
Household Sample Survey is used as t:Le base.C12) 'l\hus 
actual expenditure by each household i1 1968/68 is multiplied 
by the natural increase as attained by the 1973 census. 
Then· the consumption values were converted into amounts by 
.\ 
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using 1967/68 cotton-seed prices in each province 
(Khartoum ex-factory plus transport cos~ to the provincial 
centre). 
ii. One item of consumption is mLssing in the calculations 
of the J'1i.ni stry of Economics and Trade and that is the 
amount consumed by soap manufacturing. To arrive at this 
figure the actual soap production in .19?3 is converted into 
its original oil content. A figure of 37 per cent is. 
pro'duced by ·laboratory analysis. ( 1 3) ·However,· the cotton-· 
.seed oil reqUirement of. soap is held constant by assuming 
that the main producing area will be the location of the 
soap industry. In only one case the Prime Base was assumed, 
as is probably true, to be the main· market for oil needed 
for the manufacture of soap. 
7.7 HyQothetical Development 
In the rest of this chapter the locational analysis will seek 
a solution within the framework of four different postulates beside 
the actual locations of the cotton-seed indur.try. The· first two 
are.bypothet:ical situations where a threshold fRctory of an annual 
processing capacity of 7,500 tons of cotton-seed is examined. 
Another factory of an annual capacity of 250,000 tons ·is alternatively 
examined. The first 'figure is based on the capacity of the smallest. 
operating factory, while the other accords with existing Prime Base's · 
·capacities •. In the latter case only the two_main raw material 
? sou.rces are examined·. For both cases, out-boui.1d freight c·orresponds 
, to per cent provincial consumption. 
In the third case one location to process and supply the whole 
· country is to be decided according to the least-cost model. The 
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actual transport-cost for the eristing productio-n and distribution 
system is projected in case four. Case five seaks the optimum 
transfer of raw material and output within a theoretical framework. 
In all cases the oil cake consumption is based on the actual 
export figure as it stood in 1973, plus tne previo:1sly assumed. 
pattern of local consumption. 
7.7.1 Least-cost Location: Case One 
' Taking into account the six alternative locations previously 
selected, .. we now consider the first hypothetical situation of pro-
.. 
cessing 7,500 tons of cotton-seed. 
7.7.1.1 In-freight Bills 
With the exception of the Prime Base, all other five locations 
could provide locally the cotton-seed needed for the capacity speci-
fied above. Total in-freight bills are summarised in Table 7.7.1. 
As the Prime Base is the only location which incurs raw material· 
transfer costs and assuming that it will be urovided from the 
·nearest raw material source, we notice that ·che transfer expenses 
raises ·the in~freight cost to more than double that of Maringan, 
Hassaheisa or Serinar. More interesting however, is· that Port Sudan 
. . . . 
· will incur no in-freight cost on packing :material and caustic soda 
as they are both imported through the port. 
When considering the out-freight cost far both oil and oil 
cake, it is· evident that Port Sudan incurs hir;h inland distribution 
costs. On the- other hand high consumption of oil cake at the Prime 
Base pushes down .the outward transfer costs, and consequently the 
overall out-freight cost to become the lowest distributing location 
(see Table 7.7.2). 
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Table 7-7·"1. 
In-freig~t bills per 7500 tons of cotton-seed (LS) 
Locations Cotton-seed Tin sheets Cau.stic Total 
soda. 
Khartoum 12000.00 427-50 87.25 12514.75 
.. 
r-·. 
Maringan. 
-
495.00 104.25 599.25 
Hassaheisa 
- .472-50 ?9.0 5'71 -50 
Rabak 
-
592.50 1234'?5 716.25 
Sennar 
-
525.00 114.00 639.00 
Port Sudan 
-
0.00 0.00 0.00 
I 
Rail Transfer Cost 1 ton/100 Km LS O.E 
Table 7.7.2 
Out..-freight bills per 1312.5 tons of cotton-seed oil 
and 60000 tons of oil cake (LS) 
, ·Locations Cotton;.. seed Oil cake 
oil 
· Kharto·:J.m ~-470.89 7994.85 
l'1aringan 5497-57 11638.00 
'. 
Hassaheisa 560$.99 11322.00 
Rabak 5917.34 13456.30 
Sennar 5617.40 11020.50 
Port· Sudan · 5830.23 13330.60 
Transport .cost per ton/100 Km 
Qotton-seed oil - LS 0.8 
Oil cake - LS 0.5 
Total 
12462-24 
. 17135-57 
16930.99 
19373-64 
16657-90 
19160.83 
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Table 7. 2· 3. 
Total freight cost (LS) 
Locations In-freight Out-freight . Total. 
Khartoum 12514.75 '13465. 74 25980.49 
Hassaheisa 599.25 17'135- 57 '17734. 82 
l'1aringan 571-50 ·16930. 99 '17502.49 
Rabak 716.25 19373-64 20089.89 
·sennar 639.00 16657-9. 12296.90 
Port Sudan 00.00 19160.83 . 19160.83 
-
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The aggregate transfer costs are given in 'J.lable 7.7.3. 
Sennar records the lowest total transfer and Hassaheisa the second, 
only a few hundred pounds costlier than Sennar. The cost incurred 
at Khartoum i.s nearly LS 9000 more than the least cost location. 
However, we know that the annual production of cotton-seed and 
cotton~seed oil is far beyond that threshold capacity and. involves 
in practice a lot more movement of raw material if it is to be pro-
cessed in ~rie or more places. 
7. 7· 2 Case ·Two: Khartoum versus Hassahei sa and 1'1aringan 
A more realistic approach is to show an a-pproximation of the 
saving on transport cost when processing at the raw material source. 
The transfer cost likely to be incurred at Khartoum when processing 
250' 000 tons is now compared with a hypothetic'al si tuatio'n. where it 
is assumed that processing of the same amoant is· carried out at· the 
two inain material centres alternatively. Thi's is achieved in Tables 
7·8~1, 2 and 3, for in-freight, out-freight an1 the assembly cost 
respectively. 
Although Khartoum's location is slightly less costly on out-
freight,. great economies are attained in Hassaheisa and l"'aringan on 
in-freight bills. Th$ total difference between Khartoum and Hassa-
heisa reaches about LS 111,115 annually (fumigation cost at LS. 
87,500 )!" ·It might be mentioned that there coul_d· have still been. 
further-saving if the unnecessary two traffic transfers of raw 
material· is avoided by locating at both Hassaheisa and 1'1aringan. 
7-7·3 Case Three: The Actual Assembly and Distribution costs 
If one considers the I actual I processin_g locations and cotton-
seed production areas one can easily calculate the transfer cost of 
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Table 7. 8.1 
In-freight bills per 250000 tons of cotton-seed (LS) 
Locations Cotton-seed Tin sheets Caustic Total 
(packing) soda 
Kharto·wn 448000.00 14250.00 2925.00 465175.00 
132000.00 15750.00 3300.00 151050.00 
143000.00 16500.00 . 3475-00 1629.75.00 
Transport cost per ton/1 00 ·Km as in Table 7. 7.1 
Table 7•8.2 
Out-freight pills per 43750 tons of cotton~ seed oil (LS) 
Locations Cotton-seed Oil cake Tota'l 
oil 
.. 
KP,artoum 182362.80 166495.00 448857-80 
Hassahei sa . 186967-30 377400.00 564367.30 
Maring an 1:83252.66 387933-32 5'71186. 00 
Transport cost per ton/100 Km as in Table 7.7.1 
Table 7.8·. :2 
Total freight bills ~LS2 
Locatio:ps · In-freight Out-freight Fumigation Total 
cost 
Khartoum 465175-00 448857-80 
-
914032.80 
· Hassahei sa 151050.00 564367.30 87500 802917-30 
J.Vlaringan 162975~00 571186.00 8750C 821661.00 
the main inputs as ih Table 7.9.1. Consider~_ng the transfer 
cost likely to be incurred by the industry ac;cording to the 
available material and capacities in '1973,('1 4 ) it will be.found 
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that the in~freight cost for the three main inputs is LS. 927,268.2, 
(details in .. Table 7.9.1 ). 
As there is a high concentration of cotton-seed oil in the 
. . 
P:r:"ime Base (aboJ.t 61 per cent), almost all O\lt-freight will be 
' . . . . 
heading to the various provinces plus the expert consignment. Oil 
. ' . . 
cake will be di stri bated according to the assumption already made, 
that i$ in lirie with existing regional capacities. (For edible 
oil distribution consult Table 7.10 and Fig. 7.3). The annual 
total transfer cost (including packing causti.c: soda and fumigation), 
as shown in Table 7.9.3 is about LS. '1,328,034.8 This figure will . 
later be compared With the optimum solution figure. 
7.7.4 Cas·e Four: A. Single Location 
In a· manner sim..i.lar to the previous procedUre and with the 
same data we now assume that the whole industry would be carried 
out at one locality; the six alternative locations were in turn 
considered to determine the least-cost location. The assembly cost 
of the main inputs is shown in Table 7.11.1. As before, the trans-
ferable.cotton-seed is the actual production for 1973 of 380,ooq 
. . 
tons.- 1'1aringan (l"'edani) records the lowest it1-freight cost and in 
faGt only. slightly less than that of Hassahei sa.· .. ·. The striking 
. feature of the in-freight bill is the exceedin_sly high tr~msfer · 
cost incurred at Port Sudan; reaching :more than LS. 2,000,000. 
AlthoJlgh Khartoum is in a far better position it lS ·still· 
LS. 373~150 costlier than the least in-freight cost location. 
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Table 7.9.1 J 
In-freight bills (actual capacities in tons) (LS) 
Locations Cotton-seed Tin sheets Caustic Total 
(packing)· soda 
Khartoum 407444.00 '13363.'10 272?.30 423534.40 
Medani 
-
'1228. 70 3258-70 4487.40 
Rabak 
-
2582.50 3868.30 6450.80 
Port Sudan .479083.00 - - 479083.00 
il-Obeid '13259- 00 401.3 83.80 '13712. 60 
·Total in-freight . cost 927268.2 
Transport cost per ton/100 Km as in Table 7.7.1 
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Table 7.9.2 
Out-freight bills per ton (LS) 
Location Cotton-seed Oil cake Total 
oil 
Khartoum 104238.40 285882.70 390121.10 
Medani 
- - -
Rabak 6508.00 
-
6508.00 
Port Sudan - - -
\ 
11-0beid 
- - -
Transport cost per ton/100 Km as in Table·7.7.1 
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Table 7.9.3 
Total freight bills__lLS) 
-----· ---. --------
Locations In-freight Out-freight Fumigation Total 
cost 
----------
Khartoum 423534.40 390121 • 1 0 
- 813655-50 
l"'edani 4487.40. - 4137-50 •8624.90 
Rabak 6450.80 6508.00 
-
12958.80 
Port Sudan 479083.00 - -. 479083.00 
-al-Obeid 13712.60 
- -
13712.60 
I 
•rotal Flow system 1328034.80. 
.Table 7.10 
Cotton-seed oil supply and demand* (Tons per Annum) 
Provinces Demand** Supply Su..1)lus or 
deficit 
Kassala 2314 
-
-2314 
Red Sea 20652 15550 -5102 
' Nile 846 
-
-846 
Northern 608 
-
··608 
.. 
Gezira 6340 33'10 . -3030 
Blue N;i.le 1819 
-
-1819 
White Nile 3810 5720 . +1910 
Khartoum 6276 41026 t34750 
Southern Darfur 1128 
-
-'1128. 
Northern Darfur 319 
-
-319 
Northern :kordofan 1279 889 -390 
Southern ·Kordofan 702 
-
-702 
Baher El Ghazal 1778 
-
·-1778 
. Equatoria 950 
-
-!)50 
Upper Nile 1306 
-
-1306 
a.gi2\ 
Total 3Q~ 66495 
* Cotton~seed oil for soap manufacturing is not accounted 
for ( s·ee text). 
** Demand figures are estimates based on the 19f.7/68 Household 
· ·Sample Survey, and population in 1973. 
Sm1.rce.: Supply figures obtained fro:n l"'inistry cf Industry and 
Mining, A memorandum on the basis of cotton-seed 
allocat=l:g_~ __ .i2._2il mills, Khartoum, 1973. 
268 
Fig.7·3 ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION FLOWS OF COTTON-SEED OIL (IN TONS) 1973 
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However, the out-freight bills as read uff 'I'able 7.11.2 
reflect a different picture where distribution cost is lo1vest at 
the Prime Base. The total transfer cost is clearly in favoar ·af 
Hassaheisa, though J.VIaringan is still very competitive (see Table 
7.11.3). It should however, be mentioned that· e~tra expenses on 
methyl bromide fumigation of the cotton-seed in localities within 
the irrigated Gezira., were added at the rate 0f P.T.35 per ton, 
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(this figure is mnltiplied by 62.5 per cent of -che amount of cotton-. 
seed processed as it is pertinent to assume that the other portion 
would normally be processed before the deadline-of .mid-June referred 
to above). 
Now comparing the least-cost location in this one location 
analysis with the figures for the actual situation as computed 
above (Case 3), it co~ld clearly be seen that the latter is even 
·slightly more favourable than the theoretical least-cost· location 
(a difference of about LS.40,000). 
7·.7·5 Case,Five: Optimum Location 
The result arrived at ~bove leads us to an alternative theor- · 
etical consideration where production of the cotton:..seed is.assumed· 
to be carried out at the various material sources and distributed 
thence to demand .areas. Output distribution would have been more 
precise, had it been possible to use a computerised ~inear programm-. 
ing solution. However, manual processing was preferred for the 
simple nature of the calculations and the dire.-~t single mode of 
transport assumed. Knowing the production and cons1imption patterns 
from the pre.ceding analysis, it is now easy to ch~rt the optimum 
regional flow-system, see Fig. 7 .4. It sho·;1ld be restated that ex-
portable cotton-seed oil and oil cake are tak.en to be consumed at 
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Table 7.11.1 
Annual In-freight bills-per 380000 tons of cotton-seed (LS) 
·~ 
·.Locations .Cotton-seed Caustic Packir .. g Total 
soda 
KhartOum· 831000.00 4446.00 21660.00 857106.00. 
Hassaheisa 455000.00 5016.00 23940.00 483956.0Q 
· l"'aringan· 452000.00 5282.00 25080.00 482362.00 
707000.00 6270.00 30020.00 743290.00 
Sennar 588000.00 5776.00 . 26600;.00 .. 620376.00 
Port Sudan 2273000.00 2273000.00 
Transport cost perton/100 Km as in Table 7.7.1 
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'J:lable 2.11~2 
Out-freight bills for annum per 66495 tons of cotton-seed oil 
, Locations Cotton-seed Soap oil Export oil Oil cake . 'J:lotal 
. oil 
Khartoum '1'10628.80 
-
98238.00 405047.20 6'139'14.00 
Hassaheisa 105159-30 26188.80 1'1'1'129.00 558338.60 8008'15. 70 
l"'aringan 97283.50 32736.00 1'12614.00 589623 •. 20 832256- (0 
Rabak 99439. '10 45830.40 . 126990.00 681740.90 954000.40 
Sennar 9866'1.80 37646.40 118159.00 675373-80 929841.00 
Port Sudan 200421. 70' 86750.40 . - 573612. oo 860784.10 
Transport cost per tqn/100 Km as in Table 7.7.1. 
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Table 7.11. 3 
Total freight bills and seed fumigation cost (LS) 
Locations In-freight Out-freight Seed Total 
fumie-ation 
cost 
Khartoam. 857'1 06.00 613914.00 - 1471020.00 
Hassaheisa 483956.00 .. 800815-70 . . .. 8.3.125. 1367896-7 
--
l"'aringan 482362.~ 00 . . 832256 .• 70 83.125 -1397743.7 
R9.bak 743290.00 954000.40 
-
1697290.40 
Sennar 620376.00 929841.00 
. - 155021? .• 00 
Port Sudan .2273000.00 860784.10 -. 3133?84 .• 10 
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Port Sudan. It is further assumed that I"'eda:·1i would be the locale 
of soap manufacturing. 
For in-freight bills, the cost of tin sh~ets and caustic soda 
was calculated for fo:IT of the five major black cotton-seed producers 
(see Table ?.12). It is noticeable from Table 7.12 that Port Sudan 
is likely to incur no expenses neither on these two items, nor on 
out-freight, and was mainly included to refl~ct the contrast to 
earlier tabulations. 
An attempt is made to chart the flows of the cotton-seed oil 
from surblus areas to 'deficit' areas through tte least transport-
cost surface (see Fig. 7. 4). It might be expected that Rabak with 
a total annual production of 12,250 tons of oil would like.ly supply 
the White Nile, the western and southern reg.ions, at a cost of 
around LS.40,200. Likewise, Hassaheisa~ the largest producer, 
:would supply-Port Sudan, the bulk of Khartoum n'9eds and the northern 
provinces more economically. This amounts to Lf.109,472.6. 
Althou.gh Maringan is the second producer, the whole production of 
21,000 tons of oil would be consumed locally with still a deficit 
. ',.· 
to be satisfied from the nearby mills of Sei:ll:Jar. Kassala Province 
and indeed the Blue Nile province, would be supplied by Sennar, · 
and the small surplus would be passed to Kharto<tm. The whole oil 
flow system cost would likely be in the region cf LS.163,000. 
Based on the assumptions already made about the consu:mpt:i,on 
pattern of oil cake, the flow cost of this pro:iuct from the various 
.locations. of production is even higher than when production is 
carried o·u.t at the Prime Base (see Tables 7.11.2 and 7.12). None-
the1e_ss, the. economies made by the optimum flow system is best appre-
ciated when the overall freight cost is conside~ed. A saving of about 
Table 7.12 
. In-freight, out-freight and total. freight bills. per annum for material-orient~d · 
production .· (LS) 
j 
. 
In-freight Out-freight Fumigation Total 
Locations Tin sheets Caustic· Oil. Oil cake cost freight 
soda 
Hassahei sa · 8'190.00 '17'16. 00 '1 09472.60. 333420.78 492'1.87 457?2'1.25 
Maringan 7920.00 '1668. 00 
-
88953-70 4593-75 '1 03'135.45 
Rabak 5530.00 1155-00 40278.40 5'1'194.22 - 98157~62. 
Sennar 2800.00 608.00 '12983.70 42240.00 - 58631.70 
Port Sudan - - - ..... - -
Grand Total 2444.00 . 5147.00 . '162?34.?0 .·. 515808..?0 . 
. -·. . 717646.02 
Transport cost per ton/100 Km as in Table 7.7.1 
1\) 
-...-J 
\Jl 
Fig.7·4 OPTIMUM DISTRIBUTION FLOWS OF COTTON-SEED OIL(IN TONS) 1973 
Source: 
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.LS. 610,388.8 could annually be made - after deducting the 
fumigation exp.enses at an average annual cost o.f LS. 9,515.6 -
compared to the actual location system. 
7.8 Conclusion 
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Fro:n the preceding discussion one should. accept the hypothesis. 
made about the sub-optimality of present concentration of the cotton-
seed industry on the premise of least-transport.-cost consideration. 
The unnecessary expenditure of more than LS. 600-,000 likely to be 
incurred annually by this industry is particularly significant in a 
developing economy. The susceptibility of the .cotton crop to dis-
eases has for long precluded any attempts at cotton-seed processing 
in the Gezira. As already shown, the .advances in the chemical 
industry and the low cost of fumigating the seP.U. wo.uld clearly 
allow processing of the seed in the Gezira. Hassahei sa, the main 
centre of the Gezira ginning mills, emerges as the least-cost 
location when compared with the Prime Base, a difference of more 
than LS. 111,000. The question that immediately springs to mind, 
and one cannot attempt to fully answer here, is whether.it is 
feasible to relocate the whole industry in compliance with these 
results? For one thing the figures attained here are only tentative; 
some omissions were necessary. Also, the .non-availability of data 
. . 
on relocation costs is a difficulty. The results obtained here are 
only a hint that.opens up the question of re-evaluation andre-
location for serious debate and appraisal. I11deed, the promise of 
a least-cost solution is persuasive, especially for a centrally 
ori~ented government. 
The exclusion of labour cost could prove to be a serious 
omission, especially skilled labour and management costs in the 
light of recent trends towards mod.erni sation .. On the other hand, 
the availability of cheap labour supply at t~1e growing areas and 
ginning .mills is a great incentive to relocatE: g,t the material 
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sources. By the extensive nature and periodicity of these practices 
(cotton growing and ginning), labour is redundant for a good p~rt 
of the year. If the under-utilisation of the oil. mills is a fact 
to be.lived with (the co~ntry needs to produGe an extra 275,000 
.. 
tons of cotton-seed on top of the present ammal production of 
400,000 tons merely to utilise fully the existi'1g milling c~p~­
cities),C'15) then it is prudent to inquire into the possibility 
of avoiding underemployment at least partially, on the two l'evels. 
Yet more, a move towards the provincial and rural centres wo~ld 
only be in the direction of regionali sation Jtrongly enco·u.r,aged by 
the 1974 Industrial Act.C16) 
Another matter worthy of contemplation iB _for the Gezira 
tenants' co-operative societies to embark on a rcheme to process 
.. 
their o-wn cotton-seed. The recent success that met their efforts 
on flour milling is unprecedented. The tenants, by the 'ownership' 
right of the cotton-seed should have first p:i:iori ty, thus widening 
their margins of profit. This action would also meet the aspiration 
of introducing mixed farm.i.ng :in two ·!Vays; by creating extra jobs 
and surplus money, g,nd by utilising locally the vast amounts of 
oil cake. 
HoT!VeVer, this should -not distract us from the basic argument 
of.profit maximisation. With locational interdependence, where· 
demand vary in sp~ce, it is easy to appreciate that.the least-cost 
.location does not necessarily. maximise profit ... The interpretation 
of factor$ conco:ni tant with the Prime Base (ever., to the exclusion 
. of externalities and inter-lin~<Cages) as analysed above, would 
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evidently yield more profit, ~way fro~ the least-cost location. 
The incompatibility between the location of waximlliil profit and 
least-cost is duly shown by the vast cost gap of processing 
available local material at Port Sudan and impo-rting raw material 
fro.:n inland sources. Nevertheless, Port Sudan naintains a success-
ful and possibly the most profitable operation of cotton-seed pro-
cessing. Accordingly, any enactments to encourage the dispersion 
of industry nt1.ght not bring about immediate 1·esults, and might well 
fail to halt the powerful momentum of the present system and the 
inertia of the present agglomeration. 
The deductive explanatory approach adopted earlier on in 
Chapter Four and consolidated in the first half of this discussion 
is comple~ented by the deterministic testing of the least-cost to 
provide a secular framework for decision-making. In the process, 
the Prime Base Theory emerges as a powerful explanatory paradigm 
that aids understanding of industrial localisat:·.on even though 
classic location theorie.s would suggest otherwise. 
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CHA.PI'ER EIGH'r 
RESOURCES AND PROSPECTS OF INDUSTRIAL LOCATIO;.\T DYN.A..TVIICS 
8.1 Introduction 
The foregoing historical, theoretical and em~irical acco~t 
of industry and industrial lo~ation affords most essentials for 
the perception of future patterns and trends in industrial location. 
It is anticipated however, that the impact of the effective mobili-
sation of agricultllral resources on industrial location will be to 
reshape industrial location patterns, distribution and structure.to 
comply with priorities, capacities and the re suJ.tan t regional · 
gro·tJth and regiona;t. disparities. The course of 1Ction already 
adopted in the previous and current development plans (1970/1 -
1974/5 and 197'7/8 - 1982/3) to promote agro-based industry is prob-
ably the most appropriate of all options to r·egl.onal industrial 
growth. Yet, emphasis on natural resource utili9ation may further 
advance the pre-eminance of the Prime Base induE;try as long as the 
economic system is subjective in nature and trap)ed.in existing 
price policies, marketing, and even,income distribution. 
A schematized analysis of natural resources on a regional basis 
follows to verify the relationship between natural endo·.NID.ent, equity, 
industrial activity and lo~ation. It is hopEd that this analysis 
will prove to be of some predictive value, and is therefore deferred 
to the closing stage. 
8.2 Industrial Location Dynamics and Resource Distribution 
The regional imbalance clearly exemplifj ed in the patte.rn and 
distribution of industry, and the varying levels of income and 
services between Prime Base and perip~ery has not yet been fully 
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examined witb specific reference to the country.'s natural resources. 
Up to now natural reso'J.rces seem to bear no tirect influence on 
entrepreneurs' location decisions. It is influences such as those 
mentioned earlier (Chapters Two, Three and Fo~r) that stress the 
failure of the economic system to mobilise available resources and 
po si ti vely attract the traditional sector into the economic system. 
This realisation may well be a starting point ior future strategies 
of economic development and in the. process mc..y affect industrial 
location dynamics and regionalism. 
8.2.1.1: Population Change 
The preliminary results of the second population census, 1973, 
provide for the first time an inter-censal co:nparison. How.ever, 
one should alyvays keep .in mind the basic procedural differences · 
between the two censuses: while the 1955/56 census used. the de jure 
approach where each individual is recorded acco::.~ding to the usual 
place ·of residence, the second was a defacto enu.neration, i.e. 
each individual is recorded wherever he happens to be at the time 
of the census. Nonetheless, this inconsistency alone does not 
explain the wide gap between the actual figur·es of 1973 and 
.estimates for the same year whi~h were based on the '1955/56 census. 
In fact, the wildness of this disparity was, on occasion, a great 
embarrassment to the central government. Nation,1l planning and 
claims on international grants, aid and borrowings were apparently 
initially based on higher estimates of rates of population growth. 
·The difference between the population growth .rates of prov:i_nces 
in the inter-censal period (1955/56-1973) is very great. Of 
. special relevance to th~ industrial location anc:lysis is the high 
annual population increase in the central provin-::es of Khartoum, 
Gezira, Blue and White Niles (see Fig. 8.'1). The economc activity 
Fig.S·I POPULATION CHANGE BY PROVINCE PERCENT, 1955/56-1973 
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of the Prime Base and the modern agricultural practices of the 
Gezira an·d adjacent ri verai~ lands of the White Nile is quite 
distinct from the rest of the country and is .characterised by 
lmver inf'ant and pre-natal mortal i.. ty and higr.Ler population density 
( se·e 'Fig." 's. 2). 
Inter-regional migration is another guide to growth regions 
and future econo::nic change. It is in Khartoum :md the Gezira that 
the extent of immigration becomes of special value to industrial 
. . . . . 
location.· About two-thirds of the internal migration heads to this 
central region: ( 30.1 per cent to Khartoum and. 33-5 per cent' to the' 
Gezira, .· s~e Table .8.1). * However, one characte:cistic special to 
this latter province is that outward movements make.up to 11.4 per 
cent of the. totai internal immigration, twice a·s much as the· share 
of Kharto.um.·· The economic structure of a 'pu~Iing' province satis-
fies the exp~ctations·of· a .range of migrants •. At the same time the 
economic health of a _'pushing' region largely 1etermines destination. 
of outward immigrant·s. Thus mlgrants from the inodern agricultural 
sector of the Gezira .seek· jobs in the Kharto1liD. conurbation~ Con.:. 
versely' Ko:rdofan ~igrant s who move to Khartoum" frOI!l a predominantly 
tradi ticinal s'ector areprobably accommodated ~tJithin ·the lower grades 
9f the :seconda~y :and tertiary sectors. This ,dynamic process of· 
sorting· a·nd ~rading, rearranges skills and inc'">mes in a spatial con-
text., because .of the varying econ.o::nic opportuni·cies and production 
systems; in a. way detrimental to future deveiopment and locational . 
change. ·· 
While national planning, regional policy,and industrial location. 
and reloqation are permanently influenced by -the uneU1ployment problem 
in the 'developed' countries, ( 2 ) these aspects of development have 
no direct consideration to unemployment in Sudan. More often, un-
employment statistics encompass a marginally lo·w ratio of the real 
!The fi~res g:i ven in the Six Year Plan, 19'17/'i$~1982/83 are 30.6 and 
29.6 ,per. cent for Khai·toum and the Blue· Nile Provinces respectively· (_1) 
Table 8.1 
Sudan: Per cent distribution of population by province*of birth;· 
and province of enumeratiori'' 1973 . 
Provinc-e of Red Sea Baher el Blue . . Dar Fur Equ:itoria Kassala Khartoum Kordofan- Northern Upper -Total -
-E_numeration Ghazal Nile Nile popula-
Province of· tion per cent Birth 
Red Sea 80.99 0.15 0.13 0.07 . 0.13 1.12 0.43 0.07 0.39 0.05 2.38 
Baher el 0'.17 97-54 0 •. 14 o:36 0.61 0.12 0.73 0.49 0.07 0.57 '10.47 Ghazal 
Blue Nile 0.9_2 0.09 85.21 0.38 0.29 3-15 6.37 1.06 0.60 1.80 23.46 
Dar Fur 0.48 0.45 4.18 . 94.45 0.43_ 3 .. 60 4.25 1.82 0.25 0.60 14.83 
Equatoria 0.13 0.28 0.09 0.05 87.78 0.13 0.67 0.24 0.07 0.47 5.20 
Kassala 1.44 0.01 0.56 0.10 0.10 80.60 1.07 0.14 0.67 0.06 5.48 
Khartoum 1 .41 0.15 0.90 -8.22 0.35 1.43 60.30 8.58 0.88 0.38 5-71 
Kordofan 1.97 0.28 4.91 1. 32 1.14. 1.93 11.29 94.05 0.79 4.64 15.16 
Northern 11.15 ·0.08 1~72 0.17 0.42 3-52 11'. 31 0.55 95-55 0.37 9-34 Upp·er Nile 0.10 0.11 0.25 0.02 1.13 0.12 0.82 0.15 0.12 90.81 5-91 
Province 0.23 0.80 0.22 0.26 0.61 0.13 0.18 0.24 0.03 0.10 0.27 not stated 
Other con- 'I. 01 0.06 1.b9 2.60 7-.00 4.04 -2~GO 0.63 0.57- 0.14 1.77 
tine:11+s 
Total 100.00 100.00 1 00. 00 1 00. 00 100.00 - 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.08 
- --
---~--- ~· _:_:__ - ____ . -- ·-·-·----··- ~·- -
* Provincial divisions before 1974 
Source: Statistics Department, The Second Po·j?ulation 8ensus, Sudan, 1973,, (Prelimin_ar;y ·results), 
Khartoum, 1973. 
I 
j\) 
(X) 
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une(Vlplo~e.c\ b.e:La..use o~ \rnpr~ilS(.. '\n\oune-Jtotl 1 Gt\5~~\'ie.J une..T\pl.ojvntn.t 
in the agricultural sector, low female activity rates e~ecially 
j.n·the urban areas, and over-employment or under capacity in the 
· manufacturing and service sectors. Thus the unemployment figure 
. . ' 
of 6. 3 per cent for Sudan in 1973 invites no serious considerat:lon 
and probably the real extent of the problem is buried in the com-
plex of social and economic stri.lctti.res.C3) The exceptionally high 
'·.unemployment in the case of the three southern provinces is obviously 
.. boosted by thousands of returning refugees in 1972, the prolonged 
stand-still of :the economic machinery, and the high rate of urbani sa-
tion, related. to insecurity. For these reasons unemployment iii the 
south is largely a measurable pheno~enon •. 
· ·>8.2.1.2. U:t't!3.n Population Growth 
The national definition of what is urban is an arbitrary 
mlnimum of five ·thousand persons plus a discretionary margin to 
.include administrative and market centres under this limit. Accord-
ing to .this imprecise definition, the urban population of Sudan 
has shown a remarkable growth rate during the inter-censal period 
from 8~.3 per cerit in 1955/56 to 17.4 per cent in 1973.(4 ) The 
most corisp.icuous feature of urban growth in Sudan is the integration 
of provincial areal units into the broader regions of the so·:J.th, 
centre and north which· closely relate to the pace of econoJlic 
develop~ent, political stability, or the lack of it, and potential 
for economic exploitation. 
The southern part of Sudan (including So:J.thern Dar Fur, Southern 
Kordofan and the Blue Nile, as well as the three southern provinces), 
has certainly witnessed the .nio st significant urban population 
growth relative to the country as a whole, at an average rate of 
9.-4· per cent in the inter-censal period (1955/56 - 1973), and 
hence appears to have a higher proportion of the country's urban 
populc;ti~n in the order of 24 per cent in 1973 as against 14 per 
cent in 1955/56 (see Fig. 8.3). Two factors were probably 
responsible for this urban population upsurge. 
Firstly, the prolonged political unrest in the three southern 
provinces ras created a deep sense of insecur~ty that has driven 
many of the rural population to the more secure district and 
provincial headquarters. From the history of African urb~nisation, 
tribal warfare was one of the strong factors that gro'..lped people 
toget];ler in indigenmis · agglomorations such as those of the Yoru'Qa 
in Western Nigeria. ·A lively example from Fo'J.th East Asia is the 
exodus of rural population to Saigon during the recent Vietnamese 
.. 
War. Moreover, it sho:ild be emphasised that the enumeration of 
1973 had just coincided with the rush of refugees back to the 
country after·the 1972 Peace Agreement. The destination of the 
returning refugees was mainly to the towns. Another minor factor, 
special to Equatorj,a, and again associated v-:i th political unrest, 
. . 
was the influx of refugees from neighbouring ZD.ire in the 1960' $· · 
About seven per cent of the population of this province were aliens 
in 1973. ( 5} 
Secondly, the extention of railways in the later 1950's and 
.. early 1960's to the west (Nyala) and south (Wau) and construction 
works such as th~ Ro·seires Dam, played a ma~or role in t.he trans-
formation of many small towns into larger urba.'J centres such as 
Nyala, Babanoasa, Abuzabad and Wau, and even the.creation of al-
together.ne"Y urban centres such as Damazin in the Blue Ni;Le Prov-
ince.· In Damazin jobs of vario·:J.s descriptions were· created during 
the construction work and manpower was drawn from all corners of 
the country • .El Roseires, the old district cent~e was lofsing 
heavily at the beginning though later was able to adjust and even 
benefit from :i.. t s reciprocity with the new town. 
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Fig.8·3 URBAN POPULATION GROWTH BY PROVINCE PERCENT, 1955/56-1973 
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In contrast, the northern part of the couv.try which includes 
Northern Dar Fur, Northern Kordofan, and the Red Sea provinces as 
well as the two northern provinces, records a much lower average 
rate of urban population growth, of four per cent for the period 
1955/56- 1973. In fact, the region's share in the· country's 
urban population dropped to 22.8 per cent in ·1973 from just over 
33 per cent in 1955/56. It is to be expected ~hat a region o-f 
poor economic base, meagre exploitable reso-:.1rces (much of it lies 
in the desert and semi-desert areas), and low export earnings 
would be lacking :in the driving force for urbanisation. Even the 
present rate of growth in this region is largely associated with. 
nodes of national significance and related tc the econo·my and. 
infrastructure of pre-independence days: Port Sudan, Atbara, 
and El Obeid are the best examples. Moreover, the real constrafnt 
on urbarii sation in many such regions is the direct migration from 
the rural sector to destinations beyond the boundaries of the prov-
ince. 
The conjunction of urban population grov~h with development, 
and the economic potential wo:lld, theoretically, permit a rapid 
growth o.f urban population in the central part of the country 
(Khartoum, Gezira, White Nile and Kassala) where inward migration, 
incomes and number of services are highest. Nonetheless, urban 
growth was less spectacular and the share of these provinces only 
increased from 52.2 per cent in 1955/56 to 53.2 per cent in 1973, 
at an annual average growth rate of 6.6 per ceDt. One characteris-
tic that held back the expansion of urban population gro·Nth in 
this region relative to the southern part Ls that the increase 
occurs only in a handful of towns already of profound pro:ninence 
whereas growth in other regions is characterised by the metamorph-
ism of many villages into 'overgrown villages' because of new 
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stimuli such as the western railway to Nyala. Moreover, it is 
quite possible that the filling-up of rural areas occurs in cycles 
and a large number were just passing the numerical limit in 1955/56 
whereas a second generation were as yet some di stanc.e from qualify-
ing in 1973 (see Fig. 8.4). The urban-rural hierarchy is :well 
placed to permit the creation of new urban centres, and any rural 
'spillover' is directed towards already existir.g urban centres. 
In this respect urban population growth is hardly a true index of 
the dynamism of an economic region. The relative economic maturity 
of this sectton of the country is reflected in the modern agricul-
tural se~tor and the Prime Base with higher average incomes and 
services. As will be seen later, the prospects of redressing this 
disequilibrium is anticipated in the light of the existing infra-
structure and scope for development as perceived by planners and 
investors. Altho:1gh there exists no evidence to suggest a direct 
relation between industry and urbanisation, it is predictable that 
the large investment in industry in this core area will positively 
affect the reciprocity of industrialisation an· d. urbanisation. 
8.2.2 l"'ineral Reso:1rces 
The extractive industry of Sudan has a daunting history of 
failure and a low growth profile at present~ Not surprisingly 
minerals have played a very insignificant role in the economy of 
modern Sudan. On the face of it, this would Lnply a scarcity of 
mineral deposits in the rock formations of Sudan, but this is 
increasingly becoming invalid in the light of.recent discoveries: 
the earlier search for minerals at the beginning of this century 
must have been superficial and inconclusive. The lack of interest 
and poor follow-up which continued through a good part of half a 
century c~rtainly demands some attempt at explanation.· IdE:mtifying 
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the objectives of the British prospectors is probably the first 
step towards that goal. The target set by London Syndicates with 
the successes in Southern Africa and Congo in mind, was to strike 
highly mineralized rocks, noble or precious ,minerals or·· easily 
worked deposits. Anything less than that would ~ave involved dis-
proportionate capital' investment to returns, higher production 
costs, uncompetitive produce, or lower marg:l.nE; of profit.· Indeed 
the attempt. v-ras fruitless as far as achieving .such targets was 
concerned. Soon afterwards, as was noted earlier i'h Chapter Two, · 
the ·policy towards private foreign investmerit took a dif~erent 
course. The motto of economic development wae one of slow pro-
gress, balanced budget and specialisation on agriculture •. Further 
exploration and the possibility of initiating.a mining sector 
would cleariy have' involved two basic inputs that could least be 
afforded; foreign capital and an intensive labour force. Capital 
investment was not forthcoming for reasons outlined above, and in 
a country· sparcely populated, like Sudan, minL1g would compete in 
the labo.'J.I' ·market. with the priority sector, agriculture. Any such 
action would jeopardise the British interest and should be averted. 
The national aspirations of a new nation w·ere roused _in the 
mid-n:i.neteen fifties by erratic geophysical and geochemical data 
and tentative results· on mineral finds. With rising hopes of 
minera,l:wealth and .oil riches a fully-fledged' .ministry of mining 
was immediately created. Two acts_were passed fn 1958 and 1959 
to encourage and promote oil· exploration and mineral prospecting. 
However, it was soon realised that long-term investment, associated 
with extractive industry, would not be forthcoming given the des-
cription of the mineral deposits, facilities and utilities avail-
able and, more important perhaps, the nebulous political scene on 
the· eve·· of self-rule. 
It is a formidable task for any government to secure a 
favourable investment climate for long enough to interest large 
scale mining corporations whose interests ar·e, by necessity, of 
a long-term nature. Competitive costs and becter grades are of 
paramount significance in considering'· a terri to.~?y as a fea.si ble 
contender for mineral exploration and exploitation. The rating· 
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of Sudan in the. books of mineral investors must have been very lm1. 
·However, marginal production costs and the critical min.eral 
contents.of the ore are dynamically changing because of change in 
world consumption patterns and prices, structu.ral gro·t~th, depletio:l 
of new discoveries and improvement in processin_s methods and tech-
niques. · Two further asp~cts of this change which directly affect 
Sudan's ·mi·neral exploration are only indirectly_ affected by cost: 
the inte:rest of centrally planned economies, e·specially East· Euro-
pean countries, in their bid for markets and raw materials and· in 
the context of .barter or bilateral agreements. Secondly, the U.N. 
c~ll for action in the 1960's to increase the effective use of 
' . . . . 
reso;J.rces and participate in financing development projects through 
specialised agencies such as the United Nations Special Fund -. 
Development Programme. 
With all. such complex structures, mixed interests and varied 
concerns, the signs of serious participation in the mineral resource 
development of Sudan has only materialised in.the last decade apd 
reflects what could amount to a scramble by industrialised countries. 
The Red Sea littoral and, later, offshore areas were the first .. 
locations to be extensively leased for the obvious reasons of geo-
logy and accessability. ·Spearheaded by the-Soviet Union, the 
Eastern ·Bloc is now undertakLng prospecting for manganese and iron 
ore (see Fig. 8.5). Under a bilateral agreemeLt Romania was·already 
trans-shipping iron o:re from this region. A fresh attempt to 
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exploit copper, zinc and silver, deposited in the Red Sea mud, 
is now underway. The French company; Bureau de Recherches Geo-
logigues is executing the project on behalf cf the Sudanese and 
Saudi Governments. ( 6 ) Other discoveries in th,:; area include 
natural gas (Pacific International and Standard.Oil of California). 
Japanese companies showed much interest in the early 1970's 
in the ri,ch chrome deposits of the Ingessana hills (Blue Nile 
Province). The ore is now shipped to .Japan and a. new agreement to 
expand pfoduction (300 - 400 thousand tons arnually) was .concluded 
in January 1977. ( 7) 
The move made by the American Oil companies after the 1973 
Oil War was unprecedented. The soaring oil prices after that war 
and the ever expanding demand, especially by industrialised 
coantries, were the prime force behind this fresh attempt •. Western 
and central Sudan were this time included in:the frantic and un-
fettere.d search ,for oil. In 1975 the Minister. of Industry, it was 
announced in a local newspaper, (B) was having talks with the rep-
resentatives of the American Chevron OVerseas and Ball and.Collins 
. of the United Kingdom, on the prospects of the economic exploita-
tion o·f. bil.· and gas in the Red Sea and central Sudan. Later, in 
1977, oil discovery was hinted at in the Middle East Economic. 
"Digest (1'1.E.E.D.): 
Despite the discovery of small and commercially 
viable guahities of oil deposits, production 
:has not yet started. (9) 
.An official announcement of oil discovery was broadcast in July, 
1979. The Abu Gabra oil strike may prove to be the first commerc-
ially viable oil well.C10) 
A few hundred kilometres to the south west lies Hofrat en Nihas 
where the United Nations Special Fund (Development Programme) has 
bsen financing copper exploration since the mid 1960's with, 
as yet, no conclusive results. However, oil discovery nearby 
must· add a new dimension to the long search for copper (see· 
Fig. 8. 5). 
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The activities of the Geological Survey Department were hard 
. ' 
hit by the political unrest in southern Sudan. The result was a 
total lack ·of up-to-date data on the region's mineral resources~ 
As an interim arrangement, the United Kingdom is now conducting 
. . '. . 
inve-stigations aimed at the exploration of re.re minerals and 
minerals of immediate industrial use such as Li.mestone, asbestos, 
clay and.talc, to help construction and building works urgently 
'(11) 
needed in the region. 
From the standpoint of the long-term extractive industry in 
, Sudan; the contribution to the industrial location milieu will be 
direct, iri the sense of promoting beneficati0n processes at the 
source .of ore. The structure of such undertak~ngs will probably 
determine the quality and the quantity of other inputs such A-s 
energy, water, labour and also the extent o! the market. Infra-
-;; 
structure and Utili ties associated with extractive industry, f·abri-
cation and allied industries will probably .9.ct as a catalyst to 
industrial gro·tJth in new locations and. regior: s~ Within the 11 thwnb-
forefinger11 growth region (to be described belo'tJ), Port Sudp,p and 
Kosti-Sennar stand the best chA-nce for such integrated· industries. 
Meanwhile, the effects of the mining industry in Sudan will 
·only be·indirect.in the forrri of large capital inflow mA.naged.from 
.the Prime Base. Slowly, revenue build..;..up will contribute to the 
promotion of investment in both the public ar.d. pri vp,te sectors. 
8.2.3.1 Agricultural Resources: Crop Product:l.on 
Agriculture sti;Ll.plays a central role in the Sudanese 
. ' ' 
economy and is anticipated to do so for some time to come as the 
potential for extension is highly impressive. An estim~ted 120 -
200 million feddans (1 feddan - 1.038 acres) of cultivable land 
awaits exploitation,C12 ) yet the present acreage·under cultiva~ion 
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of about 15 million·.feddans provide 98 per cent ~f export earnings(1 3) 
(including live stock). The share of the agric'll tural sector in 
the Gross Do~estic Product (GDP) is also impressive, fluctuating 
fro~ 31.9 per cent in 1970/71 to 41.4 per cent in 1973/74. ( 14 ) .· 
Probably· these figures would have been even higher but for. the dis-
proportionate l.ncrease of prices in the service and the industrial 
sectors. 
The complex structure and detailed organisation of agriculture 
in Sudan is b.eyond the scope of this study. How·ever, the dual 
character of the economy fosters the co-existence of a dual ~ystem 
of agricultural production in which the· modern sector or commercial 
sector is complemented by a traditional sector. 
The ·modern sector specialises in cash c::r::'op production and is 
confined .to the irrigated lands of the Gezira, Nile banks, and some 
annuaily floqded ba!l~s. and deltas. Future expan sian of this type 
of production is predictably tied-up with the Nile and gravitation-
ally irrigable lands. By virtue of the production characteristics 
of such areas, agro-based industries would naturally ally with this 
sE?ctor, and even fut-ure industrial location is bound to be affected 
by development in this direction. In the sub-system of this sector, 
many tropical and . sub~tropical products could. be produced and pro- . 
cessed. ·The diversity of the raw mat.erial base. is a great asset to 
future expansion and proliferation of processing industries (Fig.E?.6). 
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Table 8.2 shows the rate of increase in acreage of the main 
crops of Sudan for three periods between 1960/61 - 1975/76, and a 
fo·u.rth tentative perio:i as projected by the current. Six Year Plan, 
1977/78- 1982/83. The rate of growth for each individual crop is 
a parameter of entangle~ natural and human factors tnat det~rmine 
.the degree of growth or degeneration. In the traditional rain-fed 
areas, for example, initial crop acreage is .largely determined by 
the timing and ·amount of rainfall, whereas me ::ha:hi se.d rain-fed 
agriculture expands in response to direct govern.ment policyand de-
marcation of areas to be annually cultivated. Price trends, market-
ing policies and economic plans have an everlasting though varying 
effect on restructuring the acreage growth rate. These trends are 
closely examined in the following pages, with emphasis on selected 
industrial crops. 
From Table 8.2 it appears that the importa11ce of.short staple 
cotton (Nuba variety) was progressively weakening during the earlier 
two periods. This is a classic example of government intervention 
to discourage growers by fixing low prices to ensure a ba.lance 
. . 
between supply and demand. Prices, and conEJequently acreage, were 
slowly picking-up during the third part in response to a new con-
sumption pattern o:f local industry. The Nuba V8.riety, it .was 
planned, wo~ld be 11sed for the produ~tion of coarse counts for 
· 50· per cent of the popular fabrics.C'15) · Exp.ort prospects were 
also becoming brighter as demand was increasing through trade and 
. . . (16) bi1atera.l agreement~ The revitalisatiou of the Equatoria Pro-
ject after 1973 has also contributed to the ·r.ew :trend· which is mani-
fested in an annual rate of growth of 12.3 per cent for th~ third 
... 
period·and 14~5 per cent for the projected period of the Six Year 
Pliln (1977/78 - 1982/83) .. 
"'-., 
Table 8.2 rowth under-.sele-cted 
ofannual lncrease 
. ' 
Five to Six Year_Average 
A B c c1 . ' D 
Long staple 726 782 788 760 790 
cotton ' . 
Medium staple 
cotton 57 121 "190 210 350 
Short staple 
cotton 261 251 155 "155 350 
Sorghum 3307 3650 5076 6000 9100 
I"Iillet 1118 1426 2356 2500 2800 
wlleat 65 215 425 622 890 
Gro"..lldnuts 652 902 1594 1840 2900 
Sesame 950 1157 2173 2200 2700 
·sugar cane 15 29 39 40 288 
'I'obacco 
- -
2 2 8 
Coffee 
-- --
2 3 15 
Caster seed 13* '31 38** 50 70*** -
.A. 1960/61 - 1964/65 
B. 1965/66 - 196Y/70 
c. 1970/71 "':" 1975/76 ' 
c1 Plan's base year, 1976/77 
D.· Six Year Plan 1 s Projection to 1982/83 
1 000 feddans) _, 
. ' 
Rat~ of Annual-Increase per cent 
A-B B-C C-D A-C C1-D 
1.5 0.1 0.0 0.7 0~6 
16.2 7-8 9.1 11.6 8.9 
-0.8- -8~7 12.3 -4.6 14.5 
2.0 5~7 8.7 4.0 7-2 
5.0 8.7 2.5 7-0 1.9 
27.0 12.0 11.1 18.6 6.2 
6.7 10.0 8.9 8.5 7-9 
4.0 11.0 3.2 7-8 3-5 
14.1 5.1 33-1 31.0 39.0 
- - 21.9 - 26.0 
- - 33-4 - 30.8 
19.0 3-5 9.1 10.2 5.8 
* Three years average 
** 
*** 
F:.ve -years. average 
Estimates · 
I 
I 
--
Source: Compiled from: (1) The Democratic Republic of the Sudan,- The Six Year'Plan of Economic 
and Social Development,-1977/78-1982/83, Vol.1, .Ministry of National 
Planning, Khartoum, n~d., (in Arabic). -
(2) Ministry of Finance, Planning and National Economy, Economic Survey, 
19t5/76, Economic Research Section, Khartoum, 1976._ 
(3) In ernational Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic 
Develo m·ent and Pro ects of Sudan - The A ricul tural Sector, (Restricted), 
East Africa Depar. men • o. A -- · 
\>J 
0 
f\) 
In contrast to the ·situation of the Nuba variety, the medium 
staple-cotton (Acala Variety), was gaining much ground in the late 
1960's. Much of thiE. expansion resulting from the construction of 
Khashm al-Girba scheme, was in response to _external factors of 
world demand by medium spinners. Further expansion was achieved, 
though_at a slower growth rate, during the 'Amended Five Year P:j..an' 
1970/71 - 1974/75, with the completion of Es-SukL Scheme in 1971. · 
Perhaps the most significant expression of the §;eneral sentim.ent 
towards the. cotton industry was shown in the introduction of a 
phased programme, outlined in : 1 A ·15 Year Tentative Plan, for 
Sudanese Cotton Textile Industries' in 1972. (17)- Much en,rphas~s 
was given to the importance of medium variet~7 Acala for the local 
textile industry.· Beside supplying about 50 per cent of the coarse 
counts, this staple will provide the medium counts in the proposed 
spinning mills with the pro S:pects of export to neighbouring 
ccrLmtri es·, especially Egypt. -Accordingly, medium variety Acala 
w21J, progressively b·= expanded at an annual rate. of about nine 
per. cent· during the .Six Year Plan. (1977/78 -_1982/83). 
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The aggl:'andisement of medium staple Acala cannot fail to exert 
some influence on the spatial distribution of the ind~strial activity 
. ' 
in the country. The first thing to notice is that the locations of 
the proposed textile mills are broadly material-orientated in 
character and essentially concentrated in the central region with 
an inclination to·stretch eastwards in an effort to secure the 
advantages of an outlet to the overseas markets thro".lgh Port Sudan 
(see Fig. 8.7). 
Co:ilplernentary to cotton production and inde~d to the impo+t.ance 
·' 
of' the central region was the idea of crop divers.ificatipn which was 
becoming a major i s~me of agricultural policy in Suda~ after _the· 
completion of the Rc;:oei.·ces Dam in 1965. Apa:~t from tb,e concern 
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over the instability and occasional failure of cotton production 
and the problem of marketing, demand for import~d foods, especially 
wheat,·was gradually becoming a prom-inent fixture on the country's 
list of imports. The unacceptability of this situation was ex-
pressed in an exte:nsive programme, in the early 1970's, to increase 
wheat production on land formerly devoted to co·0ton. By inspecting 
the average annual rate of increase in wheat acreage for the three 
periods in Table a. 2 wheat scores a figure of· '18. 6 per cent, second 
only to sugar cane. 
Ul t~mately, this consideration favoured th·e growth of modern 
·:: 
flour rriills as an industry distinct from the v~idespread, small 1 
sorghu:n .rn{lls. For one thing, the effect of the new structure on 
location is.tremendous: ·where the customers of the traditional 
. . 
small stone ·mills are individual households'· the patrons of the · 
new mills are localized bakeries closely associated with·the urban 
population~ It is due to such populations that consumption was so 
rapidly.increasing. Probably the spread of thE: 'wheat-eating' 
habit in :.rrban areas is due to the changing· rhy·chm and style of 
life whi.ch do not fit in well with the preparatton of the staple 
':food, Kisra. · This is ·a lengthy and complex procedure, exclusively 
a female speciality to satisfy the immediate needs of the household. 
A large and growLng .. sector of town dwellers are· ma,le immigrants 
who are obviously incape3:ble of producing Kisra and at the same time 
co·uld not conveniently. buy' it. Bread, a cominodi ty o'b:tainable from 
the corner-shop, is the practical solution, p~ctical even for 
many fp.m.ilies whose· 'woman/hour' input is limited while the number 
to be fed is increasing through reproduction, and immigrant rela-
tives who visit for a period. that may extenC'. for years! Tne strain 
on the ~abour-input necessitates supplementin~ Ki~ with bread. 
Moreover, Ki s:.:•a is unadaptable to go ··tJi th. new food dishes 
such as the popular Egyptian beans (vicia faba), thus it is 
practically excluded from all meals taken away from home during 
the workingday. :Furthermore, the food grain itself is unsuitable 
for making item,s such as biscuits, macaroni, vermicelli, cakes, 
pa~tries etc., .consumption of which i.s rapidly expanding. 
The most important direct impact of the. expansion of durum 
wheat pr.oduction on location of flour .mills was the radical adjust-
ment to new organisations and structures rather than the switch 
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to local sources of wheat. It is true that the processing of 
imported wheat should·take place in the location of maximum profit-
ability' i.e. the conurbation' B:CCOrding to ·~he Prime Base doctorine. 
Furthermore, from classical location. theory,. developing lci.cal 
sources ()f material "should not alter the situation' since flour 
millirtg'is a mark1~t-orientated industry, because the weight. of the 
. end-proa,uct in;reases in the milling process~ This being so because 
of the. low moi stu:re content of 7. 4 per cent of the dur.um -wheat, ·as 
. compared With 14·. 5 per cent-moisture co.nte.nt. of :flour. (18 ) Unc·on-
"ientionally, all new·. flou~ mills were located in the Gezira and 
Kha·~bm!il-Girba. ·in an apparent material source orientation (see 
Fig. 8.7)· 
There appear to be at least two dimensions of this s:j.tuation 
indirectiy connected with materials and market. Firstly, in the 
govern~'D.ent-tenant agreement of the Gezira scil8me, and the later 
. . . 
Kha$hm al-Girba schel;lle, food and fodder crop.s g;rown in ro.tation 
-with the. cash crop, cotton, are exclusively for the benefit of . 
the farmer. Unlike cotton, the marketing of such crops is left to 
the .. discretion o:f the tenants. To the farmer, the production cost 
is;too high to. warrant any profit if he has to sell at the.ruling 
price of imported wheat. To maintain product,..:_ on, however, the 
government p9.ys a subsidy to growers. Revolving aro:u_:~d a deli-
cate price structure was the revitalisation .of tenants' coopera-
tives to emancipate farmers from the exploita~ion of traders and 
grain dealers. Now.farmers could at least sell at the fixed mini-
m~liD price. The cooperatives co:1J.d in. no .way miss the price differ-
ential between grain and flour. · To process would not only mean 
achieving· added va.lue but selling at the wholesaler's margin of 
'· profit. Like many processed, imported com.mcdi ties, 'Khr3.rtoum f .o .b. 
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prices were laden with a high margin of profi·:' import duties' the 
addition::tl 'profit on cost to store' and initial high processing 
cost. Grain milling in the Gezira by the cooperatives was further 
made pos.sible by the facilities and concessions given by sympathetic· 
·governments. The example set by the Gezira tenants was soon followed 
by the .farmers of Khashm al-Girb::t 13cheme. 'Ihe effect of the Prime 
Ba.se is no' longer applicable since the new pr:Lce structure ":n'd 
government. concessions negate the 'profit on cost to store' and 
curb the influence of the. basing system. Eventually, the private 
sector outside t.he Prime Ba.se was freed to act within a new market 
. . ~ . . 
s'tri.wti.lre where basic flo·:J.r milling cotl.ld flourish. 
As was show:n in Table 8. 2, it was sugai· cane tnat made the 
greatest rate of annual acreage growth for th:; perioQ. A-C. · Con-
fronted ·with an ever-increasing sugar copsu:rripti0:n and reliance on 
. ov~rsea.s suppliers, successive government reaLi-sed the need for· 
import-substit.ution~ Because of the multiplicity of conditio-ns 
under whi.clJ. sugar cane can grow, large tracts of the heavy clayey 
soils (Grade 2 and 3 - with varying degrees of So:iium content) of 
c:eptral, eastern and southern regions, lie ne3.r the climatic margin 
of irrigated s~gar cane production.C19) Within this broad area, 
sugar· refining started an:i' in the same area' the suga,r indu:stry 
will probably' flourish as a classic material-orientated industry. 
Nonetheless, quite a range of factors of significance from 
the point of view of location decision are involved when choosing 
a specific location. In an obvious material-orientat.ed industry, 
the influ.ence of the local market has no relevance to the location 
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problem in the absence of competition. One should remember that 
the stat~ ~onopoly ·of the sugar trade has been· the practice for.· 
the last 60 years. During this period an efficient price-basing 
system was developed. With Khartoum as the case,· uniform delivered 
prices .are quoted in· all ·directions, except where 'freight absorp-
tion' is practised for the .sake of remote areas·. Where ;production 
is meant for overseas markets, the price-basing system obviously 
ceases to operate as will be subsequently sho·N"n. 
Because the location of a sugar refinery is deeply set in 
the agri.cul tural framework' agronomists have . much to say· .in identi-
fying prospective carie fields according to expe:ciment s which con-
sider·. soil quality' land configuration and irrigabili ty' relative 
humidity, etc. It lies in the domain of hydrologists however, to 
determine which water source could possibly be tapped. 
· Av.ailability of· 'timelyi Nile waters. (February to ·May), poses 
a cumbersome· and a. somewhat intricate problen1 for· ag·ricul tural · 
development in Sudan. At the present pace of aL:reage expansion 
: ·. . . ..: . . . : 
an'd ·crop: in ten sif:icafi.on, the few coming ~e8,-I'S. will· almost certainly 
. ' ., . ~. . . . 
wit'n~·ss the .complete ").ltili sation of the 2CL 5 milliards (measured · 
at Sennar) allotted to Sudan· by the '1 959 Nile Wat.ers Agreement. It 
is reckoned that 23 milliards will eventuallt be needed by the 
year. 1985( 20) - a deficit of 2. 5 milliards. · 
The implications of .adjusting to such a· situation have far 
-reaching effects on industrial location. The· symbiotic relation-
ship between,river regime and agricultural deveJ_opment has for 
many years favoured the Blue Nile, whose widely inconsis~ent flo;.v 
pa:ttern th~oughout .the year (about 65· per cent. of its annual dis-
charge ·occurs during the two ·;nonths of Septe.mber and ·october, 
whereas· only seven per cent flows during December to May), ( 21 ) 
commanded priority of regulation and harne ssiqg. By the early 
1970's it was realised that the existing storag~ capacities ori 
the Blue Nile of ~5.11 milliards would only be. sufficient·in 
1978, for 'timely 11 water needs for the early stages of the Rahad 
Project and 6rop intensification.C 22 ) 
Any major ir~eigation schemes to be watered· with no further 
capital outlay on dam construction shouldobvlously be within 
reach ~f the Whit~~ 'Nile~ Previmlsly, water sup_t)ly froJl this river 
was lirirl. ted to li:ft irrigation to adjacent. pump sci?-emes, a's the 
whole White Nile :System· was conventionally· desigpated· for the 
benefit ·of .. Egypt. Because of the gentle gradient, sluggishness, 
·and uniform..tty of the White Nile's flow, it ~as alleged that .. maxi-
. . . . . . . . 
mum storage capacity had already been reached .. ,·Ti th 'the· construction 
... 
of. Jabel Auliya dam in 1935 (total capacity.of a.bout three milli-
ards)~ ( 23) ·After the completion of the over-year storage. Higp.' Dam 
in 1959, the urgency to release Jabel Auliya's-stored wat~r.~as 
- .·. . . 
Hence it was becoming possible to Jiaintain 
., . 
water to levels bigh enough to ensure late wi_nter-early summer 
watering~ .\.Jhi te Nil.e water supply for irrigation will eventually 
rl.se ~rol!-1.91 mi.ILtards in 1975 to 3-55 milliarcis i.n 1985. ( 24 } 
' . 
Along. the upper reac{le s of this river too, the prospects of adding 
. . 
2. 35 milliards are well in· sight as construction' work on the .long-
aw~ited Jonglei eanal is. now underway'. In conformity with a 
steadily increased use of the White Nile waters, the prime deter-
minants of locating the ambitious sugar plantation projects are 
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clearly. set. Hagar Asalaya, Melut, Mongallr:. and Kenana Sugar· 
schemes 'will all be irrigated from this sourc~ <Fig. 8. 7). 
Within these confines, entrepreneurs or pl.qnners make the 
final ioca:tion dec.1sion. Displaying· a multi tude of these factors 
was the. grand Kenana Sugar scheme. Although t:q.ere were initially 
three possible are~s to choose from, the extensive stretch of 
Kenana plains between the VJhite and Blue Niles probably hadmost 
. . 
.~ 
advantages· for the following reasons: 
1. While Kenana cou'ld technically be watet'ed by both \r.lh_{ te 
and Blue Niles, the limited available Blue Nile .Waters should 
logically b~ spared: for the irrigable eastern p:Lains out of ·reach 
of the White Nile. For this reason, the Roseires-Singa stretch 
was discarded. 
2~ The other option, the Malakal-Kosti stretch reqUires 
additional ·transportation and energy facilities atready available 
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at Kenana. SinGe the project has an· ultimate c·apacity of a million· 
tons of .;refined ;:;ugar annually with export plans in mind, the 
southern. stretch. was comparatively at a clear disadvantage. 
Besides, the ·Kenaha·location will make use of ancil'lary.works taking 
:piace in the central region and indeed benefit from existing facil-
. it:l.es such as the c~ment factory at Rabak and roads already. under 
. ·. t .·. t. ( 2c:,) 
cons rll,C 1.on. "' 
One more aElpect of location involved in the development of 
the sugar industry is regionalism in a general sense: specifically, 
the aim .is to· create· employment opportuni ti·is and to maintain a 
' . . . . . 
regional self-suffi~iency for the southern region and to bridge 
the· growing eco:oomic disparity between central and southern Sudan. 
Aft·er the completion of this massive :8ugaf ·production pro-
gramme,. it is hoped that Sudan will become a net exporter by the 
1980's (see Table 8.3). Success in that dire.ction too, will 
.encourage· future expansion of sugar cane .production and present 
new possibilities of industrial location. The 1'1alakal-Kosti 
. -stretch: arid Upper Atbara.· are already cited as the next likely 
1 ·. t• . (26) oca lons. . . . 
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Though less dramatic in absolute terms, the phased expansion 
of other crops is still quite substantial~ 'l'O.e projected· promot:Lon 
of tea and tobacco production as import-substitutes, for example, 
will have a special bearing on development -in southern Sudan and 
will mean the establishment of new packing plants. Similarly, 
. . 
castor-seed produetion in the Gash delta has already drawn attention 
to··the·possibilities of castor-oil refining. for .export at either 
Port Sudan .or Aroma.; 
All inall, . a new. dimension will be added to the picture of 
.·. \ 
Sudan· as merely ·a primary producer. . If currE;!nt program:.rn.es were to 
. . 
be. put into action, many institutions influencing personnel, 
marketi.ng and credit, should be revised or replaced because of . 
the. n~w orientat::~on. The new strategy nas :Lts own rules and special 
requirements:' a different banking system, mar:rl::eting structure,. 
p:itte:r:ns of cons1nnption and saving, infrastructure and investment 
will be<neces,sar;y • 
.8 ... 2. 3• 2 · Aniin9.l Reso'J.r.ces 
.. · .. · 
Sudan is renowned. for her rich animal r,esources ·to the extent 
of .occasionally being equated with-Texas in t3.rins of future p.otent-
. ial. ( 27} .The opportunity for development is commonly identified 
by interested parties. Range land is predominantly natural pasture 
clo~ely lined with the wide Savanna belt. The_ 400 mm Isohyet 
broadly divides the country into wet and dry zones, tho'.lgh semi-· 
desert and desert conditions to the upper fringE?. of ·this zone do 
.. 
. Table 8. 3 
'. 
Projection of Sugar Production in, Sudan 1974-1985, · ( '000 tons) 
.'·· 
.. . ' 
Locatio.n 'of ·m11 · 7.4/75 75/76· 76/77 77/78 · 78/79 79/80 80/81. 81/82- 82/83-83/84 84/85 
... 
Gurieid - 55 55 60 ·· . 65 70 75 75 75 80 80 80 
Khashm al-G±rba ·-- ·80 ·80. 95 ·100 · · 100 ·. 105 105. 105 110 .. 110 110 
N.W. Sennar - 40 .80 110 115 120 125 130 135 135 135 
Asalaya -· - 40 80 ·110· 115 120 125 130 130 135 
Kenana - - 85 200 300 330 350 360 · 370 380 · 390 
l"'alut - - · 40 70 90 100 1.05 110 110 115 120 
l"'ongalla -. - - - 10 15 25 30. 35 40 50 
Renk - - - - - · 140 280 ·. 360 400 410 430 
.8i -1:- 9.i t . - - - ~ - - - ?0 140 220 240 . 
Total Prod.uctiol'l 135 175 400 .. G35 · 795 1000 113"5 1365. 1.510 1620 · 1690 
Local Consumption . 300 320 340 · 360 380 400 · .. 430 460 · 490 520 · · 550 
Import(-) or . -165- -145 ~60 +275 +415 +600 755 +905 ~1020 +1100 +1140 
·EXport ( +) ______ ·---'---------------------'-------------
·Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources, Current A~ricultural 
Statistics,. Statistics Section, (CAS - Vol.1, No.1,.) Khartoum, 975. 
\jJ 
~ 
1\) 
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not .impede nomadism, whereas livestock breeding is restricted 
by the tsetse endemic in the southern tip of the wet zone. Latest 
estimated totals of animal wealth are 15.8 million head of cattle, 
27 ~ 3 ::nil.li~n sheep and goats and 2. 8 million. camels. ( 28 ) However, 
·, ' . . . 
annual animal offtake is disproportionately lo;..v' at an estimated 
figure of 2. 5 - ~· 0 per cent. ( 29) 
Cur~ously enough, this sector was the first to be ·exposed to 
foreign trad~ and yet the least affected by the· growing .modern 
sector. The willingness to sell involves a complex.of ecological, 
sociological and market factors: the natural range is of rela-
tively low nutritive value and the animals are susceptible to a 
. . 
varietyof diseases and parasites and.occasional epidemics. 'The 
reliance on 1inselective animal breeding is tightly intertwined 
·with the nom:'lds' conception of wealth. Once the nomads came in 
to·;.:wh with the. cash economy, self-sufficien·~Y, or subsi'stency, 
. started to fade away against an ·overwhelming p.et of wants. Because 
real 'cost ·is no more than labour input and time, and both have no 
material value in the rhythmic way of nomadic life, nomads could 
sell cheaply. On the other hand, demand for livestock :Ln·both 
. . . 
local and foreign markets always involved artifically lo;..v prices 
because of a pending concession to Egypt, a country whose supply 
' . 
intere$ts ·in. Sudan 'N"~re closely safeguarded dnring the foreign 
rule and·a.r~ still preserved in an air of sympathetic bilateral 
a~reement.s. ·Thus whatever differential may exist between producers 
. . 
. . . . 
apd cm:lswner~ pr:ices, is snatched by rapaciou's livestock traders 
and monopsonist importers. 
Until recently, the government.appear~·to have played little 
part in striking a fair· deal for either the cr:mtral treasury or 
the nomadic producer. Under these circumstances, animal owners 
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Vfere tied to a. virtually stagnating enviro::~mcnt, as returns were 
too slight to justify elab~rate infrastructural projects~ The 
. . ' . 
acute lack of infrastructure on the. other h::J.nd,has further re-
buffed private investors. The viciousness of these disp::J.rities 
are p9.rticularly self-perpetu::J.ting. 
Perh:1ps the.most prodigious sign of a break-thro'..lgh is the 
orchestrated· attempt by the Arab cou.ntries :1t a co:J.scio·;J.s long-term, 
intra-regional policy of .agricultural d~velopmeiJt. (30) The 1973 
Oil War not only bro·U.ght about massive riches in the Middle East, 
but also pre~ipitated a frustrating feeling of insecurity, and 
emphasised the contradiction of reliance on provokable, retaliatory 
international trading partners, who among many other items, supply 
more than ,50· per ·cent of the food. need$ of the. region.(3'1) · 
" Directly connected With the volume of money inflow :1nd world infla-
tion is the. escalation of demand for, and 'price of, goods, especially 
. foodstuffs, im:P~rted into the region. 
Understandably, so::ne industrialised countries are also becoming 
intere$ted in the possi bi'li ties of Sudan s;in~e 'they are enduring 
the depths of economic 'recession. In·many s~ch.countries unetnploy-
ment isJ"M't&riJCh:lj1~ high,· and inflation lingers at an astronomical 
level. ·To' revi tali~e these economies the options are broadly· to 
boo$t exp~rts, ·increase local investment in new .. machinery, restrain 
wage.s :1nd curb spEmd.~ng, and, if need be, borrow. Obviously, foreign 
investm·emt .is uriwelcq:me, though contractors·,: sub-contractors and.· 
engineering .consulta:pcies and agencies are eiJC.OUr~ged. Thus the 
co.mbinat;ion of. weptern technology and Arab finance is.heralded as 
. ' ,. .. . '· . 
coming a.t~ th.e right time, and in the right style ·and proportions. 
Conse9.uently, the p:ressing infra structural neec.s which were the 
basic deterrent of private investors are for the first time being 
viewed within a long-term objective·. Furthe:::-more, the often dis-
su.aded P+i vate: foreign investors are now enoour·aged by the image. 
of 1 Arab mon·ey 1 in Sudan, and are seeing great opportunities for 
involvement in Sudanese developmental projects. Animal health, 
breeds,. pasture, cmru~erciali sation and marketing would be improved 
by both tht;l already comini tted investment, a.nli the· forthcoming in-
flow of capital envisaged by the Six Year Plar 1977/78 - 1982/83, 
and anticipated in ·a coriprehensive .25 -year plan (1976 ~ 
2000) engineered by the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Develop-
. . ..· . . . . (32) 
ment (A.F.E.S.D.)~ .· 
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At this point a distinctio~. has to be made between the tradi-
tional :pasto'ral nomadism and emerging co.rnmerr.ial grazing and farming 
activities •. ·In the first sector, immed~ate gains will be proportion-
ate to the intensity of· services rather than strru.ctural or insti tu-
tional changes·, and development· will positively effect growth rates 
.... 
of-animal· otftake, net price. to producers and continuity and rl:se 
. . . ' 
of demand. ··Under this activity, one aspect of prj_me importance, 
from tne location p.oint of view, _will be the creation of upkeep 
stock corridors. Through such roates animals .move· overland from 
. . . . . ·. 
· th~ J?roduction. centre~ in the west to a di sease.:.free zon~ in c·entral, 
rwrthern ~nd eastern Sudan. It is the urban nodes of the distrib:l-
ti ve system ·:'in this zqne that would commerciall-y be invigorated in 
. . 
response to increasec;J. income and demand in both catch:nent areas 
· and catc1L~ent ·points~. · In the latter, the enlargement of· the 
.. · ... ,. 
.r:. 
slaughter b.:ouses wou:j_d eventu9.lly provide a n0w. stimulus for a 
1 ea ther industry. Of course, th-L s could not be visualised in isola-
t.ion from the overall sectoral development. 
T1,1rning to livestock ranching and commercial farming, the 
position is. st:j_ll ·in the formative process. L9.rge-sc{lle ranching 
. . v . . 
·p+ojects 'have alre~dy been mooted and p:re·-fe3.sinili ty studies are 
now i.mderway.- 1'1i.llions of feddans are being ..3Urveyed in the 
savanna plains of southern Dar Fur and the southern reaches of 
the Blue Nile Province. Unlike pastoral nomadism., tbis sort of 
farming is capital intensive an:l highly speci,alised. The objective 
is to effect st.r-u.ctural changes in response to market range and 
intensity, and consuint~r proximity and preference. Preparation and 
cold storage of meat would prpbably be the mainlivestock-based 
industries; at least for so::ne time, as dem8.nd in the Arab market 
is·characterised by fresh meat preference. 
To institute·a full range of meat canning and processing is 
an obvio·Lis future possibility intrinsic in the ·nature of such pro-
.· ' . : . . . 
jects and associated with cost-price structures and demand charac-
teristics. Probably a gradual change of co::~sumption patterns and. 
consumer preference in favour of canned and. frozen meat at the 
traditio'nal market 'woLlld be.· encouraged by aq increase of demand 
and by supply regularity, price abasement anc1 stability. Wh~n coJD.-
. . ' . 
petiti ve price~ are' maintained and demand charC!-cteristics are met', 
access to· the :Pr.eferentialist, protected markets such as those of 
the European Com:m·.ln1ty, could be just conceivable on evidence of 
the growing:gaps between su:ppl:y and demand. (33) 
' ' . 
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AsBu:min·g rationa1i ty of planners and investors, the meat canning 
and process1ng industry should locate in the vicinity of the prepara-
tion·and cold-storag~ projects. A resource-ba$e orientation is 
emphEJ.sised by the freight cost differentials between ·tran$-shipping 
. . ' ' ' . . . . . 
packed meat to cqi?slip-ption destinations and whole meat transporta ... · 
t~on to Port Sudan fpr further processing. Damazin, Nyala and 
probab:i;y 'Senn~ar or. 1Costi a~e the mb st likely locations because of 
initial. cost advantage; accessibility to raw materials, fresh water, 
energy; pools of. semi-skilled labour, and transr.ortation (see Fig. · 
8~ 6). 
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Now we turn to the other form of sto8k farming, that of 
intensive commercial feeding and breeding. The emergence of 
this activity is o::~ly recent and in .effect a product of vlgoro:1s 
interplay of supply and deman::l. Both were erratic apd eruptive 
since the beginning of this decade and especially so after the 
winter of 1973. Under the prevailing co::~ditions of animal trade, 
three short:...comings could be identified: firstly, the rate .of: 
growth of offtake is disproportionately low compared with that of 
demand, :both. domestic and foreign; secondly, a disparity between 
peak and off-peak supply is in:'2erent in the p:3.storali sm production 
system and is acce.ntuated from time to time _by vagaries of climate 
and .marketing system; thirdly, the widening or the gap between 
p:revimisly stable or quasi-stable internal prices and l'1i.dd.le 
Eastern inflationary prices after 1973. Under the norms of an 'J.n-
restricted trade with this region, internal prices were practically 
uncontrollable. As net returns to traders are higher when export-
ing, they can profitably manage to pay the ~xtra prices demanded 
by animal Qwners who are themselves pressed fo::r:- money because of 
'• ·. ·. 
theinflationary prices of consumer goods. In an attempt to stabil-
ise prices the government was forced to ban export of animals and 
meat in 1975. (34 ) -~lthough this action temporarily eased ·the acute 
pro'blE?m~. inflationary prices and supply fluctuations were still 
far f,rom being curbeQ.. 
A rad:j.cal solution, it was anticipated, w:ould be the establish-
ment within. the p:ibl;ic sector. of intensive, urban-orientated 
commer9ial farmj.ng. A pilot fattening unit was established in 
1974 in the· neig~bourhood of Kbartou.11. ( 35) Far from being com.peti:-
. ti ve\ · rriea.t ··co pt s proved to be rather exorbitant. The cost of feed 
. . . '· . 
produced under irrigation was prohibitive an::l the size of farms 
and stock numbers were all too small to reali s~ ·economies of . scale.~ 
Moreover, overhead costs and labour and management costs were 
other problems that contributed to the unsuccessful running of 
this new sector. Pro~ably the most promising line to folloll is 
the development of animal feedstuffs from crops within the exist-
ing rotations or from by-products such as oil-cake. 
In contrast, dairy farming and dairy pro.lucts are gaining 
popularity in urban are·as, particularly the con'irbation, beGause 
the main traditional suppliers are cut off by distance and the 
perishability of the product. Nearby animal keepers, though they 
are still the main suppliers, cou.ld not cope with the increased 
demand· nor the diversity of milk products ar.d specificati·ons no'.-J 
required~ 
8.2.:?~3 .Forest~d Fisheries 
Forestry and f~sheries are two economic activities largely 
in abeyance at present in Sudan, and co.mmand low priority in the 
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development strategy. \rJh.ile funds for the }?romotion of fisheries 
are·mini.mal, investment in forestry has been confined to reservation, 
plantation and. research, conducted in the p'.lblj c sector. For the 
pioneering private ~ntrepreneur, primarily engaged in import-
substitution ind.ustries, forestry and fisheries are not an attrac-
tive proposition, due to the lo'N" level of imports and thus the 
. . . 
lack- of · o:ppo.r::tuni ty for impo:r:-t-substi tution. Moreover~ the products 
of these two activities could be consumed in their raw state with 
littl~ or no transformation needed. Charcoal, railway-sleepers, 
telep2one poles, sun-d.ried fish, etc. are examples. Rigorous prom-
otion plans are th~s needed in the absence of ready markets and 
lack of· ·established taste. Forested areas as well as :marine and 
freshwa.ter fisheries are remotely located from local markets. To 
the private investor, the time element and costs are pro~ibitive. 
However, the current Six Year Plan (197'7/'78 - 1982/83) has 
shoWn some interest in ~igh-value and/or low-cost products such 
as plywood, paper, beeswax, garad (sant-pod.) for tanning, smoked 
and dried fish, etc. Beside the obvioas material orientation, 
location will be determined by the structure of the industry, i.e. 
whether it will be for export or local sale or whether it will be 
in the hands of the. private or p:1bli c sector. ·With a ready market 
for fish in central Africa, ana the intention of the government to 
explore the economic possibilities of the so,.lth, priority will be 
given to the fishing industry in the vicinity of. the swamps and 
numerous streams of the south. Similarly the e)Ctensive fresh-water 
fishing.possibil:ities of Lake Nubia (about t·:rvo to five million . 
feddans) and marine fishing along the 480 Km of the Red Sea coast 
aroused ·interest in foreign private concerns, e·~pecially those of 
the Middle East where a large market awaits exploitatio~.C36 ) 
8.3 Ancilla~, Intermediate and Residual Industries 
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The structural features and magnitude of investment so far 
discussed co:1ld be a p.romising environment for ·a process of comple-
mentary developm~nt.which is, in part, a prerequisite for the · 
establishment of al~ied 'ancillary', ~intermediate' and 'residu~' 
industries~ It is possible, therefore, from a locatfonal point of 
view, to.identify a spatial development where distributional change 
is exemplified by th~ degree of linkages, structure, an~ the size 
and form of capital •. Locational preferences o:f residual industries, 
for example, are geared to the food, textile and leather industries 
and they expand horizontally wherever such raw materials as molasses, 
bogasse, . cotton-'llTOol, tallow a.nd animal feedstuff are available. 
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I:..1termediate industries such as sweets, biscuits, margarine, 
artificial silk, shoes, tyre inner-tubes, steel and engineering, 
furniture, hardboard, etc., show a great degree of locational in-
flexibility because their intermediate inputs are. diversified and 
sensitive to distance friction. Easy access to su-ppliers and dis-
tributors is essentially, provided in the Prime Base where a wide 
spectrwn of industries already exists, and where distance fri.ction 
is minimised by the pricing system and mechanism. 
In.the light of the present annual acreage growth rate of 
4.3 per cent,· and projected annual producticn growth of 6.5 per 
cent for. the COJ!ling SiX years, the SCOpe for a:1Cillary industries 
such as agro-chemicals, agricultural machinery and implements, and 
packing material is considerable. The importat:j_on .of fertilizers, 
insectic::i_des, tractors and sacks, absorbs about one tbird of the 
country's for~ign.earnings, and constantly strains the ba,lance of 
paymen:j;. Thus, in view of the government's import-substitution 
policy. and the horizontal and vertical expansi::m of agriculture·~ 
a series of projects to ::nanufacture, assemble or process ancillary 
products wer~ earnestly sought (see Fig • .8.7) • 
. · ·The most obVious and,. indeed, the most controversial is the 
agro-chemical indus~ry. While the Confederation of British Industry 
(C.B.I~) ·believe that local production ip econc,mically unviable, (37\he 
F. A. 0. is advocating the establi sh:nent of thi a industry, (3S) and 
. . ' : 
the Japane.se. are very interested and deeply involved in promoting 
the agro':""chem:ical. i~dustry.C39) Because the main input could 
·either be a ubiquitous material such as nitrogen or a punctiform 
on~ such as naphtha, location would be in the first·case near the 
. . . ... ·. . ' . 
ma.rkets, i.e. in the Gezira, whereas in the case of naphtha the· 
industry would a:l_i.gn with the oil refinery at Port Sudan •. In an 
industry where economy of scale is a prime ·consideration for 
successful operation, it is interesting to nc te the. suggestions of 
the F.·A.O. ·-which recommends smaller fertilizer units to be dis-
persed in the main production areas of Gezira; Khash:n al-Girba 
. ·. (40) 
and Southern Kordofan. .· Another ancillary ·industry of equal 
importance is the processing of jute substitute for packLng.· This 
co:1ld either be natural such as ker.:_~f. (Hibi,:;cus ·Cannabim1s), or 
synthetic. The r1inistry of Agriculture has "teen experimenting 
with kenaf since the early 1940's in the rainy southern region 
(in the. Tonj area), and later under irrigation in central and 
ea.stern Sudan. Being a material-orientated_industry, the_choice 
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to be made was determined, in the first place, by cost differentials 
under the two water supply systems. Clearly, production under the 
rain-fed system is less costly. However, flt_ctuations of rain and 
of prod1l~tion ~ave·shifted the emphasis to irrigated production of 
kenaf in Abu Naama (Blue Nile Province) where production per feddan 
is )J.igher anp_ also it is nearer to exLsting markets.' 
It is interesting to_ note that in 1971 a private concern 
started produ¢tion of plastic sacks in the :;?rime Base with an 
initial capacity of ten thou.sand tons per anr.um. One wonders what 
benefit the. country gets from such an u.ndertaki ng that imports all 
its raw ma:terial at a time when local fibres could be processed! 
Du,ring.the last few years there has been ·a strong tendency to 
favour local assem?ly of·agricultural machinery and implements~· In 
contrast to many ancillary industries in developing co·:.mtries this 
activityhas a distinctive locational attraction to.ports since 
components are imported from overseas. Port Srdan is no exception. 
It is. quite clear that regional industrial policies had not 
been formulated within the body of legislations to promot~ indus-
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trial investment in Sudan issued prior to 1972; Unlike. industrial-
-ised countries where such policies are spontaneous measures to com-
b?,t regional imbalances, Sudan's attempt was one of initiating 
industry to augment sectoral malformation. Any such attempt is 
indifferent to place and, in an imperfect mai·ket, one location~ 
the Tripartite ,Capital, was already garnering the essentials for 
the 'incubation of industry, i.e~ consumer import substitutes. 
The rising number of rural population and exod.us to the PriiD.e 
Base, tl:le economic growth rate differential between periphery and 
. . 
core·, C?.n9. the intensified political unrest in the so:1th ( 1955 
1972) projected the regional disp.9.rities and precipitated a growing 
anxLety amongst planners •. A new regional approach was first prom-
ulgat~d in the attempt to decentralise through local and regional 
governments in the eariy _1970's. Encompassed in this realisation 
. . . 
was a fresh approach to regional industrial .location. Preferential 
treatment of 'Rural Areas' was for the first time explicit in the 
1972 Investment Act which conferred upon the Minister of In:lustry 
powers to "issue specific directions to grant enterprises estab-
lished in Rural Areas priorities in obta:j_ning finance from the 
-;Endustrial Bank and other Financial Ban"\cs ••• " ( 41 ). This, it vms 
discovered two jear$ later, was insufficient to create the desired 
1.' . 
effects. More detailed provisions were t:urther made in the 1974 
Industrial. Investme-qt Act, including further preferential conce-ss-
ions to. -r~gion.al. industry. ( 42 ) Subsidiary indt:..stries or branch 
' 
factories were for ~he first time encouraged, and promised fiscal 
assistance. 
Although it is .early days to consider the 'impact of these 
policies; the-limitations are many: .firstl;y, there seems to be 
a universal· lack of. awareness about the range. and co.mplexi ty of 
the. mechanism that disproportionately maximises profits and reduces 
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risk margins at the Prime Base. As long as :~l".e base. pricing 
system is in operation, benefits in the Prime Ease will always 
tend to ou.tweigh those of any possible fiscal assistance to 
regional industry. Under the prevailing conditions even 'b~sic' 
branch factories wo:lld only duplicate overhead and management costs, 
since wl thi.n the existing di stri b:Iti ve system it is more profitable .. 
to expand at the Prime Base. 
The second point relates to .the ambigllity of the very co:1cept 
of regional industry in the various enactments. There is no clue 
whatsoever to whether regional private industry is going to comply 
with growth points or expand within growth zones. All this demands 
organisation, definition and the provision 0~ facilities currently 
unavailable. Hence the most crllcial aspect of this shado·N,Y promo-
tion of reg:Lonal industrial location is its detachment from current 
development programmes and. gro·;rvth strategies. 
Underlying. the. concurrent development o.-:' agr~culture and indu·stry 
is adyria.m{c evolution of a 'thumb-forefinger' growth zone, defined 
by the two tips of Kh?.rto·;.rm and Port Sudan, an6. the broad base of 
Kosti-Sennar. In between are a few 'joints' such as l'1edani, Hassa-
hei sa and. Gedarif and Kassala (see. Fig. 8. 7). Presently most new 
investment in both public and joint ven.tures is directed towards 
. . ,· ' . . 
. this region which iEJ favourable to growth·be~ause of the existence 
of a multivarious export-orientated infrastructure. A.F.E.S.D's 
.short-term programme allocates about 60 per ·cent of its capital 
investment for the cO:ming ten years to this ce.ntral region, as was 
reportedby l'1.E.E.D •. in 19?7: 
The .A.A.D.A.I. (Arab Authority for Development 
and Agricultu~al Itivestment - an A.F~E~S.D. agency) 
found it necessary' to concentrate its projects up· 
to 1985 in the northern and easteru regions where 
it can make immediate use of the e:z:isttng facili-
ties of water, irrigation, electricity, manpower 
.and, mo$t important, port facilities, which are· 
available only at Port Sudan. (43) . 
It is most likely that a blend of agro-based industries,.as well 
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as non-basic industries, wo::t.ld prosper in proportion to the capital 
outlay and general rise in income. Yet, in the short-r-u.n, this 
industrial .. grmvth is only horizontal, void o:: any str~ctural sub-
starlC~, i.e., a one-industry one-factory si tua.tion. · 
·In contrast, the Prime Base, with its image of primacy, manages 
the in~lowing capital with its financial and banking agencies, an~ 
this adds. intensity to its economic transactions. A new environment 
for a more ·mature industrial structure would t~us be created and the 
ehricht~ent of the· 'th1Elb-forefinger' zone would further consolidate· 
the· distributiv'e i:n-echahism already centred at the Prime Base.. How-
ever, one would anticipate that in the long-run this situationwould 
. . ... 
be interrUpted by pressures extending from a new centre of gravity 
. ' . . . . . . 
at the ··new base of 1'1edan:l-Sennar-Kosti created by· the. projected 
d~velopment of agro-based export industry, in line with the intended 
. . ; 
full use of the economic resources of centra:t.,· southern and south-
western' :regions. 
At this 'midland', a diversity of industri€1 linkages wo'.4d 
pro'bably. <iev.eiop to'.:~ati ~fy growing demand for· ·copsurner and c·api tal 
goods as the remnant 'wealth generated in the agricultural and i!:!-
dustr~al sectors is.J;"einvested. At the 'forefinger tip', Port Sudan, 
and probably Suakin, . (if reinstated as an international sea port) 
: . . . . . 
. ' 
would grow into despatchi.ng.centres having a distinctive industnal 
structurebased on assembly and petrochemicals 'fAith a wide range of 
industries ranging from edible oil mills to spare parts arid pharma-
ceuticals •. 
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CHAP:rER NINE. 
CONCVJSIONS 
9.1 Prologue 
The concern in this thesis is with industrial location in 
Sudan with f?pecial reference to two particular ·aspects. The first 
relates to the analysis of events and economic development pro-
' ' . . . 
c~sses that_culminated in the present location pattern, while the 
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other presents a theoretical-framework to expla~n industrial 
localization through these events and proces1;es. · The complement':" 
arity of the-empirical and theoretical appro3..ches demonstrated,in 
this study facilitates a better understanding of industrial location 
ii.J. Sudan, and. could assist in the apprais-al of future industrial 
location both in the private_ and public sectors. 
9.2 ,The Economic-Process 
The n~ture of the economic process in Sud:m is expressed in 
a- charter·goverrtment-model which was endowed witb. the capacity to 
polarise the export-import trade' the service sector·- and skilled 
persor:in~l·, ~nd . empowered to create a modern 'sec_tor, thus- fostering 
a dual, , prfmary prod-y.cer econo:;ny. ·One obvious· co~ sequence is the 
fact that the gulf that separates the urban ugglo:meration, the 
Prime Base,_- and the periphery is widening thuE promotin.g econo:;¢.,c 
l.r:iequali ty arid smoothing the road for in-migration, especially to 
. . . 
the _modern agricultural sector and ul tiinately to the Prime Ba~e. 
Another i~~ortant- disparity is reflected by the· di sp~oportionate·_. 
dev_elopment of the econo.:n:Lc sectors and· their varying contribution_ · 
to· the national economy. Significantly_,-_ industry {n Sudan was 
suppressed for half a century while export-imr.ort trade, agriculture 
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and services were developing·. However, when industry was later· 
promoted, it had to comply in areal terms with a well-established 
pattern of localization of wealth, commodity flows and 'shadow 
entrepreneur.s', and ~as naturally drawn to wrJ.ere these factors 
localize. The effect of this titne lag on industrial location 
must be· the logical starting point of industrial.location an9,lysis. 
. . . 
In Brookfield.' s words: 
Proper. analysis of the economy of a spatial 
·.aggregate thus demands examination of its 
production ·system and the whole structure· and 
organisation of itp economy. It demands . 
furthermore that· this be done with hi stori·cal 
perspective' and with attention t;o its. 
spatial plan. ('1) 
. . 
The pattern d:l. scovered for Sudan, arid indeed man:r similar economies, 
lS one of centralised· control over capital and control ·of the means 
of ·distribution and diffusion through bureaucratic ma.chinerie.s. and 
comm~rcial banks' thus leading to accumulation of wealth with those 
in command ·of foreign trade and clearing hou~es. Public spending, 
managerial skill ~nd techni·cal know-how are likewise concentrated. 
The ··sho;te'st · route to industri~li sation then i ~ ~o superimpose it 
. . . 
. . . 
on. the well~es:tablished centralised· s;ystem to economise on· trans ... 
. portation,' extenston.services (i.e. electricity, water, industrial 
lahd, sewers etc.) and the· time involved in providing these faci1i-
ties afresh~ 'Shadow industrial entrepreneurs'in Sudan were quick 
to take advantage of the concessionary measures offered to promote 
industry. :i,.t;i. '1956• .. As l.ndustry is predominantly Jonducted by ·this 
· group, it ·automatically inherited· the entr.enched systems of ex_port-
i~ort ,: accessibility to cred,i t· funds, and the intrinsically higher. 
profit ·margins at the Prime Base. The market area ·of this urban 
. complex e:ctends over the whole count:ry .where access to the market 
at· the· national scale ·is more profitably achieved since the Prime 
B?.se is the central depot where all commodity prices are fixed,· 
increasing in all directions :proportionate to di.stance. Accord-
inglY,, industrial localization is an integral :part of the whole 
economic pr6cess as se.en along the s:pace...;tim~' scale •. Obvio".lsly 
thi_s ex:plaJ1p.tion goes far. peyond Hoover's gener:1l observation of 
the tendency for young industry to locate at specific favourable 
:places: 
When an indu,stry is young and its :problems · 
unfamiliar it :prospers best in those few 
·:places which provide the co::nbination of 
appropriate basic skills, together with 
ex:perienc~d managers and so::ne ven:t;Lresome 
enterprisers and financial backers ••.• (2). 
Our departure from :'ioover lies in the attempt in·this study to 
. . . . . . . . . . 
resolve th·e question why certain locations, or indeed· one location, 
. . 
sl:io'Jld garner the :prerequisites for the nascent industry, ·and how-
it all began. 
It has already been indicated that the :Prime Base is the 
heart land of Sudanese industry, and without doubt it comprises 
. the mbst·'coinplex organisation of the incipient i';ldustry in the. 
co·antry. ·As. SU:ch, it is imperative t·o stress that 'basic' industry 
is. still dominated· by agro-industries, ·engaging four-fifths of the 
country's industrial· manpower and :paid-up ca:pi ~a],.. How~ver, the 
. . . . 
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overall capital :performance is weak and indicates among other 
?· 
thing$ the :presence of redundant ca:paci ties. underca:paci ty is · • 
-~----o""> 
likely to be g:reater :o·J.t side the Prime Base . sine 3 the di stri buti ve 
channels are. less developed there, and ill-:equi:ppedto cope with 
commodity· d:i- scharge on the national level. It follows that the-
. . 
ri_s1c ·eiement is more pronounced 1n the regional areas in contrast 
to the Prim~ Base where assets such as industrial land and $torage 
:-.' 
. . - . . 
facilities adequately compensate for any losses that may be in- . 
curred." . The· results of this study also point to variations of 
performance within the sectoral and size structures as revealed 
by the relative efficiency of the Electricaland Engineering 
Industry (SIC m Gro·up VI), and middle size-c~esses (100- 500 
workers). Bahri has more industry, particularly in these cate-
gories, than any other location, and for that reason may justifi-
ably be described as the nerve-centre of Sudan's industry. 
9~3 Industrial Location Patternsand Trends 
·In :many ways the distribution of. industry in Sudan resembles 
that of a' 'developing' country which often dj_splays a three-tier 
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. pattern; .·at the heart is the conspicuo-us Prime Base industry 
stirrounded ·by the em.erging 'non-basic' industries of the secondary 
bases, and the patchy, orie-factory industries of the public s~ctor ',' 
which sparsely dot the remote areas. Struct1p:-al configuration of 
the industij ··varies from one industrial pattern to another thus 
underlin:lng pattern diff~rentiation. The one-factory, public 
' ' 
sector indu'stry' for instance is characterised 'by, large capital 
investment to. satisfy. socio-political objectives," and at the ·same 
. . . . . . 
time to tap une:Xploi ted agricultural re·sources •.. The function· and 
performance of this industry is often ·at odd.; with the Prime Base 
industry e~cept that both industries serve· thE nationwide mar~et. 
wpile the Prime Base industry has developed a cqmplex structure, 
industrial inter..:,lin~ages and relatively higher value added, 
regional industry is_isolated and registers low value added. The 
nori-basic industry of the secondary bases on the other hand, ident;i-· 
' ' ' 
fies more. with the Prime Base, albeit on a much smaller scale. ·Yet 
function~lly it processes local material, agaip on a very limited 
scale. Secondary base industry is singular however, in that it 
only se:r:ves the immediate market. 
In developing a· prognosis for the direction. and growth 
form of Sudanese industry, one must note the important changes 
. . 
taking place in terms of urban growth, and regional and agro-
industriai development. ·About one-fifth of the country's popula-
tion were urban ·dweller9 in 1976. Of this proportion 30 per cent 
live in ·the Kharto·~m Province, and the population of the Prime 
Base is now nearing the million mark.· A di versi ·;y of 'non-basic' 
industries -can thus reach their threshold in the Prime Base, and 
. . 
_ the chances of higher industrial growth and productivity are 
increased -be~ause of the growing industrial inter-linkages and 
. ·-
' . ' . . . 
economies of scale. This fact stresses the growing disparity 
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between the Prime Base and the rural areas, and is causing much 
concern among the admini s,trati ve and planning au]hori ties. Hegional 
autonomy and regional planning are sought to bridge this gap. The 
viability of this approach will be considered iii_ the subsequent 
section. However, what concerns us here is t~e impact of plans 
now under execution on industrial location trends. The strategy 
adopted in the mid-1970's to invite foreign inv8stment, especially 
Middle East.ern capital, to promote agri-business and infrastructure 
will •have •. a; skewed im:pact on industrial iocation _since the central 
·region (Gezira- Prime Base) garners a multifarious export-oriented 
infrast.ructure ,_ and registers a higher~than-average income' product- . 
i vity and. population per sq. Km. than the rest of the country. As 
production,- both ·primary and secondary,. is predom.inantly export-
oriented, major road qonstruction is now traversing the central 
regiori ·and reaching through -the fertile east to the Red Sea. This 
-developmc:mt will l.ead to the evolution of a·' t~umb-forefinger 
growth zone_' defined by the two tips of Khartoum and .Port Sudan 
and- the brmid base of Kosti-Sennar. Capital· investment will -be 
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.at_tracted to this zone, and already 60 per cent ')f A.F.E.S.D's· 
(Ar~b Fund for Economic and Social Development) short-term pro-
gramme (up .to 1985) is concentrated here. Agro-based industries, 
and eventually allied, ancillary and residual industries such as 
fertilizers, agricultural machinery and animc..l feed-stuffs will· 
prosper in. tb,e 'th1l1Ilb-:-forefinger growth zone'. The discovery of 
. . . -
oil in Western Sudan in 1978 will add a new dim·e"'1sion to devel.op-
ment in .th.e central region if commerciai viability of oil production 
i~ asc~itai~ed •. . . The proclamation of 19~0 as 'the year of ·oil'. in a 
'Presidential' broadcast is a strong hint of the positive results 
. . . . ( 3) . . . . 
so far o'bta1ned. There 1 s already speculation about the ext en si.on 
. . 
of pipe lines to the oil fields of the we.st, a11d in fact, a pre~ 
feasibility st~dy f~r· a new oil refinery was pre)ared in 1979~ 
Either Senr:i.ar or Ko st1 were selected as the IPO st sui table locations, 
· agq.in manife~ting the strong pull of the. centra:!. region. It may 
be .anticip~.ted however t0.at the proportion of ind~strial conceritra~ 
tion in the Prime Base itself will be ·somewh&t curbed. Nevertheless 
the d.ivers:L ty and cornplexi ty of the Prime Base in(lustry :will c·ontiime. 
Already the Prime Base has embarked upon 'sustai·1ed growth', and 
will .further intensify its·capacity to manage foreign capital in-
flow and hopefully Sudanese oil dividends. All this, it is antici-
pate(i, will increase ~conomic transactions and industrial localiza-
tion at the Prime Btise. 
. ,_. . . . 
9.4 ·The·Theoretical.Framework 
.. ·. 
Altho,;gh several iocation models and treatises have been cited 
(Chapter· Four), two .broad themes run through ind1:1strial location 
.literature,·relating to least-transfer-cost and locational inter-
Q.ep'endence. These theories are lamentably inadequate for explanation 
; .... 
... 
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of industrial localization in 'dev.eloping' countries. As 
G. Norcliffe noted, the reasons may be congenit~l in view of 
the limited knowledge of 'developing'. co:mtries, and more 
significantly because: "the rest of the worlG: will probably not 
follow pattern's of locational development e:x:hi. .:>i ted in eco~omically 
adva~ced countries."( 4) Since the paths of econ·1mic development 
in industrial ·and 'developing' countries are fundamentally dis-
similar, .and since industrial location is inseparable from the 
totaii ty of the economic pro~ess, s. theory of industrial location 
must have as its roots an explanation of these processes o;f.' 
economic development. In contradistinction to many location mod.el s, 
the theoretical explanation proposed here throug'l the formulation 
of the Prime .Base Theory is thus an attempt to :mderstand industrial 
location in: .. terms of .socio"':'economic organisation as translated. into 
. structural systems and economic process in Sudan. From. t}4s stand-
point, the'. author takes account of the malfoi·mations of the charter 
export-import development and the contradictions of the economic 
.. ·. :.· ·. 
system to ·form the basi'c hypotheses whose tru.th vere assert~d in 
'Chapters· Two a~d Three. Furthermo~e, in any th~.?retical · abstrac-
' .. ,' 
tion one inevitably· has to make some assu.mptions. Among the ·ex-
plfci t assumptions of . the theory one may list even di stri b:ution of 
demand (market), uniform transfer cost ;i.n all directions, and 
identical·· labour cost .and skill. This is not to decry the1r import-
an.Ge. In fact, the assumptions made closely res3mble the real con-
. . ' . . . 
' . 
ditions they' operate J.n. For example, the practiGe of 'profit on 
cost to §tore.' and price basing has more far-reaching effects on 
location thi:rfl actual tra~sportation cost. Similarly., the impo·rt~ 
SUb.sti tute . 'basiC I industry that deVeloped, and the CentraliSed 
' ' ' 
' ' ' 
distributive channels have reduced the impact. o~the market as a 
discrete area .. The ineptitude with which locatiJn factors are 
usually catalogued·often ignores the basic fact that location 
factors operate Within the mechanism of the whole· econoJJic 
process which conditionstheir effectiveness through the existing 
economic· system and policy goals. 
The central tenets of the Prime Base Theo~y are cast in a 
profit maximisation model, and accordingly industri~l ~ocalization 
can be explained in terms of the spatial variability· of profit 
mcirgins, variable cost, arid demand. All three factors are graph-
ically represented to depict locations of maximum profitability. 
Three points, P (port), B (Prime Base), and C (countryside). are 
concurrently considered. Since 'basic' indust :y often imports 
more· than 50 per cent of its input, the local material consumption 
ls alternatively assumed .to be procurable fro:mP, B or C. Moreover, 
as transfer cost of finished goods is five times higher than that 
of raw materials, and profitability varies with profit ·On cost .tq: 
store, the visual impression· from .Figs. 4.3, .4.4. and 4.5 (Chapter 
Four) indicates in each case· that B is the loc:.ttion of maximum 
pr.ofitability~ The main theoretical and methodological conclusion 
therefore, is that basic private industry which normally .imports 
a high proportion of. .its· inputs, will concentrate in a specif:l.~ 
1ocati.on, the· Prime Base. Of course, considerations other than 
. maximi sat~ on of profit are important in general -terms. However, 
these considerations are far less significant :·.n a 'developing' 
country because· the lack of basic services and mJnim,um p.rerequ:j_sites 
in many non-Prime Base areas :r:ules out personal preference. · By. con-
trast, in .industrial countries personal factors· or 'ps.Ychic 1 income·. 
has oft'en stimulated preference for certain locations. 
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9. 5 Industrial Location and Regional Planni~ . 
The degree to which the existing econo~ic system limits 
industrial dispersion was examined in the case.: study (Chapter 
Seven). The economic efficiency of alternative.J.ocations for 
. . . 
the cotton-seed industry on the premise of the least-transfer~-
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co st is- tested. Although sub-optimality of the present concentra-
tion of the cotton-seed. industry at the Prime Base is ascertained 
_iri monetary t~rms (a difference of more than LS. 600,000), the 
constructs of the Prime Base Theory point to the existence of 
.. 
complex factors that yield more profit at the Prilme Base. Para-
doxically then, a leaE?t-cost location does not. necessarily maxi-
mise profit. The dilemma. of this paradox must concern the planning 
authority in two ways. There is the· depressed periphery yvi th its . 
incapacity to fulfil the private entrepreneur's objective of maxi-
. . 
mising profit, and apparently there is an enor·inous wastage in 
a"t?solute moneta,ry ·terms (as has been shown fro~ the e·xample of 
cotton-seed industry), and social cost both at. the urban a~d 
regional.levels. The question we must now pose relates to the 
feasibility-, or even the desirability, of curbing industrial lo~al-
. izatibn at the Prime Base of Sudan, and· conv·ersely the· monetary 
cost and. ·economic r~turns of industrial regionalisation. The 
rising tid~ ,against t;he dispersion of industry in regional planning 
circles 'in the 'West' is neatly summari·sed by Smith: 
·Powerful economic forces are encouraging the 
increasing concentration of economic activity 
and popJJ,lation in major metropolitan regions, 
and it wo'.lld be foolish and imprac+:icable to 
attempt to reverse this to any gre8.t extent. 
Thus there will always be some placES· where 
industry declines and where subsidised economic-
. revival·will not be in the national interest 
on either economic or welfare grounds. (5) 
What Smith had in mind was probably the coal mining a,rid textile 
industries of North-East and North-\-Jest of England. His 
attitude is possibly a direct response to the widespread negative 
results of regional planning to alleviate deyressed conditions 
by fi$cal a~si stance. and creation of growth certres and zones. 
In the two: i~ stances mentioned, industrial decay was largely 
attributable to the dyn.amic restructuring of the industry ·.tn the 
face of nE?W technology, and national and international market 
forces. However, there is another facet to this exposition con~ 
vin·cingly. argued by Alonso: 
-~ •• legislation which encourages the _;_nvestment 
of national r~sources in depressed are~s would 
·.seem to sac:rifice some national econ~mic growth 
for greater internal equality. ( 6) · . · 
. ' ' . . 
The implicit assumption here is that higher _pro::luctivity is more 
likely to b.e attained in the urban agglomeration bec~use of indus-
trial inter-linkages, specialised' services,. massing of" reserves, 
. . . . 
and externalities. 
. . : . 
These objectives could not be satisfied at 
the: periphery and consequently in attempting to -'regionali se 
industry, the country will forfeit national economic growth. The 
co·imter· argument that may be advanced is that externalities in · 
the Prime Base are· sustained largely because of indirect _subsidies 
rel~te.d to spatial. P.J:'Ofi tabili ty margins and .pric~ basing system.· 
This distortion of the space economy has a mar€9.nal _cost -distinct 
from external diseco~omies - unaccounted for by_ Alonso, that would 
. certainly re·8ult in a lower marginal produc~ at the Prime Base 
than is generally assumed. According to the fii.1dings of this 
study if. thesE? econonlic factors are understood in their true pers- .. 
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. pective, higher productivity at the Prime Base· cq.n be achieved' 
simply by, scrapping certain regulatory practices such as the spatial 
variability of profl.t margins, and the price b~sing system. With-
drawing these· indirect subsidies will largely reduce marginal cost' 
and in effect, mean higher marginal product. One might also 
argue. ho.,.,ever, that a multiple price basing q..t different secondary 
bases, restructuring of transfer cost and profit margins, and 
striking a fair deal for primary producers co:1ld together create 
. ,. 
stimuli' similar to those .currently in operation at the Prime Base. 
Regio.nal :industries could accordingly be pro'Jloted without direct 
subsidies to minimise marginal cost in proportion to· ::riarginal 
product, thus achieving national economic grcwth at the regio#al 
as well as the urban levels.· The corollary of i;bjs· simple ,solution 
is that e:X:planation of the economic system is crucial for controll-
ing phenomena. Thus instead of pouring financial subsidies and 
concessions into rural industry, a thoro"J.gh understanding of how 
the 'yowerful economic forces' function· is proposed here as the· 
' . 
most appropriate b3:si s for correcting and re~haping the spatial 
malfunctions of ·the system in conformity with O"lr own objective 
pursuits. 
As expected,. the planning body of industri .. ai development in 
Sudan adheres to the common practice of fiscal assistance·to 
'rural areas.' as explicitly evinced from the 1972 Industrfal Act·. 
and .its more generous reinforcement two yearu l~ter~· the 1974 . 
Industrial Act. But the many adversities that. ·0onsistently' bog 
down attempts at ·induced· regional industrial 'growth must be viewed 
in the light of the measures adopted; apd the approach to industrial 
location a.s Snri.th.rightly observed: 
••• it is not surprising· that publ5_c industrial 
location policy is generally based on- less soph-
.isticated approaches, .involving cm:icepts that 
m13,y havemore intuitiveappeal than theoretical 
or empirical support. ( 7) · · .·· . · · 
One:-extraord{nary demonstration .of such ari aP.proach is provided by 
the selection-of a location for textile mills in Sudan in 1972 by 
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'a UNIDO expert and nearing completion towards the end of the 
1970's.(S) The procedure adopted was merely an arbitrar.y score-
rating for each intuitively selected location, using various 
location factors such as availability of raw materials, trans-
portation, water, etc. Hazardous procedures of this kind will 
not do. Whatever industrial location strategies may be chosen, 
they should be integrated with national planning objectives, and 
related to theory and relevant methodological solutions. The 
lack of co~ordination is possibly best shown by the restructuring 
of the Transfer Rate Book, 1974. Although the main objective was 
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more efficient running of Sudan Railways, the emphasis on capacities 
and monetary concessions to bulk transfer clearly serves the 
interests of the larger firms of ·the Prime Base. If the positive 
effect of transfer cost and price basing was understood at all, 
the freight regulations could have been more creatively deployed 
to serve the national interest in line with the desire to region-
alise industry. This is one exaxqple to substantiate claims made 
in this study that a theoretical and empirically derived framework 
is long overdue for planning industrial location in Sudan. 
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APPENDICES 
.· .. ·. 
Appendix 5.1 
Basic.data for industry in the Prime 
Base on 13 variables~ 
Key to variables:* 
1. Employment 
2. Paid up capital 
3. Gross value added· . 
4. Raw materials (local) 
5. Raw materials (imported) · 
6. Fuel 
7. Value of production 
8.. Wages and. salaries ·· 
· 9. Buildings 
10. 1'1achiriery and equipment 
11. Total cost (local) 
12. Total cost (im}orted) 
13. Spare parts and maintenance 
* Except (1) all variables in LS. 
· So•~rce: Compiled from IDCAS, Industrial 
SurV-ey, Sudan, 1969/7Q, Cairo, 1970. 
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Appendix 5.'2 Industrial Lo~a~ization il;l the ~rime Base. Q.Y. SIC Grou@ on _five variables, 
and the Cc:>eff:Lclent of Geographical Assoclatlon (Cg.) . = · 
SIC :tn. Group Food; Drink and Tobacco· ·Textiles.· and, Ginning- Leather and Footwear 
. . ( s.t C m II I ) .. 
. \.SIC m I) , (SIC m II) .· . . . 
. . . . . . I . 
L6cali ty 1. ·. 2. 3 · · 4 5 · '1 2 ·· . 3 · 4 . · 5 '1 2 3 4 · . 5 
. . 
Bahri 58.9 83.·7 69.3 .75-5 ·78.4 94.5 9?-9 96.4 95-9 96.'1 67.8 52.6 84.8 79-7 ??.8 
Khartoi~ID 31.0 13.0 24.3 19.4 17.2 . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.2. 41.4 11.7 15.3 16.'1 
Omdurman . · -'10.0 3-3 6.3 ·5.'1 . 4.3 5-4 2.1 3.6 4.'1 3-9 ·12.0 5.8 3-4 4.9 6.'1 
Coefficient '12.0 -3~0·· 3."6 '1.4 ·6.2 27.2 17.123.0 21.3 23.8 3-5 27~0 1'1.9 · 5.1 5·.1 
of Geogr.aph-
ical Assoc.(Cg) 
I . 
SIC in Group Wood, Paper & Printing 
.. (SIC m IV) ... ·che~icals and Allied (SIC m V) 
Metals and Electrical 
(SIC m VI)' 
Locality 1 2 .3 4 5 '1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 
23-5 36-3 33-0 31.0 28.4 70-3 72-3 71-7 71-3 67.8 61.9 49-5 63-9 
64.9 55-6 60.9 '59-6 64.3 14.6 11.4 14.6 '13~8 11.3 32-6 38.4 28-7 
11 . 6 .. s. '1 6. 1 9. 4 7. 3 'J 5. 1 1 6. 0 14. '3 14. 8 20. 8 5. 5 . 1 2. 0 7. 4 
43-6 43-8 44~8 4'1.0 47-7. 9.1 '11.5 8.3 8.3 14~0 8.8 31-2 9~0 
Bahri 
Kharto:l111 
Omdurinan 
Coeff:lcient 
of. Geograph...; 
ice a~. Assoc. ( Cg )' 
~ ..... _.-~ .. ·, . 
sic· in Group · Cem&~t·:, ·Tiles, Glass· et<.;. 
. . .. ( SIC m ·VI I ) ... Key· to m,;,!nbers 
Locality 
Bahri 
Khartoum· 
·. ·omdurman 
Coefficient 
of Geograph-
ical Assoc.·(Cg) 
1 2 . 3 4 . 5 
68.1 86.2 75-3 75-4' 88.2 
3'1.8 13.8 24.7 24~6 1'1.8 
o.o 0.0 0.0 0.0. 0~0. 
9.0 8.2 5-0 6.5. '16.0 
· Source: Compiled fro,m .data in App.endix 5.t1 
'1 
2 
.3 
4 
5 
Employment 
Paid-up capital 
.'Gross ·value added 
Produc~ion value 
Wages and salc;i.ries 
* For· formula see text 
4 5 
59-9 49.4 
32-9 42.01 
7-1 8.4 
14.6 ·22.8 
-
\>I 
~ 
....0 
~ 
Appendix~ ;Location· guotien_t on .five variables .for the. Prime ·Ba:se · .· 
: SIC· m Group Eood.,,· Drink & Tobacc.b 
(SIC m I) 
· T.extiles and· Ginning 
(SIC _m II:) 
. Leather and FoOtwear·. 
Locali..ty 
Bahri 
Khartoum 
Omdurman 
(1) C2)-C3Y- (4) (5) -(1) 
o. 85 ·1. 04- o·. 95 1. o·1 1. 09 _1 • 40 
,1.3~-0.~&1-15 1.0i 0~82 0.00 
1.11 0.73 1.07 0.78 0.63 0.61 
. . . 
·(SIC m III) 
(2) ( 3) (4) ( 5) (1). (2) ( 3) . ( 4') ( 5) 
1.21 1.321.27 '1.33 ·1.01 0.651.16 1.0?.'1.08· 
o.oo o.oo.o.oo o~oo 0.85 2.81 0.55 0.81 ·o.77 
0.47 0.61 0~63 0.58 1.33 ~.30 0.58 0.77 0~90 
-~ --------------------------------
SIC· m Group Wood., Paper & Printing · Chemicals and Allied Metals and Electrical 
'(SIC m IV) (SIC ril V) (SIC m VI). 
Locality ( 1) (2). (3) (4) (5) ( 1) (2) ( 3) (4) ( 5) ( 1) (2) ( 3) (4) ( 5) 
Bahri 0.35 0.45 0~45 0.30 0.39 1.05 0~90 0~98 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.61 0.88 0.80 0.68 
Kharto'.lm 2.7'1 3·53 2.94 3-25 3.21 0.61 0.78 0.;66 0.73 0.541.37 2.61 1.361.74 2.01 
.. 
Omdurman 1.28 1.80 1.0.3 1.45 1'.0,8 1.68 3-57 2.40 .2.28 3.06 0.61 2.6? ·1.25 1.10 1.25 
SIC m Group ·.Cement_,.. TiTes & ·Glass 
(SIC ·m. -VIl) Key to 70-riables 
Locality 
Ba:hri 
Khar't o 1.1m 
Omdurman 
( 1) ( 2). ( 3) ( 4 )" ( 5) . 
1 • 01 1 • 07 .1 • 03 1 • 01 '1 • 22 
1 • 34 0. 94 . ·1 • 1 7 1 . 30' 0. 56 
o. 00 0. 00 o. 00 o. 00 0~ 00·. 
(1) 
(2) 
( 3) 
(4) 
( 5) 
-------· 
Employment 
Paid-up ca;pi tal 
·Gross value added .. 
Wages ~nd salaries . · 
Production value --·~ 
L-~---~----------------~.L...o..---,-.--'---------·--.-:...-.;_,.......-.....:..!' · .. 
Source; C<;>m;piled .from data_ -in. Appendix 5.1 · 
. .. · 
\.N 
\.J1 
0 
._ .Appendix_2~4. Nuniber of· work~=£8, ·paid-up· caJ?ital. and gross~value added by size .class · 
. . . . and .l.ndustrial group (LS. '000) . . . . 
,· Size. Ciass 1 :(30~99) .Size Class 2 (1·00-299) 
,---,-....'__;_ ____ ...;__ ___ -:-_E_mp_l_o_y_m_o_~n....;.t_Capital' Gross VBl.Ue l Em;loyment· .. ca~i tal -Gross value 
added .... · · . added 
SIC m GJ:'O:lp, 
Food Drink & Tobacco 
'rextiles & Qinning •·. 
Leather & Fo'otwear · 
Wood Paper & Printing 
. Chemical. & Allied 
Engineering & Electrical 
Cement, Tiles & Glass et 
·:rotal and 
. Per cerit 
SIC m Gro·:.1p 
F00C.. Drink & Tobacco 
·Textiles & Ginning 
Leather & Footwe~r· 
Wood Paper & Printing 
Chemicals. & Allied 
Engineering & Electrical 
Cement Tiles Glass etc 
Total and 
Per cent 
808 930.0 426.6 
525 373-7 ., 151.4 
129 '• 69-.0 . - 32.6 
768 889-5 . 214.4 
715 565.o4 -436.4 . 
594 380~8: . . 243~5- . 
64 40 .• 0 15.'7 
3603 3248.4 1520.-6. 
(16.44) (14.13) (13.7) 
Size Class 3 (300-499) 
. 2245. 
778 
393 
735 
4131 
. (18.85) 
14.35 7· 1168.6 -
1075-.A . 346. 3 · 
- -
1 50. 0 ·1 07. 8 
·-]25. 0 •1 70 ~ 7 
2786.1 1793.4 
(12.12) (16.16) 
Sourc.e.: Co'mpiled from data in App'endix 5:.1 
·--- -·-· --··-· 
2362 2842.0 
149 90.0. 
293 .. 
. 173-0 
1172 . 1148.0. 
554 : 425.1 
332 15o.·o 
132' 2,20.0. 
A999 ·5078.1 
(22.81) (22.08) 
Size Class 4 { 500 - ) 
5828 
1623 
976 
525 
829 
9181 
( 41. 9) 
~ 
10211 ~ 5. 
858.C 
488.4 -
200.0 
.125.0 
11882.9 
(51.67) 
1515.0 
88.1 
'100~1 
629.6 
267-3 
185.0 
'47.8 
2832.9 
(25.53) 
2884.6 
·1125-3 
371.6 
241.8 
328.2 
4951·. 5 
(44.6) 
\.).1 
\Jl 
~ 
.... 
' Matrixes of correlation coeffic.ients. 
for ten indust£Y__coefficient§_·· 
5-5-(~i) 
Engineeri,ng and Electr·ical 
(SIC m Group VI) 
Leather and Footwear 
(SIC m Group III) 
5-5-(iii).Food, Drink and Tobacco 
. . (SIC m Group ·r) 
* Vari.able.s as in Table 5. 3 
So;~rce: ·Compiled from IDCAS, Industri'al 
Sur~y; Sudan, 1969/70, ·Cairo, 1970 
_;. 
5-5-(i) 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
J 
A 
t.~o;:,c­
c 3?) 
S-=CoCGl 
-0.3611 
( 32) 
5=::>.021 
-0.2558 
( 32) 
5=0.079 
-0.3549 
( 32) 
5=0.023 
0.5999 
( '3 2) 
5=0.001 
0.2840 
( 32) 
5=0.058 
o.ooso 
( '32) 
S-=0.489 
-0.2272 
( 32) 
S=0.106 
-0.1726 
( 32) 
5=0.172 
-0.0995 
( 32) 
S=0.294 
P ::: A R 5 0 ~J C 0 R R E L A T 
El 
~0.3611 
( 32) 
5=0.021 
1 .coo:; 
( 32) 
5=0.001 
0.9115 
( '32) 
5=0.001 
Oo7913 
( 32) 
5=0.001 
-0. 3532 
( .32) 
S=C • 024 
-0.2785 
( 32) 
5=0.061 
-0.1352 
( 32) 
5=0.230 
0.2460 
( 32) 
5=0.087 
0.0387 
( 32) 
5=0.417 
0.0057 
( 32) 
S-=0.48A 
c 
-0.2558 
( 3?.) 
5=0.079 
0.9115 
( 32) 
5=0.001 
1.oooo 
( 32) 
5=0.001 
0.7954 
( 32) 
5=0.001 
-0.2796 
( 32) 
5=0.061 
-0.1669 
( 32) 
s =0 • 1 '3 1 
-0.1713 
( 32) 
5=0.174 
0.0307 
( 32) 
S=O • 4 34 
0.0249 
( 32) 
5=0.446 
0.0064 
( 32) 
5=0.486 
I) 
-c~.354') 
( 32) 
5=0.023 
(·.7913 
( 32) 
5=0.001 
0.7954 
( 32) 
5=0.001' 
1.oooo 
( 32) 
S=OoOOI 
-0.5143 
( 32) 
S=Oo001 
0.2176 
( 32) 
5=0.116 
0.3243 
( 32) 
S=0.035 
-0.1763 
( 32) 
S=0.167 
0. 54 3!'1 
( 32) 
s=o.oot 
-0.0778 
( 32) 
S=0.336 
0 N 
E 
c.s999 ( 32) 
5=C.001 
-0.3532 
( 32) 
5=0.024 
-0.2796 
( 32) 
5=0.061 
-0.5143 
( 32) 
5=0.001 
1.oooo 
( 32) 
5=0.001 
..:.0.2944 
( 32) 
5=0.051 
-0.3713 
( 32) 
5=0·018 
0. 184 8 
( 32) 
5=C.156 
-0.4670 
( 32) 
5=0.004 
-o. C'4 94 
( 32) 
S=Oo394 
C Cl E F F 
F 
0.2840 
( 32} 
5=0.058 
-0.2785 
( 32) 
5=0.061 
-c. 1669 
( 32) 
S=0.181 
0.2176 
( 32) 
S=0.116' 
-0.2944 
( 32 I 
S=O.OSl 
1oOOOC 
( 32 I 
5=0.001 
0.7354 
( 32) 
5=0.001 
-0.571101 
( 32) 
S=0.001 
o.t:-292 
( 32 I 
5=0.001 
-C.t627 
( 32) 
S=O.tR7 
c E N T 3 - - - - - - - - - -
G 
0.0(;~)(\ 
( 32) 
S=0-489 
-0.1352 
( 321 
S=0.230 
-0.1713 
( 32) 
5=0.174 
Ce3:?.43 
( 32) 
5=0.035 
-0.3713 
( 3 2) 
5=0.018 
Oo7354 
{ 321 
S=0.001 
t.oocc 
( 32 I 
5=0.001 
-0.3995 
( 32) 
s =0. c 12 
0.7178 
( 32) 
5=0.001 
-0.1395 
( 32) 
S=0-223 
H 
-0.2272 
( 32) 
S=C.106 
0.2460 
( 321 
5=0.C87 
0.0307 
( 32) 
5=0.434 
-0.1763 
( 32) 
S=0.167 
0 • 1 84 R 
( 321 
5=0.156 
-0.571'3 
( 32 I 
S=O.OCl 
-0.3995 
( 32) 
S=0.012 
1o0000 
( 32) 
5=0.001 
-o .2976. 
( 321 
S=Oo049 
0.1145 
( 32) 
5=0.266 
-2.1726 
( 3 ;:>) 
5=0.172 
0.0387 
{ 321 
5=0.417 
0o0249 
( 3?.1 
S-=C>.446 
0.5438 
( 32) 
S=C.001 
-0.4670 
( 32) 
S=0.004 
0.6292 
( 321 
5=0.001 
1).7178 
( 32) 
5=0.001 
-0.2976 
( 32) 
5=0.049 
loCOt::C> 
( 32) 
S=O.C01 
-0.1617 
( 32) 
5=.0 • 188 
CCOEFFIC1ENT / (CASES) / SIGNIFICANCE) (A VALUE OF 99.0000 IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT 9F. COMPUTED) 
J 
-O.C995 
( 321 
S=0.294 
0.0057 ( . 32) 
S=C.488 
o. c 064 
( 3:?) 
5=0.486 
-0.0778 
( 321 
5=0.336 
-0.0494 
< 32 I 
5=0.394 
-0.1627 
( 32) 
5=0.11:17 
-0.1395 
( 32) 
5=0 .• 223 
Ool145 
< 32 I 
5=0.266 
-0.1617 
( 32) 
S=Oo18A 
1.0000 
( 32) 
5=0.001 
\>1 
\J1 
\>1 
- 5 ... 5.: (,;i.i.) 
A 
8 
c 
0 
E 
F 
G 
H 
J 
A 
1o0000 
( 1 4 ) 
S=Oo001 
-0.7777 
( 14) 
5=0.001 
-0.55.67 
( 14) 
5=~.019 
-0.6193 
{ 14) 
5=0.009 
0.7457 
( 1 4 ) 
5=0.001 
-0.1106 
{ 1 4) 
5=0.353 
-0.4614 
( . 14) 
5=0.048 
-0.1997 
( 1 4) 
5=0.247 
-0.4154 
( 14) 
5=0.070 
Oo3518 
( 1 4) 
5=0.109 
-PEARSON C 0 R R f: L A T 
B 
-0.7777 
( 1 4) 
5=Co001 
1.0000 
( 1 4) 
5 =0 • C• 0 1 
c.a£172 
( 14) 
5=0.001 
0.4782 
( 14) 
5=0.042 
-0.4018 
( 1 4) 
5=0.077 
-0.1881 
{ 1 4) 
5=0.260 
Oo1167 
( 1 4) 
5=0.346 
Oo6341-
( 1 4) 
5=0.007 
0.2')06 
( 14 ). 
·5=0.157 
-0.3272 
( 14) 
5=0.127 
c 
-0.5557 
( 1 4) 
5=0.019 
0.8.'372 
( 1 4) 
5=·::l. 001 
1.00:)0 
( . 1 4 ) 
5=0.001 
0.1416 
( 1 4) 
5=0.315 
-0.2291 
( 1 4) 
5=0.215 
-0.29C)C 
( 1 4 ) 
5=0.150 
-0.2857 
( 14) 
5=0.161 
0.8160 
( 1 4) 
5=0.001 
-o. tOI35 
( 1 4) 
5=0.356 
-0.1005 
( 14) 
5=0 • .366 
D 
-0.6193 
{ I 4 l 
5=o.co-~ 
0.47132 
( 14) 
5=0.042 
Oo1415 
( 14) 
5=0.315 
, 
loOOOO 
( 1 4) 
5=C•o00 1 
-0.6212 
( 1 4) 
5=0o009 
0.5976 
( 1 4) 
5=0.012 
Oo7954 
{ 1 4) 
5=0.001 
-0.3443 
( 14 ) 
5=0.114 
0.6414 
( 1 4) 
5=0.007 
-0.2108 
( 1 4) 
5=0.235 
0 N 
E 
c-.7457 
( 14) 
5=0.001 
-0.4018 
( 1 4) 
5=0.077 
-0.2291 
( 1 41 
5=0.215 
-0.6212 
( 1 4) 
5=0o00:) 
loOOOO 
( 1 4) 
5=0o001 
-0.5873 
( 1 4) 
5=0.014 
-0.5905 
( 1 4) 
5=0.013 
0.2624 
( 1 4) 
5=0.182 
-0.3544 
( 1 4) 
S=Oo107 
-0.0787 
( 1 41 
5=0.395 
C 0 E F F I C 
F 
-0.1106 
< 1 4 I 
5=0.353 
-0.1881 
< 14 I 
5=0.?.60 
-0.2990 
( 1 4) 
5=0.150 
0.5976 
{ 1 4) 
5=0.012 
-0.5873 
( 14) 
5=0.014 
1.ooco 
( 1 4) 
5=0.001 
0.6624 
( 1 4) 
S=Oo005 
-0.7272 
( 14) 
5=0.002 
Co2434 
( 1 4) 
5=Co201 
0.:?581 
( 1 4) 
5=0.186 
E N T S - - - - - - - - - - - -
G 
-0.4614 
( 1 4) 
5=0.048 
0.1167 
( 1 4) 
5=0.346 
-0.2857 
( 14) 
5=0.161 
Oo7954 
( 1 4) 
5=0.001 
-0.5905 
( 14) 
5=0.013 
Co6624 
( 1 4) 
5=0oC05 
1.c-ooo 
( 1 4) 
5=0.001 
-0.5854 
( I 4 l 
5=0.014 
0.7002 
( 1 41 
S=Oo003 
-0.2342 
( 1 4) 
5=0.210 
H 
-0.1997 
( 1 4, 
S=Oo247 
0.6.341 ( 1 4, 
S=0.007 
Oo81bC 
( 1 4) 
5=0.001 
-0.3443 
( 1 4) 
5=0.114 
C'o2624 
( 1 4 I 
5=C.182 
-0.727?. 
( 1 4). 
.s=o. 002 
-0.5854 
( 1 4 ) 
5=C•oC14 
loOOCO 
< 1 4 I 
5=0.001 
-0.2654 
( 141 
5=0.180 
-0.2093 
( 1 4) 
S=Co236 
-0.4154 
( I 4) 
S-=Co07C 
0.290"' 
( 1 4) 
S=C·.157 
-o. 1 o 85 
( 1 4) 
S=C·. 356 
Oo6414 
( 1 4 ) 
S=O.G07 
-0 • .3544 
( 1 4) 
5=0.107 
Oo24'34 
( 1 4) 
5=C.201 
o.7C02 
( 1 4) 
5=0.003 
-c. 2654 
( 1 4) 
5=0.180 
1.cooc 
( I 4 l 
5=0.001 
~0.6962 
( 1 4) 
5=0oC03 
(COEFFICIENT / (CASE5) / 51GNIF1CANCEI (A VALUE OF 99o0000 IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED) 
J 
r::.3518 (. 14) 
5=0.109 
-0.3272 
( 1 4) 
5=0·127 
-0.1005 
( 14) 
5=0.366 
-0.2108 
( 1 4 ) 
5=0.235 
-0.0787 
( I 41 
5=0.395 
(;.2581 
( I 4) 
5=0.186 
-0.2342 
( 14) 
5=0.210 
-O.?.Cq3 
I I 4) 
5=0.236 
-0.6962 
( 1 4 ) 
S=O.OC3 
1 .coco 
( I 4 I 
5=0o001 
\>I y; 
A 
0 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G' 
H 
t 
J 
100 5 ( .. ; ) 
- ./~ ..! }lJ.. -
"' 
1.000(; 
( 7) 
S=O. C·O I 
-0.6250 
( 7) 
5=0.067 
-0.6l06 
( 7) 
5=0.073 
-0.5555 
( 7) 
5=0.098 
Oo9l~82 
( 7) 
5=0.001 
0.2867 
( 7) 
5=0.267 
0.9224 
( 7) 
5=0.002 
-0.3817 
( 7) 
5=0.199 
-0.6517 
( 7) 
5=0.056 
0.9453 
( 7) 
5=).001 
-PF..II."SnN C 0 Cl P E L 1\ T 
B 
-0 o625(' 
( 7) 
5=0.067 
loOOOO 
( 7) 
5=0.001 
0.7349' 
( 7) 
5=0.030·. 
Oo6557 
( 7) 
5=0o055 
-0.5270 
( 7) 
5=0.112 
. -o. 5630 
( 7) 
5=0.094 
-0.5085 
( 7) 
5=0·122 
Oo6920 
( 7) 
5=0.042 
Oo6513 
( 7) 
5=Co057 
-0.6943 
( 7) 
5=0o042 
c 
-('.6106 
( 7) 
5='J.C73 
bo7349 
( 7) 
5=0.030 
1.0000 
( 7) 
5=0.001 
0.9430 
( 7) 
5=0.001 
-C.592Q 
( 7) 
5=0o080 
-0.2883 
( 7) 
5=0.265 
-0.5292 
( 7) 
5=0.111 
0.0934 
( 7) 
5=0.421 
Oo8512 
( 7) 
5=0.008 
-0.6276 ( . 7) 
5=0o066 
D 
-o~555s 
( 7) 
5=0.098 
Oo6557 
{ 7) 
5=0.055 
Oo9430 
( 7) 
5=0.001 
1 .oooo 
( 7} 
5=0oOOI 
-0.6402 
( 7) 
5=Co061 
O.OOA7 
( 7) 
S=Oo493 
-0.3624 
(. 7) 
5=0.212 
-0.07f\3 
( 7 ) 
5=0.434 
0.9329 
( 7) 
5=0.001 
-0.5607 
( 7) 
S=vo095 
CJ N 
E 
Co9482 
( _7) . 
S=CoOOl 
-0.5270 
{ 7) 
5=( .• 1 1 2 
-0.5929 
{ 7) 
5=0.080 
-0.6402 
( 7) 
5=0.061 
1.0000 
( 7) 
5=0.001 
--0.0111 
( 7) 
5=0.491 
0.7804 
{ 7) 
5=0.019 
-o. 1583 
( 7) 
5='0.367 
-0.7295 
( 7) 
5=0.031 
OeH592 
( 71 
5=0.007 
COEFFIC 
F 
0.2867 
( 7) 
5=0.267 
-0.5630 
( 7) 
S=Co094 
-.0.28'33 
( 7) 
5=0.265 
C.OC87 
( 7) 
S=C.493 
-C:.C.111 
( 7) 
S=O • 4 91 
1 .occo 
( 7) 
5=0.001 
0. 50 6 7 
( 7) 
S=Oo123 
-C.75F!O 
( 7) 
5=0.024 
Oo0485 
( 7) 
5=0 o 459 
Go3612 ( . 7) 
5=0.213 
E N T 5 - - - - - - - - - - - -
G 
·0.9224 
( 71' 
S=O.C02 
-0.5085 
( 7 ) 
5=0.122 
-0.5292 
( 7) 
S=Oo111 
-('. 3624 
( 7) 
5=0.212 
Co7804 
( 7) 
5=0.019 
0o5067 
( 7) 
5=0.123 
loOGCO 
( 7) 
5=0.001 
-0.4183 
( 7) 
5=0.175 
-c. 4C•71 
( 7) 
5=0.182 
0.8471 
( 7) 
S=O.C·0'3 
H 
-0.3817 
{ 7) 
S=C• • 199 
0o692G 
( 7) 
S=O.C42 
Oo0934 
( 7) 
5=0.421 
-0.0783 
( 7) 
5=0.434 
-o.1s.:u 
{ 7) 
S=C:o367 
-0.7580 
( 7) 
5=C.C24 
-0.4183 
( 7) 
5=r·.175 
loOCOO 
{ 7) 
S=Co001 
0.0157 
( 7) 
S=Oo4A7 
-0.4807 
( 7) 
.S=C· • 1 37 
-·1.65)7 
( 7) 
S=C.056 
Go6513 
( . 7) 
5=~.057 
OoF\512 
( 7) 
5=o.ccs 
0.9329 
( 7) 
5=c.oot 
-0.7295 
( 7) 
S=C .031 
OoC435 
( 7) 
5=0.459 
-0.4C71 
(· 7) 
5=0.182 
o.et57 
{ 7) 
5=0.487 
1oGOOO 
( 7) 
3=0·001 
-0.7262 
( 7) 
5=~.032 
J 
0~9453 
( 7) 
5=0o001 
-0.6943 
{ . 7) 
5=0.042 
-0.6276 
( 7) 
s=·o. 066 
-0.5607 
( 7) 
S=Oo095 
0.859~ 
( 7) 
S=Oo007 
Oo3612 
( 7) 
'•3=Go213 
OoB471 
( 7) 
S=OoOOA 
-0.4807 
( 7) 
5=0o137 
-0.7262 
( 7) 
S=Oo032 
1o0000 
( 7) 
5=~·001 
(COEFFICIENT / (CI\5ES) / SIGNIFICANCE) CA VALUE OF 99o00~0 IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT 9E COMPUTF.Dl 
\.}J 
\J1 
\J1 
,, 
... 
Key: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
:7. 
8. 
Appendix 6.1 
Sudan industry by district 
on five variables 
Employment 
Paid:-UP capital (LS) 
Gross value added (LS) 
Vaiue of production (LS) 
Wages and salaries (LS) 
(except 1. in·Ls) 
Sources: ( 1) 
(2) 
IDOAS, Industrial ·Survey, Sudan; 
1969/70, Cairo, 1970 ·.· .. · 
Statistics Department, Regional· 
Industry, 1970/71, Khartoum; 1971 
: . . :· 
' 
' 
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. . 
'. '·~ ,,·.: 
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----. -------2- 3 7 H 
=~E~JQ=}~I~~=~=IQ~~~~G~=======-----------32 \4C:C~ 340CJ J76~00 11 
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77 1495(0 \62r0 23GH00 16 
93 15~000 115900 6062~0 20 
67 6(0(0 49600 206500 31 
~2 11(00~ ~13~0 167100 
113 lCOOCC 57300 3325~0 
153 5JOOO 6300 155900 
1~4 15C1C~ 354JO 22230C 
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173 140000 100900 395400 
238 750GCC 2614GO 31065JC 
293 300000 378300 1551600 
3C2 734100 3H5500 1114600 
352 6COCO 110900 449300 
426 20000~ 208600 1533600 
441 250~00 283300 1909700 
-~I~~Il~~~-~-~1~~1~~!---------
eo 1DJOOO 67SO 41600 
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5?5 2~00CJ 241HCO 1567800 
-~~~I~~~-~-~~b~l~l~~~~--------77 136700 461GO 210500 
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429 250CO 71~ro 348100 
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3720G 
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122500 
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830C· 
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46700 
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6570(· 
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33100 
51<?0C 
6'33(;C 
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555C.O 
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• 
\.).1 
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Appendix 6. 2 
Co.efficient of Specialisation, Co~fficierit . · 
of Localization and Location Quotjent 
for Five Variables 
Smirce: As in Appendix 6.1 
··.' 
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5 = 1 CH0'.~1! C.l\·L.S t. !>.i...l_ I ED'. 
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7 = • t.E t-..1 E.:' J T l I L:: S · G L ASS ETC ' . 
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COEFFICIENT OF SPECIALISATION FOR CAPIT~L 
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32.26CC 
1(•.600<.; 
26. ?52f: .. 
lJ 2. 7400. 
13.38.''>:0. 
61.6"'.)94 
33. 1 -'~54 
67.7400 
32.2601) 
32.2600 
12.oz:;.~c 
67 .• 7400 
32.2600 
'32. 2600 
32.2600 
67.7400 
32.2.6(;0 
32.2600 
3 
2.2209 
'22.66?3 
8.3467 
3.95GC 
1.9500 
3.95f.i0 
3.95{'10 
·3. 9500 
3.9500 
3.95CO 
'3.95/)(i 
3.950(. 
3~950.0 
3.9500 
3.950() 
3. 95-:f(· 
3.9.50(1 
3.9500 
3.9500 
4 
0.74C8 
34~1205 
!~.052B 
4.6800 
4.68CC 
4.6BOC 
4.6aco 
4.6800 
4.680C 
4.68(( 
4.6~00 
.4.~800 
4.6800 
27.7046 
4.630( 
4.6BCC 
4.68CO 
4.680G 
4.6800 
.. 
cs. 
~ 
:;; 
1. :H76 
c. 01 59 
"1 !J._. 2672 
39.5S66 
f,. 550 (J 
• ~-· t::;C::::('\1"' 
....... '"' ·~' •' \... (:.55(;0 
o.249C1 
6 .. 5500 
6. 55C•C 
6.S5~C' 
6.550C 
~ •• 5500 
6. 550=:· 
G.55C'C 
6.550C 
~.550(} 
f:.~ .• 55GO 
~s. 55t)C 
':> 
0.!77-? 
~>.6Ci6 
f:.. F~ j 24 
I3.422.? 
2o260G 
2.2.bCO 
? • 2 t-·)0 
2~2bGO 
2.21'>00· 
2.260(; 
2. ?r-:-00 
·2 o 2'6r:0(: 
2.2600 
2o26C·O 
2.2600 
2o26t:C• 
2.2600 
2.2000 
2.26fJ0 
1 • ::..~ 3 -~ ·~ 
~.4t·Cf:; 
2.5k~0 
2.~PG0 
2.~80( 
77.1235 
2.5~0~ 
~.?~~0 
2o5AC~ 
z.~B00 
2.5bCC 
2.5800 
2.SBOG 
2.~~C0 
2.~BOC 2.seoc 
2.5800 
2.5~20 
2.~300 
_?.l~ •• 9~-9-::.. 
~JY-.3745: 
t;!,.46fJ1 
4 7. f'h13 1:.~ 
!.;?. 72.5f' 
77. I Gi~5 
f.. 1. 65tt q· . 
33. 17(:4 
~:.7.72.5:.) 
c.:~2. 29'SC 
::-) 2. ?.9 ::.c. 
~;~. Cf:40 
67.725C 
4 7 o 61 ":. 1') 
5?.Z':J5C! 
5'2 • .2r;t5C 
~~7.725(': 
C):?. • 2':i :, c 
52.?9:1·""' 
\>I 
CX> 
\>I 
r 
( 
( 
r 
c 
(" 
', 
( 
,-_. 
\. 
t• 
•: 
; 
\:.. .. 
( 
\... 
•,_ 
COEFF I C I E.NT OF 
1 BAHf{l 1 
1 KHARTOUM• 
0 0MDURMAN• 
'AMA ~8USHAR IN' 
'EDDUt:IM• 
°KOSTI• 
1 ALHASAHiSA' 
'ALMEDINA' 
'.NORTHERN FUNG• 
1 RUFAA SHUKRIA 1 
1 KASSALA.' 
-
1 NE.W f~ALFA • .. ~ . -. 
·'SOUTH GEDA.RlF-• 
'BIDE I RIA,. .. ~ ... .. ,. 
. •EAST KORDUFAN 1 -· 
'·MESSIRIYA'1 . 
·, s·o(JT.fi' JEBEL.S 1 
·
1 SOUTH ·oARUR' 
•wAU' 
~' :. 
.. 'l: 
SPEC.! ALI SA 1 LON F!J~ VALUE ADDED 
I 2 3 
3.7933 :·1 • 8GSO "9.06.10 
.1. '70t..a· :35.4300- 0. 2 531 
0.3939 ·'t3 •. 3 309 0.6606 
5. 751 1 '34 •. 9456 7.7600 
s;oo£15 40.0285 7.76oo· 
27.3373 i 4 .• 3 ?:36 7 •. 7600 
25.7850 59.9:)50' 7. 76.00 
4.6534 28.1120 7.7600. 
3o·.-4sc.c 64.5700 7 •. 7600 
·'69.5500 '35. 4300 '7. 7600 
-69.5500 . 3_5 • A-3 fJO ·7.7600 
35.4075," 1.2.875 7 .'760'0. 
. 30.4500' .. -'6 4 • 57 0 0 :: . .-:.7. 7600 
" ,64 .• 354·2 . 35. 4300':. ·::r_~_7600 
"69.5500. •!•35.'4300"- .· 7 • .7600 
is 9.~ 55:o 0 _.; _:35 •. 4300'. ·" .. : -7:_. 760,0 
30·;.'·450'0 64~5700 ~.760Q 
'69. 5500 .35. 4300. 7.7600· 
69o'550C 35 .• 4300' 7o7600 
·" 
'-· · .... :,· 
cs. 
I+ ') 
3.9133 ·2 .8990 
3~.6176 '5.9571 
·.5. 302 6 !C:.S.:l35 
s. 94v r· 40.1560 
5.9400 12_. 2400 
. ·s. '~'+;;:·.o .. 12·· 24(:0 
. .5. 94 0 0 12.2400 
5 • t}4GO 2.1()59 
·5.9401) 12.2"4f}0 
5,9400 12• 24()() 
. 5. 9400 l2o24C'O 
'.. 5. 94 0 0 12.2.400. 
5.9400' 12.240_0 
0. 7f~t;.2 ·1 2. 2 4 c-,o . 
5:.·940G i-2. 24-00 
:··.5 .94;00 .12.2400 
5o9400 12.2400 
·5 .94 c,o r2.z4no 
5,9400 .12.2400 
'· 
.;.. 
6 
0.3154 
4-.314:6 
3.3981 
15.41?.7 
7.0100 
.7. e:'t 00 
7.C·IOO 
7.0100 
7·.Gl00 
7.0100 
7.0100 
7.0\00 
7.0100 
7. (' 1 00 
7oC':.100 
-,. 0 1.00 
7. o t o·o 
7.0IDO 
7.C.IC'C 
7 
o.:c.·3~39 
C'·.«fA~6 
1.1300 
I.! 300 
I • 1 3 0 0· 
;4.:;: .• 95.].7 
1 • 1 3 0-'0 
.o. "' 4 1 1.':> 
I • 13-GO 
1 ol 300 
lo\300 
1 ol 300 
·l.\300 
1• 1:100 
-1.13(<0 
1. 130.0 
t•1300 
I • 1 .'3 C·O 
1~13.00 
11.}61+5 
4 1-. 8o97 
l9o674R 
:0,5.?463 
4·o.ocs~; 
·60.:~073 
59.fH3·50 
·28~0.'?20 
6/~. ~50 0· 
69.530{) 
69. 536'0 
35 .•. 387r:i 
64.5500 
~:.·A. 3342 
f-,9. ~-)300 
6g .. 5300 
64~r-i500 
69.53CC 
(~t"J .• 5 3•0 0 
\>I 
CX> 
~ 
• 
COEFFiCIENT GF SPfJ: J t.L l SA. T I Dr~ Fo·.o '::>HODUC::T I Jr• 
l ,, '3 
'BAHI'l' 1+ • c-~52C 4-.~)5::,7 5.~~95 
'KHII.RTOUM' ~.?~S~7 1·9. F.:2·J(' 2.l~7'26 
'OMf1U""'AN' 1 ~s. ?99Q 7. ~·91 (:.:· 1. qB55 
.( 'AMA~BUSHAr>f N' 1.4t11-12 1 q. -:!"~}2(: 7, 2f) 1J0 
'EDDt ..:: I 1.1' 26 • .::.~f3S4 5-':J. 045!'t 7. 260C~ 
'KOSTI' 3(:1 .. -:~a71 1S.J6)2· 7,;:'F.C(; 
'ALHASAHISA' 2?. 2. 4_ q 1 5/J. 9:)01 7, ?600 
'ALMED INA' 12:.~~565 4,':?4C4- 7.26!)0 
iNORTHERN FUNG' 47.·32.(•0 eo. 1 en:'(• 7. ::DOC· 
•RUFAA SHUKP.lA' 5:2.-4 ~H..JC'· l9.3?.(G 7. ~_::noc 
I KA.SSII.L.A. 52.4 300 1 ·*?. 8 '?.00 7.?.600 
'NEw HALFll.' 24.::•<.94 7.7!06 7. 2 600 
1 SOUTH GED AR IF 1 47.520C 80.ldOC .7.260( 
'BIDE! RIA' . 4g. 7·~3(. l:J.P .. :~r;o 7.-z6c~o 
'EAST KORDUFAN' 52 .• l.;.eco 19, 32C;O 7.·2-nco 
'MESSlRIYA' 52.4R(10 3 9. 8.2CC 7.2f>OC 
•souTH JEBE'LS• 47,52.CO '30.!9(JC 7.?.600 
'SOUTH DARU"<' 52. t:. t'IOD 19.8200 7.260C 
1 \IIAU' 52.4'300 1 q. ?.2r:~c: . 7 .• 2600 
VA.LU:: c: ~. 
4 ~) 
2 •. ! ,; -, 7 (';.4-'.::79 
20. 76:,:3 ~.9Ci4~ .. ~ 
~-· 3:3':>3 ·! c;;. 'IC' :; .. :) 
4.2.?:CC 9. ~C-·70 
4.2.?Cr; 1 1 • (:~4 oc 
4. 2·~ -:-) c~ I 1, .~Ll.C(' 
4. 2.:?~:(' 1 1 • B4 o-o. 
LL,2.2CC 3. ~")406 
4.2?C•(· JJ,84CO 
·.4.2?00 11.84')l) 
4.2:<00 1 1 • '34 (<(• 
4. 22'J(.t ! l I ~~~ .. (:\') 
4 • . <:? i)·O l l •. ~14C:G 
1, '>93C·. 1 l • 8f4..: ... :' 
a..220C 11.f14()') 
4 I 220(! 11, ~l4\~C; 
4.220(. 1 1 • 34 1~:0 
4. ~20 c: 1 1 • 84 0( 
i ... 22.00 1 1 • '34 t)(: 
... 
6 7 
2.2:'"5641 ( " I,.:=;''") 3 
5.1':d02 c-.31 •',7 
-c .• ?(f,7 f.", r.~(; (' G 
·?.:l.C-20~ (. • or:-•::•:• 
~,.4CC<) ( • v (. (: t) 
;::;.4('00 C"l ~7 I ~ .. ; f'; ·: 9 
.Sc40QC c: .• qc co 
6.4000 C·. :: .. 1-1 7 ~ 
B,aOOG (. • 9 1.) (i {\ 
c:. t~ c·oo c.gc~c·o 
t~.acoc. (..CJC•SC 
8.4 Ql)C,t (· .. (1:/( .. '0 
8 •'+GC.'' .. l ('.9~·;0 
B. 4C~o;:· c. Q(\ oc:: 
8.40CO C,.90C'O 
8 .u (!(:0 ( .• 9~:. 0 0 
8. i; 0 (t(• (... 9( (. l' 
S • i.:.OC'·O C• I YC. ()() 
s. 4 (·('·(; C.90·JC: 
c.ql52 
~~-S.LJl72 
:~3.~1(:6 
~~1.?'-..-..20 
-:::-,? ~ :'"; ;: :::'",[.: 
71,f' 6~~71 
Sl+ •· 9t:1Y1 
:?· :?: • :2 1 ·r cs 
Bt':. 1 6C(: 
5:?. 46C!t;· 
,~, :-::: • 4 f: (• 0 
3;;~ ~ :::)4.0C 
:~·:). 1 ~.;r C· 
/;~~.7:182 
:., :.:. • ·4 £': r. c~ 
~-.>. t.~·6cC 
t3'.)• .16CC~ 
52.'" uC C 
5"-~. !1 f1. 0 ~~ 
• 
\).I 
CX> 
\.n 
COEFF!~l~NT nF SP~~JALISATION FOR NAGES ~ SALA~lES 
'BAHRT' 
1 KHARTOU~' 
1 0~1DURMAN' 
1 A"-1A,/8USHAPI"Ji 
1 EDt)•)!;: I M 1 
'KOSTI' 
1 ALHASM-1ISA' 
1 A L ME f) IN A' 
'NOI<T•·iERN FLING' 
•RUFAI\ SHUKr~IA• 
• KASSt•.LA I 
•NEw HALFA' 
•SOUTH GEDA"<IF• 
1 BlDEIRIA' 
'EAST KORDUFAN• 
'MESSIRIYA 1 
•SOUTH JERELS' 
•SOUTH DARUR 1 
1 WAU' 
7 c ] LJ C 1:. 
5. /1 1 :3 (· 
1 1 • f)~:;(' 6 
5. 14 ~6 
5. 7fJ) 2 
;2·~J.t~9:}C 
;:::;,.?ep;q 
1 • {~!~·);?. 
31.921 0 
r,B. ( 800 
r,g. ")8CG 
3?.6295 
31.92(10 
29.1911 
68 •. C.80C 
68. 08C•O 
31.9200 
68. 08C•C 
6~.c:~.GC 
;? 
7.nu!O 
3().6:~{;:: 
lf;.537~:. 
25. 9~,;,4 
43. 16h2 
':'.~. 9?.:~6 
hl • l ::,Eia 
23a()t-.;.G4 
69.3 ~~;(', 
~:,;. f:.r.sou 
3C:.f;;.;CG 
6. 7-7(>5 
69.3?:(:0 
30. 6fi('_j 
3Cioo3GO 
30.6i300 
69. 3zr-o 
30.6300 
3Ga6C~C·O 
3 
n.sczt, 
1.0438 
?.5701 
a.crooo 
e.ooDo 
a.boocr 
~.00CO 
3o000U 
~.opoo 
a.oooc 
8.0C~0 
8.0000 
s.oooo 
e.~ooo 
a.oooo 
e.~ooo 
8.0000 
B.OGOC 
~.ocoo 
4 
4o43~~ 
35.J4~S 
S.l3Gl 
3.S~CG 
~.B~C~ 
s.R9rc 
8.80fG 
R.Ru(Q 
8.?..9(:( 
8 • f3C:?C, C 
6. ~-=1CZ": 
8.R-?C"C 
a. R<-~c c 
29.49-S"=":1 
s.g:.;;oc: 
8. qq(>C 
e.Bqr(' 
a.s9r,r: 
FJ.0-:.)(.0 
·• 
c. s. 
"" (. 95{)1 
6 .. (..,£?t('G 
1 9. P..631 
:3S, 6.:3St-t 
.12.t+lCO 
1 ::. !.; 1 ')0 
l;~.t~l--=·c. 
1. 4 l '?6 
J' 2. , .. lj0 
1 ~: • .6.1 G 0 
12.4!00 
l~o(!l('CJ 
12.410C 
1 2. 4 1 r. () 
1?..4100 
12.41(;0 
1 ? . • 'J 1 c·o 
12.41:)0 
12.410:: 
"' {) .. C::.f317 
7" c, 6 5(1 
2. t-.( 5(.; 
10. ?-'1=:t':) 
6. 1 ~;rr :') 
:) ".1 3Gf:. 
~. ~ .3r: (' 
;::, • 1 ::. () !) 
-::,.1 30C 
~.!3()0 
~, c 1 300 
6. l 3GC 
6. 1 30;) 
~). 1 30C 
6. 1 3!"'·0 
6.l300 
6. l 3 () c 
6c]3()i) 
~.]~(;(. 
7 
!: t> L! :- ~, "!· 
l • -: /J. '.} l~ 
i. • o . ..,. :::G 
l c ._,. :-i (• ") 
l • (J?. C· 'J 
~)5~ :--~-4 ~:4 
l. 'J30C 
! • L ~ 7 ·:· 
1 • ·i ·:.; ~~ 0 
1.9~08 
i • -~3 [.·( 
J. q·_30(J 
1 • •:,t-:-~ ~~0 
J. <;"C'-,1) 
1.~300 
l .9~(0 
1 .n~oo 
1.~~ro 
],O~CQ 
l 7 •• •:;e:-:.n 
~-~.J3()? 
:-1 r. • ~ ,·J. ~?. 
/J.-~. ~:?::)~-::) 
!J. ~~. 1 4 ~ 2 
t·-:1. 1 L'l '~0 
~-1. oe~;t• 
? '). ·~!) f·f:.· 
·:,.-:~. ~ccr~ 
t.: :-3 • .:'• !~ ('• c 
i)::s. c~~oo 
:7,l.:3CC· 
· .... , .> c 3C r:•O 
'~ •.l. 1 7(. c. 
i) • C· ~~, ( ::; 
r-~. (:,:.co 
·:~. ·.!0 ( r 
.:.s. (1~()0 
... ~. ~."~6•. ~) 
• 
\J-1 (X) 
()) 
.. 
f 
( 
( 
.. 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
COEFFICIENT UF Localiz-ati'on'< FO!~ EMPLOYMENT 
'BAHRI' 
'KH.AR.TOUM' 
'OMDURMAN• 
'AM~ /fJ'JSHAR IN' 
'EDDUEIM• 
·
1 KDSTI• 
'ALHASAHISA' 
1 ALMEDlNA' 
1 NORTHERN FUNGI 
•RUFAA SHUKP.IA' 
1 KASSALA' 
1 NEi~ HALFA' 
•SOUTH GEDARIF' 
'8lDEIR1A' 
'EAST KORDUFAN' 
1 MESSJ.RIYA' 
• SOUTH JE8ELS 1 
'SOUTH DARUR' 
1 WAU' 
17.1657 
2 .• 082 7 
t.t~f)l4 
3,1043 
G, 1 ti2 1 
],6409 
,5. 2342 
3. 1 c·35 
1o1900 
6. 4·1 97 
;>,063~~ 
1 5, (,CJ53 
0.2:?.00 
c. 1'3 30 
lo4225· 
1. 6?.31 
C. I 30 0 
0.4654 
1o14S/5 
32.26-35 
? 
1 0. '5 '30 1 
13e 8,..-}QC's 
2 •. 3-'309 
·3.1 :n3 
C.2513 
1, U>2 S 
l 1 • 4 1 .:.4 
9.1+679 
2 .• 4h41 
3e96C(i 
1.? 700 
8. 2 1 (·-(~ 
0.4742 
0. 2?C'0 
o. 8700 1.ooco 
0.2702 
0.2300 
0.7000 
36.04136 
· ... 
3 
28.151;::: 
6e30Y7 
6 .• 7491 
.3.710() 
·Q.5000 
l • ·'3 .~ () (: 
6.0'3.00 
7. 7 ;'')() 
1.1~0(1 
3o960(' 
!.2700 
11.3300 
·(;. 2200 
0.2600 
0.8700 
1 .·00 00 
0.1300 
C.2AOC 
0.7000 
41_.1700 
4 
15.2'~75 
49.11'31 
b. 1 69g 
3.710(. 
0.~)000 
l, R'>OO 
~>.OSCG 
7. 7'3()(; 
1 • l 90 0 
3,960(: 
1 • 2 70 0 
11.3'30(. 
0,. ?2.0C· 
0.9595 
0.8700 
1. 0000 
·0.1.300 
G,23,JO 
0.7000 
56.2075 
.. 
CL. 
5 
2.?..8:'>97. 
0 .9225· 
B.l753 
4. l 7 62 
o.scco 
1 • P.:~~GC 
6. C5C•O 
4.5t>B6 
I • 1900 
.3.9600 
1.270() 
11.33C0 
().2200 
0. 260(1 
(lot3700 
I .0000 
o •. 1 300 
Ci.28CJO 
o.7·Joo· 
35.1711 
(> 
18.6126 
16.c7369 
0.! c 63 
2 .• 256d 
0.5000 
J,F.RGO 
6. c::>oo 
7.7800 
l .!900 
-~. 9600 
l • 2 700 
11.3300 
o.?2oo 
0.260~) 
0.8700 
1<0000 
c. 1.3.00 
('.280(: 
0. 7COO· 
.37. 56~>3 
7 
1 li- ;~ 1?. 65 
2.(601 
5.28~)0 
3.71£::C 
C.5QOO 
52. /..J-f139 
f .• 05 OC:.· 
c. 722··3 
1 • 1 9(•0 
3.96()0 
1 .27(1(1 
11.3300 
0.22CC 
0.260() 
0,67i:;C 
1..0000 
0.1300 (.2ebo· 
G. ?O.CuJ 
:::) :3 • 1 1: f:.; ~ 
\>I 
0) 
. -...:1 
CDi:FF 1 C I Eh!T. OF .Loca.Ji.zaui-en·- FOC:: CAPT TAL 
? 3 
'BAH'<l 1 17.J3lJ.7 2.'5. 11 '-} l 1 .f3 .. 9 .,,~ t:. 
'K,HA'<lOU·\.1 1 j. ~; 7~~l4 6. 161':0 ~.s. 3174 
1 0MDURMAN' l. 2?37 o~r:.~lGO :~. 96 2,(1 
1 AMA../8USHARIN' .]'.~?~66 7 • "l --"' 14 {J. 7. g:,"'(':(; 
1 EDD\)>;::IM 1 C• • 1 P,9G ~::. lJ. 2,4.:) 0.3f-·':-C· 
1
"KOSTI • ~~.47J?., t.0~5d5 2.550( 
1 ALHASAH!SA 1 3.9'it.5 e. 76;?._B 4. ·s 3:; c, 
0 ALNIEDJNA 1 '2. q 14 3 7.21,(;1 7 .·o 4 oc 
t NOPTHER N FUNG• 0. (, (' () c 1. 26'32 o. r;ooc~ 
0 RUFAA SHUKf< I A • 19.9402 .I q, 1 700 18.170(. 
1 KASSI\LA' 2. 1 21? 1.920:) 1.92.00 
•NEW HALF A• 6e56H5 3.6331 9,75(.0 
'SOUTH .GEDARIF' 0.1600 (1.3385 0.1600 
'BIDEIRIA' 0.1274 0. 230(; o.2aoc 
•EAST KORDUFAN• 0.6948 Oo620CI .o.62oc 
1 MESSIRIYA 1 2. 14!56 lo95GO t.9S00 
•SoUTH JEBELS' ·o.t9oc 0'. 4223 o, 1 90G. 
• SOUTH DAR UP' 0,1287 o. 1 coo .0.1COC 
1
.W.A:.J' 2.0976 lo9!CO. 1.9100 
33.7796 43.5910 58. ·1.750 
'· :::.~. 31 7? 
lt4. 87-~(. 
f~. ('"l ~-11 
-/,9500 
c.3b~"'n 
2·. 5S( (. 
4. s er,; (: 
7. i)t,. ('('. 
o. 5,::co 
18.17(:0 
1 • q,~ r:.(:· 
9.75t:(T 
c-.16(·( 
1. 7067 
0.62C:C. 
t.gsuo 
. o. 190(• 
O.JOCO 
1 .91GO 
57. f39~·::· 
.;.. 
.. 
CL.. 
~ 
('Jc7:..JO~ 
1. '.i061 
q.(.01t4 
4 a •• -s:'3'J 
G.~G~0 
?,~~"G 
4,5~CO 
0.265~ 
0 e ;:...r; !: .. ::> 
1 . .:3 • ! 7 C!J 
1 .. 9:~oc. 
9.7500 
(1.1600 
_G.2R0f: 
c·.(:.20C-
t.s-sco 
c- • ! ) ~-C 
i:.1C·0". 
1 ,·q 1 ·:1() 
;:;:~.1~74 
f_-. 
;:_. 7 76_g 
l 7.9GC:(~" 
·:;. 63..,;) 
;;: .~.~ .. ~ 1 1 :) 
0,3S0~ 
2.~50C 
4,52CC 
7, r a(~('; 
0. , .. GC(t 
1 :::1. l··roc; 
J.92f\· 
~~. 7;)~')() 
C~160:.:~ 
J.2A,(:CJ 
o.t.2o:~ 
l • 9 !:~."J. D 
•:). 1 c)ef) 
c~. 1 0r·c. 
1 • q 1 (1(• 
~-; ::-. r:· c 1 -·~ 
'"-J •••• 
:::~. 
I • 
7. 
"' f;.:.f:._-:; 
/J. !' 7 
7 -:.:..0 
r;.:_·, 0 
c ., "f:: t) () 
7 !··.} h ·-~2 
.... '';'\00 
1:,. \ .. -., 7 3 
('. f:..('< .... 0 
18.1700 
l,Q200 
9,7SG0 
~.!GG~ 
C.?R~O 
c. b: .. ~00 
1. c.'S CO 
c • ! t~) (: 0 
C • 1 :;. C· ;:, 
l.CJ~(.O 
7 ,:- .• 1? 1 :~ 
\.N. 
CP 
CP 
\' 
COEFFICIENT UF Localization·!' ~=''0;:;' VALUE ADDED 
'BAH'll' 
'KHAPTOU'-1 1 
'OMDUPMAN' 
1 AMA~RUSHART"l' 
1 EDDU:c IM 1 
1 KOSTl' 
1 ALHASAti!SA' 
1 ALME:UlNA' 
'NOqTHEP.N FU•~G' 
1 RUFAA SHUKRIA' 
1 KASSil.L.l\' 
t t~ E W li A L FA 1 
1 SOUTH GED AR IF' 
1 BID!:.:IRIA' 
•EAST KORDUFAN' 
' MESS I R 1 Y A' 
•SOUTH JEBELS' 
1 SOUTH DARUR' 
'WAU' 
4,G7b9 
0.6~57 
O.C33l 
2.1?6R 
0,)036 
lod3G4 
G,S3~6 
t.e7?.1 
(;. ~~ 1 t c. 
].6_~1-+7 
0.1279 
8.61'>73 
0.010C 
2,7)()9 
0.7364 
2. 1 699 
0.040G 
0.2533 
1.4170 
1 R. 3?7') 
., 
1.9t424 
11.3EJ0(; 
1. 6 41 t' 
I 1 • l ?'57 } .• 62~~~;-, 
(\,1)4''01CJ 
l 3. 7t• ?.!.':> 
1.7102 
1. 6·~) ?:s 
o.7tc.o 
1).0 15C(.; 
c.cb'~~.;, 
0.0:-".!-~2 
1. 20·')( 
0.32CO 
0.9500 
n.0BS6 
·0.1100 
·').6\0C 
2 :3 • f+ :i 1 ~} 
~ 
45. 670S"4 
0 • .'F:Jl7 
0.27~5 
l 1 .2~30C 
(;. 550(, 
1 .. b00C' 
8.1'3}0 
1 ;::.·25·~iC 
o.qlC!C; 
C.710C 
0.'15CJC 
7. !1 !_=, ()(. 
G.OtQ} 
l.~BOC 
0.3200 
Q.0~0G 
0.0400 
0.1100 
0.6100 
46.2~50 
!J 
2l:). 7~:S8l 
~)1• 1 3A~:. 
2 • .::~·~73 
1 1 • 2 8(1 c 
( . ~ :; •) (" 
1 • 6 r.t) (. 
Boi3CC• 
1 2. 2 ~}{) c 
C.'<lC(! 
0.71C(; 
n.n:)r.o 
7. 4";·cO 
0.01(( 
c·. 1 s 1 :=-i 
Oo32C0 
0.9scr 
0,04Gl• 
() e·1 I 0 C' 
O.~lCC 
70 .9Clf)f; 
(!..._. 
"' 9.C:?06 
5.5~97 
2.75!2 
· :? 7 t C· 1 f:, r_. 
( It 5'S(.•(: 
1 • ~.s \:; ( :i 
F) .• 1 .] 'J C· 
;~. 1 6 r:.)(-1 
(.. Ql0·2-
0.71Ci0 
o.osoo 
7,i.t.f:-JG 
(: • C 1 IC 
J.2~~(;C· 
c. :32 c :j 
n. q:~o~: 
(,('•q(l(' 
G. I I 00 
o.6!0C 
:!-9, 7-:..st 
() 
I , 7?. I 1 
f).ng~~l 
1. =:;t~ ·~14 
24. "7F: •. ;;~ 
c~. r~;~>C:(: 
1 • (:. ( •7· (.' 
~~.].30(; 
~2.2:,("Jt) 
C.9!fJC 
0.7!00 
o.c·~r:o 
7.A500 
C.C1Cr: 
l.r~fJO(_\ 
:~. ~~!r>(: 
0.0:.)C'(".J 
C.(.JL~O(' 
n. 1 1 oo 
C'.OlC'C. 
:::s.cc:=,c; 
.7 
J ( 1 7 1 f. 1 
~, • ~-.• 7 ~~ :; 
3" ] ,.-... ;() 
1 1 I ~::: ~~ ;-· 0 
r_. ~-.}')(·') 
!:.1 tJ. • ::. ~? ~ -3 
p f 1 :;?: !: 
:~.P-379 
.- "') l r r:· 
G. 7 l 0 0 
() • r'::~('0 
7 "'t. ~~:-r 
C.C·lCJC 
1 • :: ~-"'·O 
c. • ::.."2 r! :-; 
(". :.;-5')0 
( • ( '-.; :-, (J 
c.n-:·c 
c-. n 1 ~: o 
r;-t.: • E;~ ~ ~ 
\).I 
(X) 
\.0 
I 
', 
( 
'~·· 
\.. 
COEFFICIENT OF Lbcaliz.a.titm" FOR p;:;:QDUCT HJN VALUE 
'BAH'-<1' 
'KHARTOUM' 
'OMDURM.AN' 
'AMA .,_/Bl. ISHAR IN' 
'EDDUEIM' 
°KOSTI 1 
·•ALHA5AHISA• 
'ALMEDINA' 
.• NORTHERN FUhiG • 
1 RUFAA SHUKf-'I A' 
1 KASSALA' 
'NEI'I HALFA 1 
1 SOUTH GEDARIF 1 
0 BIDE I R.I A'. 
1 EAST KORDUF AN.' 
·•MESSIRIYA' 
··sotJTH JEBELS' 
• SOUTCH DARUR 1 · 
1 YIAU 1 
1 
4. 3991 
1.261.3 
1. 25.64 
0·.3900 
0.2127 
0.8398 
ld'211 
-:; .• 1 •")70 
0.40CC 
1.7748 
0.!750 
1. 9969 
0<02C!O 
1.2214 
·0.4027 
c.-4142 
0.07-00 
0.1859 
0.6ll?.5 
1 o. 3404 
:~ 
10.':3'):')2 
·11 • 4 1 G 0 
1.t<')5l 
1;?.2692 
1o1064 
0. 821J.~-! 
10.!3410 
2.6.i34 
1. 653";l 
1. 5900 
0.1400 
1.4807 
,·o. 0965 
1 ~ 1 50 0 
0.3500 
. 0. 3600 
0.323<' 
0.1600 
0.5700 
29.5543 
3 
33.5719. 
3.8'357 
1.0723 
12.5400 
0.3900 
r.<:cr•o 
3,9(:00 
l.2.27t")t) 
0.4000 
1.5900 
0.1400 
.3.8000 
0.0200 
·t.1500· 
0.3500 
0.3600 
0.0700 
.c. 1600 
0~5700 
38.!700 
IJ 
23.50'"11 
5~.1751 
5.4166 
12.540(; 
0.3·:./0(· 
t.ooo~; 
3.(i0GO 
12.270(: 
0 • 4·0t:·C 
I • 5 90 C. 
0 • 1 40 0 
3. 30(: 0 
···o.o?.oc 
:0. 4:'3 27 
.0. 350( 
'0. 3600 6. o7oc 
0.160:0 
0.5700 
6 1 •. s 3 1 e. 
.. 
CL • 
, 
I. 9?. 34 
?..8887 
5.2216 
9. B4Ci7 
0.3900 
1. ooco 
3,'-l(;(hJ 
3.76Qij 
c·.4oc.,o 
1. 590C 
.0. 1 4 00 
3 •. gcoo 
··o·. 02t10 
1.15C·O 
0. 3"50!) 
0 • 3AIJ(; 
0. 07 00 
0.1600 
C·.5700 
1 e. 77?.1 
6 
12.22">1 
7. c 602 
o.e:983 
31 .3576 
0.3900 
1.ccoo 
.3. 900(1 
12.27(:0 
0. LJ[).t)O 
1 • 5qoo 
0.1400 
3.800(J 
(). 020(, 
1ol50C• 
0.35CO 
o·. 3("'oc, 
0. 0 70( 
0.1600 
o. 57C·O 
39..45~')] 
7 
2 :: •. r.; 371 
4.(;q!)8 
3.91tJC 
12. 54~1c; 
C·. 2'·'7(."0 
61.4(59 
?..90ti0 
it.U0-30 
C.lt(;I')O 
1 • ~- '":100 
0ol 1<00 
3.?.000 
c; • ('~ 2 o o 
I.! 5QO 
C'.35C·O 
C .3~>C0 
0.0700 
['.]6(.0 
n•~7:.:c· 
f:.J.34S0 
• 
\)J 
'-.0 
0 
CO:OFF1Clt:Nl liF Localization . I-DR. WAGES & S4L..APIES 
I BAi-i;;: 1. 
'I(HJI;<TOU"'' 
• OM::>uRM.AN• 
I AM:' ... /i3\!SHAP TN I 
' ELl tJ Uto J M 1 
°KUST1 1 . 
'ALHASAHfSA' 
I AU'o\f':f) 1 NA I 
'NORTHERN FUNG 1 
•RUFA.A SHUKRlA' 
1 KA5SALA 1 
1 NE,•I HALFA 1 
'SOUTH .GEDAR I F• 
1 BluEIRlA 1 
'EAST KDRDUFAi-J 1 
1 MESS1RTYA 1 
0 .SOUT~I JEBELS' 
'SOiJTH DARIJR 1 
'WA\J' 
~~~-'5417 
:?.4.25.3 
1 • '::. ·~ 1 .3 
1.324() 
O.lCS? 
l.t3511 
3.5lb5 
0, It qt-.F3 
(l, Q5(,.;(' 
"'. [;356 
1 • 758.3 
s. •'?~-)2~ 
·G,l9C0 
p. 1 34 2 
0.40'tl 
2. tJf•7ft 
G, 2C·G ( 
.J.?~013 
2.946c;. 
21."3''7(, 
2 
·.t. 7 '35 ·_) 
la,27C) 
2. 4qE:..:1 
6 .. ~.;726 
J .• :~J31 
r. • C. 5~~-~) 
q, 4 ,:-,:~u 
r,.4~"3~) 
2. 1 5:):,:, 
.3. 2~.:co 
~.~3?0:J 
-:;,o12S 
Q,4t .. OC' 
o. 1 ,~,.·r;C· 
0.,4100 
J • 2 50 c 
0.4597 
1), {FlGD 
1 • '3 5 ~:: ;} 
31 ,C7C:6 
:. 
.3 r;.. 1 1 Q i 
1 f- g i1 ;.c. 
1.Cq29 
E) • ? !~ 0 f. 
o.590C· 
1. q90~ 
4,74JC 
8.~600 
0 .. 9501) 
3.20·JC 
Oor ;:~:?.OC 
5~~100 
C.l9.0G 
0. 1 4 oc 
0.4100 
1 • 2 5<) 0 
( • 2 (• 0 0 
r:.o~oo· 
!,3SC~C 
36,LJ(IJC• 
" c.] «.2 71 7 
55,. 4(;77 
2.f:>S1.:J 
B • ?.·'+ :, ·:·= (' • ~) 9·::· c 
1 • q ·-;; ;:: r· 
l.! .7tJ {.'(. 
3.~)(;(}0 
G. ':lc:,(. G 
3 • 2Cr 0 () 
C: • ~~:? ~· ( 
5o.'".J;;(I 
o.t9cr 
0.486f·, 
.C·, 'll Co C 
1 .2~·CC: 
0.2000 
O.OF\('C 
l , :'\HOC 
5g.5~17 
CL. 
;::;=) 
3. ~:· ',.1 !'..,. ':':', 
7.f.;87(l 
?.:J3(~::-o 
.?.r:, .. ~-599 
~·.59(' ... , 
! • '?'9( ~: 
'-+.7US·: 
~~~.os;;-o 
".:.95b( 
3,2Cf: 
c:. t-3? o~· 
5. P.tGr: 
0. 19(; :J 
0.1ll(1 C 
C..410C' 
1.2500 
{:.2000 
0.nR~C 
i. 3' .. 3CG 
~1. 7A611 
~ 
4.C897 
~~-~014 
l,S73~ 
13.82~7 
(,SQ~C 
1.0900 
q,740C 
~.30~0 
o.sso<: 
~.?G00 
0.8200 
S.PlCO 
0.190n 
0,140( 
0.4100 
1.25~~ 
0,200C 
Q,Q60G 
1.38~0 
34,24~7 
7 
::·.' .... ~ s :~ c:~ 
l.:; .. ·:; 1 1"; 
t.:..f:IJL:O 
~ .. ·.? 4:: 0 
~.~·;c.c 
"', 7 • 1 :>,P. 4 
~..: • ?b C:C 
4.:: ·~? ') 
(. (,_f5( .. ~) 
:;. • ?"':· (1(. 
r ,..~;:> ::ro 
~. ,'-:-11 ::;'0 
(, .. 1 (-:'>GQ 
t .. 1 /.J, t: c 
c. • t.~ 1 -'" G 
1. 25·Jc 
('. 2G \~"j 
c-. C ~.C(t 
1. ~:~·)[) 
0:::.7. (· Q,;.~f.! 
• 
\>J 
\..0 
~ 
\, 
'BAH~!' 
'KHARTOUM' 
I 0Mf)•.Jf~'..,.A.N• 
'AM/\ •JBUSHAR 1 N' 
1 EUDU': I"'' 
1 KOST!' 
'ALHASAHISA' 
'ALMED 11-JA' 
I NCl'<THE~N- F:UNG' 
'RUFAA SHlJKRlA 1 
1 KASSALA' 
'NE\v HALFA' 
'SOUTH GED .AR IF' 
'BIDE I RIA' 
•EAST KORDUFAN• 
1 ME5S!RIYA' 
'SOUTH JE.BELS' 
1 SOUTH DARUR' 
1 WAU' 
· "Location :Quotient i:: 0~ FMPL C!Y J"'l'.: ~-iT 
3 
c. l-)..J;; 7 1.2 .. ) 7 ·J } • 7 1 ;, t ... 
(' • '3 ~~ .~;. 8 Q,CYC.C ].l.~,~~q 
C.722~~ r .• 5 -'• ·:~. 7 '.'.276~3 
l • :=--:.:~.3 7 0. J ·~ \.:(·;. '-I.. (; 0 C• 0 
1 o 3 'J 5 I 1 •. ~ ~ 1 ~' (·, c.o cr: 
C·. 1 ~~ ~ :-t l .. fJ::~TS r • . )Q "1C 
\). J jLJ.::.: ('?..~.-)7':) c.()(;()(· 
G • t:-O'::.b 2. 2! ~1 (". • C G •)":.' 
c.cccc 3. o:~36 c .• ocoo 
2.6209 C. OOC·O c.oooo 
2.~J209 o.ooc.c (l. G: 0 c (· 
2.3.;~3<? (:.?752 c.cocc 
O. G(tQG 3,0!+'):'? o.ooc-c 
1 • 66 7 F:. o.ooc:<:. O,('J{JO:. 
2·. 6209 O. OQC.(J o.cooc 
2.1'-.2('9 o.oouo C>,OOC"!O 
o.oocc- 3.0·4~t~) o·. ooov 
2 .• -5>2C·9 (;, 0')00 C•,OC:OO 
2.6209 O. 00C'~ c.ccoc 
~·· c • f_., l :5 (~ 
1-;_c:5~3 1:1 
~. 1 (, ?':'"'J. 
0 •. :)(j (' 0 
C. • 0 ,-.t·· C' 
o.cc~o 
0.0000 
c.ccrc 
o.ootc 
0,0000 
o.oro0 
o.e;coe 
o.ovoo 
4.~QOG 
0,000( 
0.0000 
6.00(0 
O.GGOO 
o.ooor 
LO. 
s 
1 & 5 7r.~,·? 
C·.~:i33 
?,51!~;-3 
'2. l :?21 
o.cccc 
G.CC'C(: 
li, C CG (f 
c.. t-t 1 ~!i 
(' , C· C· ,: 0 
0.0000 
c.c.ooo 
o.cr.·r·o 
C.000C 
C.C·C:G.C 
O.OOC·0 
C.OOC') 
0. ("(;co 
:.:. . ( ("'.:')(: 
'CI,(I(.0(' 
r-, 
1. 4.6()7 
:?.~~0'~4 
(\. 97·:~3 
! • f;-(;5"-
C..OGLC 
o.,.o~~JOC: 
0" :-r. OG 
0' c.~; ·)0 
~.ecce 
o.rcoc 
c.ooo0 
o.r0oc 
G,GOGr 
0,0COC 
o.aocc 
0.0 co 
0.r o~ 
o.r 0c 
o.c ~( 
r.. f 3 -~ 1 
C· , .c. ~~-. l :;) 
(1 • { ( ::;: ~.; 
c. • r. (' r. C 
c.rr::o 
2.':·. ,>j(: q·:j 
(.cr·(~O 
1, C92C 
(j,('('·(.{} 
O.GO':'i) 
(.0000 
( , r_-'1 (' f, G ( • :1 c; r· t) 
('.CCCG 
C .c~:;OO 
c. c c· ,.>J 
(•. (' (';~_-Q 
(' , ,.. C· r· (I 
C. • r· :- -~ •J 
\>J 
'-!) 
1\) 
( 
( 
( 
( 
(' 
( 
i. 
•... 
' 
( 
' •· ... __ . 
! 
\.. 
( ;~tc ·. ~~ ·::·.:;, 
1 8AHRI' 
'KHARTOUM' 
'QMDURM.O.N•· 
1 AM t. ..(BUSHAR IN' 
., EDOUIC: 1M' 
1 KOSTI'' 
'ALHASAHISA' 
1 ALMEDINA' . 
., NORTHERN FUNG 1 
1
.RIJFAA SHUKRIA' 
'KASSALA' . 
1 NEW. ·HALF A' 
'SOUTH GEDARIF' 
'0 81DEIPIA' . 
•.EAST KORDl.JFAN' 
• ME·ss 1 R 1 v A • 
'SOUTH JEBELS•' 
'SOUTH DARUR' 
1 WAU' 
; .:.Locatioil· Quoti(u:~t FOR CAPITAL. 
2 3 
0.492:2 1.7439. 1. 5607 
0. 'l 1 95 O.OOOC· ·6,7321 
C·. 3443 0.671::: 3.1101 
.0. 3361 0. l 025 o.•or:oo 
0.5242 2. 3'24..3 ·o.oooo 
0.0299 o. 58q a o.oooc 
0.]273 2.9109 O.COOC' 
0. 5£157 2. 0.282 o. oo·oo 
o.oooo 3.0990 o.oooo 
2.0968 o.oooo o.oooc 
2oG968 0,0'}00 O.GOOG 
1 .6726 ·0.6,~70 ·0.0000 
o.ooor 3.0990 o. oCioo 
1.4178 o·.o(~no. o.oooo 
2. 0968 o.oooo o.cooci 
2.0968 o.oooo o.oooo 
o.coov 3.0990 o.oooo 
2.091)8 o.oooo (·,0000 
2.0968 o.oooo o.oooo 
4 
I ol 573 
8.·283';: 
4e.2129 
o.oooo 
o.oooo 
o-. OOGCt 
C.OCCiO 
o.oooo 
O,OOOC• 
o'. oooc. 
o.oooo 
o.oocio 
o.oooc· 
6.::) !.4 l 
o .• oooo 
o.oooo 
o.oooo 
o.oooo 
o.oooo 
.... 
L):>. 
5 
0.7987 
0.6921" 
.3.;775 
7.0421 
c.vooc 
o.ocoo 
C.. C'OC·O 
.. 0.91',1?. 
o.oooo 
G.OOO·J 
o.oooo 
(· ~ 0000 
c.oooo 
c-.cooo· 
o.coco 
c.ooco 
o .• coco 
0.0000 
o.ocoo 
" 
6 
0.9]7f> 
3.9C'53 
3.9982 
4,70"76 
·o. o c• co 
o.occo 
v.cooc 
o .• (: 000 
0.0000 
o.oooo 
o.oooo 
o.cc-oo 
o.t:oc•o 
o.oooo 
.o.oooo. 
o.oooo 
o.oooo 
0~0000 
o.oooo 
:• 
7 
(;.5213 
O.U56G 
c-.oooc. 
o.r:.JCO 
v~coco 
30.P..654 
c. .c•cco 
(r. 1 2 ·~g 
c.cono 
c.oooo 
C·.c·oco 
0 .• ocoo 
v.oo~o 
o.r.:OGfJ 
0. e ~; C·O· 
c.ocoo (.).no no 
0.(,.000 
o.tcoo 
• 
\>1 
\..0 
\>1 
~-
,.. .. 
, : ~ .1~;. ~~~ 
1 BAHP.I' 
'KHARTOUM• 
•OMDU1<"1AN• 
1 AMAo/3USHARlN' 
t EDD~-IM' 
I KOSTI-• 
1 AL-HASAH!SA-. 
1 ALMED INA' 
•'NORTHERN Fi.JNG" 
•RUFAA SHUK·RIA' 
1 KASSAL·A•· ·· 
(' .. 1 NEW HALFA'' :/ 
. 
1 SOUTH GEDARIF'-' 
iBlDEIR.'lA'. . .. ('': i~i!h~~~~~-:::··:-,. 
!• SOIJ.TH., bARUR-'. 
1 WAU' · .. , . 
( 
r-. 
~ ..... : 
{,. .. ·,. 
.-· i., 
4·~- ·. :1·.-
'·\·.~-~-
... · .. \~ 
'.\·,.,..· 
(~ ,. 
,, 
( 
\.. 
~- . 
Locati.On t~9tuo'tient·~ FOR· VALUE. ADDED 
. ~. . ""' ."'-: . -~--. . . 
.. . . ~ ' 
,1.· 
·-· .. 
. ;,• 
';. 
1 
0.875.2 
I .0557 
o .• 9:'\68 
·o •. ot.09 
f) ·130 58. 
o. 1022 
0. 1'532 
O.f.o470 
o.oooo 
3. 2833, 
3 •. 2833 
2.1623 
·o • OOC0-
·3···1.-128. 3~283:3. 
3•·2833. 
·o·. ctoo. · 
3.~ 2833' 
3. 2833 . 
' ·~·· -·.~ '~ . •;' 
'i 
:2 
1.0!5C>B 
.0.0000 
0.4825 
0.·0·1 3 7 
·z·. 1 ?.93-
l.o 4::>5·:~ 
2·, 690 I 
·J.7930 
2.8218 
-o. oooo 
o-. oooo 
,'C ~ 963~ · 
'·.2• 8215 
'o-•. oooo.-
.:o. 0000 
· .. '.a .• oo·o.o 
:_''2 .,8 21 8· 
o.oooo 
'().0000 
· .. ·· 
'3 
2~16?1 
:1.0324 
!.0349 
.v.oooo 
.c.oooo 
o.oooo 
. 0 .oooo. 
o.oobo 
o.oooo 
O.iOOOO 
·o.oooo 
0 •. o.o co 
.(•. 000.0 
_:;.;· o .• o o .o·o 
... )j,o·o.po 
-.: ·o·.cooo 
' o. 0000 
.'Co 0000 
o.oooo 
LO. 
,, 5 
(),3407 0.76:?.9 
''·6· 986El 0~51·31· 
1'.89('1· ·1• 8600 
o·.·c,ooo A. 27-92· 
·o·.O(rf]O 0~0(;00 
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